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797 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-15488hcr707305003 shiroiAdmin · Unrestricted Upload Medium6.9EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-15488 A vulnerability was determined in hcr707305003 shiroiAdmin 1.1/1.3. Affected is the function FileController::upload of the file app/common/controller/FileController.php. Executing a manipulation of the argument File can lead to unrestricted upload. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. Upgrading to version 1.4 is able to address this issue. This patch is called 3ecde28ea8a20a3840dbfefd6d6863ee79a83e70. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. EPSS 0.5%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 5.4% | CVE-2026-61450getgrav grav · Code Injection High7.1EPSS 5.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61450 Grav before 2.0.2 contains a Twig sandbox bypass that allows a page author (any admin.pages user, or anyone able to write to user/pages) to exfiltrate configuration secrets. Although the sandbox replaces the 'config' variable with a redacted facade and strips Config::get/toArray from the method allowlist, the raw container remains accessible via the allow-listed grav.offsetGet('config'), which returns the real Config object. Allow-listed object-dumping filters (json_encode, print_r, yaml_encode) then serialize that object at the PHP level without invoking the sandbox method gate, exposing the full config tree including plugin secrets such as SMTP credentials, API keys, and plugin DB credentials. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9. EPSS 5.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.0 | EPSS 1.3% | CVE-2026-41880R-SOFT SERWIS DMS · OS Command Injection Critical9.0EPSS 1.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-41880 R-SOFT DMS is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in the Optical Character Recognition (OCR) module. Multiple command execution functions accept user-controllable file paths without proper sanitization before passing them to the system shell via SSH. In current infrastructure the URL encoding neutralizes the injection during the standard web upload flow. An authenticated attacker who is able to trigger the OCR functionality for the uploaded file can execute OS commands within the context of a root user. This issue was fixed in version v3.19-2862 and v3.17-2580. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-55605arikusi deepseek-mcp-server · Missing Authentication Medium5.3EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-55605 DeepSeek MCP Server is an MCP server for DeepSeek V4. Starting in version 1.4.2 and prior to version 1.8.0, the self-hosted HTTP transport of `@arikusi/deepseek-mcp-server` exposes `POST /mcp` without any authentication: `createMcpExpressApp` is called without an `authProvider` and no middleware guards the route, so any network-reachable client can issue an unauthenticated `initialize` request and obtain a valid MCP session identifier. In reproduced testing against commit `5e1302171e99`, an unauthenticated client was able to initialize a session, enumerate tools, and invoke the local `deepseek_sessions` tool with no credentials. The same unauthenticated session also exposes `deepseek_chat`, whose handler uses the server-side `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` when self-hosted deployments configure one. This issue applies to self-hosted HTTP mode, not the separately documented hosted BYOK endpoint in `README.md`, which expects an `Authorization: Bearer ...` header. Upstream self-hosted container assets enable HTTP mode by default (`Dockerfile`) and publish port `3000` (`docker-compose.yml`). Version 1.8.0 contains a patch for this issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-57028Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved · Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints High7.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-57028 An Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints vulnerability in Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved allows an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to cause license exhaustion. Due to an incorrect initialization, a process which should only be able to communicate internally within the device, can be reached over the network via an open port. This leads to unauthorized access to the license management. This issue affects all Junos OS Evolved versions before 23.2R2-EVO. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-33803Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved · Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints Medium6.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-33803 An Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints vulnerability in Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved allows an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to cause a limited information disclosure and availability impact to the device. Due to a wrong initialization, a process which should only be able to communicate internally within the device can be reached over the network via an open port. This leads to a device being inadvertently exposed and increased CPU cycles spent processing ingress packets. This issue affects Junos OS Evolved: * all versions before 23.2R2-S7-EVO, * 23.4 versions before 23.4R2-S8-EVO, * 24.2 versions before 24.2R2-S5-EVO, * 24.4 versions before 24.4R2-S4-EVO, * 25.2 versions before 25.2R2-S1-EVO, * 25.4 versions before 25.4R1-S2-EVO. