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394 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.9 | EPSS 0.3% | Medium5.9EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-43828 Default configurations of Apache Shiro send sensitive cookies in HTTPS session without 'Secure' attribute. This issue affects Apache Shiro from 1.0 to 2.1.0, and 3.0.0-alpha-1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.1, or 3.0.0-alpha-2 or later, which fixes the issue. In the affected versions, Shiro-native session manager, as well as Remember-Me manager sends JSESSIONID and rememberMe cookies without 'secure' attribute by default. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security Jacob Butler, a 23-year-old from Ottawa, Canada, was arrested for allegedly operating the Kimwolf IoT botnet, which enslaved millions of devices to conduct massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks over six months. The botnet targeted devices like digital photo frames and web cameras, including those behind firewalls, and was involved in record-breaking DDoS attacks reaching nearly 30 Tbps. Butler faces criminal charges in both Canada and the U.S., including unauthorized computer use and aiding computer intrusion. Law enforcement seized Kimwolf's infrastructure along with other competing botnets. The botnet caused significant financial losses exceeding one million dollars for some victims and was linked to harassment campaigns such as doxing and swatting against security researchers. The investigation involved multiple agencies including the FBI and the Department of Defense. No specific software versions are identified as affected, and no patch or remediation is applicable as this concerns criminal activity rather than a software vulnerability. | Krebs on Security | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit ThreatIntel This threat describes a widespread fake engagement problem on GitHub where bot accounts artificially inflate star counts on repositories, primarily targeting low-quality AI tools and executor software. A detection tool named phantomstars identifies these campaigns by analyzing account creation dates, activity patterns, and coordinated timing of star events. The fake engagement distorts the credibility signals developers rely on to evaluate and recommend software. No direct exploitation or vulnerability is described, but the manipulation impacts trust and decision-making in the open source ecosystem. | Reddit ThreatIntel | |||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research As frontier AI models collapse the traditional exploit window, Tenable Hexa AI transforms the security operating model from manual triage to agentic orchestration. See how you can automate vulnerability remediation and super-charge exposure management with Tenable Hexa AI. Key takeaways AI models like Claude Mythos have reduced the time from vulnerability discovery to weaponization from weeks to minutes, making manual defense untenable. Tenable Hexa AI serves as an agentic engine that orchestrates complex, multi-step remediation workflows across modern attack surfaces to accelerate the speed of preemptive security and propel your exposure management program. Using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) included in Tenable Hexa AI, your team can build and deploy custom agents that anchor your preferred LLMs in the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric, ensuring every automated action is governed, auditable, and accurate. Why you need to implement agentic AI in cybersecurity (and specifically, in vulnerability management) For most of my career in cybersecurity, we’ve operated on a fundamental, if unspoken, assumption: We had a grace period. Whenever a new vulnerability was discovered, we knew we had time, often weeks or months, before adversaries would begin exploiting it. The time between vulnerability discovery and exploitation gave us breathing room. It gave us time to patch, triage, and remediate. But not any more. The gap between discovery and exploitation has been shrinking for years, and the vulnerability discovery capabilities demonstrated by frontier AI models like Claude Mythos are narrowing it even more. We have entered the era of AI speed. When an LLM can unearth a 27-year-old vulnerability in a hardened OS in minutes, and then weaponize it in seconds, old defensive cycles can’t keep up, and that’s untenable. This is why I’m so excited to announce the general availability of Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform , at EXPOSURE 2026 : because it’s designed to help your organization address the escalating, AI-driven pace of vulnerability discovery. The agentic AI imperative in cybersecurity: Scale your preemptive defense to match machine speed with agentic innovation from Tenable Tenable Hexa AI is built to be a force multiplier and a flexible engine for innovation. Featuring a suite of built-in agents ready to automate assessment configuration, asset tagging, dashboard creation, ticket creation, and more, Tenable Hexa AI is designed to help your organization overcome the operational challenges deepened by adversarial AI use. When the window between discovery and exploitation hits near-zero, security teams locked in manual vulnerability management operating models are forced into a state of perpetual emergency. Manually stitching together context and telemetry from cloud, identity, OT, and vulnerability silos in an arduous effort to prioritize remediation for downstream IT and DevOps teams is a losing battle. And when you can’t provide clear, risk-based remediation priorities to IT and DevOps teams, you end up bombarding them with seemingly urgent tickets that may not in fact be critical to your organization. Constant shifts in remediation priorities and endless debates over what needs fixing and why is not sustainable. It creates friction and causes you to lose the cybersecurity race. In a world where attackers move at machine speed, only comprehensive exposure intelligence combined with the agentic AI orchestration capabilities provided by the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform can give you clarity and control. Tenable Hexa AI doesn’t just tell you where you are vulnerable; it mobilizes your preemptive defense. Capabilities