The cobrowsing-k8s-module npm package version 35.6.2 contains malicious code that, upon requiring its main entry, dynamically reconstructs remote hostnames to fetch and execute an opaque binary payload. This payload is downloaded over HTTPS and saved with disguised filenames before execution. If the HTTP fetch fails, the code uses a DNS-TXT record covert channel to retrieve the payload in base64-encoded chunks, bypassing HTTP egress filters. The malicious behavior is disguised as analytics or telemetry functionality. No integrity verification of the downloaded payload is performed.
The npm package 'contract-contract-builder' version 35.5.2 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a platform-specific binary from dynamically assembled Cloudflare Workers hosts. This binary is saved to temporary directories with disguised filenames, given executable permissions, and launched detached from the main process. If HTTPS delivery fails, a DNS TXT record fallback channel reconstructs a base64 payload from multiple DNS TXT records. The package falsely advertises itself as a UI toolkit, but the fetched binary is unrelated, unverified, and executed automatically upon import.
The npm package 'constructor-blocks-common' version 35.5.6 contains malicious code that executes during module loading. It reconstructs remote hostnames, downloads a platform-specific binary to temporary directories, sets executable permissions, and runs the binary detached from the main process. This results in remote code execution on the host installing or requiring the package. The malicious payload is disguised and obfuscated to evade detection, including a second dropper copy hidden under an 'Analytics SDK' cover story.
The npm package 'constructor-blocks-landings' version 35.5.7 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a binary payload specific to the OS and architecture. The payload is fetched from dynamically assembled hostnames and a DNS-TXT fallback, saved with disguised filenames, given executable permissions, and run detached from the main process. The package uses obfuscation techniques to evade static analysis, including computed property names and a fake telemetry module. This behavior is characteristic of an attacker dropper rather than legitimate telemetry.
The npm package custom-plugins-request-factory version 35.5.4 contains malicious code that executes an attacker-controlled binary on the host upon installation or require. The package auto-loads a setup script that downloads a platform-specific executable from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers endpoints, writes it to a temporary directory under disguised names, sets executable permissions, and runs it detached. If the primary HTTPS download fails, it uses DNS TXT records as a covert channel to reconstruct and execute a base64-encoded payload. The package is disguised as an analytics/telemetry SDK, with similar malicious behavior also present in its telemetry.js component.
The npm package ded-ps-ded-ps-core version 35.9.1 contains malicious code that executes arbitrary native binaries on the host system upon requiring the package. It dynamically fetches a platform-specific native binary from Cloudflare Workers and uses DNS TXT record fallback channels to retrieve the payload. The binary is saved to temporary directories with filenames mimicking legitimate cache or .NET diagnostic files, then executed detached from the main process. The package also uses runtime string concatenation to evade static analysis. This behavior results in arbitrary attacker-controlled native code execution on the host.
The npm package ded-pwa-bnpl-forms-demo version 35.9.6 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a binary payload at import time. The payload is fetched from dynamically constructed Cloudflare Workers hosts or via DNS TXT record queries, then written to temporary directories and executed without integrity verification. The dropper masquerades as analytics-related telemetry but performs unauthorized code execution.
The npm package delivery-ci-pipeline-rules version 35.9.3 contains malicious code that, upon installation or import, fetches and executes attacker-controlled binaries from external infrastructure. The malicious script assembles hostnames dynamically to download platform-specific payloads, writes them to temporary locations with disguised names, sets executable permissions, and runs them detached. If HTTPS fetching fails, it uses a DNS-TXT record covert channel to retrieve the payload. This results in arbitrary code execution on the installer's host system.
The delivery-ci-notify npm package version 35.2.5 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a native binary payload from hardcoded Cloudflare worker hosts or via a DNS TXT record covert channel. The payload is saved under disguised filenames and executed detached from the main process, using techniques to evade static detection and impersonate legitimate dotnet diagnostic files. The package masquerades as a CI notification tool but includes intentional evasion mechanisms consistent with malicious intent.
The npm package delivery-ci-validate version 35.1.4 contains malicious code that executes automatically when the package is imported or required. It loads a polyfill script that dynamically constructs obfuscated hostnames to fetch attacker-controlled binaries from Cloudflare Workers URLs without version pinning or integrity checks. If that fails, it uses a covert DNS-TXT channel to retrieve a base64-encoded payload. The payload is saved to a temporary directory, made executable, and then executed detached via shell commands. This behavior is inconsistent with legitimate package functionality and represents a supply chain compromise.
The npm package delivery-ci-upgrade-form version 35.5.9 contains malicious code that downloads and executes OS-specific binaries from obfuscated Cloudflare Worker hosts and fallback domains. The payload is saved under disguised filenames in temporary directories, given executable permissions, and executed detached from the main process. The package uses obfuscation techniques to evade static analysis, including string-splitting and dynamic import of child_process. A parallel dropper component writes base64-decoded chunks to disk and executes them similarly. This behavior indicates a deliberate attempt to deliver and run malicious binaries on affected systems.