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.4 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-23556xen · When oxenstored is tearing a domain down, the node data is cleaned up but the usage counts are leaked Critical9.4EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-23556 CVE-2026-23556 is a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor as packaged in various Ubuntu versions. It causes usage counts to leak when tearing down a domain, which results in the new domain being able to create fewer nodes before hitting a quota limit. This may impact resource allocation but does not indicate direct compromise or code execution. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.7 | High7.7GCVE Database ### Impact In Phantom <= 1.3.0, when `PHANTOM_OUTPUT_DIR` was unset (the default), the MCP tools accepted arbitrary absolute output paths with no confinement. Anything able to send tool calls (e.g. an AI agent driving the MCP interface) could **write or overwrite arbitrary files** the process user can write — including shell startup files (`~/.zshrc`) or a Reaper `__startup.lua`, which is effectively local code execution on a developer workstation. Separately, the stem-separation and render paths decoded input audio with no size/duration cap (the analysis path was already guarded). A small, highly compressed FLAC/OGG could expand to multi-gigabyte PCM, causing memory-exhaustion DoS, and widened exposure to decoder bugs including libsndfile CVE-2026-37555. ### Patches Fixed in **1.3.1**: - File writes are always confined to `PHANTOM_OUTPUT_DIR` (default `~/.phantom/output`); symlinks resolved and re-verified on the final path. - Decode/duration/size guards mirrored onto the separation and render paths (plus ffmpeg `-max_alloc`/`-t`/`-fs`). - Atomic `O_CREAT|O_EXCL` output creation in reference matching and symlink-TOCTOU hardening on confined input reads. ### Workarounds Set `PHANTOM_OUTPUT_DIR` (and optionally `PHANTOM_AUDIO_DIR`) to dedicated directories before starting the server. ### Credit Found during an internal security audit. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-12593Qt Axivion · Missing Authorization High8.7EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12593 The implementation of an internal and undocumented Dashboard API endpoint (POST /api/users/~/{user}/tokens) forgot to ensure an HTTP request for creating an API Token for another user had sufficient permission to do so. Precondition for successful exploitation was a preexisting internal user (with more privileges than the attacker), the attacker knowing its login name and the attacker being able to authenticate to the Dashboard via OAuth/OIDC. The attacker would then have had to forge a token creation API request on behalf of the other user and could have authenticated and finalized the token creation with their own OAuth/OIDC credentials. In the worst case, this would mean an attacker could have become Dashboard Administrator and been able to perform all administrative actions if the preexisting internal user had administrative privileges. In combination with a separate weakness, this could have further led to code execution on the host system running the Dashboard with the privileges of the OS-User running the Dashboard server. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.0 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-56000X.Org xwayland · Use After Free Critical9.0EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56000 Local attackers with a X connection able to provide GLX commit to the X server xorg-server before 21.2.24 and xwayland before 24.1.13 could cause a Heap Use After Free, due to CommonMakeCurrent() pointing into potentially reallocated memory. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.9 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-55079V2 · Coder's unbounded memory allocation in provisioner file upload allows authenticated denial of service Medium4.9EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-55079 ### Summary `NewDataBuilder` in `provisionersdk/proto/dataupload.go` allocated a byte slice using the client-supplied `FileSize` from a `DataUpload` message without an upper-bound check. Although the DRPC wire limit is 4 MiB, the `FileSize` value itself was unconstrained ### Impact An authenticated user able to reach the provisioner daemon serve endpoint could send a roughly 50-byte message declaring a huge `FileSize` (for example 1 TiB), triggering an unrecoverable Go out-of-memory abort that terminates `coderd`. This is a single-message denial of service affecting the entire deployment. ### Patches The fix validates `FileSize` against an upper bound (`MaxFileSize = 100 MiB`) before allocation. The fix was backported to all supported release lines: | Release line | Patched version | |---|---| | 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) | | 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) | | 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) | | 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) | ### Workarounds Restrict access to the provisioner daemon serve endpoint to trusted provisioner daemon service accounts. ### Resources - Fix: #25710 ### Credits Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22442) for independently