Search: payload.bin
656 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (5cb86188f9853b34c6dc3cf9c8259a789920326e8ddf4ae4cd3566385bba3ea1) The package presents itself as a dotenv-style environment loader but ships a Windows dropper that fires automatically on module load and on CLI invocation. Both dist/index.cjs (the package main) and dist/cli.cjs (the bin) contain an inlined routine dispatchAnalytics() invoked at top level. That routine reads dist/stest.jpg, extracts an encoded payload from the JPEG APP14 (0xED) segment, writes a self-deleting VBS wrapper to os.tmpdir(), and launches it via wscript.exe to run powershell.exe with -EncodedCommand, using detached and windowsHide to hide the console. The strings 'powershell.exe', 'wscript.exe', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', and '-EncodedCommand' are reconstructed by joining split fragments to evade static analysis, and the executable content is smuggled inside a JPEG rather than appearing as a literal in source. Because the payload is opaque encoded PowerShell decoded at runtime from a bundled image, the eventual behavior on the installer's Windows host is fully attacker-controlled. Any require('secure-env3'), import 'secure-env3/config', or execution of the dot2env CLI on Windows triggers this hidden execution path. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (43eddaf152e2aa60b9f823513a2d9b11fc424a5cff4bb3c031f6823a48dc2f4e) package.json declares a postinstall hook `wscript.exe 4444.vbs` that fires automatically on `npm install`. The shipped 4444.vbs contains a ~660-entry base64 string array (ArtifactBundleHX) that is reassembled and decrypted through layered AES-256-CBC and ChaCha20-IETF (keys derived via SHA-256) at install time, written to %TEMP% as a random `.dat` file, and passed to powershell.exe as a two-tier loader for in-memory execution / process hollowing. The VBS additionally obfuscates its Windows API surface: CreateObject targets such as `ADODB.Stream` and `Msxml2.DOMDocument` are stored as XOR-encoded colon-delimited integer arrays and decoded at runtime, and the AES S-boxes and SHA-256 round constants are XOR-masked. The package presents a `Device Telemetry Aggregator` / `Verdant Signals Corp` cover story in comments while package.json ships empty author and description fields. The combination of an auto-executed lifecycle script, multi-layer cryptographic unpacking of a hidden payload, in-memory PowerShell hand-off, and misleading self-labeling is arbitrary code execution on the installer's Windows host at install time. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (eff7b9f53e0aed7a8a1c48ae92851ea0ed67b86566d208c78329ecb1b8a73173) src/index.js unconditionally invokes _bootstrap() from src/utils/bootstrap.js at module load time. bootstrap.js is heavily obfuscated with javascript-obfuscator (400-entry rotating string-array decoder, hex-escaped identifiers, self-defending wrapper, control-flow flattening) and imports the full download-and-execute primitive set: https.get/http.get, fs.createWriteStream, fs.mkdirSync, fs.chmodSync, fs.unlinkSync, os.tmpdir, and child_process.execFile/spawn. The destination URL, dropped filename, and executed argv are reconstructed at runtime from the obfuscated string array, so the network target and payload are concealed from static inspection. package.json declares javascript-obfuscator as a devDependency and defines an `obfuscate` build script, confirming the concealment is deliberate. The advertised purpose of the package is terminal string coloring / title setting, which does not require fetching or executing a binary at import time. Any consumer that imports chromatitle-js triggers the fetch-and-execute chain on the installer's machine. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General The domain third-party[.]com, historically used as a documentation placeholder similar to example.com, has been compromised and now serves ClickFix lures to Windows users while displaying harmless content to other operating systems. Since at least June 2026, Windows visitors receive a fake Cloudflare verification page that poisons the clipboard with a malicious PowerShell command, instructing users to press Win+R and paste the payload. The domain appears in over 1,500 files across 1,700+ repositories from trusted sources including Chromium, Sanity, and Vercel. Unlike example.com, third-party[.]com is not IANA-reserved, allowing adversaries to register and weaponize it. The attack leverages social engineering to bypass security tools by using signed Windows binaries, making detection difficult through traditional scanning methods. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A detailed technical analysis examines the evolution of MacSync, a macOS stealer-as-a-service initially known as Mac.c, which targets cryptocurrency enthusiasts and developers. The malware has undergone significant changes, replacing AppleScript-based droppers with binary executable files written in Objective-C and Swift. The infection chain utilizes malicious DMG images and employs iCloud infrastructure for payload delivery. MacSync collects extensive data including browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, Telegram data, SSH configurations, and keychain files. The stealer incorporates novel techniques like PAM API for password verification and features a backdoor module for persistent access. Distribution occurs through social engineering, fake applications, and cracked software disguised as legitimate crypto wallets like the nonexistent Toria wallet, promoted through dedicated websites and social media channels. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-66079rabbitmq-server · Unthrottled Resource Allocation High8.2EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-66079 RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6, parse_array_primitive/2 for constructor 0x45 (list0) returns an element with byte-width B = 0. The enclosing array32 parser at line 148 reads a 4-byte Count from the wire and loops Count times consuming B bytes each , with B = 0, no input is consumed and the loop builds a list of Count empty elements bounded only by the 32-bit field. The SASL-mechanisms / SASL-init frame is parsed by amqp10_framing:decode_bin/1 from rabbit_amqp_reader.erl:412 before authentication completes. The pre-auth incoming_max_frame_size (default 8192 bytes) caps the frame, not the Count field, so a 19-byte payload with Count = 0xFFFFFFFF is accepted. No max_heap_size is set on the reader process. An unauthenticated network attacker can crash any RabbitMQ node that has the AMQP 1.0 listener enabled (default port 5672) by sending a single ~19-byte frame. The reader process attempts to build a list of ~4 billion empty elements, exhausting heap memory and terminating the Erlang VM. All tenants and protocols on the node lose service. Preconditions include Network reachability to the AMQP listener (port 5672, enabled by default) No authentication required. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, and 4.2.6. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package bytepack-probe-a7x3 versions 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 declare a dependency on a package named leak-internal, which is fetched from an external HTTPS tarball URL rather than a standard registry. This tarball is retrieved without version pinning, integrity verification, or signature checks, allowing arbitrary code execution during npm install. The external URL and dependency name suggest the payload is designed to perform internal network probing, potentially leaking sensitive information. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General In April 2026, a manufacturing organization in the Middle East was targeted by a ransomware attack leveraging Active Directory Group Policy Objects (GPOs) without deploying ransomware binaries on endpoints. Attackers with domain admin privileges created malicious GPOs linked at the domain root to distribute ransom notes, modify user interface elements, enforce logon banners, and disable local administrator accounts across all domain-joined workstations. The attack did not encrypt files but focused on operational disruption and data exfiltration. Initial access was obtained via compromised VPN credentials. The attackers delayed activation by one day to evade detection by file-based security tools, exploiting trusted Active Directory infrastructure for domain-wide impact. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.3% | Critical9.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59163 Mnemosyne is a memory layer for artificial intelligence agents. Prior to v3.10.1, the auth check in mnemosyne/core/sync_server.py parsed the JWT's header and payload using base64 decoding, then passed the token to a jwt library call with options that effectively disabled signature verification. The server accepted any well-formed token regardless of the signature, including tokens with alg: none and tokens signed with the wrong key. The fix in v3.10.1 replaces the broken decode with a from-scratch HS256 verifier using only the Python standard library. For users who cannot upgrade immediately, restrict network access to the sync server endpoint to trusted clients only. Firewall, reverse proxy with mTLS, or localhost bind with SSH tunnel are all viable. The vulnerability is not exploitable against an unreachable endpoint. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.7EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-89418 google-protobuf contains an unbounded recursion when parsing unknown protobuf group fields. An attacker can send a small crafted payload of deeply nested START_GROUP wire bytes to any Node.js service that calls the generated deserializeBinary() API, causing a RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded and crashing the process. No authentication or prior knowledge of the schema is required. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-90678HAProxy · CWE-130 High7.5EPSS 0.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-90678 An issue was discovered in HAProxy 3.3.0 through 3.4.4 and in 3.5-dev1 through 3.5-dev5. Exploitation requires an HTTP/3 frontend: HAProxy must be built with QUIC support and configured with a QUIC bind listener, and the affected traffic must reach a backend over HTTP/1.1 using chunked transfer coding on a reused connection. Under those conditions, when an HTTP/3 request carries no Content-Length header, the HTTP/3 multiplexer credits the length declared in a DATA frame header to the stream endpoint's known-input-payload estimate at the moment the frame header is decoded, before the payload has been received, and that declared length is emitted verbatim as the HTTP/1.1 chunk size. A remote unauthenticated client that declares more payload than it delivers and then ends the stream causes HAProxy to announce a chunk larger than the bytes it writes and to return the connection to the idle pool in a desynchronized state. The result is potential HTTP request smuggling on reused backend connections: an attacker can place a request past a frontend rule such as a path-based http-request deny, so that the smuggled request is never seen by HAProxy's HTTP analysis, and can cause concurrent clients' requests, including their request lines and Authorization headers, to be consumed as the attacker's request body and lost. Exploitation is not deterministic; it depends on a race with backend connection pooling, succeeding in a majority of but not all trials during testing, and can be retried freely. The mechanism was introduced in 3.3-dev10; releases 3.2.x and earlier are unaffected. