Threat database

The Kirki WordPress plugin before 6.3.2 does not prevent shortcodes held in comments from being executed when it renders them, and displays comments regardless of their moderation status, allowing unauthenticated visitors to run shortcodes registered on the site and to read private custom fields of the page being viewed.

Missing Authorization vulnerability in WP Media WP Rocket wp-rocket allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WP Rocket: from n/a before 3.23.5.

This entry is a daily update from the SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC) titled 'ISC Stormcast For Friday, October 9th, 2026.' It provides general information about the ISC's activities and resources but does not describe any specific security threat or vulnerability.

Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) on the BeeTienda e-commerce platform, specifically in the latest demo version. The incident occurs due to a lack of proper sanitization of user input data in the 'search' parameter of the product list endpoint. When malicious payloads are transmitted via the 'search' parameter, they are displayed insecurely in the HTML response, allowing for the arbitrary execution of JavaScript code in the victim's browser.

The Redux Framework WordPress plugin up to version 4.5.11 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability. Authenticated users with Subscriber-level access or higher can exploit insufficient capability checks to set arbitrary user roles, including Administrator, during profile updates if a plugin or theme uses certain Redux user profile fields. This vulnerability arises from saving arbitrary meta keys under a registered option without proper restrictions.

Warden Stealer is a Rust-based infostealer malware-as-a-service that has rapidly gained prevalence since August 2026. It targets a wide range of cryptocurrency wallet extensions and applications, and uniquely collects data from AI assistants and agentic coding tools. Distributed via cracked software, game cheats, malvertising, and ClickFix campaigns, it uses advanced obfuscation and bypass techniques to steal sensitive browser data. The malware avoids CIS and Baltic countries and operates on a tiered subscription model.

The user-mode verification handler for the device_deinit() system call, z_vrfy_device_deinit() in kernel/device.c, validated its dev argument with K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT(dev, K_OBJ_ANY). k_object_validate() short-circuits its type comparison when the requested type is K_OBJ_ANY, so the check reduced to "this pointer is the base address of some kernel object the calling thread has been granted" — the object's actual type was never compared, and K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT also skips the initialization-state check. The sibling handlers z_vrfy_device_init() and z_vrfy_device_is_ready() already used K_OBJ_DRIVER_ANY and were unaffected. A thread running in user mode can therefore pass any kernel object it holds permission on — most usefully a thread stack object obtained from the k_thread_stack_alloc() syscall or a statically defined K_THREAD_STACK it was granted in order to spawn a child user thread — whose backing memory is writable from user mode. z_impl_device_deinit() then interprets those attacker-written bytes as a struct device: it dereferences the state pointer read out of the object, calls the function pointer read out of ops.deinit, and on success writes through state again. The result is an indirect call to an arbitrary address executed in supervisor mode, plus an arbitrary kernel read and a single-byte kernel write. Exploitation gives a local unprivileged thread full kernel code execution, defeating the CONFIG_USERSPACE isolation boundary entirely; a less precise attempt yields a supervisor-mode fault and a system crash. The defect is only reachable in builds that enable both CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_DEVICE_DEINIT_SUPPORT — with de-initialization support disabled, z_impl_device_deinit() returns -ENOTSUP without ever dereferencing the pointer. In v4.2.x and v4.3.x, CONFIG_DEVICE_DEINIT_SUPPORT defaulted to y, so every CONFIG_USERSPACE build of those releases is exposed unless the option was explicitly turned off. From v4.4.0 the option is opt-in (no default, and not selected by any in-tree subsystem), so a v4.4.x build is exposed only if it enables the option explicitly. The v4.2 line is no longer maintained and receives no backport. The fix changes the object check to K_OBJ_DRIVER_ANY, which constrains the argument to the build-generated driver object type range (K_OBJ_DRIVER_FIRST..K_OBJ_DRIVER_LAST) — the real struct device instances placed by the linker — so the state and ops.deinit fields are once again kernel-controlled.

