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MacSync Stealer Evolves: From ClickFix to Code-Signed Swift Malware

0
Medium
Published: Tue Dec 23 2025 (12/23/2025, 01:59:52 UTC)
Source: AlienVault OTX General

Description

The MacSync Stealer malware has evolved from requiring user terminal interaction to a more sophisticated, code-signed, and notarized Swift-based malware delivered via disk image. This new variant uses a signed installer with Developer Team ID GNJLS3UYZ4 and includes decoy files to evade detection. It retrieves encoded scripts from remote servers and executes them through a Swift helper executable after performing environment checks such as internet connectivity and execution timing. This evolution enables the malware to bypass macOS security mechanisms that rely on notarization and code signing. The malware is an infostealer targeting macOS systems, leveraging advanced evasion techniques to deliver second-stage payloads. Indicators include multiple file hashes and domains associated with the malware's infrastructure. No known exploits in the wild have been reported yet, but the threat reflects a growing trend of macOS malware sophistication. European organizations using macOS devices should be aware of this threat and implement targeted mitigations to reduce risk.

AI-Powered Analysis

AILast updated: 12/23/2025, 09:37:00 UTC

Technical Analysis

MacSync Stealer is a macOS infostealer malware that has recently evolved from earlier variants relying on drag-to-terminal and ClickFix techniques to a more advanced delivery and execution method. The new variant is distributed as a code-signed and notarized Swift application packaged within a disk image (.dmg), which removes the need for direct terminal interaction by the user, thereby improving stealth and ease of infection. The installer is signed with Developer Team ID GNJLS3UYZ4, lending it legitimacy in the eyes of macOS Gatekeeper and notarization checks. To evade detection, the malware includes decoy files that inflate the installer size and performs environmental checks such as verifying internet connectivity and timing of execution before proceeding. Upon execution, it downloads an encoded script from a remote server and runs it via a Swift-built helper executable, which acts as a dropper for the second-stage payload. The malware employs multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques including code signing evasion (T1553.002), execution via scripting (T1059.004), persistence mechanisms (T1547.001), and credential access (T1555). The use of notarization and code signing represents a strategic shift to bypass macOS security controls that traditionally block unsigned or unnotarized binaries. Indicators of compromise include specific file hashes and domains such as zkcall.net, focusgroovy.com, and gatemaden.space. While no active exploits have been reported, the sophistication and stealth capabilities of this malware make it a significant threat to macOS users, especially in environments where macOS is prevalent.

Potential Impact

For European organizations, the MacSync Stealer poses a medium-level risk primarily to those with macOS endpoints, including enterprises, government agencies, and educational institutions. The malware’s ability to bypass Gatekeeper and notarization checks increases the likelihood of successful infection, potentially leading to theft of sensitive information such as credentials, personal data, and intellectual property. This could result in data breaches, unauthorized access to corporate networks, and subsequent lateral movement or espionage activities. Organizations relying on macOS devices for critical operations may face operational disruptions if the malware deploys additional payloads or persistence mechanisms. The presence of decoy files and sophisticated evasion techniques complicates detection and response efforts, increasing dwell time and potential damage. Given the increasing adoption of macOS in European corporate environments, especially in countries with strong technology sectors, the threat could have widespread implications if left unmitigated.

Mitigation Recommendations

1. Implement strict application whitelisting policies that only allow execution of software from trusted developers and verified sources, beyond just relying on notarization. 2. Employ endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions with macOS support capable of behavioral analysis to detect anomalous script execution and network communications. 3. Monitor network traffic for connections to known malicious domains such as zkcall.net, focusgroovy.com, and gatemaden.space, and block these at the firewall or DNS level. 4. Educate users about the risks of opening disk images from untrusted sources, emphasizing caution even when installers appear signed and notarized. 5. Regularly audit installed developer certificates and revoke trust for suspicious or unknown Developer Team IDs like GNJLS3UYZ4. 6. Use macOS system integrity protection (SIP) and enable full disk encryption to limit malware persistence and data exfiltration. 7. Conduct threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators such as the provided file hashes and unusual helper executable activity. 8. Keep macOS systems and security tools updated to leverage the latest protections against evolving malware techniques. 9. Implement multi-factor authentication to reduce the impact of credential theft. 10. Establish incident response plans tailored to macOS infections to enable rapid containment and remediation.

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Technical Details

Author
AlienVault
Tlp
white
References
["https://www.jamf.com/blog/macsync-stealer-evolution-code-signed-swift-malware-analysis"]
Adversary
MacSync Stealer
Pulse Id
6949f798ff6abcb62cd7546e
Threat Score
null

Indicators of Compromise

Hash

ValueDescriptionCopy
hash06c74829d8eee3c47e17d01c41361d314f12277d899cc9dfa789fe767c03693e
hash2e671bd9673d174de9b4ad8fd03049859e1d2d17ac9bc49ecc5d736505002937
hash4ae745bc0e4631f676b3d0a05d5c74e37bdfc8da3076208b24e73e5bbea9178f
hash7cfe0b119e616ac81ddb1767a5c7f40bec67d91fdd66e53490c0225789537073
hash985683bd660c0c47c6be513a2d1f0a554d52d241714bb17fb18ab0d0f8cc2dc6
hash9990457feac0cd85f450e60c268ddf5789ed4ac81022b0d7c3021d7208ebccd3
hash9d43e059111460c4f81351a062fb7eb7dbfd34988a06d756c7206f330c06cb42
hashbe961ec5b9f4cc501ed5d5b8974b730dabcdf7e279ed4a8c037c67b5b935d51a
hashc4d3e5cdb264eded917cd61b8131c40715c0ee3f4d2c94c84d60fa295ca4ed97
hashecfaa20f25e11878686249c7094706bc3dcd2dc0ace0f2932a39d1bfdac85863

Url

ValueDescriptionCopy
urlhttps://zkcall.net/download

Domain

ValueDescriptionCopy
domainfocusgroovy.com
domaingatemaden.space
domainzkcall.net

Threat ID: 694a5f2d033f6f66d772eb13

Added to database: 12/23/2025, 9:21:49 AM

Last enriched: 12/23/2025, 9:37:00 AM

Last updated: 12/24/2025, 1:54:16 AM

Views: 59

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