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4c611131ac135f4608698ce56eebd7dc89623b591510a050f2059369c9d51bbf) Pymem-win is a near-verbatim copy of the legitimate upstream Pymem package (reusing its description, repository URL github.com/srounet/Pymem, and author identity Fabien Reboia <srounet@gmail.com>) republished under a confusable name. The top-level pymem/__init__.py contains a one-line loader that reverses a bytes literal, base64-decodes it, zlib-decompresses it, and passes the result to exec(). This runs unconditionally on `import pymem`, handing full in-process code execution to a payload deliberately hidden behind three stacked transforms. The multi-layer obfuscation around an exec target has no legitimate purpose in a library import path; combined with the typosquat cover story that reuses the upstream author's identity, the package's function on install/import is to run attacker-chosen code inside any process that imports it. ## Source: kam193 (82eb1f11c9b56a2f2c3e97530db43ef94784a2c75697223828403927b0528477) During import, the obfuscated code downloads and executes an executable. The remote executable did not exist during analysis, but the repository used to host it overlaps with previous campaign 2026-07-yt-api-dlp --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-09-pymem-win Reasons (based on the campaign): - obfuscation - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - clones-real-package | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (38b69dc345e5f7b75dbe6dccaf3dfc013a98e302176130aac064cbd8d042bae7) The distribution eth-account-web3 installs under the import name eth_account, colliding with the legitimate ethereum/eth-account library. On import, __init__.py invokes _auto()/sync() in a background thread named 'urllib3-connection-pool'. When the ETH_ACCT_RPC and ETH_ACCT_CONTRACT environment variables are present, sync() issues an eth_call to the configured contract to retrieve a URL, downloads the response over HTTP(S) with no hash or signature verification, and passes the bytes to _apply_txn_payload. Python payloads are handed to exec(compile(...)). Windows PE payloads (MZ magic) are mapped via CreateFileMappingW/MapViewOfFile and launched with CreateProcessW using DETACHED_PROCESS|CREATE_NO_WINDOW, avoiding any on-disk artifact. Other binary payloads are written to /tmp/_ethrt_<pid>.bin, chmod +x'd, spawned detached with start_new_session=True, and then deleted. The URL source is attacker-controlled (a Solidity contract the operator of the on-chain pointer can update at any time), giving remote code execution on the installer with in-memory execution and anti-forensics on Windows and immediate file cleanup on POSIX. The import-name collision and the urllib3-impersonating thread name are deliberate concealment intended to blend into normal Python/Web3 activity. ## Source: kam193 (25b1d3ecadcdc171186f8b8c574e830d3078a33be08f0455fd7bafc179d028ca) A clone of a legitimate package with import-time malicious code activating if specific env variables are set. Once activated, it queries the blockchain to retrieve the next stage URL stored in a smart contract. The payload from the URL is then downloaded and executed. The address of the smart contract is not included in the package. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-09-web3-eth-account Reasons (based on the campaign): - typosquatting - clones-real-package - c2-in-blockchain - Downloads and executes a remote malicious script. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (19e3eadaccc63a1e12d0e3cfe153cbf78e114f30285d4da3694990827e5f5c5a) The package `web3-eth-account` typosquats the legitimate `eth-account` library and copies its metadata (ApeWorX/ethereum.org author addresses, README instructing `pip install eth-account`). On `import eth_account`, `__init__.py` calls `_auto()` which, when the environment variables `ETH_ACCT_RPC` and `ETH_ACCT_CONTRACT` are set, spawns a background thread (named `urllib3-connection-pool` for cover) that performs a JSON-RPC `eth_call` with selector `0x5600f04f` against an attacker-controlled Ethereum contract, decodes an ABI-encoded URL from contract storage, downloads bytes via `urllib.request.urlopen`, and hands them to `_apply_txn_payload` in `signing.py` / `transaction_utils.py`. That sink classifies the fetched bytes and executes them three ways: Python source via `exec(compile(...))`; Windows PE loaded in-memory via ctypes `CreateFileMappingW`/`MapViewOfFile`/`CreateProcessW`; otherwise written to `/tmp/_ethrt_<pid>.bin`, `chmod +x`, launched via `subprocess.Popen` in a new session with the file removed after launch. The C2 URL is resolved on-chain rather than embedded as a literal, defeating static URL extraction, and the dropper functions are disguised under transaction/signing names. ## Source: kam193 (bd36aeb2d45881a66bf5373c0b91a108637938dab5e0c153525e6f938c9c9503) A clone of a legitimate package with import-time malicious code activating if specific env variables are set. Once activated, it queries the blockchain to retrieve the next stage URL stored in a smart contract. The payload from the URL is then downloaded and executed. The address of the smart contract is not included in the package. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-09-web3-eth-account Reasons (based on the campaign): - typosquatting - clones-real-package - c2-in-blockchain - Downloads and executes a remote malicious script. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Threat actors exploited trusted brands and cloud services in a sophisticated web campaign combining fraudulent DocuSign workflows, Florida healthcare screening lures, and deceptive cloud infrastructure to deploy ConnectWise ScreenConnect Access clients. The attack utilized Cloudflare Pages hosting with fake Cloudflare verification workflows to establish legitimacy. Victims were socially engineered to download a ZIP archive containing a malicious HTA file that employed Base64-encoded VBScript, fake Adobe interfaces, UAC privilege escalation, and Microsoft Defender SmartScreen registry modifications. The attack leveraged living-off-the-land techniques using native Windows tools like mshta.exe, curl.exe, and msiexec.exe for silent ScreenConnect installation, ultimately providing unauthorized remote access. The campaign was classified as Zero Hour Fraudulent and blocked at the web entry point before payload delivery could occur. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d7d5f0fb8c06c23afad28686a3d3d689dfc5a3786c73bff2c569fd8b55f2b4ad) The package's preinstall.js lifecycle script executes automatically on `npm install` and performs reconnaissance on the installer host. It collects hostname, username, current working directory, platform, and the output of OS commands including `whoami /all`, `ipconfig /all` / `ifconfig`, `tasklist` / `ps aux`, directory listings of `/`, `C:\`, and the user's home, and a dump of environment variables. The collected data is transmitted via HTTP GET and POST to the hardcoded bare IP endpoint `http://209.126.81.147/etoro-nuget-verify1f8eaa57a875/v4/...`. The package's declared main is an empty stub and its description ("Internal service client library") combined with the implausibly high version number `99.0.2` is consistent with a dependency-confusion attack targeting an internal `etoro-aggregator` name. The manifest plus the preinstall script constitute the entire payload; installing the package leaks installer host identity, network configuration, filesystem structure, and environment variables (which routinely contain credentials and tokens) to an attacker-controlled endpoint. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A massive cybercrime campaign tracked as CL-CRI-1171 has operated undetected for at least two years, utilizing a pay-per-install marketplace to distribute multiple malware families. The operation targeted primarily young gamers through YouTube channels with hundreds of thousands of followers, while simultaneously using SEO poisoning to compromise corporate endpoints including critical infrastructure and government entities. The campaign employed OfferLoader, a custom loader capable of delivering unique payload combinations through sophisticated gating mechanisms. Three distinct malware families were identified: Insomnia RAT, a cross-platform backdoor targeting Windows and macOS; ARKTunnel, a WebSocket tunneling tool hidden via steganography; and Docro Hijacker, a Chrome browser hijacker. Over 10,000 distinct loader samples were discovered, indicating a much larger deployment campaign affecting numerous organizations globally. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The net-util-y8 npm package contains a malicious payload hidden in its package.json description field. This payload is a large base64-encoded POSIX shell script that acts as a dropper for the XMRig Monero miner. The script attempts to ensure required tools are installed with root privileges, downloads XMRig binaries from suspicious sources, and configures the miner to connect to a specific Monero mining pool using a hardcoded wallet address. It also includes functionality to kill competing miners and obfuscate its process name. This package appears to be part of a multi-package cryptomining campaign using payload smuggling techniques to evade detection. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package @yane88/workbuddy versions 1.0.0 through 1.0.3 contains malicious code that delivers a Windows executable payload by reassembling split ZIP archive parts from sibling packages during installation. This behavior is not standard for npm packages and indicates a deliberate attempt to deliver opaque binary malware. Systems with this package installed should be considered fully compromised, and all secrets and keys on those systems must be rotated immediately. Removal of the package alone may not eliminate all malicious components. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An attacker exploited a flawed GitHub Actions workflow in the npm package @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen to publish 10 malicious versions. The vulnerability stemmed from an issue_comment trigger lacking author-association checks, allowing arbitrary users to trigger npm publishing from forked repositories. The malicious payload used multiple execution methods, including a binding.gyp file exploiting node-gyp's Python evaluation and a preinstall hook, ultimately delivering a large obfuscated script that downloaded Bun v1.4.0. This attack aligns with the Mini Shai-Hulud toolkit previously seen in other supply chain compromises. All malicious versions have been removed from npm. | AlienVault OTX General |
Page 3 of 33