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Deconstructing a Cyber Deception: An Analysis of the Clickfix HijackLoader Phishing Campaign

Medium
Published: Fri Sep 12 2025 (09/12/2025, 14:56:55 UTC)
Source: AlienVault OTX General

Description

This analysis delves into the HijackLoader malware campaign, which has gained prominence since 2023 for its sophisticated payload delivery and evasion techniques. The campaign initiates with a CAPTCHA-based phishing attack, progressing through multiple stages of obfuscated PowerShell scripts. It employs advanced anti-analysis methods, including anti-VM checks and registry manipulation. The final payload, typically an infostealer like NekoStealer or Lumma, is delivered via a multi-stage process involving packed .NET executables and protected DLLs. The loader's evolution and its role in the broader malware-as-a-service ecosystem underscore the need for organizations to focus on detecting initial access and intermediate stages rather than just final payloads.

AI-Powered Analysis

AILast updated: 09/12/2025, 19:32:45 UTC

Technical Analysis

The Clickfix HijackLoader phishing campaign is a sophisticated malware distribution operation that has been active since 2023. It begins with a CAPTCHA-based phishing attack designed to bypass automated detection and lure victims into executing malicious content. The campaign employs multiple stages of obfuscated PowerShell scripts, which complicate detection and analysis efforts. These scripts incorporate advanced anti-analysis techniques such as anti-virtual machine (anti-VM) checks and registry manipulation to evade sandbox environments and forensic tools. The multi-stage infection chain culminates in the delivery of infostealer malware, primarily variants like NekoStealer or Lumma, which are known for harvesting sensitive information such as credentials, cookies, and system details. The payload delivery involves packed .NET executables and protected DLLs, adding layers of complexity to reverse engineering and detection. This campaign exemplifies the malware-as-a-service model, where loaders like HijackLoader facilitate the distribution of various payloads for different threat actors. The campaign’s sophistication and modularity highlight the importance of detecting early-stage indicators such as phishing attempts and intermediate script execution, rather than focusing solely on the final payload. Indicators of compromise include numerous file hashes, suspicious domains, and an IP address linked to the campaign infrastructure. The campaign leverages multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques, including T1566.002 (phishing), T1497.001 (virtualization/sandbox evasion), T1059.001 (PowerShell), and T1071.001 (application layer protocol), among others, underscoring its complexity and evasive capabilities.

Potential Impact

For European organizations, the Clickfix HijackLoader campaign poses a significant risk to confidentiality and operational security. The infostealer payloads can exfiltrate sensitive corporate data, including user credentials, personal identifiable information (PII), and intellectual property, potentially leading to identity theft, financial fraud, and corporate espionage. The multi-stage and obfuscated nature of the attack complicates detection, increasing the likelihood of prolonged undetected presence within networks. This can result in lateral movement, privilege escalation, and further compromise of critical systems. The campaign’s use of phishing as an initial vector exploits human vulnerabilities, which remain a persistent challenge despite technical controls. Given the campaign’s malware-as-a-service nature, it can rapidly adapt and target various sectors, including finance, healthcare, government, and critical infrastructure, all of which are prominent in Europe. The campaign’s evasion techniques may also hinder incident response and forensic investigations, delaying remediation efforts and increasing potential damage. Additionally, the presence of protected DLLs and packed executables complicates signature-based detection, necessitating more advanced behavioral and heuristic analysis methods.

Mitigation Recommendations

European organizations should implement a layered defense strategy focusing on early detection and prevention of initial access and intermediate stages. Specific recommendations include: 1) Enhance phishing defenses by deploying advanced email filtering solutions that incorporate machine learning to detect CAPTCHA-based and obfuscated phishing attempts; 2) Conduct regular user awareness training emphasizing the risks of phishing and the importance of verifying unexpected CAPTCHA challenges or links; 3) Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of monitoring and analyzing PowerShell script execution, particularly obfuscated or multi-stage scripts; 4) Implement application whitelisting and restrict execution of unauthorized .NET executables and DLLs; 5) Monitor registry changes and unusual system behaviors indicative of anti-VM or anti-analysis techniques; 6) Utilize network traffic analysis tools to detect anomalous outbound connections, especially to known malicious domains and IPs associated with the campaign; 7) Maintain up-to-date threat intelligence feeds and integrate indicators of compromise (IOCs) such as file hashes, domains, and IP addresses into security monitoring systems; 8) Conduct regular incident response drills simulating multi-stage malware infections to improve detection and containment capabilities; 9) Employ sandbox environments with enhanced evasion detection to analyze suspicious files and scripts; 10) Enforce the principle of least privilege to limit the impact of credential theft and lateral movement.

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Technical Details

Author
AlienVault
Tlp
white
References
["https://www.seqrite.com/blog/deconstructing-a-cyber-deception-an-analysis-of-the-clickfix-hijackloader-phishing-campaign/"]
Adversary
null
Pulse Id
68c434b702367baa76c87ab9
Threat Score
null

Indicators of Compromise

Hash

ValueDescriptionCopy
hash86b32049a679b945a803b32e58ba9462
hashcd0c6cb4807f5266df4c34846e5a3250
hashb9df6e383de60d6c91d4953face7ba335af78481
hashd94a15b3585336943154dae4ae5f2b78975b4a74
hash1b272eb601bd48d296995d73f2cdda54ae5f9fa534efc5a6f1dab3e879014b57
hash3552b1fded77d4c0ec440f596de12f33be29c5a0b5463fd157c0d27259e5a2df
hash37fc6016eea22ac5692694835dda5e590dc68412ac3a1523ba2792428053fbf4
hash50258134199482753e9ba3e04d8265d5f64d73a5099f689abcd1c93b5a1b80ee
hash52273e057552d886effa29cd2e78836e906ca167f65dd8a6b6a6c1708ffdfcfd
hash782b07c9af047cdeda6ba036cfc30c5be8edfbbf0d22f2c110fd0eb1a1a8e57d
hash921016a014af73579abc94c891cd5c20c6822f69421f27b24f8e0a044fa10184
hashc03eedf04f19fcce9c9b4e5ad1b0f7b69abc4bce7fb551833f37c81acf2c041e
hashd0068b92aced77b7a54bd8722ad0fd1037a28821d370cf7e67cbf6fd70a608c4
hashe2b3c5fdcba20c93cfa695f0abcabe218ac0fc2d7bc72c4c3af84a52d0218a82

Ip

ValueDescriptionCopy
ip91.212.166.51

Domain

ValueDescriptionCopy
domaincosi.com.ar
domain1h.vuregyy1.ru
domainrs.mezi.bet

Threat ID: 68c4749156cc6d7fb97f0b39

Added to database: 9/12/2025, 7:29:21 PM

Last enriched: 9/12/2025, 7:32:45 PM

Last updated: 9/12/2025, 11:14:01 PM

Views: 4

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