Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.18.21 includes a security update addressing a vulnerability in the github.com/golang/glog package related to log file creation (CVE-2024-45339). This update is rated as having an Important security impact by Red Hat Product Security. Users of OpenShift Container Platform 4.18 are advised to upgrade to the updated packages and container images to mitigate this issue.
The vulnerability was identified in the code developed specifically for Lenovo. Please visit "Lenovo Product Security Advisories and Announcements" webpage for more information about the vulnerability. https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/home
FBI seizes $2.4M in Bitcoin from new Chaos ransomware operation
Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fbi-seizes-24m-in-bitcoin-from-new-chaos-ransomware-operation/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: Abort __tc_modify_qdisc if parent class does not exist Lion's patch [1] revealed an ancient bug in the qdisc API. Whenever a user creates/modifies a qdisc specifying as a parent another qdisc, the qdisc API will, during grafting, detect that the user is not trying to attach to a class and reject. However grafting is performed after qdisc_create (and thus the qdiscs' init callback) is executed. In qdiscs that eventually call qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog during init or change (such as fq, hhf, choke, etc), an issue arises. For example, executing the following commands: sudo tc qdisc add dev lo root handle a: htb default 2 sudo tc qdisc add dev lo parent a: handle beef fq Qdiscs such as fq, hhf, choke, etc unconditionally invoke qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() in their control path init() or change() which then causes a failure to find the child class; however, that does not stop the unconditional invocation of the assumed child qdisc's qlen_notify with a null class. All these qdiscs make the assumption that class is non-null. The solution is ensure that qdisc_leaf() which looks up the parent class, and is invoked prior to qdisc_create(), should return failure on not finding the class. In this patch, we leverage qdisc_leaf to return ERR_PTRs whenever the parentid doesn't correspond to a class, so that we can detect it earlier on and abort before qdisc_create is called. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/d912cbd7-193b-4269-9857-525bee8bbb6a@gmail.com/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Correct signedness in skb remaining space calculation Syzkaller reported a bug [1] where sk->sk_forward_alloc can overflow. When we send data, if an skb exists at the tail of the write queue, the kernel will attempt to append the new data to that skb. However, the code that checks for available space in the skb is flawed: ''' copy = size_goal - skb->len ''' The types of the variables involved are: ''' copy: ssize_t (s64 on 64-bit systems) size_goal: int skb->len: unsigned int ''' Due to C's type promotion rules, the signed size_goal is converted to an unsigned int to match skb->len before the subtraction. The result is an unsigned int. When this unsigned int result is then assigned to the s64 copy variable, it is zero-extended, preserving its non-negative value. Consequently, copy is always >= 0. Assume we are sending 2GB of data and size_goal has been adjusted to a value smaller than skb->len. The subtraction will result in copy holding a very large positive integer. In the subsequent logic, this large value is used to update sk->sk_forward_alloc, which can easily cause it to overflow. The syzkaller reproducer uses TCP_REPAIR to reliably create this condition. However, this can also occur in real-world scenarios. The tcp_bound_to_half_wnd() function can also reduce size_goal to a small value. This would cause the subsequent tcp_wmem_schedule() to set sk->sk_forward_alloc to a value close to INT_MAX. Further memory allocation requests would then cause sk_forward_alloc to wrap around and become negative. [1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=de6565462ab540f50e47
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: carl9170: do not ping device which has failed to load firmware Syzkaller reports [1, 2] crashes caused by an attempts to ping the device which has failed to load firmware. Since such a device doesn't pass 'ieee80211_register_hw()', an internal workqueue managed by 'ieee80211_queue_work()' is not yet created and an attempt to queue work on it causes null-ptr-deref. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9a4aec827829942045ff [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0d8afba53e8fb2633217
Red Hat Ceph Storage is a scalable, open, software-defined storage platform that combines the most stable version of the Ceph storage system with a Ceph management platform, deployment utilities, and support services.
This new container image is based on Red Hat Ceph Storage 8.1 and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.10, 9.5, 9.6.
Users are directed to the Red Hat Ceph Storage Release Notes for full Red Hat Ceph Storage 8.1 Release Notes information:
https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_ceph_storage/8/html/8.1_release_notes
All users of Red Hat Ceph Storage are advised to pull these new images from the Red Hat Ecosystem catalog, which provides numerous security and bug fixes.
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments.
This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.15.55. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this release:
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:11352
Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes:
https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.15/html/release_notes/
Security Fix(es):
* golang.org/x/oauth2/jws: Unexpected memory consumption during token parsing in golang.org/x/oauth2/jws (CVE-2025-22868)
For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.
All OpenShift Container Platform 4.15 users are advised to upgrade to these updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.15/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli.
Hi all,
I am a cybersecurity analyst with 1 year and 6 month experience. Im writing this for fun and to teach some people who maybe interested and are at a beginner level on detecting suspicious sign in activity.
In my example Im going to be using Entra ID, as this is the most common IAM solution and the one Im most familiar monitoring.
First step is analyzing the alert you received in the queue.
"Impossible travel time" or "Anomalous sign in activity" "sign in from bad IP" - These are the type of suspicious authentication logs that you will see in the SOC.