disclosing this issue! | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-54760Langroid · SQLChatAgent dangerous-function blocklist can be bypassed with quoted or schema-qualified pg_read_file calls Critical9.3EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-54760 # SQLChatAgent `_validate_query` dangerous-pattern regex is bypassable via quoted/commented/qualified function names ## Summary The `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`. PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable. ## Affected Code Tested against current `main` commit: `6e8e7b2bb23ec04c1c25be479f16b8cc9a4f8796` The current source still contains: ```python re.compile(r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE) ``` `_validate_query` checks the raw query against `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`, then parses with `sqlglot` and allows `SELECT` statements. The dangerous-call check is raw text, not normalized AST function-name matching. ## Root Cause The current mitigation treats dangerous PostgreSQL function calls as a raw-text regex problem. The regex requires the `pg_...` function token to be followed directly by optional whitespace and `(`, but PostgreSQL accepts equivalent calls through quoted identifiers, comments, and schema-qualified names. Because `_validate_query` only uses `sqlglot` to enforce the top-level statement type, those normalized function names are never checked after parsing. ## Auth Boundary The boundary is the default `SQLChatAgent` safety policy between attacker-influenced SQL generation and database operations that can read server-side files. With `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, a user or prompt that influences generated SQL should not be able to bypass the guard and execute PostgreSQL file-read functions such as `pg_read_file`. This is not a new unauthenticated endpoint or product-wide SQL injection; it applies when untrusted user content can influence SQLChatAgent's generated SQL. ## Reproduction The local harness uses the current `sql_chat_agent.py`, extracts the real shipped dangerous regex list, validates the queries with real `sqlglot==30.8.0`, then executes the accepted bypasses against a local throwaway PostgreSQL 16 container. Transcript excerpt: ```text CONTROL "SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd')" -> REJECTED: matches '\\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\s*\\(' BYPASS 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('/etc/passwd')" -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) === Part B: real PostgreSQL execution of the bypass === connected; is_superuser=t executed bypass 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('<file>')" -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' RESULT: VULNERABLE ``` The control query is blocked by the current regex, while all three equivalent PostgreSQL forms are allowed by the validator and return the mounted proof file contents from a real PostgreSQL server. The `LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...` value is a harmless marker generated inside the throwaway local container for this proof. ## Impact On a deployment using `SQLChatAgent` against PostgreSQL with a role able to call `pg_read_file` (superuser, or a role granted `pg_read_server_files`), an attacker who can influence LLM-generated SQL can coerce the agent into emitting one of the obfuscated queries and read files accessible to the PostgreSQL server process through `pg_read_file`. This is the same impact and precondition shape as the published `pg_read_file` advisory, but it targets the bypassability of the current regex-based fix rather than the pre-fix absence of a `pg_read_file` block. Severity: High by parity with the published parent advisory; not Critical. CWE-184 leading to server-side file read. ## Suggested Fix Do not rely on raw-text regex matching for dangerous-call detection. After the existing `sqlglot` parse, walk the AST and reject any function invocation whose normalized, unquoted, schema-stripped, case-folded name is in a dangerous set such as `pg_read_file`, `pg_read_binary_file`, `pg_ls_dir`, `pg_stat_file`, `lo_import`, `lo_export`, `load_file`, or `load_extension`. Also | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-58203pydantic-settings · Path Traversal Medium5.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-58203 ### Summary `NestedSecretsSettingsSource` reads secret values from files in a configured `secrets_dir`. When `secrets_nested_subdir=True`, a directory entry inside `secrets_dir` that is a symbolic link pointing **outside** `secrets_dir` is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented `secrets_dir_max_size` protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This report does not claim network reachability by itself. ### Details `NestedSecretsSettingsSource` performed two passes over `secrets_dir` using two different, inconsistent directory-traversal implementations: * The size check in `validate_secrets_path()` used `Path.glob('**/*')`, which does **not** descend into a symbolically-linked directory. * The loader in `load_secrets()` used `glob.iglob(f'{path}/**/*', recursive=True)` followed by `read_text()`, which **does** follow symlinked directories and reads through the link target. Because the two passes disagreed on symlinks, a symlinked directory inside `secrets_dir` whose target lives elsewhere was invisible to the size accounting (counted as 0 bytes) while still being fully read by the loader. This produces two distinct problems: 1. **Out-of-tree read (CWE-22 / CWE-59).