A phishing campaign targeting Chile continues to evolve with significant infrastructure expansion. Security researchers identified 99 new domains impersonating the legitimate PasasteSinTAG portal, with 22 domains confirmed active and 77 registered but not yet activated. The active domains utilize various top-level domains including .click, .cfd, .cyou, .mom, .best, .rest, .top, .help, .sbs, .icu, .life, .xyz, .buzz, .casa, and .pics. The infrastructure is hosted across seven IP addresses. This campaign represents an ongoing threat to Chilean users through brand impersonation tactics, with threat actors maintaining a large reserve of dormant domains for future rotation.
LockBit 5.0, the latest version of the notorious ransomware, has been released with support for Windows, Linux, and ESXi systems. This update brings improved defense evasion, faster encryption, and enhanced modularity. The Windows variant employs extensive anti-analysis techniques, while Linux and ESXi versions remain unpacked. All variants share a common encryption scheme using XChaCha20 and Curve25519. LockBit 5.0 demonstrates a focus on enterprise and infrastructure targets, including explicit support for Proxmox virtualization. The group's data leak site reveals a primary focus on the U.S.business sector, with victims spanning various industries. LockBit's infrastructure has shown connections to SmokeLoader, suggesting possible cooperation or infrastructure reuse among malware operators.
An analysis of Chinese hosting environments identified over 18,000 active malware command-and-control (C2) servers distributed across 48 infrastructure providers, with China Unicom hosting nearly half. The majority of malicious activity is C2 infrastructure (84%), followed by phishing (13%). Key malware families such as Mozi, ARL, and Cobalt Strike dominate C2 activity, supporting both cybercrime and state-linked operations. High-trust networks like China169 Backbone and CERNET are exploited, revealing persistent abuse patterns and infrastructure reuse across campaigns.
This analysis explores the corporate structure and operations of Intellexa, a mercenary spyware vendor. It reveals new companies likely tied to Intellexa's network, particularly within a Czech cluster, and examines their roles in product shipment and potential infection vectors. The report traces Intellexa's activities across multiple countries, including new evidence of Predator spyware deployment in Iraq. It highlights the challenges in tracking such operations due to complex corporate structures and evolving techniques. The analysis also discusses broader trends in the spyware ecosystem, including geopolitical fragmentation, persistent facilitators, and expanding targeting beyond traditional victims to include corporate leaders.
On February 24, 2022, a cyberattack exploited a VPN vulnerability in Viasat's KA-SAT satellite network, deploying AcidRain wiper malware. This attack disrupted satellite communications for thousands of users in Ukraine and disabled 5,800 wind turbines in Germany. The malware shares similarities with the VPNFilter malware family and targeted management systems to cause widespread operational disruption. Although impactful, the attack was less severe than other infrastructure attacks on Ukraine during the same period. The incident underscores the vulnerabilities in satellite network security and the critical need for robust defenses against sophisticated cyber threats targeting critical infrastructure. No known exploits are currently active in the wild, and the attack required access through a VPN vulnerability. European organizations relying on satellite communications and renewable energy infrastructure are particularly at risk. Mitigation requires patching VPN vulnerabilities, enhancing network segmentation, and monitoring for indicators of compromise related to AcidRain. Germany is notably affected due to the impact on its wind turbines, and other European countries with similar infrastructure and satellite dependencies should remain vigilant.
The German hosting provider aurologic GmbH has become a critical infrastructure hub for multiple high-risk and sanctioned cybercrime networks, including entities involved in disinformation and malware campaigns. Despite public scrutiny and sanctions, aurologic continues to provide upstream transit services, enabling threat actors to maintain operational stability. The provider's approach to abuse handling is reactive and legally compliant rather than proactive, allowing malicious infrastructure to persist. This situation highlights challenges in accountability within the hosting ecosystem and the risks posed by infrastructure neutrality when it enables cybercrime. Numerous suspicious domains linked to aurologic-hosted networks have been identified, associated with malware families and threat actor tools. European organizations, especially in Germany, face increased risks due to this infrastructure's stability and continued operation. Mitigation requires enhanced monitoring of traffic from these domains, collaboration with upstream providers, and pressure on hosting providers to adopt proactive abuse prevention. Countries with significant internet infrastructure and cybercrime targets in Europe are most likely to be affected.
The PolarEdge threat actor operates a sophisticated botnet infrastructure leveraging a newly discovered RPX_Client component and over 140 VPS nodes as RPX Servers. This infrastructure uses a multi-hop relay design involving more than 25,000 compromised IoT devices to conceal attack origins and enable proxy services and remote command execution. The botnet exploits CVE-2023-20118 to compromise IoT devices, facilitating anonymized and encrypted communications via SOCKS5 and Trojan protocols. Despite no known active exploits in the wild, the infrastructure poses a medium severity risk due to its potential for stealthy persistence, evasion, and large-scale disruptive attacks such as DDoS. The use of suspicious certificates and reverse-connect proxies complicates detection and mitigation efforts. The threat primarily impacts IoT ecosystems globally, with a focus on European organizations.