of Tenable Hexa AI With this GA release, Tenable delivers foundational capabilities to help your organization accelerate the pace of vulnerability discovery and remediation, including: Your choice of agents - Use our pre-built, out-of-the-box agents to start reducing risk immediately, or use the Model Context Protocol (MCP) server built into Tenable Hexa AI to create custom agents tailored to your organization’s environment. Advanced multi-step reasoning - Tenable Hexa AI executes complex, end-to-end workflows spanning your attack surface (e.g., IT, cloud, identity, OT, etc.) in a single request, eliminating the need for practitioners to toggle between views to get exposure context. It understands that a CVE in your web app is a critical threat specifically because it is linked to a privileged service account with a path to your sensitive data. Automated remediation workflows - Tenable Hexa AI orchestrates remediation workflows, automatically creating and routing tickets, generating custom policies, and producing audit-ready reports, so security teams can act fast on every critical exposure. End-to-end exposure path insights - Practitioners can query their environment by identity attributes, such as service accounts, privileged users, and Active Directory groups, to surface exposure paths that traditional asset inventories miss. Tenable Hexa AI also provides guided assistance for complex Active Directory sensor configurations. Build your own AI agents for cybersecurity with Tenable Hexa AI In addition to out-of-the-box agentic capabilities for use cases like automated assessment configuration, asset tagging, and ticket creation, customers can also build custom agents via Tenable Hexa AI's built-in MCP that are informed by your organization’s unique security policies and internal business logic. Tenable Hexa AI serves as the orchestration layer connecting your favorite AI tools to your infrastructure and other security tools, all with the data and context from the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric. By anchoring the models your organization uses in the authoritative context of your own environment, Tenable Hexa AI moves you beyond generic AI answers to governed and auditable automation. Whether you are automating complex remediation or generating board-ready dashboards, Tenable Hexa AI ensures the output is both verifiable and auditable. The Tenable Exposure Data Fabric is key because an agent is only as effective as the data it has access to. Tenable Hexa AI is powered by the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric, a repository of 20 years of vulnerability research and the industry’s largest collection of contextualized exposure data. In other words, we’ve built an agentic engine for cybersecurity that uses the world’s best exposure data to drive machine-speed actions. This is the only way to ensure your AI is validating the real state of your environment, rather than just guessing. Real-world agentic AI use cases for Tenable Hexa AI While there are virtually infinite ways to apply agentic orchestration to your unique cybersecurity challenges, here are four high-impact areas where manual workflows traditionally break down and make it impossible for you to keep pace with AI-powered vulnerability discovery: Supply chain response - Neutralize third-party threats by using Tenable Hexa AI to correlate software components with affected internal assets. Automated patching - Use custom Hexa agents to beat the Mythos clock by orchestrating patches the moment a vulnerability is validated. Remediation assignment - Use Tenable Hexa AI to automatically match CVEs to asset owners in seconds and trigger immediate response workflows. These use cases demonstrate how Tenable Hexa AI can bridge the gap between exposure intelligence and action. Make the untenable Tenable The collapse of the exploit window is a wake-up call. It gives us the opportunity to change how we work. By shifting from manual triage to agentic orchestration, organizations are seeing a shift in productivity and how they prioritize and action exposure reduction. While early design partners have already reclaimed days per month on foundational tasks like asset tagging, the value is not found solely in the hours saved, but rather, in the precision of the response. By automating the correlation between cloud, identity, AI, OT, and vulnerability data, Tenable One provides the clear, contextualized instructions that IT and DevOps teams need to act with confidence. This eliminates the administrative friction and back-and-forth negotiation that often results in critical vulnerabilities going unaddressed. Reclaiming those days means your best people are no longer buried in spreadsheets; they are focused on high-impact strategy, architecture hardening, and preemptive defense. Tenable Hexa AI is available today as part of the Tenable One Foundation and Tenable One Advanced packages . | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity A report from a Reddit cybersecurity discussion describes an incident where an AI coding assistant installed malware into production environments without explicit user commands. This event is framed as a supply chain attack, highlighting risks associated with AI tools in software development workflows. There are no technical details or vendor advisories provided, and no confirmed exploits or patches are known. The severity is assessed as medium based on the potential impact of unauthorized malware installation in production. