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1,272 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.6 | EPSS 1.0% | CVE-2026-57206microsoft simplechat · Missing Authentication High8.6EPSS 1.0%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-57206 SimpleChat is a secure AI conversation application with personal and group workspaces for document-grounded interactions. Prior to 0.241.206, several plugin validation routes in application/single_app/plugin_validation_endpoint.py, including `POST /api/admin/plugins/test-instantiation`, `GET /api/admin/plugins/health-check/<plugin_name>`, `POST /api/admin/plugins/repair/<plugin_name>`, and `POST /api/plugins/validate`, relied on @swagger_route(security=get_auth_security()) documentation without enforcing @login_required, @user_required, or @admin_required at runtime, allowing unauthenticated or unauthorized clients to invoke plugin validation, health, and repair behavior. This issue is fixed in version 0.241.206. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.9% | CVE-2026-57205microsoft simplechat · Information Exposure Medium4.3EPSS 0.9%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-57205 SimpleChat is a secure AI conversation application with personal and group workspaces for document-grounded interactions. Prior to 0.241.203, the authenticated GET /api/user/info/<user_id> and GET /api/user/profile-image/<user_id> endpoints in application/single_app/route_backend_users.py accepted a caller-supplied user_id and read the matching Cosmos DB user-settings document without object-level authorization, allowing a low-privilege authenticated user to retrieve another user's email address, display name, and profile image. This issue is fixed in version 0.241.203. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.7% | HighEPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-44787 A vulnerability in Discourse prior to versions 2026.6.0, 2026.5.1, 2026.4.2, and 2026.1.5 allows newly registered users during signup to assign themselves a primary_group_id. This improper assignment grants them whisper-group privileges without legitimate membership on sites configured with whispers_allowed_groups. The issue has been fixed in the specified patched versions. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research Anthropic’s new AI agent for Slack acts under an admin-configured access bundle rather than each user’s own credentials. Here’s how that model works, what admins should understand and how to securely configure it. Key takeaways Claude Tag, Anthropic’s newly launched AI agent for Slack, acts on connected services using shared credentials an admin configures for a workspace or for a specific private channel, not the credentials of the user tagging it. Claude Tag uses the service-identity pattern, like deploy bots, workflow automations, and incoming webhooks, rather than per-user OAuth delegation. As a result, one admin-configured bundle serves everyone in the channel. Inviting someone to a channel where Claude Tag is present lets them converse with Claude and see its output there. What Claude can access is fixed by the admin-configured bundle, and organizations can require claude.ai login and role-based access control before a user may interact with Claude at all. Channel invitations do not confer new permissions on the invitee. As part of Tenable’s ongoing partnership with Anthropic, Tenable Research worked with their security team through coordinated disclosure. Claude Tag lets Slack channel members direct an agent whose reach is defined by the admin-configured access bundle. (Source: Tenable Research) What is Claude Tag? Claude Tag is a multiplayer AI assistant that lives inside Slack. With Claude Tag, which was released by Anthropic on June 23, 2026, anyone in a channel can tag @Claude to hand off tasks, run autonomous jobs over hours or days, and watch the work unfold in-thread. Claude Tag in a Slack channel, using the attached access bundle to read from a connected GitHub repository. The agent responds to any channel member within the bundle's scope. Source: Tenable Research. In a traditional 1-on-1 AI interaction, such as a chat UI, a command-line interface (CLI), or a Model Context Protocol (MCP)-connected app, the agent acts as you. Claude Tag keeps that model in direct messages: a DM runs on the sender’s own claude.ai account, using that user’s own connectors. In shared channels , however, Claude Tag is a multiplayer agent: It serves many users at once, and no single user’s credentials define its access . There, the agent is given its own identity, with its own permissions, configured once by an admin, and reused by everyone who tags it. The controls governing that access are: The admin’s bundle configuration determines what the agent can do The channel determines where it participates and what it can see Organization-level Claude Enterprise controls, such as required claude.ai login and role-based access control, govern who can direct it Claude Tag also differs from per-user Slack integrations . Slack’s own GitHub integration, for example, uses