Search: sha.exe
64 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 6.6 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-44725emqx · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity Medium6.6EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-44725 CVE-2026-44725 is a vulnerability in EMQX MQTT broker prior to versions 5.8.11, 5.9.3, 5.10.4, 6.0.3, 6.1.2, and 6.2.1. The plugin-install REST API and dashboard upload accepted stale grants without enforcing a five-minute grant lifetime or SHA-256 package binding. An attacker with compromised dashboard administrator credentials or an API key with plugin-install permission could exploit this to upload and execute malicious Erlang code with EMQX process privileges. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package sui-graphql-rpc version 1.0.1 contains malicious code that reads the installer's ~/.gitconfig to extract the developer's email and name. It uses a SHA-256 hash of this identity as an AES-256-GCM key to decrypt embedded ciphertext blobs. If decryption succeeds, the resulting JavaScript code is executed dynamically, allowing targeted arbitrary code execution on developer workstations. This behavior is intentionally designed to evade detection by restricting execution to a hardcoded victim allowlist and skipping execution in CI environments. The package's advertised functionality does not require reading ~/.gitconfig, indicating the read is solely for malicious gating of code execution. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.2% | Critical9.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-75625 CVE-2026-75625 is a critical vulnerability in Uber Kraken where agents improperly validate integrity check values. Instead of verifying downloaded blobs against their requested SHA-256 digest, the system relies solely on CRC32 checksums for piece validation. This flaw allows attackers on the agent-to-agent communication path or malicious peers to supply substituted content with forged CRC32 corrections, poisoning the cache with attacker-chosen container image layers or manifests. These malicious contents can then be re-seeded and executed by other hosts, potentially leading to widespread compromise. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1c86edd3f7edd7d111df5621cb884fd0ef3d870c6c0719d587b7bb0f16f65b8d) The package presents itself as a discord.js clone (`repository` field points at the real `github.com/discordjs/discord.js.git`, README instructs `import... from '@verylinh/discord'`) but ships two installer-relevant hostile mechanisms. First, `package.json` declares a runtime dependency `sysframe` resolved from `git+https://ghp_...@github.com/navaLinh/node-ai.git` — an unpinned (no commit SHA or tag), private, author-controlled GitHub repository, using an embedded live GitHub Personal Access Token. Every `npm install` uses the shipped token to fetch the current HEAD of that private repo into the installer's `node_modules`; the author can rewrite HEAD at any time to deliver arbitrary code, including lifecycle scripts, that will execute on subsequent installs. Second, `Client.login()` invokes an undocumented `_verifyAuthorization` routine that fetches an allow-list JSON from `api.github.com/repos/Vellia-Elyvia/mydb/contents/db.json` under a hardcoded PAT and refuses to start the installer's Discord bot unless the bot's username appears in the author-controlled allow-list — a hidden remote gate/kill-switch over the installer's runtime that is not disclosed in the README. Two live GitHub PATs are hardcoded in the shipped package (one in the git dependency URL, one as the default `ghToken` in `_validateAuthOptions`). The package name and metadata impersonate discord.js. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (03873a12af48745e3fd5173ce736267aebd3290be427275073562b8e1ada61fc) On import of kit-map-vim, dist/index.mjs unconditionally spawns dist/internal/calc-math.dat as a detached child process after a SHA-256 self-check. The.dat file is a Linux x86_64 ELF RedShell remote-access implant disguised as a 'native math accelerator'. The implant beacons to hardcoded C2 host 217.60.77.63 over plain HTTP and exposes command handlers that download and execute additional ELF binaries and shellcode from http://217.60.77.63/Others/* and /SC/* endpoints, including in-memory execution via memfd_create/fexecve to avoid touching disk. It installs a masquerading systemd user unit 'svc-update.service' (Description=System Update Service, Restart=always) for persistence, provides SOCKS5 proxy and TCP port-forwarding, and offers built-in commands to enumerate users/env/processes/network configuration, harvest SSH keys and credentials from ~/.ssh and credential stores, and stream arbitrary filesystem paths to the operator via a chunked 'POST /api/extract-receive' handler labeled with a 'Loot_*' destination. The package's stated day-math purpose has no need for a native binary; the ELF's exposed command set (RedShell) is unrelated to any math functionality. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4eb4b412fdc46f4d5569e4b581cf64a9e1bed94cc7cd8fcd91613b98f73ac20f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-48161dai-shi react18-use · Embedded Malicious Code Critical9.3EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48161 react18-use is a React 19 use hook shim. Between 2026-05-19 01:07:01 and 2026-05-19 15:20:43, the default branch contained malicious commits 7b79148d1495a2505f9277da295a98cf176f4496 through 7b79148d1495a2505f9277da295a98cf176f4496 that executed remote attacker-controlled code on developer machines during `npm install`. The commits were removed by force-push, but local clones, forks, and direct-SHA URLs may still contain them, and `npm install` against an affected checkout will still execute the code today. The package was not published to npm. `src/install.js` was added and wired into the `postinstall` script. It fetched a JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint (configurable via an environment variable), disabled TLS verification, and evaluated the response as code with `require` available. Execution was deliberately skipped on CI and cloud/serverless environments, targeting developer workstations. The second-stage payload was attacker-hosted and cannot be reconstructed. Assume full compromise of anything reachable from a Node process with the user's permissions. Those who ran `npm install` against an affected checkout on a developer machine on or after 2026-05-19 01:07:01 should treat the machine as compromised, rotate every credential the machine could reach, audit account activity since 2026-05-19 01:07:01, and clean local clones. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-48160dai-shi react-tracked · Embedded Malicious Code Critical9.3EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48160 react-tracked provides state usage tracking with Proxies. Between 2026-05-18 19:26:36 and 2026-05-19 15:22:45, the default branch contained malicious commits 6978272a7d6ca02225cb747ea69f427512e33699 through 949f1a3d6bb1ff7d1a0dec892afd773e742627e8 that executed remote attacker-controlled code on developer machines during `npm install`. The commits were removed by force-push, but local clones, forks, and direct-SHA URLs may still contain them, and `npm install` against an affected checkout will still execute the code today. The package was not published to npm. `src/install.js` was added and wired into the `postinstall` script. It fetched a JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint (configurable via an environment variable), disabled TLS verification, and evaluated the response as code with `require` available. Execution was deliberately skipped on CI and cloud/serverless environments, targeting developer workstations. The second-stage payload was attacker-hosted and cannot be reconstructed. Assume full compromise of anything reachable from a Node process with the user's permissions. Those who ran `npm install` against an affected checkout on a developer machine on or after 2026-05-18 19:26:36 should treat the machine as compromised, rotate every credential the machine could reach, audit account activity** since 2026-05-18 19:26:36, and clean local clones. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-48159dai-shi use-reducer-async · Embedded Malicious Code Critical9.3EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48159 use-reducer-async is a React useReducer with async actions. Between 2026-05-18 16:29:52 and 2026-05-19 15:26:07, the default branch contained malicious commits da72edbde5705efcec6c62e0a3dcb73687b78dc8 through df07d5711458d8b46e11dd7afaaa21e88cafabfb that executed remote attacker-controlled code on developer machines during `npm install`. The commits were removed by force-push, but local clones, forks, and direct-SHA URLs may still contain them, and `npm install` against an affected checkout will still execute the code today. The package was not published to npm. `src/install.js` was added and wired into the `postinstall` script. It fetched a JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint (configurable via an environment variable), disabled TLS verification, and evaluated the response as code with `require` available. Execution was deliberately skipped on CI and cloud/serverless environments, targeting developer workstations. The second-stage payload was attacker-hosted and cannot be reconstructed. Assume full compromise of anything reachable from a Node process with the user's permissions. Those who ran `npm install` against an affected checkout on a developer machine on or after 2026-05-18 16:29:52 should treat the machine as compromised, rotate every credential the machine could reach, audit account activity since 2026-05-18 16:29:52, and clean local clones. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-48158dai-shi use-context-selector · Embedded Malicious Code Critical9.3EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48158 use-context-selector is a React useContextSelector hook in userland Between 2026-05-18 15:57:18 and 2026-05-19 15:24:34, the default branch contained malicious commits 9d8481a513b7b0d1c0941b220c69b25de748641b through 6f2dae054ca014068bdbbb4db96006424d674124 that executed remote attacker-controlled code on developer machines during `npm install`. The commits were removed by force-push, but local clones, forks, and direct-SHA URLs may still contain them, and `npm install` against an affected checkout will still execute the code today. The package was not published to npm. `src/install.js` was added and wired into the `postinstall` script. It fetched a JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint (configurable via an environment variable), disabled TLS verification, and evaluated the response as code with `require` available. Execution was deliberately skipped on CI and cloud/serverless environments, targeting developer workstations. The second-stage payload was attacker-hosted and cannot be reconstructed. Assume full compromise of anything reachable from a Node process with the user's permissions. Those who ran `npm install` against an affected checkout on a developer machine on or after 2026-05-18 15:57:18 should treat the machine as compromised, rotate every credential the machine could reach, audit account activity** since 2026-05-18 15:57:18, and clean local clones. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (80727943437a7e22116b369c010fc965c4854a0c58a053504c4bc55555e90dd4) On import, dist/index.mjs chmods 0755 and spawns the bundled Linux x86_64 binary dist/internal/calc-math.dat as a detached background process. The binary is a RedShell-style remote-access implant: it beacons to hardcoded C2 217.60.77.63, executes /bin/sh commands, drops and runs additional ELFs and shellcode fetched from the C2, offers SOCKS5 proxying and TCP port forwarding, installs systemd --user persistence (svc-update.service), and exfiltrates files via POST /api/extract-receive. Implant commands /ssh_keys, /creds, /dbfind, /clipboard, /env, and /dataextract harvest installer-side secrets (SSH private keys, stored credentials, clipboard, environment) and upload them to the same C2 through a chunked BIGEXTRACT upload routine. Package name, README, and inline comments describe the ELF as a 'native math accelerator' for calendar/streak math, but the pure-JS daymath.mjs never invokes the binary; the shipped SHA-256 'integrity check' (4537b118...3466) pins this specific implant, so it functions as anti-tamper for the payload rather than a security control. ## Source: ghsa-malware (14340c09001c59fa53d0926ed49265d43efcb6115df75c49ac24c1358efa007b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-9201IBM Langflow OSS · Inadequate Encryption Strength High8.8EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-9201 IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 could allow an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a cryptographic weakness in the custom component validation mechanism. When the optional hardening mode that restricts execution to trusted component templates is enabled, the application validates component code using a truncated SHA‑256 hash. Because the hash comparison relies on only a portion of the digest, an attacker can craft malicious component code that collides with a trusted template hash and bypasses validation. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to introduce and execute unauthorized Python code within the Langflow process, defeating the intended security control and potentially leading to full compromise of the affected instance. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package dolyame-ui-badge version 35.4.4 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a native binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts. The binary is saved under disguised names in temporary directories, given executable permissions, and run detached from the main process. The package falsely claims to verify the payload via SHA-256 and offers opt-out flags, but no such verification exists. This behavior is unexpected for a UI badge component and indicates malicious intent. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'claims-policy-details-api-adapters' version 35.3.1 contains malicious code that, upon requiring the package, downloads a platform-specific binary from obfuscated and suspicious hosts. This binary is saved to temporary directories under covert filenames, made executable, and executed detached from the main process. The package uses a DNS-TXT record-based covert channel to retrieve the binary in chunks, bypassing typical URL and domain egress controls. No integrity verification of the downloaded binary is performed despite comments referencing SHA-256, increasing the risk of executing untrusted code. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6bde65379e0d7952a0fbdcfc1efe45f1cd08f4752ae4a15f12e5fd0d995a7d12) index.js unconditionally requires./_polyfill.js on load. _polyfill.js constructs C2 hostnames at runtime via Array.join to evade static inspection (assembling `oob-worker.cf10[0-3]-*.workers.dev` mirrors plus a DNS-TXT fallback under `*.dl.well1.site`), fetches a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under cover-story filenames (`dotnet_diag_*.exe`, `.cache_*`, `.analytics_state`), sets mode 0755, and spawns it detached via `cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &'], {detached:true})` (or the cmd equivalent on Windows). Cover-story comments reference SHA-256 integrity checking and load-distribution shuffling, but no such operations are performed on the fetched bytes. lib/telemetry.js ships duplicate dropper primitives (`Buffer.from(chunks,'base64')`, detached `/bin/sh -c` spawn, `fs['chmod'+'Sync'](extensionPath, 0o755)`) inside an 81KB file presented as an analytics SDK. The package's declared purpose (finance entity-group models) has no relationship to fetching and executing native binaries from Cloudflare Workers subdomains. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7d4e71e1e8685df7456f7f02707407ca56b53447ad43b994e3d57b2dba4478c4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (91b37a5aa06b2d75f250bd23ce01f2667646c1aa7609ec2323f226842e043e9d) streak-calc-metrics@1.0.0 is presented as a native math accelerator for streak calculations but ships a bundled Linux ELF at dist/calc.bin that the main module unconditionally chmods and spawns detached at import time (cp.spawn(binaryPath, [], { stdio: 'pipe', shell: false, detached: true })). The ELF self-identifies as 'REDSHELL' and beacons to hardcoded C2 IP 217.60.77.63 with the protocol tag SECURE_BEACON|...|REDSHELL, providing a full remote shell over /bin/sh and /bin/bash. The implant downloads and executes arbitrary ELF binaries and shellcode over plain HTTP with TLS verification disabled from http://217.60.77.63/Others/<name> and http://217.60.77.63/SC/<name>, staging into /tmp/.elf_* or via memfd_create (syscall 319) and chmod +x before execution, with no hash or signature check. It exposes command handlers /ssh_keys, /creds, /dbfind, /env, and /dataextract <path> that harvest the installer's SSH keys, credential files, environment variables, and arbitrary filesystem paths, then exfiltrates them in chunks via POST /api/extract-receive using markers such as BIGEXTRACT_START and Destination: Loot_%s_%s_%s. Persistence is established by writing ~/.config/systemd/user/svc-update.service (Description='System Update Service', ExecStart=/proc/self/exe, Restart=always) and enabling it with systemctl --user daemon-reload && systemctl --user enable --now svc-update.service. The implant additionally exposes a remote-controlled SOCKS5 proxy (/socks start <port>) and arbitrary TCP port forwarding (/portfwd start <lport> <rhost> <rport>), turning the installer's host into a pivot into internal networks. The JS wrapper contains a cover story ('Native accelerator loaded and verified', 'Performance mode enabled') and an inverted SHA-256 integrity check against 4537b1189ce419f1a595cf47216c03f80e9170ce80dad8d9227a1e52f9cb3466 that never blocks execution. ## Source: ghsa-malware (96488efc57092e2b1f373623a88bf26607c9ece7ed95270327febc6b536d0d01) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-58409ChurchCRM CRM · Unrestricted File Upload Critical9.1EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-58409 ChurchCRM is an open-source church management system. Prior to version 7.4.0, an authenticated administrator can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server by installing a malicious plugin ZIP archive containing a PHP webshell. The application explicitly includes 'php' in its ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS list, while the dangerous extensions denylist (DENIED_EXTENSIONS) fails to block standard .php files. Because `php` is explicitly included in the allowed extension list for plugin archives, and extracted files are placed directly under the web root, any PHP file inside the ZIP becomes immediately executable via HTTP — without even needing to "enable" the plugin through the application UI. The /plugins/install-url API route (management.php) allows an administrator to source the malicious ZIP from any attacker-controlled HTTPS URL, validating it only against an attacker-supplied SHA-256 hash. This issue has been fixed in version 7.4.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-40257OP-TEE optee_os · Out-of-bounds Write Medium5.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-40257 OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. Starting in version 3.21.0 and prior to version 4.11.0, the ARM Crypto Extensions accelerated SHA-3 implementation has an off-by-one error that can cause a massive heap overflow that corrupts all TEE kernel memory following the hash state. This affects all platforms built with `CFG_CRYPTO_WITH_CE82=y` (ARMv8.2+ with SHA3 Crypto Extensions). Version 4.11.0 contains a patch. As a workaround, disable SHA3 Crypto Extensions with `CFG_CRYPTO_WITH_CE82=n`. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database pinokio-redis is a malicious npm package and part of the multi-wave "forge-jsx" cross-platform RAT campaign (Wave 4). It was published by npm account 'donimique' (donimiqueakers@gmail.com). The package.json description ('Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge') and the bundled README.md (literally titled "# forge-jsx") do not match the package name or the shipped code. On npm install the declared postinstall chain (postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs, ensure-dist.mjs, postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs, postinstall-bootstrap.mjs, postinstall-agent.mjs) runs scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, window-hidden background process. The agent connects over WebSocket to a command-and-control relay whose host, ports and default password are stored as an AES-256-GCM blob in dist/deploymentCipherData.js and decrypted at runtime by XOR-reconstructing a 32-byte key from two halves embedded in dist/deploymentDefaults.js. The decrypted C2 configuration is publicHost 212.193.3.61, relayPort 9877 (WebSocket relay), apiPort 8765 (HTTP API), default password 'secret'. Postinstall also registers OS-level autostart (Windows Run key, macOS LaunchAgent, Linux