dynamic_object_create() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c computed the backing allocation for a dynamically allocated kernel object as obj_size_get(otype) + size, and for thread stack elements as STACK_ELEMENT_DATA_SIZE(size) (a round-up plus fixed overhead), without checking either expression for unsigned wrap-around. A size close to SIZE_MAX makes the computed total wrap to a very small value, so the heap chunk handed out is a few bytes while the object descriptor is still tagged with the full requested type and registered in the kernel object table. The size argument reaches that arithmetic directly from user mode. k_object_alloc_size() is declared __syscall in include/zephyr/sys/kobject.h, its verifier z_vrfy_k_object_alloc_size() in kernel/userspace/userspace_handler.c is a bare pass-through, and z_object_alloc() only range-checks otype — nothing bounds size. The stack-element branch is additionally reachable through the k_thread_stack_alloc() syscall via kernel/dynamic.c. Because subsequent kernel-object validation checks only the object's type and initialization state, the undersized handle passes K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT()/K_SYSCALL_OBJ_NEVER_INIT(), and the matching init syscall (for example k_mutex_init(), k_sem_init(), or k_thread_create()) then writes a complete object over the truncated allocation. An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore trigger a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write into the kernel resource-pool heap, of a size and content it substantially controls, corrupting sys_heap chunk metadata and adjacent kernel objects. Under CONFIG_GEN_PRIV_STACKS the thread-stack branch additionally stores an attacker-influenced wild pointer as a user thread's privileged stack base. The practical result is escape from the CONFIG_USERSPACE sandbox — kernel-level code execution or at minimum kernel memory corruption and system compromise. Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE together with CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS (also selected by CONFIG_DYNAMIC_THREAD under userspace), and a calling thread with an assigned resource pool. The fix rejects both overflowing computations and frees the partially built descriptor.

The ARM64 MMU back-end allocated address space identifiers (ASIDs) for memory domains with a bare round-robin counter in arch_mem_domain_init() (arch/arm64/core/mmu.c). VM_ASID_BITS is 8, so only 255 ASIDs exist; once the counter wrapped, arch_mem_domain_init() could hand an ASID to a new domain while a still-live domain held the same one. Domain-private mappings are installed non-global (MT_NG), so the ASID is the only tag separating one domain's cached translations from another's in the TLB. The context-switch path in z_arm64_swap_ptables() only flushes the TLB when the outgoing and incoming domains carry the same ASID, which does not cover a duplicate reached through a third domain: for domains A and C sharing an ASID and an unrelated domain B, the schedule A -> B -> C never takes the flush branch, so the ASID-tagged entries A populated remain resident while C runs. Under SMP two live domains sharing an ASID can additionally be resident on two CPUs at once, which the architecture does not allow for distinct translation-table sets. Triggering the wrap requires a CONFIG_USERSPACE application on ARM64 that creates more than 255 memory domains over its lifetime; k_mem_domain_init() and k_mem_domain_deinit() are supervisor-only APIs and are not exposed as syscalls, so an unprivileged thread cannot drive the counter directly. Once two live domains alias, however, a user-mode thread in one domain can read and write memory belonging to the other domain's partitions and thread stacks with that domain's permissions, defeating the memory-domain isolation boundary. The fix scans the live domain_list before assigning an ASID, advances the round-robin counter past ASIDs already in use, and returns -ENOMEM when all are taken, so domain creation fails closed instead of silently aliasing.

