To Be (A Robot) or Not to Be: New Malware Attributed to Russia State-Sponsored COLDRIVER
COLDRIVER, a Russian state-sponsored threat group, has rapidly developed and deployed a new suite of malware families—NOROBOT, YESROBOT, and MAYBEROBOT—following exposure of their previous LOSTKEYS malware. The infection chain starts with a COLDCOPY lure disguised as a CAPTCHA, leading to multi-stage payload delivery. NOROBOT acts as a DLL loader for subsequent stages, YESROBOT is a short-lived Python backdoor, and MAYBEROBOT is a more advanced PowerShell backdoor. The malware uses HTTPS for command and control communication, encrypts commands, and employs evasion techniques to avoid detection. The group targets high-value intelligence assets and continuously evolves its tools to maintain stealth and persistence. Indicators include multiple malicious domains, IP addresses, and file hashes. The threat is medium severity but poses significant risks to organizations handling sensitive data, especially in Europe due to geopolitical tensions and targeted espionage activities.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The COLDRIVER threat actor, attributed to Russian state-sponsored operations, has adapted quickly after the public exposure of their LOSTKEYS malware in May 2025 by developing new malware families: NOROBOT, YESROBOT, and MAYBEROBOT. The attack chain begins with a social engineering lure called COLDCOPY, which masquerades as a CAPTCHA challenge to trick victims into initiating the infection. Upon successful execution, NOROBOT, a DLL component, is deployed to retrieve and load subsequent malware stages. YESROBOT, a Python-based backdoor, was used briefly but has since been replaced by MAYBEROBOT, a more flexible and sophisticated PowerShell backdoor. These backdoors facilitate command and control (C2) communication over HTTPS, encrypting commands to evade network detection and analysis. The malware employs multiple evasion techniques such as process injection, obfuscation, and living-off-the-land binaries to avoid endpoint security tools. The continuous evolution of the malware chain indicates a focus on stealth and persistence, targeting high-value intelligence and governmental organizations. Indicators of compromise include a set of IP addresses, numerous malicious domains, and file hashes, which can be used for detection and blocking. The malware leverages various MITRE ATT&CK techniques including scheduled task execution (T1053.005), credential dumping (T1003), encrypted communication (T1573), and PowerShell abuse (T1059.001), highlighting a complex and multi-faceted attack methodology.
Potential Impact
European organizations, particularly those involved in government, defense, critical infrastructure, and intelligence sectors, face significant risks from COLDRIVER’s malware. The malware’s stealthy nature and use of encrypted HTTPS communications make detection challenging, potentially allowing prolonged unauthorized access and espionage. Compromise could lead to exfiltration of sensitive data, disruption of operations, and loss of intellectual property. The use of PowerShell and Python backdoors enables attackers to execute arbitrary commands and maintain persistence, increasing the risk of lateral movement within networks. Given the geopolitical context, European countries with strategic importance or active intelligence cooperation with Western allies may be specifically targeted. The threat also poses risks to private sector organizations that handle sensitive government contracts or critical infrastructure. The medium severity rating reflects the malware’s sophisticated evasion and intelligence-gathering capabilities balanced against the lack of known widespread exploitation at this time.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Implement advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting PowerShell and Python script anomalies, including obfuscated or suspicious command execution. 2. Monitor network traffic for unusual HTTPS connections to known malicious domains and IPs associated with COLDRIVER, employing SSL/TLS inspection where feasible. 3. Deploy strict application whitelisting and restrict execution of unauthorized DLLs and scripts, especially those launched from user directories or temporary folders. 4. Conduct regular threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators of compromise such as the provided hashes, domains, and IP addresses. 5. Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) and least privilege principles to limit attacker lateral movement and privilege escalation. 6. Educate users to recognize social engineering lures like fake CAPTCHAs and suspicious web forms to reduce initial infection risk. 7. Maintain up-to-date threat intelligence feeds and integrate them into security monitoring tools to rapidly detect emerging variants. 8. Harden PowerShell usage by enabling constrained language mode and logging all script executions for forensic analysis. 9. Regularly audit scheduled tasks and persistence mechanisms to identify unauthorized modifications. 10. Collaborate with national cybersecurity agencies for intelligence sharing and coordinated response efforts.
