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## Source: amazon-inspector (c937a54c3629f80fb7b92fbdafda502706b6028b43bc4675eb30c55d9bc059e9)
Package masquerades as 'Performance fixes for Minecraft Velocity proxy' authored by 'Velocity Team' — Velocity is a Java project from PaperMC and has no legitimate npm distribution. package.json declares scripts.postinstall = 'node scripts/loader.js', which silently spawns a bundled payload.exe via `start /b` on every `npm install`. The bundled PE contains a hardcoded C2 at https://751.lol/upload/ and posts a multipart form with fields `username`, `os_info`, `ip_address`, and `file=data.zip` — exfiltrating the installer's hostname, OS, IP, and a zip of collected files to an attacker-controlled host. The payload labels itself `[INJECTOR]`, reads registry values (ProductName, DisplayVersion), and performs sandbox / VM evasion (probes for SbieDll.dll, snxhk.dll, Vboxguest.sys, vmGuestLib.dll, VMware/VirtualBox artifacts) so it only fully detonates on real victim hosts. The combination of brand-impersonation lure, install-time auto-execution of an opaque native binary, hardcoded exfil endpoint, and anti-analysis evasion is an unambiguous Windows-targeted supply-chain dropper.
## Source: ghsa-malware (9baaec1a1ef9243e12f876eb21d81e1f02912fe2e56aee1646d95e679a20b5ea)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
A sophisticated supply chain attack compromised the legitimate 3CXDesktopApp softphone application across Windows, macOS, and Linux platforms. The malicious activity involved trojanized signed installers that deployed a compromised ffmpeg.dll binary, establishing HTTPS beacons to attacker-controlled infrastructure and enabling second-stage payload deployment. Analysis revealed the attack utilized specific beacon structures and encryption keys matching infrastructure patterns, with hands-on-keyboard activity observed in targeted cases. The operation affected multiple platforms through signed MSI installers containing malicious components. The attack demonstrated advanced tradecraft through abuse of trusted software distribution channels, requiring immediate removal of affected versions and deployment of behavioral detection capabilities to identify malicious beaconing activity.
A new campaign has been identified utilizing a valid digital signature from a Chinese technology company that remains unrevoked. The attack chain employs a dropper that retrieves an extension-based module list from command and control infrastructure. The malicious payloads exploit DLL Side-Loading techniques through a legitimate Tencent-signed executable to achieve code execution. The infrastructure includes Google Cloud Storage and a dedicated domain for command and control operations. Multiple components have been identified including an EXE dropper, DLL loader, DAT payload, and the legitimate Tencent executable used for side-loading purposes.
OnyxC2 emerged in early 2026 as a malware-as-a-service stealer sold on cybercrime networks for $250 monthly. The platform includes a web panel, payload builder, and tiered pricing structure with refund guarantees. Written in C++ with assembly for direct syscalls, it targets approximately 210 applications across nine categories: 45 browsers, 109 extensions including 2FA tools, 5 password managers, 17 cryptocurrency wallets, 11 FTP clients, 5 email clients, and VPN/messaging applications. The stealer achieves 99% detection evasion through mutated builds and delivers via DLL sideloading using signed binaries. Higher tiers unlock remote access capabilities including HVNC, LSASS dumping, reverse SOCKS5 proxy, keylogging, and reverse shell. Distribution occurs through fake installers delivered as password-protected archives, with C2 communication over Cloudflare-fronted HTTPS to akmuniverstall.top.
Acronis Threat Research Unit identified two espionage campaigns targeting Cambodian government entities in defense and public works sectors, attributed to a cluster tracked as Khmer Shadow. Both campaigns delivered a custom C++ loader named NIGHTFORGE through government-themed lures in self-extracting archives. NIGHTFORGE employs sophisticated evasion techniques including NTDLL unhooking and Hell's Gate syscall resolution to decrypt and execute a Havoc Demon payload in memory. The loader utilizes DLL sideloading through a legitimate VMware-signed binary (VMwareNamespaceCmd.exe) and establishes persistence via COM-based scheduled tasks. Despite advanced technical capabilities, the actor demonstrated poor operational security by reusing identical payloads and infrastructure across targets. The campaigns targeted Cambodia's Information Collection Bureau and Ministry of Public Works and Transport using meeting-themed social engineering lures.
A sophisticated multi-stage malware campaign targets victims through tax-themed phishing emails impersonating Indian and Japanese government authorities. The operation leverages social engineering, fraudulent tax notifications, and trusted third-party email delivery services to distribute ZIP archives containing three staged payloads. The malware implements advanced evasion techniques including DLL Search Order Hijacking, API hooking, token manipulation, Mersenne Twister-based execution logic, COM callback execution, mutated RC4 encryption, and reflective PE loading. Execution occurs primarily in memory, significantly reducing forensic artifacts. The malware establishes persistent WebSocket-based command-and-control communication through HTTP protocol upgrades, allowing malicious traffic to blend with legitimate activity. Chinese-language artifacts were observed throughout the infrastructure and code, though attribution remains at moderate confidence. The campaign demonstrates characteristics of a mature, ...