** A symlinked directory (or file) inside `secrets_dir` that resolves outside it is followed, and the external file's contents are loaded into the corresponding settings field. 2. **`secrets_dir_max_size` bypass (CWE-400).** The size check never sees the out-of-tree content, so the documented size cap is neither respected nor able to reject the oversized external file. A related amplification exists for cyclic in-tree symlinks, which `glob.iglob(recursive=True)` re-traverses, inflating the size accounting and the number of loaded secrets. #### Reproduction In a clean Linux container, with a `secrets_dir` containing a symlink `secrets/db -> /path/outside` and an `outside/passwd` file of 512 bytes, while `secrets_dir_max_size=100`: ```python from pydantic import BaseModel from pydantic_settings import ( BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict, NestedSecretsSettingsSource, ) class Db(BaseModel): passwd: str | None = None class Settings(BaseSettings): model_config = SettingsConfigDict( secrets_dir='secrets', secrets_nested_subdir=True, secrets_dir_max_size=100, # outside/passwd is 512 bytes ) db: Db = Db() @classmethod def settings_customise_sources( cls, settings_cls, init_settings, env_settings, dotenv_settings, file_secret_settings ): return (NestedSecretsSettingsSource(file_secret_settings),) ``` On affected versions, `Settings().db.passwd` is populated with the 512-byte out-of-tree file and **no** `SettingsError` is raised, even though the file exceeds `secrets_dir_max_size`. ### Impact Applications that opt into `NestedSecretsSettingsSource` with `secrets_nested_subdir=True` and load secrets from a directory whose entries can be influenced by an attacker or a lower-privileged component (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount, or a secrets directory partially populated from untrusted input) are affected. The impact is: * **Confidentiality:** files outside the configured `secrets_dir` can be read into settings values (local file read). * **Integrity / availability of the safeguard:** the advertised `secrets_dir_max_size` cap can be bypassed, and cyclic symlinks can inflate resource usage during loading. The vulnerability requires the ability to place a symbolic link inside the configured secrets directory; it is not remotely reachable on its own. Applications that do not use `NestedSecretsSettingsSource`, or that point `secrets_dir` at a directory fully under the application's control, are not affected. ### Mitigation Upgrade to **pydantic-settings 2.14.2**, which: * walks the secrets directory explicitly and only descends into directories whose resolved path stays within `secrets_dir`, so symlinked directories pointing outside are never followed; * uses a single, cycle-safe iterator for both the size check and the loader, so the size accounting and the loaded set are always consistent and each real directory is visited at most once; * skips any file whose resolved path escapes `secrets_dir`, as defense in depth. If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure the configured `secrets_dir` is fully owned and controlled by the application (no writable or attacker-influenced entries), or avoid `secrets_nested_subdir=True`. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Check Point Research For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 6th July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES River Bank & Trust, a US financial institution, has experienced a ransomware incident after an unauthorized actor accessed the network of parent company River Financial Corporation on June 16. The bank found ransomware on portions of its server environment and is assessing whether personal data was accessed or exfiltrated. Indra Group, a Spanish defense, aerospace, and technology contractor and NATO cyber coalition member, has confirmed a ransomware attack affecting one subsidiary. The Gentlemen ransomware gang threatened to leak allegedly stolen data, while Indra said the incident was contained and that service continuity was maintained. Check Point Threat Emulation and Harmony Endpoint provide protection against this threat Nidec, a Japanese electric motor and industrial manufacturer, has disclosed a ransomware attack affecting the network of its Taiwanese subsidiary, Nidec Chaun Choung Technology. BlackField group claimed responsibility and alleged theft of more than two terabytes of corporate data, including employee, financial, procurement, manufacturing, legal, and IT records. US insurance firm Aflac has disclosed a data breach affecting its Japan operations after attackers accessed its policyholder portal between June 15 and June 25. Personal and financial data of nearly 4.4 million customers was exposed, including policyholder information and premium payment account details. AI THREATS Check Point Research has demonstrated a browser-native ransomware technique generated by a large language model that abuses Chrome’s File System Access API. A fake image-enhancement page convinces users to grant folder access, then reads, exfiltrates, and encrypts photos inside the browser on Android and Windows. Researchers examined shell command injection weaknesses in open-source AI coding agents, finding that 10 out of 11 popular tools failed to block obfuscated destructive commands. Simple rewrites bypassed filters and enabled destructive actions, including file deletion, while only the Continue agent properly parsed commands. Researchers warned that attackers are exploiting LLM phantom squatting by registering AI-generated domains to hijack traffic and deliver phishing. They recorded 250,000 hallucinated domains and subsequent registrations, including an AI-built phishing kit, Montana Empire, using a postal-service domain for credential theft. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Oracle E-Business Suite is affected by CVE-2026-46817, a critical remote code execution flaw reportedly exploited against about 950 internet-exposed instances worldwide. Successful exploitation can give attackers control over ERP systems. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (Oracle E-Business Suite Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-46817)) Linux kernel maintainers patched CVE-2026-46242, a Bad Epoll privilege escalation flaw affecting Linux servers, desktops, and Android devices. The race-condition use-after-free vulnerability allows an unprivileged local user to gain root access, and a public exploit demonstrated reliable exploitation against vulnerable systems. Citrix has addressed CVE-2026-8451, a NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway memory disclosure flaw affecting SAML Identity Provider configurations. Active exploitation was observed less than 24 hours after disclosure, with attacks able to leak session tokens from vulnerable appliances. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (Citrix NetScaler Out Of Bounds Read (CVE-2026-8451)) Progress has addressed CVE-2026-8037, a critical OS command injection flaw in Kemp LoadMaster load balancers with a CVSS score of 9.6. Exploitation attempts began on June 29 and could allow unauthenticated remote code execution against vulnerable systems. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (Progress Kemp LoadMaster Commad Injection (CVE-… | Check Point Research | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-55994Apache Camel Iggy · Improper Input Validation High7.5EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-55994 Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel in Iggy component. The camel-iggy consumer mapped the user-headers of inbound Iggy messages into the Camel Exchange header map without applying any HeaderFilterStrategy (IggyFetchRecords copied the message user-headers straight into the Exchange). Because nothing blocked the Camel header namespace, an actor able to publish to the consumed Iggy stream/topic could set Camel-internal control headers - including CamelHttpUri (Exchange.HTTP_URI) - simply by supplying them as message user-headers. In a route where the Iggy consumer feeds a downstream HTTP producer, the injected CamelHttpUri redirects the server-side HTTP request to an attacker-chosen destination (server-side request forgery - for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint). In addition, the HTTP producer resolves Camel property placeholders on the resulting (attacker-controlled) URI, so placeholders embedded in the injected value - such as an environment-variable reference, an application property, or a vault reference - are resolved to their real values and sent to the attacker, disclosing environment variables, application properties and vault secrets. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.17.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix adds a dedicated IggyHeaderFilterStrategy (and a headerFilterStrategy endpoint option) that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so externally-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from the inbound message before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), restrict who can publish to the consumed Iggy stream/topic, and avoid bridging an untrusted consumer directly into an HTTP producer whose target URI can be driven from message headers. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-49086Apache Camel Dapr · Improper Input Validation Medium6.5EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-49086 Improper Input Validation, Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy') vulnerability in Apache Camel DAPR component. The camel-dapr Dapr Pub/Sub consumer (DaprPubSubConsumer) copied two fields from each inbound CloudEvent - its Pub/Sub component name and its topic - into the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic Exchange headers. These two headers are producer-direction routing headers: when the route republishes through a Dapr producer, DaprConfigurationOptionsProxy reads them back and prefers them over the destination configured on the endpoint. As a result, in a route that consumes from one Dapr Pub/Sub topic and republishes to another (for example from('dapr-pubsub:p:t').to('dapr-pubsub:p:other')), an actor able to publish a message to the subscribed topic could set the CloudEvent's pub/sub-name and topic to values of their choosing and cause the re-published message to be delivered to an arbitrary Dapr Pub/Sub component and topic instead of the configured destination - redirecting or exfiltrating the message and bypassing the route's intended routing and any topic-level access controls in the underlying broker. Exploitation requires the ability to publish to the topic the route subscribes to; no other authentication or user interaction is needed. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.12.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, remove the CamelDaprPubSubName and CamelDaprTopic headers from the Exchange between the Dapr consumer and any Dapr producer in the route (for example removeHeaders('CamelDaprPubSubName', 'CamelDaprTopic')), and restrict who can publish to the subscribed Dapr Pub/Sub topic so that only trusted producers can send to it. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-46456Apache Camel · Improper Input Validation Critical9.8EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-46456 Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel AWS2-SQS Component. The camel-aws2-sqs component map inbound message attributes into the Camel Exchange through a component-specific HeaderFilterStrategy. Sqs2HeaderFilterStrategy configured only an outbound filter (setOutFilterPattern, which blocks Camel*, breadcrumbId and org.apache.camel.* headers being written to the broker) but did not configure an inbound filter. As a result, when Sqs2Consumer copies each SQS MessageAttribute into the Exchange via HeaderFilterStrategy.applyFilterToExternalHeaders, DefaultHeaderFilterStrategy applied no inbound rule and treated every header name as not filtered - including Camel-internal control headers such as CamelHttpUri, CamelFileName or CamelSqlQuery - copying them unmodified onto the Camel message. Any principal able to send messages to the consumed SQS queue (for example a cross-account sender or a lower-privileged in-account component holding sqs:SendMessage) could therefore set arbitrary Camel control headers that influence the behaviour of downstream producers in the route (for example redirecting an HTTP producer, changing a file name, or overriding a query); the injected headers also persist across internal direct, seda and vm hops. The concrete downstream impact depends on which producers the route uses. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix adds an inbound HeaderFilterStrategy rule to Sqs2HeaderFilterStrategy that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so sender-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from inbound messages before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), and restrict who may send to the consumed SQS queue by applying least-privilege sqs:SendMessage permissions on the queue resource policy. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-46457Apache Camel · Improper Input Validation High7.5EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-46457 Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel NATS component. The camel-nats component maps inbound NATS message headers into the Camel Exchange but defaulted its headerFilterStrategy to a bare new DefaultHeaderFilterStrategy() with no inbound rules configured (NatsConfiguration). With no inFilter, inFilterPattern or inFilterStartsWith set, DefaultHeaderFilterStrategy.applyFilterToExternalHeaders returns not filtered for every header name, so NatsConsumer copies every NATS message header - including Camel-internal control headers such as CamelHttpUri, CamelFileName or CamelSqlQuery - unmodified onto the Camel message. A client able to publish to the consumed NATS subject can therefore inject arbitrary Camel control headers that influence the behaviour of downstream producers in the route (for example redirecting an HTTP producer, changing a file name, or overriding a query); the injected headers also persist across internal direct, seda and vm hops. The concrete downstream impact depends on which producers the route uses. NATS message headers require NATS 2.2 or later, and the issue is reachable without credentials when the NATS server is configured without authentication (the NATS server default). This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes camel-nats default to a dedicated NatsHeaderFilterStrategy that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so client-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from inbound NATS messages before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), and enable authentication on the NATS server so that only trusted clients can publish to the consumed subject. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-59510ail-framework · Path Traversal High7.1EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59510 AIL Framework contains a path traversal vulnerability in its PDF object handling. Prior to commit 14c618fce4d1df02358717c48ea903706abecdf2, the PDF.get_filepath() function constructed a file path by joining the configured PDF storage directory with a path derived from a PDF object identifier, without verifying that the resolved path remained within the intended PDF_FOLDER directory. An authenticated attacker able to invoke PDF object operations with a crafted identifier could use relative traversal sequences or absolute path components to cause AIL Framework to open files located outside the PDF storage directory. This could allow disclosure of files readable by the AIL process, including application configuration, credentials, or other sensitive local data. This vulnerability is potential due to additional errors before being able to be executed. The fix canonicalises the resulting path with os.path.realpath() and rejects paths whose common directory is outside the configured PDF directory. | CVE Database V5 |
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