Casbaneiro is a banking Trojan active as of August 2026, targeting Latin American users through phishing emails and malicious PDFs disguised as invoices and legal notices. It uses a multi-stage infection chain with HTA downloaders and AutoIt loaders, employing geofencing to restrict infections to specific regions. The malware evades detection by distributing stolen data across multiple servers, deliberately responding with HTTP 403 to some requests, and activating only when victims visit targeted banking websites. It steals email data, performs clipboard injection, and creates fake windows to facilitate fraud. The campaign targets Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, while avoiding systems using German, French, or English languages.
An investigation beginning with a single RedLine Stealer C2 server from VMRay UniqueSignal evolved into uncovering a targeted Business Email Compromise campaign against South Korean maritime infrastructure. The analysis started with IP 194.156.79.122 on port 55615, leveraging fingerprinting techniques through FOFA and VirusTotal to identify additional C2 infrastructure. Pivoting through communicating files revealed spear-phishing emails targeting Kangrim Heavy Industries, a major South Korean marine boiler manufacturer. The campaign delivered Formbook malware through impersonated maritime supply chain companies. Further infrastructure analysis identified seven fraudulent domains hosted on TheHost LLC infrastructure, utilizing similar naming patterns and TLS certificates. The attack demonstrates sophisticated BEC tactics combining malware delivery with social engineering, mimicking legitimate business correspondence within the maritime shipping sector.
In May 2026, an attack campaign targeting banking users in Spain and Portugal was identified involving the Ousaban banking Trojan. The malware, previously active in Brazil, spreads through phishing PDFs that redirect victims to malicious webpages performing environment checks to ensure targets are located in Spain or Portugal. The attack chain involves VBS scripts downloading steganographic images containing the payload, which is then dropped and executed on victims' systems. Ousaban establishes persistence, monitors banking activity across multiple financial institutions, and uses daily-changing DDNS domains to resolve C2 server addresses. The malware employs screenshot capture, keylogging, clipboard injection, and remote control capabilities to steal banking credentials. It utilizes custom encryption algorithms and geofencing techniques to evade detection and limit exposure to intended targets.
An MDR investigation successfully mapped the complete operational infrastructure of Banana RAT, a Brazilian banking trojan operated by threat cluster SHADOW-WATER-063. The investigation uncovered both server-side and client-side components, revealing a sophisticated FastAPI-based polymorphic payload generation system that produces hash-unique builds to evade detection. The malware employs layered obfuscation, AES-wrapped payloads, and fileless PowerShell execution. Once deployed, it enables operator-driven fraud through remote input control, keylogging, screen streaming, bank-branded overlays, and Pix QR code interception specifically targeting Brazilian financial institutions. The tooling exclusively targets 16 Brazilian banks and crypto exchanges, with all operator artifacts written in Brazilian Portuguese, indicating a financially motivated actor operating within the Tetrade banking trojan ecosystem.
BlueVoyant researchers have uncovered a broad, multi-pronged phishing campaign targeting Spanish-speaking users in organizations across Latin America and now Europe as well. While recent industry intelligence heavily documented attacks utilizing WhatsApp to deliver banking trojans under the umbrella of the Brazil-based eCrime group Augmented Marauder (a.k.a. Water Saci)
This report details the discovery and analysis of a Horabot malware campaign targeting primarily Mexican users. The attack chain begins with a fake CAPTCHA page leading to multiple stages of obfuscated scripts, ultimately delivering an AutoIT loader and a Delphi-based banking Trojan. The malware employs sophisticated encryption techniques, anti-VM checks, and a custom protocol for C2 communication. It also includes a spreader component written in PowerShell that harvests and exfiltrates email addresses to distribute phishing emails. The analysis reveals Brazilian Portuguese comments in the code, suggesting the threat actor's origin. The report provides detection opportunities including YARA rules and hunting queries to identify this threat.
The Water Saci campaign is a sophisticated malware operation primarily targeting Brazilian banking and cryptocurrency platforms via WhatsApp. It employs multi-format malware delivery using various scripting languages, including a shift from PowerShell to Python, likely enhanced by AI tools to evade detection and complicate analysis. The malware features aggressive anti-sandbox techniques, extensive backdoor capabilities, and persistence mechanisms. Although currently focused on Brazil, the use of WhatsApp as a propagation vector and targeting financial applications poses a potential risk to European organizations with ties to Brazilian markets or users. The campaign’s complexity and AI-enhanced development pipeline indicate a medium severity threat with significant evasion and persistence capabilities. Defenders should prioritize monitoring WhatsApp-based phishing attempts, scrutinize multi-format file attachments, and implement advanced behavioral detection to mitigate risks. Countries with strong economic or diaspora links to Brazil and high WhatsApp usage are more likely to be affected.
