Threats tagged 'homebrew'

### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes. This requires loading a PDF with a large trailer `/Size` value in incremental mode. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.10.2](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.10.2). ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#3735](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3735).

### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to large memory usage. This requires extracting text in layout mode with large character offsets. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.12.0](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.12.0). ### Workarounds If developers are unable to immediately upgrade, they should consider applying the changes from PR [#3790](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3790).

### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes. This requires cross-reference streams with `/W [0 0 0]` values and large `/Size` values. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.12.0](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.12.0). ### Workarounds If developers are unable to upgrade their apps immediately, they should consider applying the changes from PR [#3791](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3791).

### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to large memory usage. This requires extracting the text of a page which contains a form XObject with self-references. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.12.2](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.12.2). ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#3805](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3805).

### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to an infinite loop. This requires extracting the text in layout mode. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.13.0](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.13.0). ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#3830](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3830).

### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to an infinite loop. This requires merging a file with outlines into a writer. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.13.0](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.13.0). ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#3830](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3830).

### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to an infinite loop. This requires merging a file with threads/articles into a writer. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.13.1](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.13.1). ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#3839](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3839).

### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to long runtimes and large memory consumption. This requires parsing the font width entries of a font with unusually large values, for example during text extraction. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.15.0](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.15.0). ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#3946](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3946).

### Impact An attacker who uses this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to large memory consumption. This requires parsing the `/ToUnicode` entry of a font with unusually large values, for example during text extraction. ### Patches This has been fixed in [pypdf==6.15.0](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.15.0). ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade yet, consider applying the changes from PR [#3944](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3944).

CVE-2025-50181 is a vulnerability in the osc-cli product related to urllib3's handling of redirects when retries are disabled on PoolManager instantiation. The retries parameter intended to disable redirects at the PoolManager level is ignored, causing redirects to remain enabled. This can leave applications vulnerable to SSRF or open redirect attacks if they rely on disabling redirects at this level. The vulnerability affects specific versions of osc-cli and related packages. A patch is available to fix this issue.

## Summary When building a source distribution (`python -m build --sdist` / `setup.py sdist`), setuptools' `FileList` applies `MANIFEST.in` directives (`exclude`, `global-exclude`, `recursive-exclude`, `prune`) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names **byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization**. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and a `MANIFEST.in` rule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the `.tar.gz` and, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index. ## Details File names in `FileList.files` come from `os.walk` (`setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`, `_find_all_simple`), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while the `MANIFEST.in` pattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization: ```python # setuptools/command/egg_info.py (FileList.global_exclude) def global_exclude(self, pattern): match = translate_pattern(os.path.join('**', pattern)) # fnmatch.translate -> regex, no NFC/NFD return self._remove_files(match.match) # byte-level regex over raw os.walk names ``` A rule written NFC (`café` = `63 61 66 c3 a9`) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (`café` = `63 61 66 65 cc 81`), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file. A `unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...)` helper exists in `setuptools/unicode_utils.py` (`decompose()`), but it is **never called in the manifest matching path**, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area, `EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize`, uses `filesys_decode` (bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writing `SOURCES.txt`, after matching has already occurred. ## Impact `MANIFEST.in` exclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected. ## Proof of concept With a project containing `MANIFEST.in`: ``` global-include *.txt *.json global-exclude secret_café.txt # rule saved NFC ``` and an on-disk file `secret_café.txt` written in NFD, `python -m build --sdist` packs the secret file into the resulting `.tar.gz`, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1. ## Remediation Normalize both the walked path and each `MANIFEST.in` pattern to a single canonical form before matching, in both `setuptools/command/egg_info.py` (`FileList`) and the vendored `setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py`. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document that `MANIFEST.in` matching is normalization-insensitive on macOS. ## Credit Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.

### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in `PackageIndex` was fixed in setuptools version 78.1.1 ### Details ``` def _download_url(self, url, tmpdir): # Determine download filename # name, _fragment = egg_info_for_url(url) if name: while '..' in name: name = name.replace('..', '.').replace('\\', '_') else: name = "__downloaded__" # default if URL has no path contents if name.endswith('.[egg.zip](http://egg.zip/)'): name = name[:-4] # strip the extra .zip before download --> filename = os.path.join(tmpdir, name) ``` Here: https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/6ead555c5fb29bc57fe6105b1bffc163f56fd558/setuptools/package_index.py#L810C1-L825C88 `os.path.join()` discards the first argument `tmpdir` if the second begins with a slash or drive letter. `name` is derived from a URL without sufficient sanitization. While there is some attempt to sanitize by replacing instances of '..' with '.', it is insufficient. ### Risk Assessment As easy_install and package_index are deprecated, the exploitation surface is reduced. However, it seems this could be exploited in a similar fashion like https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9hx-vwmv-q579, and as described by POC 4 in https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cx63-2mw6-8hw5 report: via malicious URLs present on the pages of a package index. ### Impact An attacker would be allowed to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem with the permissions of the process running the Python code, which could escalate to RCE depending on the context. ### References https://huntr.com/bounties/d6362117-ad57-4e83-951f-b8141c6e7ca5 https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/issues/4946