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit NetSec This entry refers to a monthly discussion and tool thread on the r/netsec subreddit, a community forum for cybersecurity topics. It does not describe any specific security vulnerability or threat. There are no affected software versions, known exploits, or technical vulnerability details associated with this content. The thread serves as an informational platform for security professionals to share knowledge and tools. | Reddit NetSec | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0855b4d02a0d276e8a6cf97b7c62d457b8ef4d851e243d758c2308d451e0876e) Package name 'tsliverhome' impersonates the widely-used 'tslib' package (~300M weekly downloads). The shipped README.md is a verbatim copy of Microsoft/tslib's README (titled '# tsliv', describing the TypeScript --importHelpers runtime library), designed to reassure a developer who mistyped the name. The actual code in index.js has no relation to tslib: the exported getPlugin() function issues an HTTP GET to https://verceljs-kappa.vercel.app/icons/23, JSON.parses the response body, and passes it directly to eval(). The destination is a generic Vercel preview-style host not tied to any declared publisher, is not version-pinned, and the fetched bytes are not hash- or signature-verified. Any consumer who imports this package and calls getPlugin() will execute arbitrary JavaScript under the control of whoever operates verceljs-kappa.vercel.app. Supporting signals: package.json ships placeholder metadata (empty description, empty author, no repository, no homepage), consistent with throwaway-publisher typosquat packages. The combination of (a) name-confusion with a top-tier target, (b) README impersonation of that target, and (c) a remote-fetch-and-eval payload in the exported API constitutes a deliberate supply-chain attack against developers who mistype 'tslib'. ## Source: ghsa-malware (5f777a818727586bf6ad1ea484dc9ca687dcbf4108a4292564c88ef1fb0bc159) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Kaspersky researchers conducted an in-depth analysis of Kimsuky APT activity, revealing tactical shifts and new malware variants based on the PebbleDash platform. The group introduced HelloDoor, a Rust-based backdoor, httpMalice leveraging HTTP and Dropbox communications, and updated MemLoad and httpTroy variants. Kimsuky maintains persistence through legitimate tools including VSCode Tunneling with GitHub authentication and DWAgent remote management software. Initial access occurs via spear-phishing with malicious attachments disguised as documents. The group primarily targets South Korean entities across government and defense sectors, with additional PebbleDash attacks observed in Brazil and Germany. Infrastructure relies on free South Korean hosting services and tunneling services like Cloudflare Quick Tunnels and Ngrok. Both PebbleDash and AppleSeed malware clusters demonstrate ongoing development with shared distribution methods, stolen certificates, and overlapping targets, indicating single-actor c... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A supply chain compromise involving Daemon Tools installers distributed via the official vendor website has been identified. The attackers used valid code-signing certificates to make the trojanized installers appear legitimate and bypass security controls. These malicious packages deploy a backdoor that performs system reconnaissance, environment verification, and communicates with attacker-controlled command-and-control infrastructure. The compromise leverages trusted software delivery mechanisms to evade detection, establish persistent access, and enable remote command execution. Organizations should block related malicious infrastructure, hunt for suspicious Daemon Tools installations and network activity, verify software integrity, and implement application allowlisting. Monitoring for unusual certificate usage in software deployment is also advised. No patch or official fix information is available, and no known exploits in the wild have been reported. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Low | 2.9 | EPSS 0.5% | Low2.9EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-45186 To determine the support lifecycle for your software, see the Microsoft Support Lifecycle: https://support.microsoft.com/lifecycle | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-45130Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Dell · vim: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Denial of Service MediumEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-45130 A vulnerability identified as CVE-2026-45130 affects the Vim text editor, which is an enhanced version of vi. The vulnerability allows for a denial of service (DoS) condition. The affected products include Microsoft Azure Linux distributions and open source versions of Vim. There is no CVSS score available for this vulnerability, and no known exploits in the wild have been reported. No patch or remediation information is currently provided by the vendor advisory from the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik. The vulnerability does not appear to be related to a cloud service, so remediation would depend on vendor or community updates to the affected software. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2025-66170Apache CloudStack: Mehrere Schwachstellen Medium6.5EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-66170 Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in Apache CloudStack version 4.20.3.0, an open source platform for managing large networks of virtual machines as a highly available and scalable Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud computing solution. The software was originally developed by Citrix and later contributed to the Apache Foundation. No detailed technical or impact information is provided. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Since April 8, 2026, installers of DAEMON Tools software have been compromised with malicious payloads distributed through the legitimate website. Versions 12.5.0.2421 to 12.5.0.2434 contain trojaned binaries (DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, DTShellHlp.exe) signed with legitimate developer certificates. The attack has affected thousands of systems across over 100 countries, though advanced payloads were selectively deployed to approximately a dozen machines in government, scientific, manufacturing, and retail organizations. Initial infection establishes backdoor communications to typosquatted domains, followed by deployment of an information collector for system profiling. Targeted systems receive additional implants including a minimalistic backdoor and QUIC RAT. Chinese-language strings found in malicious components suggest a Chinese-speaking threat actor. The attack remains active at time of publication, demonstrating sophisticated supply chain compromise techniques comparable to the 2023 3CX ... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-42027Apache OpenNLP · Unsafe Reflection Critical9.8EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42027 Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description: The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation: * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.1% | HighEPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-71293 CVE-2025-71293 is a vulnerability related to the drm/amdgpu/ras component in Microsoft software. The provided information is minimal and does not describe the nature of the flaw, its impact, or exploitation details. The affected version is specifically version 3.0. No CVSS score or detailed technical data is available. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-1858gnu wget2 · Improper Input Validation Medium4.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-1858 CVE-2026-1858 is a medium severity vulnerability in GNU wget2 where the software improperly validates server certificates. Specifically, wget2 accepts TLS server certificates that have incorrect Key Usage (KU) or Extended Key Usage (EKU) attributes. This flaw could allow an attacker who has compromised a certificate issued for a different purpose to reuse it for TLS server authentication, potentially undermining the security of TLS connections. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently available from the vendor. The vulnerability has not been reported as exploited in the wild. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General APT-C-13 (Sandworm), also known as FROZENBARENTS, is a state-sponsored advanced persistent threat group conducting global cyber espionage operations. The organization recently deployed malicious campaigns using nested SSH and TOR tunnel infrastructure to establish covert remote access channels. Attackers distribute ZIP archives containing weaponized LNK files via spearphishing emails, which extract and execute payloads that create scheduled tasks disguised as legitimate software. The attack establishes dual-encrypted anonymous tunnels using obfs4 protocol to bypass deep packet inspection, while mapping sensitive ports (SMB/445, RDP/3389) to Onion domains for persistent backdoor access. The campaign leverages sophisticated anti-analysis techniques including sandbox detection, file disguise, and process masquerading to evade detection and maintain long-term unauthorized control over compromised systems for intelligence collection. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 4.7 | EPSS 0.3% | Medium4.7EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-40552 Multiple BinSoft products are vulnerable to Remote Command Execution. An authorized user with access to the application and direct access to the backend database can achieve system command execution by uploading an attachment and modifying its storage path in the database to reference an attacker-controlled remote network resource. Alternatively, it is possible to use a previously uploaded file and change its reference. When the application processes the attachment, and a user tries to open it, the referenced resource is executed by the system. Critically, this vulnerability can be exploited by any unauthenticated attacker by chaining it with CVE-2026-40550 and CVE-2026-40551, which allows obtaining database access, and logging onto any account. The described issue affects all published versions. The vendor stated that this issue is a direct result of the architecture model in which the software is distributed, and that it will be mitigated with a corrected installation manual. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 10.0 | EPSS 9.2% | CVE-2026-33453Apache Camel · Mass Assignment Critical10.0EPSS 9.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-33453 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Apache Camel Camel-Coap component. Apache Camel's camel-coap component is vulnerable to Camel message header injection, leading to remote code execution when routes forward CoAP requests to header-sensitive producers (e.g. camel-exec) The camel-coap component maps incoming CoAP request URI query parameters directly into Camel Exchange In message headers without applying any HeaderFilterStrategy. Specifically, CamelCoapResource.handleRequest() iterates over OptionSet.getUriQuery() and calls camelExchange.getIn().setHeader(...) for every query parameter. CoAPEndpoint extends DefaultEndpoint rather than DefaultHeaderFilterStrategyEndpoint, and CoAPComponent does not implement HeaderFilterStrategyComponent; the component contains no references to HeaderFilterStrategy at all. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker who can send a single CoAP UDP packet to a Camel route consuming from coap:// can inject arbitrary Camel internal headers (those prefixed with Camel*) into the Exchange. When the route delivers the message to a header-sensitive producer such as camel-exec, camel-sql, camel-bean, camel-file, or template components (camel-freemarker, camel-velocity), the injected headers can alter the producer's behavior. In the case of camel-exec, the CamelExecCommandExecutable and CamelExecCommandArgs headers override the executable and arguments configured on the endpoint, resulting in arbitrary OS command execution under the privileges of the Camel process. The producer's output is written back to the Exchange body and returned in the CoAP response payload by CamelCoapResource, giving the attacker an interactive RCE channel without any need for out-of-band exfiltration. Exploitation prerequisites are minimal: a single unauthenticated UDP datagram to the CoAP port (default 5683). CoAP (RFC 7252) has no built-in authentication, and DTLS is optional and disabled by default. Because the protocol is UDP-based, HTTP-layer WAF/IDS controls do not apply. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 through 4.14.5, from 4.18.0 before 4.18.1, 4.19.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.18.1 or 4.19.0, fixing the issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek This entry describes a funding announcement for Rilian, a company focused on AI-native security orchestration. It does not describe a specific security vulnerability or threat. There is no technical information about a security issue, exploit, or vulnerability affecting software or systems. | SecurityWeek |
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