Search: 10.4-5

@walknpm/todo-cli@2.0.1 is a new release of a todo-list CLI and web app whose only change from 2.0.0 is a postinstall script, `sh scripts/miner.sh`, that runs on npm install. The script downloads a gzip carrier from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com to /tmp/.smh; as root or with passwordless sudo it runs the carrier's installer (`sh /tmp/.smi agent`), which installs an XMRig miner plus two helper daemons under random system-component names and persists them as systemd units or @reboot cron entries, and otherwise it extracts the bundled XMRig binary to ~/.local/lib/<random name>/ and mines Monero to networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 over TLS with a hardcoded wallet. The npm account walknpm published the same scripts/miner.sh in dsh-plugin-blender-3d@0.2.1 within 27 seconds of this version on 2026-10-26, and it is byte-identical to the one in @sudobility/testomniac_client (MAL-2026-18129). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f32e42bc70458d6a0973dfbe2d94961cca2ee423198c53bf753a7680c61df96f) The package's `postinstall` hook runs `scripts/miner.sh`, which fetches a gzip-compressed payload from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com (using a hardcoded AWS access key <redacted> in a presigned URL), writes it to `/tmp/.smi`, and executes it via `sh` on every `npm install`. If root or passwordless sudo is available, the script runs `sh /tmp/.smi agent` to install a persistent agent (cron/relay/tor per in-script comments). Otherwise, it extracts an embedded XMRig binary (base64/tar.gz blob after a `__PAYLOAD__` marker), writes a Monero pool configuration to `$HOME/.sysmond.json` pointing at networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 with wallet 49u1mKb1dNoMixgRHt11Ra32D1w4hviUuRDbaJhXFwXUjQP4FiHsSjnDa7XZepDUW1Tx6HhR6gFwWgbuwNxby4UAMiqxieX, copies the miner to `$HOME/.local/lib/<stealth-name>/<stealth-name>` using a system-daemon-like name pool (`edid-mon`, `smmon`, `irqstatsd`,...), and backgrounds it with `nohup`. Installing the package results in unconditional remote code execution on the installer's host, cryptomining compute/electricity theft, and persistence that is non-trivial to detect and remove. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4b1b865efcc7d2ea28c5ad7580b823a36d22c88bc165f9c57a2f42b3accc4d88) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (8c741f8bd0012bceb8789b8e2fc0ac836c5ccb88a348918365af4850f1576be4) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@walknpm/todo-cli' @ 2.0.1 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.

dsh-plugin-blender-3d@0.2.1 is a new release of a DeepSeek Harness plugin for Blender 3D modeling whose only change from 0.2.0 is a postinstall script, `sh scripts/miner.sh`, that runs on npm install. The script downloads a gzip carrier from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com to /tmp/.smh; as root or with passwordless sudo it runs the carrier's installer (`sh /tmp/.smi agent`), which installs an XMRig miner plus two helper daemons under random system-component names and persists them as systemd units or @reboot cron entries, and otherwise it extracts the bundled XMRig binary to ~/.local/lib/<random name>/ and mines Monero to networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 over TLS with a hardcoded wallet. The npm account walknpm published the same scripts/miner.sh in @walknpm/todo-cli@2.0.1 within 27 seconds of this version on 2026-10-26, and it is byte-identical to the one in @sudobility/testomniac_client (MAL-2026-18129). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (08bd399ddec36950a4cb3c82cb8460e95cde40441f464fbff1d215f6a7f13937) dsh-plugin-blender-3d declares a postinstall script (`sh scripts/miner.sh`) that fires automatically on `npm install`. The script downloads a gzip payload from https://amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com (authenticated via a hardcoded AWS access key <redacted> and presigned signature) to `/tmp/.smh`, decompresses it to `/tmp/.smi`, and executes it. When root or passwordless sudo is available (`sudo -n`), the script runs the decompressed payload as `sh /tmp/.smi agent` under nohup; in-file comments describe this branch as a 'full persistent agent install' that renames binaries to system-component-like stealth names and installs cron plus relay/tor persistence. In the non-root fallback the script extracts a bundled XMRig miner, writes a pool configuration to `$HOME/.sysmond.json` targeting networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443, stages the miner under `$HOME/.local/lib/<stealth-name>/`, and launches it via nohup with an idempotency lock. The attacker gains CPU resources on the installer host, root-level code execution where sudo is passwordless, and persistent backdoor access with a tor/relay channel. ## Source: ghsa-malware (de8aa280aeabc3f7fd50e0f22f8b02fd5ae1d61e36e9c3321620853e08e8570a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (ae55a6a112dc0b823afa1c7c0217871c1c19b5d0b77fde2a8ec29d4b26a9549b) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'dsh-plugin-blender-3d' @ 0.2.1 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.

