CVE-2025-34095 is a critical OS command injection vulnerability affecting Real Time Logic's Mako Server versions 2.5 and 2.6. The vulnerability resides specifically in the tutorial interface, notably the examples/save.lsp endpoint. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this flaw by sending a crafted HTTP PUT request containing arbitrary Lua code executed via the os.execute() function. This malicious code is then persisted on disk by the server. Subsequently, when a GET request is made to examples/manage.lsp, the stored Lua code is triggered, resulting in remote code execution (RCE) on the underlying operating system. This vulnerability affects both Windows and Unix-based deployments, making it platform-agnostic. The CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.3 reflects the critical nature of this vulnerability, highlighting its ease of exploitation (no authentication or user interaction required), high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and the ability to execute arbitrary commands remotely. The root cause is improper neutralization of special elements used in OS commands (CWE-78), indicating insufficient input validation and sanitization of user-supplied data before passing it to the OS command execution context. No patches are currently linked, and no known exploits have been reported in the wild yet, but the vulnerability's characteristics make it a prime target for attackers seeking to compromise systems running vulnerable Mako Server versions. Given that the vulnerable endpoint is part of a tutorial interface, it may be overlooked in production environments, increasing the risk of exposure if not properly disabled or secured.

For European organizations, the impact of this vulnerability can be severe. Successful exploitation allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands on affected servers, potentially leading to full system compromise. This can result in data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information, disruption of services, and lateral movement within corporate networks. Organizations using Mako Server in critical infrastructure, industrial control systems, or web-facing applications are particularly at risk. The ability to execute commands without authentication means attackers can exploit this vulnerability remotely and anonymously, increasing the likelihood of automated scanning and exploitation attempts. Additionally, the persistence mechanism (storing malicious Lua code on disk) can facilitate stealthy backdoors and long-term access. The cross-platform nature of the vulnerability means that both Windows and Linux-based deployments common in European enterprises are vulnerable. This threat could also impact supply chains if vendors or partners use vulnerable Mako Server instances. Given Europe's strict data protection regulations such as GDPR, any data compromise resulting from this vulnerability could lead to significant legal and financial penalties.

1. Immediate mitigation should include disabling or restricting access to the tutorial interface endpoints (examples/save.lsp and examples/manage.lsp) in production environments to prevent exploitation. 2. Implement strict input validation and sanitization on all user-supplied data, especially those passed to OS command execution functions like os.execute(). 3. Employ web application firewalls (WAFs) with custom rules to detect and block suspicious PUT requests targeting the vulnerable endpoints. 4. Monitor server logs for unusual PUT and GET requests to these endpoints and for any unexpected Lua code execution. 5. Network segmentation should be used to isolate Mako Server instances from critical internal systems to limit lateral movement. 6. Since no official patches are currently linked, organizations should contact Real Time Logic for updates or consider upgrading to versions beyond 2.6 if they address this issue. 7. Conduct thorough security assessments and penetration testing focusing on Lua scripting interfaces and command execution paths. 8. Employ runtime application self-protection (RASP) tools that can detect and block command injection attempts in real time. 9. Educate developers and administrators about disabling or securing tutorial/demo interfaces before deployment. 10. Prepare incident response plans to quickly contain and remediate any exploitation attempts.