The ITE IT8xxx2 SHI host-command backend (subsys/mgmt/ec_host_cmd/backends/ec_host_cmd_backend_shi_ite.c) copied the 8-byte host-command request header from the SPI Rx FIFO directly into the shared receive buffer data->in_msg and only afterwards checked the protocol version and the derived packet length. The interrupt handler also accepted a chip-select assertion and an Rx-valid-length (RVLI) interrupt in any driver state other than SHI_STATE_DISABLED, so a new header could be parsed while the host-command thread was still processing the previous request out of the very same buffer. The host processor is the SPI controller and drives both chip select and the clock. After sending a well-formed request it can immediately de-assert chip select — which returns the driver to the ready state and re-enables the FIFO — and start a second transaction carrying a header with data_len = 0xFFFF. Those eight bytes are written into in_msg before the oversized length is rejected, so they land in a buffer whose contents verify_rx() in subsys/mgmt/ec_host_cmd/ec_host_cmd_handler.c has already validated. If this lands in the window before the host-command thread executes args.input_buf_size = rx_header->data_len, the framework hands the registered command handler a 65535-byte input length over a 256-byte buffer. The result is an out-of-bounds read of up to roughly 64 KiB beyond the request buffer: command handlers that copy or echo input_buf_size bytes disclose adjacent embedded-controller memory back to the host or overflow the response buffer, and a read past the end of SRAM faults the controller. The same race also allows cmd_id and cmd_ver to be swapped after checksum verification and after handler lookup. Exploitation requires the ability to drive the inter-processor SHI bus (a compromised host OS or physical access to the SPI lines) and winning a timing race, which the SPI controller can retry indefinitely. The fix parses the header into a local struct ec_host_cmd_request_header and copies it into in_msg only after the length has been bounded by sizeof(data->in_msg), and ignores chip-select and RVLI interrupts outside SHI_STATE_READY_TO_RECV/SHI_STATE_RECEIVING. A residual, bounded race remains: an end-of-transaction interrupt still resets the state to ready while the host-command thread owns the buffer, so a valid second request can still overwrite the in-flight request's contents, unlike the NPCX backend which parks in SHI_STATE_CNL_RESP_NOT_RDY while the buffer is in use.

The LE Audio Broadcast Sink in subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_sink.c copies subgroup metadata from a received Basic Audio Announcement (BASE) into the static Broadcast Audio Scan Service parameter structure mod_src_param without any bounds check. In base_subgroup_meta_cb() the destination element was selected as mod_src_param.subgroups[mod_src_param.num_subgroups] with no test against ARRAY_SIZE(mod_src_param.subgroups) (sized by CONFIG_BT_BAP_BASS_MAX_SUBGROUPS, default 1), and the metadata was copied with memcpy() using the raw on-air length returned by bt_bap_base_get_subgroup_codec_meta() into a metadata array sized by CONFIG_BT_AUDIO_CODEC_CFG_MAX_METADATA_SIZE (default 4). The BASE validator bt_bap_base_get_base_from_ad() only checks structural consistency and permits up to ~24 subgroups and metadata LTVs of ~240 octets. The defect is reached from the periodic advertising receive callback: pa_recv() → bt_data_parse() → pa_decode_base() → update_recv_state_base() → bt_bap_base_foreach_subgroup() → base_subgroup_meta_cb(). Every broadcast sink registers a scan-delegator receive state at creation (bt_bap_broadcast_sink_create() calls broadcast_sink_add_src()), and CONFIG_BT_BAP_BROADCAST_SINK depends on CONFIG_BT_BAP_SCAN_DELEGATOR, so the path is active in every broadcast-sink build once the device is periodic-advertising-synced. An attacker in radio range who operates a broadcast source the device syncs to — or who impersonates the advertiser address and SID of one already in use, periodic advertising data being unauthenticated — can change the BASE at will; each new BASE is re-parsed. A crafted BASE therefore writes attacker-chosen bytes past the end of a fixed static object in .bss: up to roughly 236 bytes for an oversized metadata LTV, plus whole struct bt_bap_bass_subgroup records for each subgroup beyond CONFIG_BT_BAP_BASS_MAX_SUBGROUPS. This is memory corruption of adjacent Bluetooth-audio state reachable with no pairing, bonding or GATT connection, with a potential for remote code execution in the Bluetooth RX thread; in addition, the unvalidated metadata_len is forwarded to bt_bap_scan_delegator_mod_src(), which neither clamps it nor rejects it, leading to a further copy into the receive state and to out-of-bounds memory being disclosed in the BASS receive-state notification sent to a connected Broadcast Assistant. The fix rejects a BASE carrying more subgroups than the receive state can hold (discarding the update entirely) and omits metadata that does not fit rather than copying it, and additionally honours the previously-ignored error return of the subgroup decode pass.