### Summary MCP SSE redirects could forward Authorization headers. In affected versions, a lower-trust caller or configured input path could execute or persist actions beyond the caller's intended authorization. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could execute or persist actions beyond the caller's intended authorization. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.6.5`. ### Mitigations Upgrade to a patched OpenClaw release when one is listed. Before upgrading, restrict the affected feature to trusted operators or disable it when it is not needed. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

### Summary Workspace .env could override Homebrew executable selection for skill install flows. In affected versions, a workspace `.env` in a repository opened by a trusted operator could override the Homebrew executable used by the install helper. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could run an unintended Homebrew-compatible executable during skill setup. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.27`. ### Mitigations avoid running skill install flows from untrusted workspaces until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

### Summary MCP loopback could skip owner-only tool policy for non-owner callers. In affected versions, a non-owner caller reaching the affected loopback path could skip owner-only tool policy and before-tool-call hooks. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could invoke owner-only behavior through that loopback path. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Resolution Update to a patched OpenClaw release when one is listed for this advisory. If the Patched versions field is populated, use that version or later. ### Mitigations restrict MCP loopback access to trusted operators until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

### Summary In affected LAN/shared-token Control UI deployments, a caller could spoof locality information used during Control UI pairing and obtain a durable admin-capable device token. This issue is limited to deployments where the caller already has the network/authentication foothold needed to reach the Control UI pairing path. It is not an unauthenticated internet exposure issue. ### Affected configurations This affects configurations such as LAN-bound gateways or shared-token Control UI access where locality signals were accepted as sufficient for pairing decisions. ### Impact A temporary or shared Control UI access path could be turned into a persistent admin device token. That token could remain useful after the shared gateway token was rotated, unless the paired device was removed. The issue is a pairing/locality validation problem: locality-derived trust was stronger than it should have been. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.22`. ### Mitigations Upgrade to `openclaw@2026.5.22` or later. For older deployments, remove unexpected paired devices and avoid exposing Control UI pairing paths on networks with untrusted clients.

### Summary Message read actions could skip channel allowlist checks. In affected versions, a lower-trust caller with access to the affected message read action could request messages without the same channel allowlist check used by normal delivery. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could expose messages from a channel that was not intended for that caller. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.19`. ### Mitigations limit message read actions to trusted operators and keep channel allowlists narrow. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

### Summary OpenClaw hook ingress can start automated agent runs using a configured hook token. In affected releases, a hook-triggered run could select a bundled CLI backend that received owner-scoped MCP loopback authority instead of a scope appropriate for hook ingress. This issue affects the boundary between hook-token automation and owner-only MCP tools. It does not affect deployments with hooks disabled. ### Affected configurations This affects deployments where hooks are enabled, `/hooks/agent` is reachable with a valid hook token, and a bundled CLI backend can be selected for the hook-triggered run. ### Impact A caller with the hook token could cause the spawned CLI runtime to see or call MCP tools that should have been owner-only. The practical impact depends on which MCP tools are available; the reported proof used persistent cron state as a representative owner-only action. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.20`. Fixed in the `2026.5.20` stable release. ### Mitigations Upgrade to `openclaw@2026.5.20` or later. Keep hook tokens secret, restrict network access to hook endpoints, and disable hooks when they are not needed.

### Summary Fake package roots could influence memory-core artifact loading. In affected versions, a local package root resolution path influenced by workspace state could select a package root that was not the intended bundled artifact root. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could load memory-core artifacts from an unintended local location. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.4.25`. ### Mitigations run memory-core flows from trusted workspaces until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

### Summary Matrix allowFrom could bind to mutable display names. In affected versions, a Matrix account able to change display name metadata could match a policy entry through mutable display metadata. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive agent access intended for another Matrix identity. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.7`. ### Mitigations use stable Matrix user IDs in allowlists until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.