each user’s personal GitHub OAuth token. When a user runs /github in a channel, the integration acts as that user, and sees only what that user can see. The same is true for Slack’s Jira and Asana apps. Claude Tag works the other way: One shared credential applies to every user in the channel. For GitHub, that credential is a Claude GitHub App installation token scoped to a repository allowlist the organization owner configures. No individual's OAuth is used, and actions are attributed to the Claude app. Admins can restrict which repositories each channel can reach by attaching different bundles to different channels. For example, a finance channel can be scoped only to finance repos, while an engineering channel only to its own. For non-GitHub OAuth connectors (e.g., Google Drive), the bundle reuses the OAuth credential of the organization’s admin or owner who connected it. Claude Tag’s access model Claude Tag isn’t just a Slack bot; it’s an autonomous AI agent with its own identity, separate from any human user. When someone in a channel types @Claude, the assistant doesn’t act as that user; it acts as itself, using credentials provisioned by access bundles . The identity model for Claude Tag has three layers : A Claude Tag installation bound to a Slack workspace Access bundles that group connector credentials configured once by an admin, such as a Claude GitHub App installation for repositories, and OAuth-approved credentials for other services) Scopes that define which Slack contexts, such as a workspace or a channel, a bundle is available in. An access bundle configured attached to a single Slack channel. The bundle's scope is set by the admin, not by the users in the channel. (Source: Tenable Research) The trust boundary that admins can control is the scope. Attaching a bundle to a channel is an admin decision: Members of that channel can then direct Claude within the bundle’s scope. For example, they can scope a GitHub app installation to an allowlist of repositories, while for other OAuth connectors they can scope the credential of the admin who connected them. Claude Enterprise admins can additionally require users to log in to their claude.ai account and restrict usage via role-based access control (RBAC), under which non-qualifying users cannot start Claude sessions and their messages in existing threads are treated as untrusted. There’s no mapping from “the Slack user who typed @Claude” back to “what that user is allowed to access in the connected service.” The model also constrains users: Someone acting through Claude cannot bring their own privileges. Writes happen only where the agent is scoped to write, so they land in admin-chosen, visible locations rather than wherever an individual user’s credentials could reach. Anthropic’s documentation states the model explicitly. The attach-to-scope page warns: “A bundle attached to a public channel grants its access to anyone who joins that channel. In most Slack workspaces, anyone can join a public channel, so the channel’s join policy becomes the effective access control for whatever the bundle grants. Keep elevated credentials in private-channel scopes.” Security implications of multiplayer agents Slack channel configuration is now part of your access-control surface. Traditional application identity and access management (IAM) is per-user: Each person authenticates and is gated against their own identity in each system. An agent like Claude Tag instead has its own identity: the admin-configured bundle defines what the agent can reach, and the channel defines where it participates and who can converse with it. Adding a user to a channel lets them direct Claude within that admin-chosen scope; organizations can require claude.ai login and RBAC before a user may direct Claude at all. You should review bundle scope and channel membership together. Slack admins now make decisions that matter for access control. Attaching an access bundle to a channel determines what Claude can reach there. Review bundle attachments with the same rigor you apply to IAM changes, and use organization-level controls, such as required claude.ai login and RBAC) to bound who can direct Claude. Channel invites then govern who can converse with the agent within that admin-chosen scope. You should scope bundles deliberately and pair them with organization-level controls. Keeping elevated bundles in private channels narrows where the agent participates and who can converse with it. A new channel member can see prior scrollback and converse with Claude there, but what Claude can access stays fixed by the admin-configured bundle. The right practice is minimum-privilege bundles per channel, per task, combined with those organization-level requirements. Anthropic’s planned enhancements Anthropic has said publicly that it plans to strengthen Claude Tag’s security offerings with two additions (see Anthropic’s June 24 post, “ Agent identity in Claude Tag: a new access model ”): Just-in-time credential grants, where a user approves a single sensitive action in the moment without permanently widening the