Affected Countries
Germany, France, United Kingdom, Poland, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Finland
Indicators of Compromise
- ip: 85.239.52.32
- hash: dc29f423fffa172bbd40e4c3615744bf
- hash: f6bdde6ce0fb00b05aafdc8511d1aabb2ec87c29
- hash: 2e74f6bd9bf73131d3213399ed2f669ec5f75392de69edf8ce8196cd70eb6aee
- hash: 3b49904b68aedb6031318438ad2ff7be4bf9fd865339330495b177d5c4be69d1
- hash: 52eb2b3df1e5e2a07ba4562b79eeb67679ac6f7f90190e72d3e6adcf5186401d
- hash: 87138f63974a8ccbbf5840c31165f1a4bf92a954bacccfbf1e7e5525d750aa48
- hash: b60100729de2f468caf686638ad513fe28ce61590d2b0d8db85af9edc5da98f9
- hash: bce2a7165ceead4e3601e311c72743e0059ec2cd734ce7acf5cc9f7d8795ba0f
- hash: c4d0fba5aaafa40aef6836ed1414ae3eadc390e1969fdcb3b73c60fe7fb37897
- hash: d7520e4f1c55ed1dcbdeba5c6e681e1d269d9b5a690636bf18bcdc5b294f3f8a
- hash: e9c8f6a7dba6e84a7226af89e988ae5e4364e2ff2973c72e14277c0f1462109b
- hash: f2da013157c09aec9ceba1d4ac1472ed049833bc878a23bc82fe7eacbad399f4
- domain: applicationformsubmit.me
- domain: blintepeeste.org
- domain: captchanom.top
- domain: documentsec.com
- domain: documentsec.online
- domain: inspectguarantee.org
- domain: ned-granting-opportunities.com
- domain: onstorageline.com
- domain: oxwoocat.org
- domain: preentootmist.org
- domain: southprovesolutions.com
- domain: system-healthadv.com
- domain: viewerdoconline.com
- yara: f88919e3172cdc09135d610c87a87b5d57de9116
- yara: 1258a6234ad82bb11bc5aba39233a9bf1851a20c
To Be (A Robot) or Not to Be: New Malware Attributed to Russia State-Sponsored COLDRIVER
Description
COLDRIVER, a Russian state-sponsored threat group, has rapidly developed and deployed a new suite of malware families—NOROBOT, YESROBOT, and MAYBEROBOT—following exposure of their previous LOSTKEYS malware. The infection chain starts with a COLDCOPY lure disguised as a CAPTCHA, leading to multi-stage payload delivery. NOROBOT acts as a DLL loader for subsequent stages, YESROBOT is a short-lived Python backdoor, and MAYBEROBOT is a more advanced PowerShell backdoor. The malware uses HTTPS for command and control communication, encrypts commands, and employs evasion techniques to avoid detection. The group targets high-value intelligence assets and continuously evolves its tools to maintain stealth and persistence. Indicators include multiple malicious domains, IP addresses, and file hashes. The threat is medium severity but poses significant risks to organizations handling sensitive data, especially in Europe due to geopolitical tensions and targeted espionage activities.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
The COLDRIVER threat actor, attributed to Russian state-sponsored operations, has adapted quickly after the public exposure of their LOSTKEYS malware in May 2025 by developing new malware families: NOROBOT, YESROBOT, and MAYBEROBOT. The attack chain begins with a social engineering lure called COLDCOPY, which masquerades as a CAPTCHA challenge to trick victims into initiating the infection. Upon successful execution, NOROBOT, a DLL component, is deployed to retrieve and load subsequent malware stages. YESROBOT, a Python-based backdoor, was used briefly but has since been replaced by MAYBEROBOT, a more flexible and sophisticated PowerShell backdoor. These backdoors facilitate command and control (C2) communication over HTTPS, encrypting commands to evade network detection and analysis. The malware employs multiple evasion techniques such as process injection, obfuscation, and living-off-the-land binaries to avoid endpoint security tools. The continuous evolution of the malware chain indicates a focus on stealth and persistence, targeting high-value intelligence and governmental organizations. Indicators of compromise include a set of IP addresses, numerous malicious domains, and file hashes, which can be used for detection and blocking. The malware leverages various MITRE ATT&CK techniques including scheduled task execution (T1053.005), credential dumping (T1003), encrypted communication (T1573), and PowerShell abuse (T1059.001), highlighting a complex and multi-faceted attack methodology.
