Search: ms-software-genuine.com
7 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 6.7 | KEVEPSS 1.0% | Medium6.7KEVEPSS 1.0%AlienVault OTX GeneralCVE-2026-110936 A DLL side-loading vulnerability (CVE-2026-110936) in Siemens Software Center version 3.5.8.7 is actively exploited by attackers distributing a genuine signed application with malicious DLLs via unofficial channels. The vulnerable software loads attacker-supplied DLLs without validation, enabling code execution. The attack uses ClickFix social engineering to trick users into running commands. Version 4.0.9.8 patches the vulnerability with automatic updates applied on restart. No official Siemens systems or distribution channels were compromised during this campaign. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Between late July and mid-August 2026, multiple organizations were compromised by a sophisticated modular RAT disguised as a legitimate Exodus cryptocurrency wallet. Victims were tricked through fake PDFs or software updates delivered via JavaScript files that downloaded a tampered Windows Installer package. The installer deploys genuine Exodus wallet version 24.33.4 with three modified files that prevent the user interface from displaying while establishing persistent access. The payload includes six modules providing hidden VNC, SOCKS proxy, browser credential theft, file management, remote shell, and script execution capabilities. Communication occurs via Azure Table Storage as a dead drop mechanism, avoiding traditional command and control domains. The RAT maintains persistence through scheduled tasks executing hourly and includes mechanisms to bypass corporate proxy configurations. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Projextor is a malware campaign that leverages Electron-based productivity applications to deliver malicious payloads. The threat disguises itself as legitimate document converters, meal planners, and PDF management tools with working user interfaces. Distribution occurs through impersonating websites that mimic genuine services, using high-ranking search results to lure victims. Applications like Kitchen Canvas, Food Formula, DocConvertWizard, and PDFGrip contain insecure Electron configurations that enable dynamic JavaScript execution and desktop capture capabilities. The infection chain begins with NSIS, Squirrel, or Inno Setup installers that download the main Electron application. Preload scripts abuse privileged Node.js APIs with intentionally disabled security features, allowing arbitrary code execution and screen monitoring. This enables threat actors to capture sensitive information, monitor user activity, and execute remote commands while maintaining the appearance of functional productivity soft... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (79b9ab7431b1a6a1250c089e2ea33f54ad92313f587fbd2aabc020c12be55f69) Package `@dervix/ws` impersonates the popular `ws` WebSocket library — `package.json` copies the legitimate ws project's homepage (`https://github.com/websockets/ws`), repository, and author metadata while publishing under an unrelated scope. `lib/websocket.js` appends ~130KB of heavily obfuscated code after the genuine `socketOnError` function; this payload executes at `require()` time via `index.js`. On import the payload (1) re-spawns the current Node process detached with `stdio:'ignore'` and `windowsHide:true`, gated by an obfuscated marker env var so the parent returns cleanly while a daemonized child continues; (2) constructs an AES-256 key by XOR-combining four hardcoded hex Buffers; (3) issues an HTTPS GET (following 3xx redirects) to an encrypted-in-source URL, streams the response to a file under `os.tmpdir()`, and decrypts it via `createDecipheriv`; (4) `fs.chmodSync(path, 0o755)` and `child_process.spawn(path,...)` with `detached:true` then `unref()`s it. Dynamic `import('child_process')` / `import('path')` is used to defeat static `require` audits, and an `inspector.url()` check short-circuits execution when a debugger is attached. There is no signature verification, no version pinning, and the destination URL is RC4-decoded at runtime so it cannot be inspected statically. Combined with the cloned ws metadata, this is a deliberate typosquat dropper that lands and executes attacker-controlled binary code on any machine that installs and imports the package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (b0c3046401ca7c230339c585db9d1e925c670b5739209048b6d29f88b14ddc01) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d89ef9716015743217a9492f4b4469459da701a1b6198851f1527033f1e5c9ae) On require(), index.js invokes _initMsgCache() at module top level. The function derives an AES-256-CBC key, IV, and ciphertext from a hardcoded 161-byte array (index.js:62) processed through an LCG-derived sbox, decrypts a URL, performs an https.get to that URL, parses the JSON response, and executes the response's `cookie` field via `new Function('require', mod)(require)` (index.js:155). This is a fully attacker-controlled remote code execution payload that runs on every consumer's machine the moment the package is imported, with full `require` access in the Node process. The package additionally impersonates the legitimate chai utility `check-error` — it copies chai's author metadata, description, the chaijs/check-error repository URL, and the original API surface (compatibleInstance, compatibleConstructor, compatibleMessage, getMessage, getConstructorName), with the dropper grafted onto the genuine sources. Unused runtime dependencies (axios, form-data, socket.io-client) are declared as further cover. The URL obfuscation (byte array + sbox XOR + per-index subtraction + bit rotation + AES-256-CBC) exists solely to hide the C2 endpoint from scanners — legitimate packages do not encrypt their network destinations. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6a94fb4ad979c29d1d9bccd7289e92e821fb11a15d3e072d1f62162d321cdae1) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research Discover how continuous control validation in Tenable One can improve your CTEM program by filtering out alert noise and factoring in your active cyber defenses. Focus your team on accessible and exploitable attack paths. Key takeaways: With vulnerability exploitation ranking as the top initial access vector and frontier AI accelerating vulnerability discovery, organizations must shift from managing theoretical cyber risks to validating actual, accessible exposure. Tenable One maps active security controls including EDR, MFA, and firewalls directly onto potential attack paths, allowing teams to automatically deprioritize weaknesses that existing defenses already neutralize. Ingesting penetration testing results via the Tenable One Open Connector allows organizations to layer real-world attack simulations over real-time exposure insights to identify toxic risk combinations that threaten critical assets. Your security tools probably indicate you have thousands, perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands, of vulnerabilities across your environment. Maybe your tools prioritize these vulnerabilities based on CVSS scores or other criteria, but how do you know which vulnerabilities combine with other preventable security risks, like misconfigured cloud buckets and identity weaknesses, to create attack paths threat actors could realistically traverse? How do you