Multiple security issues were addressed in the flannel-0.28.10-1.1 package included in the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed. These fixes resolve vulnerabilities present in earlier versions of the flannel package. No specific details about the nature of the vulnerabilities or their impact are provided.

Multiple security issues were fixed in the azure-storage-azcopy-10.34.1-1.1 package distributed on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed. The vulnerabilities affect the SUSE product but specific details about the flaws or their impact are not provided.

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability (CVE-2026-111497) was discovered in the Google Brotli decoder, a lossless compression algorithm used in various Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 distributions. This vulnerability could potentially lead to memory corruption. Red Hat has released a security update fixing this issue in brotli version 1.0.9-10.el9_8.1.

Multiple vulnerabilities in freeipmi, an IPMI remote console and system management software, allow arbitrary code execution and denial of service via stack-based buffer overflows and malformed Fujitsu System Event Log responses. These issues affect versions prior to 1.6.20-1.el10_2. A security update to version 1.6.20-1.el10_2 addresses these vulnerabilities.

Libreswan, an IPsec and IKE implementation for Linux, has multiple security vulnerabilities including a use-after-free bug in IKEv2 when using IKE-over-TCP (CVE-2026-94453), a denial of service via bogus X.509 certificates (CVE-2026-77205), and a null pointer dereference in PKCS#7 bundles with no certificates (CVE-2026-77207). These issues affect versions prior to 5.3.3-1.el10_2. A security update fixing these vulnerabilities is available.

The httpd packages provide the Apache HTTP Server, a powerful, efficient, and extensible web server. Security Fix(es): * httpd: httpd: HTTP response smuggling via crafted Transfer-Encoding response in mod_proxy_uwsgi (CVE-2026-63718) * httpd: httpd: Denial of Service via integer overflow in mod_dav_fs (CVE-2026-93546) * httpd: httpd: Authentication state corruption via concurrent Digest authentication requests (CVE-2026-73637) * httpd: httpd: unauthorized connection to arbitrary hosts via crafted FTP PASV response (CVE-2026-63045) * httpd: httpd: Arbitrary code execution via oversized Host header in mod_vhost_alias (CVE-2026-63292) * httpd: httpd: mod_heartmonitor: Denial of Service via NULL pointer dereference (CVE-2026-46729) * httpd: httpd: Authentication bypass via credential replay in mod_auth_digest (CVE-2026-73636) * httpd: httpd: Denial of Service via charset conversion failure in mod_xml2enc (CVE-2026-63686) * httpd: httpd: Denial of service via forged Authorization headers in mod_auth_digest (CVE-2026-48005) * httpd: httpd: Denial of Service via mod_rewrite lookahead (CVE-2026-56154) * httpd: httpd: Denial of Service via heap-based buffer overflow in mod_charset_lite (CVE-2026-56153) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

The skopeo command lets you inspect images from container image registries, get images and image layers, and use signatures to create and verify files. Security Fix(es): * podman: Arbitrary file write when importing OCI archive (CVE-2025-11395) * net/[http:](http:) golang: golang: Denial of Service via crafted HTTP Range headers (CVE-2026-78667) * crypto/x509: golang: crypto/x509: Man-in-the-middle attacks via untrusted intermediate certificates (CVE-2026-111943) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Starman versions before 0.4019 for Perl contain a vulnerability that allows remote attackers to exhaust worker memory by sending chunked HTTP request bodies with unbounded chunk sizes. The chunked body decoder buffers each chunk in memory without limiting the length of the chunk-size line, enabling a single connection to cause memory exhaustion.