agent’s scope An identity-aware overlay, adding user-level checks on top of an agent’s scope for organizations with more complex clearance structures These are additive options layered onto the channel-scoped agent model, not a replacement for it: agent identity remains a first-class model, and organizations will be able to combine it with user-level checks, or rely on user identity alone for a given channel where it fits their needs. Coordinated disclosure Tenable Research approached Anthropic’s security team via HackerOne to discuss Claude Tag’s access model and worked through coordinated review. Anthropic engaged promptly, provided a detailed clarification of the product’s access model, and confirmed that the admin-experience feedback we raised has been shared with the relevant product team for consideration in the setup flow and documentation. We appreciate their thorough and professional engagement throughout. Timeline (UTC): 2026-06-30 14:57 – Tenable Research submits an initial report to Anthropic via HackerOne (TRA-699). 2026-06-30 17:14 – Anthropic responds with a detailed clarification of Claude Tag's access model. 2026-07-01 9:49 – Tenable Research replies with follow-up observations regarding the admin configuration experience. 2026-07-02 13:41 – Anthropic confirms the feedback has been shared with the relevant product team for consideration in the setup flow and documentation. 4 ways to better secure multiplayer agents Multiplayer agents aren’t going away. Here are four actions you can take immediately to reduce the access risks they create: Audit your access bundles. For every Claude Tag bundle in your organization, identify the: connectors it holds credentials for scopes it’s attached to users who can direct Claude in those scopes today, making that set deliberate: manage channel membership, and use organization-level controls (such as required claude.ai login and RBAC) so only intended users can direct Claude. Review channel membership and bundle scope together. For channels whose bundles grant sensitive reach, route invites | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity ADPathFinder is an Active Directory attack path mapping and password auditing tool that integrates data from BloodHound collectors including SharpHound, MSSQLHound, and ConfigManBearPig. It automates the identification of privilege escalation paths across AD, ADCS, MSSQL, and SCCM by querying combined graph data, grouping related paths, and producing detailed reports. The tool also enhances password audits by contextualizing cracked passwords with BloodHound graph data, highlighting risks based on account privileges and group memberships. ADPathFinder is intended for use in internal penetration testing engagements to efficiently identify complex attack paths and password weaknesses. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A previously undocumented remote access tool named LabubaRAT has been identified, masquerading as NVIDIA software through fake metadata and runtime artifacts. This Rust-based malware creates persistent footholds enabling hands-on operator activity including host profiling, security tool identification, command execution, file transfers, screenshot capture, and traffic proxying. The implant supports multiple communication methods including HTTPS polling, WebView2-based communication, and DNS tunneling. It uses a configurable framework model with organization, group, server, and API key parameters suggesting a Malware-as-a-Service platform. The malware maintains local state in SQLite databases and provides comprehensive remote access capabilities including PowerShell and JavaScript execution, SOCKS5 proxy support, and user-level persistence through registry autoruns. Infrastructure analysis revealed LabubaPanel branding with associated command and control servers hosted on German providers. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 5.7 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2025-56364connectedhomeip · Use of Uninitialized Variable Medium5.7EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-56364 A use of uninitialized value vulnerability exists in the Matter SDK (connectedhomeip) before 1.4.0, where the `GetDestinationGroupId().Value()` method is called without first checking whether a value exists. This leads to a crash when an InvokeCommand is sent without initializing the destination group ID. The issue affects all versions before commit 0360cc3 (Dec 5, 2024) and leads to denial of service through SIGABRT. It is fixed by adding a .HasValue() check before access. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-62196OpenClaw · Incorrect Authorization High8.7EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-62196 OpenClaw versions from 2026.3.22 up to but not including 2026.6.6 have an authorization bypass vulnerability. This flaw allows attackers with lower-trust access to perform actions that normally require stronger authorization by exploiting WhatsApp group ID validation in the affected feature. The issue is fixed in version 2026.6.6. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Nihon Kotsu, Japan's largest taxi operator, suffered a cyberattack that compromised its internal systems, forcing a shutdown of part of its infrastructure. The attack disrupted critical services including taxi dispatch, car hire, web booking, reservation management, and telephone dispatch, with some services remaining offline. The company confirmed unauthorized external access via malware infection and implemented emergency measures by disconnecting affected systems. No data leak has been confirmed yet, but the investigation is ongoing with external cybersecurity experts engaged. Customers are advised to be cautious of suspicious communications purportedly from the company. No ransomware or extortion group has claimed responsibility so far. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| –Not rated | – | Check Point Research For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 13th July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES U.S. auto insurer AssuranceAmerica has disclosed a data breach affecting approximately 7 million people. Attackers targeted an employee and used compromised credentials to access company systems, stealing names, contact information, driver’s license numbers, insurance policy and account data, vehicle information, and claims details. Latvia’s state-owned forestry company Latvijas Valsts Meži has suffered a ransomware attack that disrupted mapping, hunting, contractor, and customer systems. Attackers exploited a system that had remained unpatched for two years and leaked approximately 44GB of internal documents, credentials, cryptographic keys, source code, and email correspondence. Injective Labs, a developer of blockchain and cryptocurrency software, has experienced a supply chain compromise after attackers accessed its SDK project and published malicious npm packages. The affected releases exfiltrated cryptocurrency wallet private keys and seed phrases when developers used legitimate key-generation functions embedded in the compromised software. Moody Bible Institute, a U.S. faith-based educational institution, has disclosed a data breach affecting more than 2.3 million donors, students, alumni, and supporters. The ShinyHunters extortion group published allegedly stolen information, including names, dates of birth, residential addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers. AI THREATS Researchers profiled JadePuffer, an autonomous ransomware operation that used a large language model to conduct an intrusion without direct human control. The operation exploited CVE-2025-3248 in an exposed Langflow instance, accessed a production MySQL server, exfiltrated selected information, deleted the database, and issued an extortion demand. Researchers showed that malicious instructions hidden inside open-source project files could achieve remote code execution through Anthropic Claude Code and OpenAI Codex. When operating with automated permissions, the coding agents processed the instructions and executed attacker-controlled scripts, demonstrating a risk that may affect other autonomous development tools. Researchers disclosed Rogue Agent, a vulnerability in Google Dialogflow CX that allowed users with limited agent-editing permission to insert persistent malicious code. The injected code could capture and exfiltrate chatbot conversations. Google addressed the issue, and no known customer environments were compromised through the vulnerability. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Multiple Tenda router models are affected by CVE-2026-11405, an undocumented authentication backdoor that provides administrative access through a hidden password. The flaw affects several FH1201, W15E, AC10, AC5, and AC6 firmware versions and allows attackers to bypass configured credentials and modify device and network settings. Linux maintainers have patched CVE-2026-53359, a critical vulnerability in the Kernel-based Virtual Machine hypervisor. A malicious guest virtual machine could corrupt host kernel memory and potentially escape into the host environment. The flaw affects Intel and AMD x86 systems and is particularly relevant to shared cloud infrastructure. U-Boot has addressed six vulnerabilities affecting signature verification of Flattened Image Tree files used during secure boot. Two flaws could enable arbitrary code execution while a device loads a supposedly verified image, and four could cause crashes. The affected bootloader is widely used in routers, cameras, and embedded controllers. Opera has addressed a critical vulnerability in the Opera GX browser that allowed malicious websites to install browser modifications without user confirmation. An attacker-controlled modification could inject styles across open tabs, leak information such as Gmail addresses, and crash the browser. Opera corrected the issue. TH… | Check Point Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General APT-C-60 continues targeting organizations in Japan with evolved tactics observed throughout 2026. The threat group employs spear-phishing emails containing Proton Drive links or direct attachments with RAR archives. Victims extract LNK files that execute JavaScript via mshta.exe, leading to multi-stage payload delivery. The attackers abuse legitimate services including GitHub, GitLab, jsDelivr, and Codeberg as infrastructure for hosting malicious components. Git.exe is leveraged to execute scripts that deploy downloaders and loaders, ultimately delivering SpyGlace malware versions 3.1.15 through 3.1.18. The attack chain involves multiple obfuscated JavaScript files and persistence mechanisms similar to previous campaigns. By utilizing developer-oriented services and CDNs commonly allowed in corporate environments, the threat actor attempts to evade detection and blend malicious traffic with legitimate communications. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 6.0 | EPSS 1.7% | CVE-2026-0286Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS · OS Command Injection Medium6.0EPSS 1.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0286 CVE-2026-0286 is a command injection vulnerability in the management plane of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software. It allows an authenticated administrator to execute arbitrary operating system commands with root privileges. The vulnerability affects PAN-OS on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls and Panorama (virtual and M-Series). Cloud NGFW and Prisma Access are not impacted. The risk is reduced if CLI access is restricted to a limited group of administrators. Fixed versions are available. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-61474Improper Authorization Check Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-61474 An improper authorization check in MISP's attribute creation endpoint allowed authenticated users with attribute-adding permissions to associate attributes with unauthorized sharing groups by submitting a sharing_group_id without triggering the appropriate authorization check, unless the attribute distribution was explicitly set to 'sharing group'. This flaw could lead to access-control bypass affecting sharing metadata integrity and potentially expose or misuse restricted sharing group relationships. The patch corrects the authorization logic to always check sharing group permissions when a non-empty sharing_group_id is provided. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 10.0 | EPSS 6.2% | CVE-2026-59726ruvnet ruflo · OS Command Injection Critical10.0EPSS 6.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-59726 Ruflo is an agent meta-harness for Claude Code and Codex. Prior to 3.16.3, ruflo's default docker-compose deployment exposed the MCP bridge POST /mcp and POST /mcp/:group endpoints without authentication, allowing an unauthenticated network attacker to invoke tools/call to terminal_execute, obtain a shell in the bridge container, read provider API keys, and poison AgentDB learning-store patterns. This issue is fixed in version 3.16.3. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated spear-phishing campaign targeting Russian aerospace and aviation organizations has been identified, likely attributed to the Rare Werewolf threat group. The attack begins with fraudulent emails impersonating a legitimate Russian aerospace research institute, delivering password-protected archives containing malicious installers. The campaign employs living-off-the-land techniques, abusing legitimate tools including AnyDesk, Blat, WinRAR, and Tray Minimizer to establish persistent remote access. The attack chain deploys portable AnyDesk with unattended access configured using a predefined password, exfiltrates configuration data via SMTP to attacker-controlled infrastructure, and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks. The operators conceal their activities by minimizing the AnyDesk interface and removing forensic artifacts. This methodology aligns with previously documented Rare Werewolf campaigns targeting strategically important sectors across Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, par... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Low | 3.8 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-59269VMware Pinniped · Improper Input Validation Low3.8EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-59269 CVE-2026-59269 is a vulnerability in Pinniped Supervisor versions 0.11.0 through 0.46.0 that could allow a user authenticating via Pinniped to gain elevated permissions in Kubernetes clusters. This requires a specific configuration involving an ActiveDirectoryIdentityProvider with an empty groupName attribute, the ability for an attacker to modify group distinguished names in Active Directory, and knowledge of a valid AD user password. The issue is fixed in Pinniped version 0.47.0. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.3 | EPSS 0.2% | High8.