This analysis examines the Bookworm malware family and its connection to the Chinese APT group Stately Taurus. Using a structured attribution framework, the study evaluates tactics, tooling, operational security, infrastructure, victimology and timelines to establish a high-confidence link between Bookworm and Stately Taurus. Key evidence includes shared program database paths, overlapping command and control infrastructure, and consistent targeting of Southeast Asian governments. The framework assigns scores to each piece of evidence, resulting in an overall attribution confidence score of 58.4 out of 100, indicating strong confidence in the connection. This systematic approach aims to improve analytical rigor and collaboration in threat intelligence.
The SystemBC botnet, composed of over 80 C2s and 1,500 daily victims, primarily targets VPS systems from commercial providers. It creates proxies enabling high volumes of malicious traffic for various criminal threat groups. The network is used by multiple proxy services, including REM Proxy, which offers tiered packages for different cybercriminal needs. SystemBC's infrastructure allows for massive data transfers, with some bots generating over 16 GB of proxy data in 24 hours. The botnet is used for various malicious activities, including brute-forcing WordPress credentials, web-scraping, and supporting ransomware operations. The report highlights the evolving nature of proxy services in the cybercriminal ecosystem and their role in facilitating large-scale attacks.
This analysis reveals connections between three seemingly distinct malicious programs: AppSuite, OneStart, and ManualFinder. The investigation uncovers shared server infrastructure and similar installation patterns, indicating that these programs are likely created by the same threat actor. OneStart, initially a browser based on Chromium, evolved from earlier versions that used node.exe to run malicious JavaScript. The actors behind these programs have been active for years, distributing malware disguised as various utilities such as games, recipe finders, and manual finders. The report highlights the adaptability of these threat actors, who easily morph their software to take new forms and evade detection.
A threat group dubbed NoisyBear has been targeting Kazakhstan's oil and gas sector since April 2025, particularly focusing on KazMunaiGas employees. The campaign uses spear-phishing emails with malicious ZIP attachments containing LNK files. These files download batch scripts, which in turn retrieve PowerShell loaders dubbed DOWNSHELL. The infection chain progresses through multiple stages, ultimately leading to the deployment of a malicious DLL implant. The threat actor employs various techniques to evade detection, including AMSI bypass and reflective DLL injection. The infrastructure used by NoisyBear is hosted on sanctioned web services, and the group is suspected to be of Russian origin based on language artifacts and targeting patterns.
This report details the analysis of RapperBot, a sophisticated botnet targeting IoT devices, particularly Network Video Recorders (NVRs). The malware exploits vulnerabilities in these devices to create a large-scale DDoS infrastructure. The analysis covers the botnet's infection process, command and control mechanisms, and its evolution over time. Key features include the use of NFS for malware distribution, encrypted DNS TXT records for C2 communication, and a wide range of supported device architectures. The report also discusses recent law enforcement actions against the botnet and provides recommendations for protection against such threats.
This report provides an in-depth analysis of VexTrio's traffic distribution system (TDS) infrastructure. It reveals their use of resilient, fault-tolerant systems spread across multiple hosting providers and data centers. Key components include DevOps tools like Terraform and Kubernetes, tracking software such as Binom, and cloaking capabilities. The analysis exposes VexTrio's reliance on content delivery networks (CDNs) as potential vulnerabilities. Their CDN domains rank among the top 10,000 most popular websites globally, highlighting the massive scale of their operations. The research aims to shed light on the inner workings of malicious adtech networks to spur further investigation into the industry.
APT36, a Pakistan-linked threat group, has expanded its operations to target Indian government and civilian infrastructure, including railways, oil & gas, and the Ministry of External Affairs. The group employs sophisticated phishing techniques and novel payload strategies, using .desktop files disguised as PDF documents to execute malicious scripts. Two attack variants were identified, utilizing single and redundant command and control server setups. The Poseidon backdoor, built on the Mythic framework, is deployed for persistent access and lateral movement. Over 100 phishing domains impersonating Indian government organizations were discovered, primarily hosted by AlexHost. The campaign, active since early July 2025, poses a significant threat to Indian public sector and critical infrastructure.
Lumma Stealer, an information-stealing malware, has resurfaced shortly after its takedown in May 2025. The cybercriminals behind it are now employing more covert tactics and expanding their reach. The malware is being distributed through discreet channels and uses stealthier evasion techniques. Lumma Stealer can steal sensitive data such as credentials and private files, and is marketed as a malware-as-a-service. Users are lured to download it through fake cracked software, deceptive websites, and social media posts. The malware's infrastructure has been diversified, with a shift towards using Russian-based cloud services. Recent campaigns include fake crack downloads, ClickFix campaigns using fake CAPTCHA pages, GitHub repository abuse, and social media promotions.
Insikt Group uncovered new infrastructure linked to GrayAlpha, a threat actor associated with FIN7. They identified a custom PowerShell loader named PowerNet that deploys NetSupport RAT, and another loader called MaskBat. Three main infection vectors were discovered: fake browser updates, fake 7-Zip download sites, and the TAG-124 traffic distribution system. While all three methods were used simultaneously, only the fake 7-Zip sites remained active at the time of writing. The analysis also led to the identification of a potential individual involved in GrayAlpha operations. The group's sophisticated tactics highlight the need for comprehensive security measures, including application allow-listing, employee training, and advanced detection techniques.