Gather all the information:
time generated (time of the sign in)
app that was logged into (ex officehome, msgraph)
username/email
IP address
device info (will normally be blank if its tuned properly, if its coming from managed trusted AD device it is a big indicator its benign so need to tune it to avoid FP for VPN usuage)
locationdetails (will be crucial to see which location logged from, will determine later if its physical location or location from VPN server)
user agent (crucial to detect what type of device it's coming from, potential spoofing as well)
Then you can run a query like this (will differ greatly based off your SIEM querying lanaguage, Im using Kusto MS Sentinel)
Signinlogs
| Summarize count by timegenerated, appname ,userprincipalname, IPaddress, tostring(locationdetails), tostring(deviceinfo), useragent
| where resulttype == 0 (filtering to see successful sign in attempts only)
\^ use a query like this to gather all crucial details, we can then use the time range to see 24 hours and then compare past previous sign ins from last 2-3 weeks to see a baseline, for location, IP address, device info, to see if they have accessed that app before.
Once you determine the sign in activity is indeed suspicious, its a combination of blank device details (non managed device), new IP address, new useragent or a suspicious useragent (potential spoofed), new app that's been used and potential impossible travel based off the last successful login). We need to analyze what type of IP address is being used, from either a VPN server or a ISP IP (will show approximate physical location of actual sign in).
NEVER just focus on the IP reputation, vast majority of the true positives I caught are all coming from clean IP reputations, threat actors are smart enough to know that if their IP address has been flagged and reported numerous times, their sign in activity will be blocked. Analyze the ISP info, a threat actor MAJORITY of the time will be using an IP address from a suspicious VPN server, you can do a ISP search for that VPN name and most of the time it will be something foreign.
Once you confirm the IP is coming from a suspicious entity such as a VPN server that is not authorized to be used in the company or its a VPN server with suspicious name, can confirm it's indeed malicious.
From there you can quickly check Auditlogs table to see any major changes to the users account. Most threat actors will remove and change the comprised users MFA, will remove the comprised user mobile device and probably add theirs.
From here, you can check the email logs and url click events on the suspicious link that was clicked for them to be comprised. Once you find that suspicious email you can plug that phishing URL into a interactive sandbox such as Browserling to confirm it. Some threat actors phishing sites are capable of detecting sandboxes and won't show their sign in page so be wary of that, but this isn't very common.
After detecting all these suspicious events, you can begin to lock the users account, resetting MFA settings and starting the IR process and doing some forensics on what the threat actor did.
Will have to look for:
\- Potential data exfiltration attempts. Can detect this from email logs or web traffic logs.
\- Potential lateral movement, the threat actor will likely send the same phishing email but this time from comprised users account to other internal users. Can detect this from email events as well.
\- File modifications - the threat actor could have modified a file, deleted a file, for this can check logs such as office activity (365 events)
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform is Red Hat's cloud computing Kubernetes application platform solution designed for on-premise or private cloud deployments.
This advisory contains the container images for Red Hat OpenShift Container
Platform 4.16.44. See the following advisory for the RPM packages for this
release:
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:10782
Space precludes documenting all of the container images in this advisory. See the following Release Notes documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for details about these changes:
https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.16/html/release_notes/
Security Fix(es):
* golang.org/x/oauth2/jws: Unexpected memory consumption during token
parsing in golang.org/x/oauth2/jws (CVE-2025-22868)
* sudo: LPE via host option (CVE-2025-32462)
* net/http: Request smuggling due to acceptance of invalid chunked data in
net/http (CVE-2025-22871)
For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS
score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.
All OpenShift Container Platform 4.16 users are advised to upgrade to these
updated packages and images when they are available in the appropriate release channel. To check for available updates, use the OpenShift CLI (oc) or web console. Instructions for upgrading a cluster are available at
https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/openshift_container_platform/4.16/html-single/updating_clusters/index#updating-cluster-cli.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tipc: fix refcount warning in tipc_aead_encrypt syzbot reported a refcount warning [1] caused by calling get_net() on a network namespace that is being destroyed (refcount=0). This happens when a TIPC discovery timer fires during network namespace cleanup. The recently added get_net() call in commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") attempts to hold a reference to the network namespace. However, if the namespace is already being destroyed, its refcount might be zero, leading to the use-after-free warning. Replace get_net() with maybe_get_net(), which safely checks if the refcount is non-zero before incrementing it. If the namespace is being destroyed, return -ENODEV early, after releasing the bearer reference. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68342b55.a70a0220.253bc2.0091.GAE@google.com/T/#m12019cf9ae77e1954f666914640efa36d52704a2
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix node corruption in ar->arvifs list In current WLAN recovery code flow, ath12k_core_halt() only reinitializes the "arvifs" list head. This will cause the list node immediately following the list head to become an invalid list node. Because the prev of that node still points to the list head "arvifs", but the next of the list head "arvifs" no longer points to that list node. When a WLAN recovery occurs during the execution of a vif removal, and it happens before the spin_lock_bh(&ar->data_lock) in ath12k_mac_vdev_delete(), list_del() will detect the previously mentioned situation, thereby triggering a kernel panic. The fix is to remove and reinitialize all vif list nodes from the list head "arvifs" during WLAN halt. The reinitialization is to make the list nodes valid, ensuring that the list_del() in ath12k_mac_vdev_delete() can execute normally. Call trace: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xd4/0x100 (P) ath12k_mac_remove_link_interface.isra.0+0xf8/0x2e4 [ath12k] ath12k_scan_vdev_clean_work+0x40/0x164 [ath12k] cfg80211_wiphy_work+0xfc/0x100 process_one_work+0x164/0x2d0 worker_thread+0x254/0x380 kthread+0xfc/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 The change is mostly copied from the ath11k patch: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250320053145.3445187-1-quic_stonez@quicinc.com/ Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1