A sophisticated cyber-espionage campaign attributed to China-linked actors targets officials and citizens in Czech Republic and Taiwan through spearphishing attacks. The operation deploys malicious ZIP archives containing dual infection paths that ultimately deliver AZUREVEIL, an Adaptix C2 agent. The campaign uniquely leverages Microsoft Azure Blob Storage as a dead-drop command-and-control channel, bypassing traditional C2 infrastructure. A multi-stage infection chain employs RUSTCLOAK, a Rust-based loader implementing triple-layer encryption using modified RC4, Base64, and SM4-CBC algorithms. The final payload supports 36 post-exploitation commands including Beacon Object File execution in memory, file system manipulation, process control, network pivoting, and data exfiltration. Lure documents impersonate official communications from Taiwanese research institutions and Czech Social Security Administration, demonstrating targeted social engineering tailored to each region.
Through April 2026, Kimsuky deployed sophisticated malicious campaigns against South Korean military and corporate entities using tailored social engineering tactics including fake security software installation pages and spoofed Webex meeting pages leveraging legitimate meeting schedules. The threat actor introduced a novel JSONPing technique allowing distribution pages to verify in real time whether victims executed the payload via JSONP queries to localhost servers. Analysis revealed a new HttpSpy variant with a three-stage execution chain replacing the previous single-binary architecture, utilizing RC4 encryption and shared infrastructure indicators. Attribution was confirmed through code pattern overlaps, reused encryption keys, XAMPP certificate fingerprints, and preferred ASN usage consistent with historical Kimsuky operations targeting South Korea.
A sophisticated spear-phishing campaign designated Operation Dragon Whistle has been identified targeting Changzhou University in China. The threat actor UNG002 leveraged highly contextual social engineering by impersonating official university communications regarding mandatory 2026 National Student Physical Fitness and Health Standards testing, which directly impacts graduation eligibility. The attack chain begins with a weaponized ZIP file containing a malicious LNK file disguised as a PDF document. Upon execution, it triggers a VBScript that simultaneously displays a legitimate-looking decoy document while deploying a multi-stage infection chain involving DLL sideloading via Bandizip.exe, anti-debugging techniques, and ultimately delivering a Cobalt Strike Beacon payload entirely in memory. The campaign demonstrates advanced evasion capabilities and utilizes Chinese cloud infrastructure hosted on Alibaba Cloud for command and control operations.
A sophisticated spear phishing campaign dubbed Operation GriefLure targeted senior executives of Viettel Group, Vietnam's largest military-owned telecommunications provider, and St. Luke's Medical Center in the Philippines. The operation weaponized authentic legal documents from a genuine data breach dispute involving a Vietnamese citizen and Viettel, alongside fabricated whistleblower complaints targeting Philippine healthcare administrators. Attackers delivered malicious Windows LNK files within nested RAR archives, abusing native ftp.exe as a Living-off-the-Land dropper. Upon execution, the payload assembled polymorphic implants directly on disk from chunked .doc files, establishing persistence while displaying legitimate decoy PDFs. The malware enabled remote access through process injection, credential harvesting from browsers and remote access tools, screenshot capture, and file exfiltration via HTTPS C2 communication to infrastructure hosted on bulletproof Hong Kong servers.
A sophisticated Brazilian banking trojan named TCLBANKER has been identified, representing a significant evolution of the MAVERICK/SORVEPOTEL malware family. The campaign employs a trojanized Logitech installer that deploys two .NET Reactor-protected modules through DLL side-loading. The banking trojan monitors 59 Brazilian financial institutions using UI Automation and features a WPF-based full-screen overlay framework for operator-driven social engineering attacks, including credential harvesting and fake system screens. A secondary worm module enables self-propagation through WhatsApp session hijacking and Outlook COM automation, sending phishing messages from victims' own accounts. The malware implements robust anti-analysis capabilities including environment-gated payload decryption, comprehensive watchdog systems, and ETW patching. Infrastructure is hosted on Cloudflare Workers, with evidence suggesting the campaign was detected in early operational stages.
A ClickFix-style phishing campaign leveraged social engineering to trick users into executing obfuscated PowerShell commands that downloaded and installed a malicious MSI payload from a remote server. The attack employed a sophisticated multi-stage infection chain utilizing DLL sideloading techniques with renamed legitimate binaries to execute malicious components. The final payload deployed HijackLoader to deliver a Lumma-style information stealer designed for credential harvesting and data exfiltration. The campaign utilized multiple command-and-control domains and infrastructure hosted on specific IP addresses. Mitigation measures include blocking identified artifacts, enhancing user awareness about ClickFix social engineering tactics, implementing endpoint detection for suspicious PowerShell activity and unsigned DLL sideloading, and isolating compromised systems for remediation.
A sophisticated CHM-based malware campaign has been identified targeting Vietnamese victims through a trojanized CV document. The infection chain utilizes a compiled HTML file that deploys a multi-stage payload delivery mechanism involving Python interpreters, C++ DLLs, and layered XOR encryption. The malware establishes persistence through Shell hijacking and scheduled tasks, ultimately delivering a weaponized version of Rebex.Common.dll functioning as a Telegram-based remote access trojan. The RAT communicates via Telegram bot API, supporting commands for file download, token swapping, and arbitrary command execution. The infection demonstrates characteristics typical of targeted state-sponsored activity rather than opportunistic cybercrime, employing techniques historically associated with advanced threat actors operating in the Southeast Asian region.