In Progress® Telerik® Report Server prior to version 12.2.26.1007, a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the shared reporting engine allows an authenticated report author to embed javascript: or vbscript: URLs in report navigation actions or HTML text box links. When another user views the malicious report and the embedded navigation is triggered, attacker-controlled script can execute in the web report viewer's origin. In a multi-user Report Server deployment, this can enable privilege escalation by performing actions in a higher-privilege user's authenticated session, including an administrator's session.

In Progress® Telerik® Report Server prior to version 12.2.26.1007, incorrect privilege assignment in the service-agent SignalR hub allows an authenticated user, including a low-privilege or guest account with a valid bearer token, to register as a trusted service agent. On the next server settings-synchronization event, the rogue agent receives storage settings and encryption private keys. This privilege escalation enables disclosure of protected secrets, including stored data-source credentials and connection strings, and allows agent impersonation and interference with task dispatch.

Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an actor to infer data in related records they cannot read via Ash.count/2, Ash.exists/2 and Ash.aggregate/3. Ash.Actions.Aggregate.run/4 (lib/ash/actions/aggregate.ex) applied only the root resource's read policy before running the aggregate query. The read path also applies each related resource's read policy to filter and sort references that cross a relationship, directly (for example comments.body) or through an aggregate over one, but the aggregate path skipped that step. A caller whose filter or sort reaches these functions, for example through Ash.Query.filter_input/2, an ash_lua script, or an AshAi tool offering count or exists results, can test conditions against related rows hidden from them and recover their existence and attribute values one query at a time. Ash.read/2 and its page counts are not affected. This issue affects ash: from 2.6.0 before 3.34.6.

CVE-2026-97076 is a high-severity vulnerability in WP Media's WP Rocket plugin affecting versions before 3.23.5. It involves an executable regular expression error that allows code injection, potentially leading to denial of service. No confirmed exploits are known in the wild. The vulnerability impacts availability but not confidentiality or integrity.

The Ocean Pro Demos and Ocean eComm Treasure Box plugins for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'content' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.5.4, and 1.8.0, respectively, due to insufficient authorization, input sanitization, and output escaping in the Popup Builder's save_popup_content AJAX action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts into a published Gutenberg popup that will execute whenever a user accesses a page on which the popup is configured to display. A valid premium license, the Popup Builder module, and at least one published Gutenberg popup configured for display are required.

At Pwn2Own Ireland 2026, hackers earned over $560,000 by demonstrating exploits against the Google Pixel 10 smartphone. Multiple teams showcased various exploits, including chaining multiple bugs and combining zero-day and known vulnerabilities to remotely compromise the device. The event also featured exploits targeting other devices and AI infrastructure, with a total payout exceeding $1.2 million. Vendors will receive full details of the exploits for remediation. No active exploitation in the wild has been reported.

The FooSales WordPress plugin before 1.43.3 does not verify that an authenticated caller is entitled to act as the user a request names, allowing any authenticated user to have the FooSales WordPress plugin before 1.43.3 act as an arbitrary other user, including an administrator, resulting in that user's account details being exposed and their account being taken over.

The Code Snippets WordPress plugin before 3.10.0 does not sanitise and escape a user-supplied parameter before using it in a SQL query in some of its snippet-migration import endpoints, which are accessible to any user holding site-administration capabilities; on a WordPress Multisite network those belong to subsite Administrators, allowing a subsite Administrator who is not a network Super Admin to perform UNION-based SQL injection against shared network tables and disclose network-wide data such as other users' password hashes.

The Code Snippets WordPress plugin before 3.10.0 does not perform a capability check on one of its snippet-management actions and derives the network scope of the targeted snippet from the request instead of from the stored record, allowing an administrator of a single subsite on a multisite network to activate, deactivate and reprioritise network-scoped snippets that run across every site in the network.