The npm package delivery-ci-storyshots version 35.3.6 contains malicious code that executes remote code on the host during installation or requiring. It downloads a binary payload from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers and fallback domains, writes it to a temporary location, sets executable permissions, and runs it without any signature or verification. The malicious code uses runtime string assembly to evade static detection and includes a secondary loader disguised as telemetry functionality. This results in full-host remote code execution with attacker-controlled payload delivery.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (ad7aaa115c4d227fa01dd5a8b2e9f6945b21c65a7df4433ecf527ef69b3d0b40)
On require(), index.js loads _adapter.js which fetches an unsigned, unhashed platform-specific executable from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it 0755, and detached-spawns it via child_process.spawn on /bin/sh or cmd. If HTTPS retrieval fails, the loader falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel that reassembles base64-encoded chunks from resolver domains sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru, reconstructs the binary, and executes it. Hostnames are assembled from split string fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.','cf100-41','6.workers.dev'].join('')), a.analytics_state stamp file is written, and environment variables named DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK frame the behavior as telemetry despite the payload being an executable binary. Package metadata is placeholder (empty dependencies, no repository/author) and the name impersonates an internal CI/GitLab tool.
## Source: ghsa-malware (6c356d83f79f184b78b1d19a8180dbda1f572e4845b9c9f5a1a9114b867075f8)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (46b1b760480eca3b3ad596491193f7aa55ed0a3e982d6978c071e04e793ff8b0)
index.js unconditionally requires _bridge.js, which runs a bootstrap routine on module load. The bootstrap selects a platform-specific path (linux_x64, linux_arm64, darwin, win32), fetches an unsigned binary from split-string-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev), with a base64-chunked DNS TXT covert channel fallback under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru and net.dl.wel1.ru. The retrieved bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmod'd to 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start. Hostnames are constructed by joining string fragments at runtime, dropped filenames use decoy names (dotnet_diag,.cache_,.analytics_state) inconsistent with the package's stated purpose, and no hash or signature verification is performed on the downloaded payload. The destinations are unrelated to any publisher of this package.
## Source: ghsa-malware (75454f2a282eb740a7f1334cb94456d3fdedc39a065c89e3c8fe7f5fa6a3fcfd)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (cde262833260cbba75c5fdd2160e0f91a6c43c0f7ad202b44475c649772c1174)
devplatform-api-v2-resource-mock@35.4.1 is an import-time dropper. The package's main entry (index.js) requires _compat.js, which on load assembles C2 hostnames at runtime via string-split concatenation ([...].join('')) to evade static analysis. It issues an https.get to one of several oob-worker.cf99-*.workers.dev / cf100 / cf101 / cf102 subdomains (with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback to *.dl.wel1.ru), writes the returned bytes to /tmp/.cache_<hex> on Linux/macOS or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows under cover names impersonating diagnostic tools, chmods the file 0755, and spawns it detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', <path> + ' &']) or spawn('cmd',...). No hash or signature verification is performed on the fetched payload. A marker file (/tmp/.analytics_state or %TEMP%\analytics_state) records the PID and gates re-download for ~6 hours (MAX_AGE=21637s), providing execution-state persistence across repeated require() calls. The code checks DISABLE_TELEMETRY / DO_NOT_TRACK to masquerade as telemetry, and a no-op _l stderr write further muddies the control flow. Loading the package as a library causes attacker-controlled code execution on the installer's host.
## Source: ghsa-malware (6decf63245ff6c049995ae09f10e2423a031ee335c0ccd8ffb84e483f257fd73)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The npm package devplatform-api-v2-resources version 35.3.8 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a platform-specific binary from obfuscated, anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomains. The payload is fetched using DNS TXT record fallback, saved to temporary locations with disguised names, given execute permissions, and spawned detached from the main process. A dormant secondary dropper exists but is not currently active. The downloaded payload is unverified and opaque, originating from author-controlled infrastructure using string obfuscation to evade detection.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (3b5d92af4e479fded008aa25786634ef3869a37c3624f612a320d308808a0626)
Requiring devplatform-auth-client loads `_bootstrap.js`, which selects a platform-specific payload URL, downloads opaque bytes over HTTPS from hardcoded Cloudflare `workers.dev` subdomains (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev) with a DNS-based fallback to sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru, writes them to /tmp or %TEMP% under decoy names such as `.cache_<hex>` and `dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe`, chmods 0755, and spawns them detached via `/bin/sh -c` or `cmd`. The destination hostnames and dangerous API names are assembled from split-string fragments joined at runtime to evade static scanners. A sibling `lib/telemetry.js` module, presented as an analytics SDK, contains a parallel loader that base64-decodes a payload, dynamically resolves `chmodSync`, and spawns the decoded file. The fetched bytes are unpinned, unverified, and unrelated to any documented publisher.
## Source: ghsa-malware (84dec7cc75aa19ce40a478689c787d0a170d2f8f52aea764f4357e1b83e496a0)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The npm package devplatform-confirm-input version 35.9.8 contains malicious code that executes a platform-specific binary fetched from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts. This binary is saved with disguised filenames and executed detached from the main process, enabling remote code execution on the host system. If HTTPS retrieval fails, a DNS-TXT fallback mechanism is used to obtain the payload. The package uses obfuscation and cover-story identifiers to evade static analysis. Installing or importing this package results in attacker-controlled code execution on the installer's machine.
The devplatform-cli-spa npm package version 35.7.8 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a native binary payload based on the operating system and architecture. The payload is fetched from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hostnames and a DNS TXT base64 fallback, then saved to temporary directories and executed with elevated permissions. The malware uses runtime string assembly to evade static detection and employs decoy filenames and execution gating to avoid repeated runs across installs.
The devplatform-hooks npm package version 35.2.1 contains malicious code that, upon installation or import, downloads and executes a platform-specific payload. It uses obfuscated Cloudflare Workers URLs and a fallback DNS-TXT covert channel to fetch a binary, which is saved under disguised filenames and executed detached from the parent process. This behavior effectively makes the package a remote code execution dropper.