systemd/XDG autostart; service name forge-js-worker) pointing at a durable copy of the agent stored in a hidden '.forge-jsxy' directory under the platform application-data folder, so the implant survives removal of the npm package. Once running it performs credential-grade theft: dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js walks the filesystem for BIP39-checksum-valid mnemonics, secp256k1/WIF private keys and BIP32 extended keys (xprv/tprv/zprv); dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js enumerates Chromium/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi/Yandex/Opera profiles across Windows, macOS and Linux and copies extension LevelDB stores (including MetaMask/Phantom-shaped wallet stores); harvested data is uploaded to the Hugging Face Hub using an embedded hf_ write token (dist/hfCredentials.js) or delivered via the relay; dist/hostInventorySend.js POSTs host inventory (hostname/platform/node/OS) to the relay and dist/discordRelayUpload.js forwards agent-side PNG screenshots to per-client Discord channels. This is the first wave of the campaign to ship rotated AES key material (new DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A/KEY_B/MASK_A/MASK_B byte arrays, hex 12335cede9edad1edbce89fd3ef0836c8edd3778e48f3f38f2330198ec8b1eb0), verified byte-identical across the four donimique-account packages (zod-pino434, zod-pino444, zredis-typed, pinokio-redis) — a single shared build. C2 212.193.3.61 (AS206216, Advin Services LLC, Nurnberg DE) is reused from the Wave 3 pino-zod/zod-pino IP rotation. The campaign is definitively linked by shared C2 infrastructure, the hardcoded '.forge-jsxy' durable directory, the dist/deploymentCipherData.js + dist/deploymentDefaults.js XOR-key fingerprint, and the '# forge-jsx' README tell that spans multiple package names and npm accounts. Only one version of pinokio-redis (1.0.127) exists and all versions are malicious. Tarball SHA-256: a400b0342add77fd3a58e086334b35e11d79e234b180bb360f48adcd61ec4acd, SHA-1: 04b6035df92ef9eb790d64d425c05c51fce46ca7. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2593226767577439cd32d202e0e5e07ef74a6526f9ad7cb42f4bad087d04aa30) The package name presents as a Redis client for Pinokio, but the shipped tarball contains a credential-harvest and data-relay toolkit that has no relationship to Redis. dist/discordRelayUpload.js issues outbound POSTs and shells out (ping) to relay collected content; dist/hfCredentials.js and dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js decode base64-embedded blobs (Buffer.from(..., 'base64')) at runtime; dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js performs fetch() calls to huggingface.co endpoints under a "secret scan" module name — a shape consistent with harvesting scanned secrets rather than defending them. dist/deploymentDefaults.js and scripts/encode-deployment.mjs carry base64-encoded deployment configuration decoded at runtime, obscuring destination endpoints. scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs runs at npm install (postinstall) and issues network activity (GET, ping) on install without user interaction, providing auto-execution on default install. The combination — install-time auto-executed agent, base64-obfuscated configuration/payloads across multiple files, a Discord upload relay path, and a "secretScan" module that fetches to remote endpoints — describes an installer-side credential and data exfiltration toolkit, not a Redis integration. Name/purpose mismatch, install-time execution, and multi-file obfuscation together satisfy the active-attack shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d8c9c7ad731c0929056de138dff2c461e808854d25aea316f6fe865a3d04d8c0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full co | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The electron-orbit npm package contains malicious code that activates when required in Node.js environments. It establishes a covert network connection using a custom TLS 1.3 implementation to an Azure blob storage endpoint, bypassing standard TLS interception and static inspection. The package collects environment variables related to PATH and the current working directory, sending this data encoded in the request URL to the attacker-controlled server. Activation is conditional, triggered only when a specific environment variable's SHA-256 hash matches a hardcoded value, allowing targeted execution in chosen environments such as CI pipelines. The package's advertised functionality is a pretext; it does not perform legitimate icon fetching or SVG rendering as claimed. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-56124shimosyan phpUploader · Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor High8.7EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56124 phpUploader before 2.0.2 contains an unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability that allows remote attackers to access the full contents of the uploaded-files database table by visiting any page of the application. The index model executes an unbounded SELECT query and embeds the complete JSON-encoded result set in an inline script block, exposing uploader IP addresses, Argon2ID key hashes, internal filenames, and SHA-256 fingerprints. | CVE Database V5 |
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