Threats Tagged 'xmrig'

Aeternum is a C++ botnet loader utilizing the Polygon blockchain for command-and-control infrastructure instead of traditional centralized servers. Threat actors write encrypted and plaintext instructions directly to smart contracts, which infected devices query via public RPC endpoints. The malware implements weak PBKDF2HMAC/AES-GCM encryption with self-salting passwords, allowing payload decryption using only the smart contract address. Analysis reveals three related samples: the core Aeternum loader with Telegram-based exfiltration, a blended threat combining XWorm RAT with XMRig cryptocurrency miner, and Python source code revealing anti-analysis checks and cryptocurrency wallet targeting. The botnet demonstrates resilience through decentralized infrastructure, making traditional law enforcement takedowns significantly more challenging while maintaining low operational costs for attackers.

In May 2026, a sophisticated Monero cryptomining campaign was identified targeting Linux environments. Attackers gained initial access through trusted third-party relationships, then escalated to root privileges. Rather than operating openly as root, they weaponized Linux Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) to impersonate multiple low-privileged users, creating a forensic smokescreen and establishing redundant persistence through cronjobs. The operators suppressed system logging and deployed a customized XMRig 6.25.0 implant that self-unlinks after execution, running entirely in memory. The binary uses XOR encryption for configuration obfuscation and employs process masquerading to blend with legitimate processes. Campaign tracking revealed operations linked to the V25 Generation 26 family, connecting to the domain unable.download for mining pool communication.

Threat actors gaining initial access through SQL injection exploited a web application vulnerability in a technology sector organization. After compromising an MSSQL instance via inadequate input validation, the attackers deployed base64-encoded PowerShell scripts to conduct reconnaissance using tasklist commands and exfiltrated results to an external server. They established persistence by enabling Remote Desktop Services, creating an administratively privileged user account named adminweb2$, and disabling Windows Defender. The attackers installed BadIIS modules for SEO fraud, deployed XMRig cryptocurrency miner with hidden file attributes, and utilized service creation tools. Multiple PowerShell scripts and batch files were downloaded throughout the attack to facilitate various malicious operations and maintain access.