validate which vulnerabilities an existing security control mitigates? You need this context to distinguish the real risks from the theoretical ones to ensure your team focuses on remediating what matters most. The work of validating, prioritizing, and remediating vulnerabilities alongside other security weaknesses to understand the true exposure they create has become much more urgent, as frontier AI models accelerate vulnerability discovery. In this environment, the traditional patch-based defense model will get crushed. Moreover, defenders cannot afford inaccurate decision-making and wasted remediation work that addresses low-priority vulnerabilities. They desperately need the context and validation that a continuous threat exposure management (CTEM) program provides. This is why security leaders are evolving their vulnerability management programs to exposure management programs. Exposure management allows you to continually assess your attack surface, prioritize risks , and orchestrate automated remediation of security weaknesses at machine speed. Exposure management also helps validate which exposures attackers can actually reach by understanding the accessibility and exploitability of an attack path. It uses validation to shift your organization from managing theoretical risks to executing on actual exposure. What is exposure validation in CTEM? Validation is one of the five steps in the CTEM lifecycle. It is the process of providing consistent, continuous, and automated evidence of an attack’s feasibility. It stress-tests your defenses against real-world attack conditions, using your own environment’s controls and configurations to confirm whether an exposure is genuinely reachable and exploitable. Validation moves security from a reactive “patch everything” mindset to a preemptive, evidence-based exposure strategy . It continuously confirms which weaknesses your existing defenses have already blocked and surfaces the ones that demand immediate attention. Expanded CTEM validation capabilities in Tenable One Validation isn’t new to Tenable: we’ve been using validation techniques in Tenable solutions for more than 25 years. Tenable developed nearly 3,000 direct check plugins to actively probe a vulnerability and prove its exploitability in situations where software version detection isn’t sufficient for our high-accuracy standards. These plugins actually mimic attack techniques and monitor the target’s response to confirm the presence of the vulnerability. What is new in Tenable One is the addition of continuous control validation in the platform. By factoring in your active security controls, Tenable One helps eliminate the noise of theoretically exposed assets that are functionally blocked from exploitation. Security teams can visually map their active prevention and detection controls directly onto potential attack paths, automatically prioritizing weaknesses that existing controls already neutralize. Analysts can also filter top attack paths based on the presence of security controls and whether you can prevent attack chains for faster triage and investigation. Common control validation examples include: Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools that block Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) memory dump tools used to harvest credentials. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) methods that prevent unauthorized access via password guessing , password spraying , or credential stuffing . Firewall and data loss prevention (DLP) tools that prevent data exfiltration by detecting data staging and enforcing egress rules. See how continuous control validation works in Tenable One. Proactively manage risk prioritization with continuous security control validation. Eliminate noise from theoretical risks that are functionally blocked by existing defenses by integrating compensating security controls into the exposure prioritization process. Access a unified dashboard where assets, vulnerabilities, and exposure risks are consolidated. Filter attack paths to identify which are protected by compensating controls. View types of compensating controls deployed in the environment. Examine attack paths that could be protected with endpoint protection tools. Review security controls associated with specific attack paths, including SIEM and EDR controls. Inspect individual nodes within attack paths to determine which security controls are protecting them. Identify assets monitored by SIEM tools such as Splunk. Verify endpoint protection coverage on assets, including Microsoft Defender installations. Filter attack techniques to focus on specific threats like LSASS Memory techniques, which extract credentials from compromised systems and can be mitigated by endpoint protection tools. Identify attack paths and assets lacking appropriate EDR coverage. Prioritize remediation by examining high-priority attack paths where compensating controls are absent. Collaborate with security control owners to confirm coverage and address gaps in protection for critical assets. Integrate penetration testing data into Tenable One Beyond direct check plugins and continuous control validation, security teams can also integrate penetration testing results into Tenable One that simulate real-world attacks against your cyber defenses. This is another way to validate which exposures are truly exploitable and contextualizes them against your broader attack surface. The Tenable One Open Connector makes it easy to ingest the latest pentest results and layer them with real-time exposure insights to turn your findings into active, continuous defenses. Integrating pentest data into an exposure management program adds critical context to help you understand toxic risk combinations and enrich your understanding of high-severity weaknesses that threaten your most critical business assets. Context is essential in exposure management In the AI era, your security team can’t waste precious time on the wrong issues. With exposure management, context is essential to pinpoint the most critical risks to your organization. Security control validation, coupled with asset criticality, threat activity, entitlement privileges, and attack pathways, give your security team the advantage it needs to stay ahead of threat actors. Learn more about Tenable One , the exposure management platform for the modern attack surface. | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A phishing campaign has been identified that exploits Vercel, a legitimate frontend hosting platform, to distribute a malicious version of LogMeIn. Cybercriminals send phishing emails with links to a malicious page on Vercel, impersonating an Adobe PDF viewer and prompting users to download a disguised executable. Once executed, the malware installs and connects to a LogMeIn server, allowing remote access and control of the compromised machine. Over 28 distinct campaigns targeting more than 1,271 users have been observed in the past two months. The technique's effectiveness stems from the use of a legitimate platform, a genuine remote access tool, and social engineering tactics. Recommendations include monitoring suspicious Vercel subdomains, educating employees about fake support scams, and implementing strict controls for remote access software installations. | AlienVault OTX General |
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