Threats affecting pkg:pypi/apache-airflow-core

In Apache Airflow versions before 3.1.6, and 2.11.1 the proxies and proxy fields within a Connection may include proxy URLs containing embedded authentication information. These fields were not treated as sensitive by default and therefore were not automatically masked in log output. As a result, when such connections are rendered or printed to logs, proxy credentials embedded in these fields could be exposed. Users are recommended to upgrade to 3.1.6 or later for Airflow 3, and 2.11.1 or later for Airflow 2 which fixes this issue

In Apache Airflow versions before 3.1.6, when rendered template fields in a Dag exceed [core] max_templated_field_length, sensitive values could be exposed in cleartext in the Rendered Templates UI. This occurred because serialization of those fields used a secrets masker instance that did not include user-registered mask_secret() patterns, so secrets were not reliably masked before truncation and display. Users are recommended to upgrade to 3.1.6 or later, which fixes this issue

A vulnerability in Apache Airflow allowed authenticated UI users to view secret values in rendered templates due to secrets not being properly redacted, potentially exposing secrets to users without the appropriate authorization. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.1.4, which fixes this issue.

An example dag `example_dag_decorator` had non-validated parameter that allowed the UI user to redirect the example to a malicious server and execute code on worker. This however required that the example dags are enabled in production (not default) or the example dag code copied to build your own similar dag. If you used the `example_dag_decorator` please review it and apply the changes implemented in Airflow 3.0.5 accordingly.

API users via `/api/v2/dagReports` could perform Dag code execution in the context of the api-server if the api-server was deployed in the environment where Dag files were available.

Apache Airflow 3 introduced a change to the handling of sensitive information in Connections. The intent was to restrict access to sensitive connection fields to Connection Editing Users, effectively applying a "write-only" model for sensitive values. In Airflow 3.0.3, this model was unintentionally violated: sensitive connection information could be viewed by users with READ permissions through both the API and the UI. This behavior also bypassed the `AIRFLOW__CORE__HIDE_SENSITIVE_VAR_CONN_FIELDS` configuration option. This issue does not affect Airflow 2.x, where exposing sensitive information to connection editors was the intended and documented behavior. Users of Airflow 3.0.3 are advised to upgrade Airflow to >=3.0.4.