Potential Impact
European organizations, particularly those involved in government, defense, critical infrastructure, and intelligence sectors, face significant risks from COLDRIVER’s malware. The malware’s stealthy nature and use of encrypted HTTPS communications make detection challenging, potentially allowing prolonged unauthorized access and espionage. Compromise could lead to exfiltration of sensitive data, disruption of operations, and loss of intellectual property. The use of PowerShell and Python backdoors enables attackers to execute arbitrary commands and maintain persistence, increasing the risk of lateral movement within networks. Given the geopolitical context, European countries with strategic importance or active intelligence cooperation with Western allies may be specifically targeted. The threat also poses risks to private sector organizations that handle sensitive government contracts or critical infrastructure. The medium severity rating reflects the malware’s sophisticated evasion and intelligence-gathering capabilities balanced against the lack of known widespread exploitation at this time.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Implement advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting PowerShell and Python script anomalies, including obfuscated or suspicious command execution. 2. Monitor network traffic for unusual HTTPS connections to known malicious domains and IPs associated with COLDRIVER, employing SSL/TLS inspection where feasible. 3. Deploy strict application whitelisting and restrict execution of unauthorized DLLs and scripts, especially those launched from user directories or temporary folders. 4. Conduct regular threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators of compromise such as the provided hashes, domains, and IP addresses. 5. Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) and least privilege principles to limit attacker lateral movement and privilege escalation. 6. Educate users to recognize social engineering lures like fake CAPTCHAs and suspicious web forms to reduce initial infection risk. 7. Maintain up-to-date threat intelligence feeds and integrate them into security monitoring tools to rapidly detect emerging variants. 8. Harden PowerShell usage by enabling constrained language mode and logging all script executions for forensic analysis. 9. Regularly audit scheduled tasks and persistence mechanisms to identify unauthorized modifications. 10. Collaborate with national cybersecurity agencies for intelligence sharing and coordinated response efforts.
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/new-malware-russia-coldriver?linkId=17354485"]
- Adversary
- COLDRIVER
- Pulse Id
- 68f756148d1335a1b45d57c2
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Ip
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
ip85.239.52.32 | — |
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hashdc29f423fffa172bbd40e4c3615744bf | — | |
hashf6bdde6ce0fb00b05aafdc8511d1aabb2ec87c29 | — | |
hash2e74f6bd9bf73131d3213399ed2f669ec5f75392de69edf8ce8196cd70eb6aee | — | |
hash3b49904b68aedb6031318438ad2ff7be4bf9fd865339330495b177d5c4be69d1 | — | |
hash52eb2b3df1e5e2a07ba4562b79eeb67679ac6f7f90190e72d3e6adcf5186401d | — | |
hash87138f63974a8ccbbf5840c31165f1a4bf92a954bacccfbf1e7e5525d750aa48 | — | |
hashb60100729de2f468caf686638ad513fe28ce61590d2b0d8db85af9edc5da98f9 | — | |
hashbce2a7165ceead4e3601e311c72743e0059ec2cd734ce7acf5cc9f7d8795ba0f | — | |
hashc4d0fba5aaafa40aef6836ed1414ae3eadc390e1969fdcb3b73c60fe7fb37897 | — | |
hashd7520e4f1c55ed1dcbdeba5c6e681e1d269d9b5a690636bf18bcdc5b294f3f8a | — | |
hashe9c8f6a7dba6e84a7226af89e988ae5e4364e2ff2973c72e14277c0f1462109b | — | |
hashf2da013157c09aec9ceba1d4ac1472ed049833bc878a23bc82fe7eacbad399f4 | — |
Domain
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
domainapplicationformsubmit.me | — | |
domainblintepeeste.org | — | |
domaincaptchanom.top | — | |
domaindocumentsec.com | — | |
domaindocumentsec.online | — | |
domaininspectguarantee.org | — | |
domainned-granting-opportunities.com | — | |
domainonstorageline.com | — | |
domainoxwoocat.org | — | |
domainpreentootmist.org | — | |
domainsouthprovesolutions.com | — | |
domainsystem-healthadv.com | — | |
domainviewerdoconline.com | — |
Yara
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
yaraf88919e3172cdc09135d610c87a87b5d57de9116 | — | |
yara1258a6234ad82bb11bc5aba39233a9bf1851a20c | — |
Threat ID: 68f758f1159af2a541c15c9e
Added to database: 10/21/2025, 9:57:05 AM
Last enriched: 10/21/2025, 9:59:55 AM
Last updated: 10/22/2025, 3:47:49 AM
Views: 27
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