This analysis documents a newly observed ClickFix variant that abuses native Windows utilities, specifically cmdkey and regsvr32, for payload delivery. Victims are socially engineered through fake CAPTCHA pages to execute a malicious command via the Windows Run dialog. The single command chains multiple actions: staging credentials using cmdkey, retrieving a remote DLL via regsvr32 from a UNC path, and executing it silently. The 64-bit DLL establishes persistence through a scheduled task pulled from a remote XML file hosted on attacker infrastructure. This approach avoids traditional malware drops and leverages exclusively trusted Windows components for high stealth. The variant demonstrates continued evolution of ClickFix techniques, moving beyond PowerShell to use command chaining with legitimate system tools.
Two distinct phishing campaigns have been identified targeting companies in Greece, Spain, Slovenia, Bosnia and Central American countries to deliver FormBook data-stealing malware. The first campaign uses RAR attachments containing legitimate executables like Sandboxie ImBox.exe, TikTok desktop, Adobe PDF Preview Handler, and XZ Utils, exploiting DLL side-loading with malicious DLL files. The second campaign deploys heavily obfuscated JavaScript that drops encrypted PNG files, uses PowerShell with Base64 encoding, and leverages a custom .NET loader called Mandark to inject the payload into RegAsm process. Both campaigns deliver the same FormBook executable that employs advanced evasion by manually mapping ntdll.dll in memory to bypass user-mode monitoring and perform direct syscalls, enabling credential theft and data collection from browsers while avoiding detection mechanisms.
On April 9, 2026, the cpuid.com website was compromised in a watering hole attack lasting approximately 19 hours. Download URLs for legitimate system administration tools CPU-Z, HWMonitor, HWMonitor Pro, and Perfmonitor 2 were replaced with links to malicious sites distributing trojanized versions. The malicious installers contained legitimate signed executables paired with DLL files named CRYPTBASE.dll that exploited DLL sideloading for C2 communication and payload delivery. Attackers reused infrastructure and code from a March 2026 fake FileZilla campaign, including the STX RAT as the final payload. Over 150 victims were identified globally, primarily individuals but including organizations in retail, manufacturing, consulting, telecommunications and agriculture sectors. The attack demonstrated poor operational security with reused indicators enabling rapid detection.
A South Asian financial institution was targeted with two custom malware components: BRUSHWORM, a modular backdoor, and BRUSHLOGGER, a keylogger. BRUSHWORM features anti-analysis checks, encrypted configuration, scheduled task persistence, modular payload downloading, USB worm propagation, and extensive file theft. BRUSHLOGGER uses DLL side-loading to capture system-wide keystrokes with window context tracking. The malware's low sophistication and implementation flaws suggest an inexperienced author, possibly using AI code-generation tools. Multiple testing versions were discovered on VirusTotal, indicating iterative development. The malware components combine to create a functional collection platform with modular loading, USB propagation, broad file theft, air-gap bridging, and persistent keystroke capture.
LeakNet, a ransomware operator, has expanded its initial access methods by utilizing ClickFix lures on compromised websites and implementing a new Deno-based, in-memory loader. The group has shifted from relying on initial access brokers to running its own campaigns. LeakNet's post-exploitation playbook remains consistent, involving jli.dll side-loading, PsExec-based lateral movement, and S3 bucket payload staging. The Deno loader executes base64-encoded payloads in memory, making detection challenging for traditional security tools. Defenders are advised to focus on behavioral signals and implement measures such as blocking newly registered domains, restricting Win-R access, and limiting PsExec usage to authorized administrators.
An extensive cyber espionage campaign conducted by SloppyLemming, an India-nexus threat actor, targeted government entities and critical infrastructure in Pakistan and Bangladesh from January 2025 to January 2026. The campaign used two attack vectors: PDF lures with ClickOnce execution chains and macro-enabled Excel documents. It deployed a custom x64 shellcode implant named BurrowShell and a Rust-based keylogger. The attackers extensively abused Cloudflare Workers for C2 and payload delivery, registering 112 domains impersonating government entities. The campaign focused on nuclear, defense, telecommunications, energy, and financial sectors, aligning with regional strategic competition in South Asia.
A convincing lookalike of the popular 7-Zip archiver site has been serving a trojanized installer that silently converts victims' machines into residential proxy nodes. The fake site, 7zip[.]com, distributes a functional copy of 7-Zip alongside concealed malware. The malware deploys three components: Uphero.exe (service manager), hero.exe (proxy payload), and hero.dll (supporting library). It establishes persistence through Windows services, manipulates firewall rules, and profiles the host system. The primary function is to enroll infected hosts as residential proxy nodes, allowing third parties to route traffic through victims' IP addresses. This campaign appears to be part of a broader operation with similar tactics used for other fake installers. The malware incorporates multiple evasion techniques and uses encrypted communications.