Starman versions before 0.4019 for Perl incorrectly send response bodies for HEAD requests, causing desynchronization of responses on keep-alive connections. This includes responses with status codes 1xx, 204, or 304, which also carry a body improperly. As a result, clients may misinterpret response data, and front-end proxies reusing upstream connections may associate responses with incorrect requests.

Starman versions before 0.4019 for Perl contain a vulnerability that allows remote attackers to cause CPU exhaustion via quadratic regex backtracking when parsing chunked request bodies. The issue arises because the regex used to match chunk-size lines does not handle certain line endings correctly, leading to excessive backtracking and CPU usage. This can be triggered by sending specially crafted requests to any route.

Starman versions before 0.4019 for Perl have a vulnerability where a stalled request body can indefinitely hold a worker thread, causing denial of service. This occurs because the read_timeout setting only applies to headers, while the body is read with blocking calls without a deadline. An attacker can exploit this by sending complete headers and then stalling or trickling the request body, tying up workers until they disconnect. Version 0.4019 introduces fixes by applying read_timeout to body reads and adding a body_timeout limit of 300 seconds.

@ppa-web-components/ppa-headerfooter is a dependency-confusion package: it is described as a "Compatibility shim", uses inflated version numbers, and its README calls it an "authorized dependency-confusion test". Each listed version (1.0.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.0, 1.0.1, 99.0.1, 3.0.0) has a postinstall script that runs `node beacon.cjs` on npm install, and index.js calls the same code when the package is imported; it POSTs the hostname, install path and current working directory over plain HTTP to `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`, and index.js exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions so builds importing the real package keep running. The npm account wiseke published 14 such packages under the @greenlake, @sxm-web, @drone-js-ext and @ppa-web-components scopes between 2026-10-23 21:23 and 2026-10-25 14:28 UTC; index.js is byte-identical to that of ph-common (MAL-2026-1809), which sends to the same endpoint. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (32234bc8ba0c918d154d680b15a1bcb7ae6f6b7d20365c02095842b84e245dce) The package ships a `beacon.cjs` script wired as both the `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and a require-time side effect from `index.js`. On install and on `require()`, the beacon POSTs installer identifiers — `os.hostname()`, the install path (`__dirname`), `process.cwd()`, `process.version`, and the package name — to the hardcoded bare-IP plaintext HTTP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The package otherwise provides no functionality: `index.js` exports a Proxy that returns a no-op function for every property access, so the beacon is the sole purpose of the package. The combination of a scoped name resembling a web-components namespace, a 'Compatibility shim' description, a functionless Proxy stub, and a bare-IP recon beacon is the shape of a dependency-confusion / typosquat probe measuring where the package resolves inside private build environments, typically preceding a targeted follow-up payload. ## Source: ghsa-malware (2d6203081a7ca70c676e9bd017a2350965128b04bb4abed55ac7f82d6d95915c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@ppa-web-components/ppa-hotel-collection is a dependency-confusion package: it is described as a "Compatibility shim", uses inflated version numbers, and its README calls it an "authorized dependency-confusion test". Each listed version (1.1.0, 1.0.0, 99.0.1, 2.0.1, 3.0.0) has a postinstall script that runs `node beacon.cjs` on npm install, and index.js calls the same code when the package is imported; it POSTs the hostname, install path and current working directory over plain HTTP to `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`, and index.js exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions so builds importing the real package keep running. The npm account wiseke published 14 such packages under the @greenlake, @sxm-web, @drone-js-ext and @ppa-web-components scopes between 2026-10-23 21:23 and 2026-10-25 14:28 UTC; index.js is byte-identical to that of ph-common (MAL-2026-1809), which sends to the same endpoint. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e442008a433c1edbe8fb25f9b47dd3123f5664672c3901167fc9d3add8a6bd6e) @ppa-web-components/ppa-hotel-collection@1.1.0 is a stub package whose only functional code is a callback beacon. The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: "node beacon.cjs", and the same beacon.cjs is also triggered via the main entry on require(). beacon.cjs collects os.hostname(), __dirname, process.cwd(), and process.version/npm version and POSTs them to the hardcoded bare-IP URL http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc over cleartext HTTP. The destination is unrelated to any legitimate publisher infrastructure for the @ppa-web-components scope. The package's only export is a no-op Proxy, and the description self-labels as "Compatibility shim." with internal comments noting that a build which "completes and calls back is cleaner evidence" — consistent with a dependency-confusion probe targeting an internal @ppa-web-components namespace. Installing or requiring the package automatically exfiltrates host and path identifiers to attacker-controlled infrastructure, marking the installer's build system as reachable for follow-on targeting. ## Source: ghsa-malware (5c6c67a20abb37db21d16508f031264290a06f2426dc6cb70f74cc3f5d73d3a1) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@ppa-web-components/ppa-banner is a dependency-confusion package: it is described as a "Compatibility shim", uses inflated version numbers, and its README calls it an "authorized dependency-confusion test". Each listed version (3.0.0, 1.0.1, 2.0.0, 1.1.0, 0.0.1, 2.0.1, 1.0.0) has a postinstall script that runs `node beacon.cjs` on npm install, and index.js calls the same code when the package is imported; it POSTs the hostname, install path and current working directory over plain HTTP to `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`, and index.js exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions so builds importing the real package keep running. The npm account wiseke published 14 such packages under the @greenlake, @sxm-web, @drone-js-ext and @ppa-web-components scopes between 2026-10-23 21:23 and 2026-10-25 14:28 UTC; index.js is byte-identical to that of ph-common (MAL-2026-1809), which sends to the same endpoint. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (bcf0b03540a27943a2afcc26927ce7256d85328bc4fcbc2562f36a88ad75ce8d) @ppa-web-components/ppa-banner@1.0.1 is described as a 'Compatibility shim' but ships only two code paths: a no-op Proxy as its main export, and beacon.cjs. beacon.cjs defines BEACON = "http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc" and a fire() function that POSTs a JSON payload containing the package name, os.hostname(), the install path (__dirname), process.cwd(), and the Node/npm version to that bare-IP, plain-HTTP endpoint. fire() is invoked both from the postinstall lifecycle hook (`node beacon.cjs`) and from the module's main entry, so the beacon fires automatically on `npm install` and again whenever the package is required. The destination is an unrelated bare IP over cleartext HTTP, not any publisher-controlled or registry infrastructure, and the shipped stub has no functional purpose other than the beacon. The scoped-name + stub + install-time recon beacon shape is consistent with a dependency-confusion recon callback used to identify internal build environments that resolved this public name. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f281d26ef42603061058247eaab4a69f3f64186afffce8c9f64b9e0399f76751) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@ppa-web-components/ppa-builder is a dependency-confusion package: it is described as a "Compatibility shim", uses inflated version numbers, and its README calls it an "authorized dependency-confusion test". Each listed version (0.0.1, 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 99.0.1, 2.0.1, 3.0.0) has a postinstall script that runs `node beacon.cjs` on npm install, and index.js calls the same code when the package is imported; it POSTs the hostname, install path and current working directory over plain HTTP to `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`, and index.js exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions so builds importing the real package keep running. The npm account wiseke published 14 such packages under the @greenlake, @sxm-web, @drone-js-ext and @ppa-web-components scopes between 2026-10-23 21:23 and 2026-10-25 14:28 UTC; index.js is byte-identical to that of ph-common (MAL-2026-1809), which sends to the same endpoint. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (cc4615498b50aa4b5f39a8367c44e6a18d4a7272ae71235716a152b2933d5ddd) The package is described as a 'Compatibility shim' and ships a stub Proxy-based main plus beacon.cjs. The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: 'node beacon.cjs', and the main entry also invokes the same fire() routine on require. On both triggers, beacon.cjs collects installer identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them in cleartext to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is not a registry, publisher, or any documented infrastructure; it is a plain-HTTP bare IP with no TLS. An inline source comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence, confirming the artifact's purpose is to signal successful resolution and execution on installer machines. Combined with a scoped name resembling an internal namespace and no real library functionality, this matches the dependency-confusion / namesquat callback-probe shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (25f793f86454c72ad9c76b0ef0948c16f82bc42fb58d8d9f8e68224e52eb92fd) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@ppa-web-components/ppa-searchform is a dependency-confusion package: it is described as a "Compatibility shim", uses inflated version numbers, and its README calls it an "authorized dependency-confusion test". Each listed version (1.0.0, 1.0.1, 2.0.1, 0.0.1, 3.0.0, 1.1.0, 99.0.1, 2.0.0) has a postinstall script that runs `node beacon.cjs` on npm install, and index.js calls the same code when the package is imported; it POSTs the hostname, install path and current working directory over plain HTTP to `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`, and index.js exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions so builds importing the real package keep running. The npm account wiseke published 14 such packages under the @greenlake, @sxm-web, @drone-js-ext and @ppa-web-components scopes between 2026-10-23 21:23 and 2026-10-25 14:28 UTC; index.js is byte-identical to that of ph-common (MAL-2026-1809), which sends to the same endpoint. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c9b929e77e53b5f528d874024d0cf8cfe4a0e34845796964600b0e1511e6a49c) The package ships a `beacon.cjs` that is wired to run both via the `postinstall` lifecycle script and from top-level `index.js` on `require()`. On execution it collects host identifiers (hostname, install path, current working directory, Node.js version) and POSTs them to a hardcoded bare-IPv4 endpoint over plaintext HTTP at http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is not a publisher-owned domain. The package's `index.js` exports a `Proxy` that returns no-op functions for every property access, so the module provides no real functionality — its only effect on install or import is the beacon callback. The combination of a non-functional shim under an organisation-shaped scope with a reconnaissance beacon fired at install and import time is the fingerprint of a dependency-confusion / namesquat probe that reports successful resolution and build inside a victim's environment. ## Source: ghsa-malware (20e1280405965a158dc583a69a89a290211d37dc991ca293e84cf94cf86e2e6a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@ppa-web-components/ppa-navigation is a dependency-confusion package: it is described as a "Compatibility shim", uses inflated version numbers, and its README calls it an "authorized dependency-confusion test". Each listed version (1.0.1, 1.0.0, 2.0.0, 99.0.1, 3.0.0, 2.0.1) has a postinstall script that runs `node beacon.cjs` on npm install, and index.js calls the same code when the package is imported; it POSTs the hostname, install path and current working directory over plain HTTP to `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`, and index.js exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions so builds importing the real package keep running. The npm account wiseke published 14 such packages under the @greenlake, @sxm-web, @drone-js-ext and @ppa-web-components scopes between 2026-10-23 21:23 and 2026-10-25 14:28 UTC; index.js is byte-identical to that of ph-common (MAL-2026-1809), which sends to the same endpoint. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c88c344e72bb7cf5ae6f5e6185a1024caf8b96bce96584d448609ab78cd894af) The package is a shim whose only functional payload is a beacon. package.json declares a postinstall that runs `node beacon.cjs`, and `index.js` additionally invokes `require('./beacon.cjs').fire()` on load, so the beacon fires both at `npm install` and whenever any consumer `require`s the package. The beacon POSTs the installer's hostname, install path, current working directory, and Node version to the hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint `http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc`. The destination is not a registry, not a documented first-party service, and the plain-IP + non-standard port shape is inconsistent with any legitimate vendor telemetry. The package otherwise exports a Proxy that returns no-op functions for every property and self-describes as a 'Compatibility shim', so the beacon is the entire payload. The scoped name `@ppa-web-components/ppa-navigation` has the shape of a dependency-confusion or typosquat probe against an internal `@ppa-web-components` namespace. ## Source: ghsa-malware (b810a6b75e53293eb696e1672c7bbb4c9681eb89895bfc8d080aa527575070e5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.