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-47840 A network attacker positioned between UAA and its LDAP directory can impersonate the directory using any certificate from any trusted CA, then harvest the LDAP bind password and every end-user password sent during simple-bind authentication, and return forged group memberships that grant themselves admin scopes. This affects every deployment that authenticates users against LDAP over StartTLS. Affected versions: UAA versions prior to v78.13.0; Cf-deployment versions prior to v56.2.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-54061dgraph · Missing Authentication Critical9.1EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-54061 Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to version 25.3.5, Dgraph Alpha exposes the RPCs used for external snapshot import on the public gRPC port `:9080` without authentication or authorization. As a result, an unauthenticated network client can open `StreamExtSnapshot` and send Badger stream data to the target group’s store. In addition, the receiver calls `Prepare()` before processing the stream. This operation deletes and replaces the existing DB data. Version 25.3.5 patches the issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security A cybersecurity startup dangling millions of dollars to acquire zero-day security vulnerabilities in popular software is run by a pair of far-right conspiracy theorists and convicted felons whose most recent ventures included fake intelligence companies and a now-defunct AI-based lobbying platform they operated under assumed names. The X/Twitter account IRIS C2 (@C2IRIS) has gained more than 4,000 followers since its creation in January 2025, posting frequently about security vulnerabilities, AI and software exploits. IRIS C2 says it is a company in McLean, Va. that sells offensive cybersecurity capabilities. The IRIS C2 website dangles the possibility of million-dollar payouts for exploits to attract talent. “Our business model is this,” reads a pinned post on top of the IRIS C2 account on X. “Attract the very best vulnerability researchers and exploit developers in the world to join our company. This mostly revolves around junior engineers with raw talent/extremely high IQ. We don’t care if they have a college degree/industry experience.” The website linked in that profile — irisc2[.]com — says the company is hiring for a number of open positions, and a recent post on its LinkedIn page enthuses about an overwhelming number of applications from potential employees. The website claims IRIS C2 is in the business of acquiring “zero-day exploits, individual primitives, partial chains, and full capabilities across all major platforms. Payouts range from $10,000 to $7 million depending on target, reliability, and operational value.” The government contracting portal g2exchange.com reports that irisc2[.]com is operated by a business based in Virginia called Calvexa Group LLC . The “contact” link on the website for Calvexa Group — calvexagroup[.]com — forwards visitors to irisc2[.]com. G2Exchange shows that while Calvexa Group LLC is registered as a federal contractor, it does not appear to be working on any direct government contracts. A search on the Arlington, Va. address listed in the incorporation records for Calvexa Group LLC finds the property is occupied by Jack Burkman , the 60-year-old founder and managing partner of the lobbying firm Burkman & Associates . When approached with questions about IRIS C2, Burkman referred further inquiries to his longtime associate, 28-year-old Jacob Wohl . Jack Burkman (left) and Jacob Wohl, at a press conference in August 2020. Image: Wikipedia. Burkman and Wohl have a storied history of creating fake intelligence companies and using them to spread false claims about and frame public figures, including fabricated sexual assault claims against then FBI director Robert Mueller , and Pete Buttigieg , then mayor of South Bend, Indiana and a Democratic candidate for the presidency. In 2019, Burkman and Wohl held press conferences falsely alleging extramarital affairs by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and then-2020 presidential candidate Kamala Harris . In the wake of the 2020 presidential election, Wohl and Burkman were prosecuted by multiple U.S. states for making thousands of robocalls to residents of battleground states and disseminating false claims about mail-in ballots. They were indicted in Cleveland on 15 felony counts of orchestrating a robocall scheme aimed at suppressing the black vote in Detroit, and were sentenced in late 2025 to probation after their appeals to dismiss the charges were rejected. In 2022, Wohl and Burkman both pleaded guilty to a single felony charge of telecommunications fraud in Ohio, and sentenced to a fine, probation, and community service. In March 2023, a judge in a New York civil case ruled that Wohl and Burkman had violated federal and state civil rights laws, and the two agreed to pay a $1 million settlement. In June 2023, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed a $5.1 million fine against Wohl and Burkman for their robocall campaigns, at the time the largest fine ever sought by the FCC under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Jacob “Jay” Wo… | Krebs on Security |
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