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233 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 1.1% | CVE-2026-15307Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.7 Product Security and Bug Fix Update High8.8EPSS 1.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-15307 Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.7 has security vulnerabilities including a path traversal issue via YAML !include directive and a remote code execution vulnerability in Django's GeoDjango spatial lookups. These flaws could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code or access unauthorized files. The update addresses these issues in affected components such as automation-controller-cli and python-django. The vulnerabilities are rated as having important security impact by Red Hat. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.7 | EPSS 0.6% | High7.7EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-71366 CVE-2026-71366 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in multiple AWX notification backends of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8. Notification backends including webhook, Mattermost, Rocket.Chat, and Grafana use notification template URLs as direct HTTP request targets without validating against private, loopback, or reserved IP ranges. This allows an organization notification administrator to cause the AWX control node to make HTTP requests to internal or loopback addresses. The webhook backend also follows HTTP redirects and resends Basic Authentication credentials to redirected hosts without host validation, risking credential exfiltration. The Grafana backend sends its API key in the Authorization header to the configured URL. No complete mitigation exists except applying the forthcoming update; interim mitigations include restricting notification template creation to trusted admins and network egress filtering. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.7% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-77264 The Automation Web Platform – Notifications and OTP for WooCommerce, Advanced Country Code plugin for WordPress contains a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in versions up to and including 4.8.6. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers who know a user's email address to log in as that user, including administrators, due to the secret magic login token being returned directly in the OTP request response instead of being sent only to the user's email. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.6% | High8.1EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-76356 CVE-2026-76356 is a high-severity vulnerability in Splunk SOAR versions prior to 8.6.0. It allows an unauthenticated attacker to spoof the source IP address in requests to the Automation Broker notification endpoint, leading to arbitrary code execution on the host. This occurs because the Automation Broker trusts a client-supplied source IP header as proof of local origin. Exploitation can compromise data confidentiality, system integrity, and availability. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.7 | EPSS 0.5% | High7.7EPSS 0.5%GCVE Database A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability (CVE-2026-71365) exists in AWX's webhook status callback mechanism. The vulnerability allows an admin user on a webhook-enabled job template to forge signed GitHub webhook payloads with arbitrary status callback URLs, causing AWX to send authenticated status updates to attacker-controlled or internal URLs. This results in leakage of the Git Personal Access Token (PAT) included in the Authorization header of the status update requests. The vulnerability affects Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform versions 2.5 and 2.6. Red Hat has released security updates addressing this issue. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-9595Red Hat Security Advisory: Ansible plug-ins for Red Hat Developer Hub Product Release Update HighEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-9595 A security advisory from Red Hat addresses multiple vulnerabilities affecting the Ansible plug-ins for Red Hat Developer Hub in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.1. One notable vulnerability (CVE-2026-12143) involves a CRLF injection flaw in the form-data library, which could allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary headers or multipart parts, potentially compromising data integrity. The advisory notes that default deployments are not impacted due to fixed field names, limiting practical impact to custom integrations. No official fixes are currently available for these issues. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-18387Groundhogg (WordPress plugin) · SQL Injection Medium6.5EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-18387 The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 'tag_query' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.14 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with vendor-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. Exploitation requires the attacker to trigger the vulnerable Legacy_Contact_Query code path by submitting an unknown filter type (e.g. filters[0][0][type]=force_fallback), which causes a FilterException that dispatches execution away from the modern query handler. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 2.9% | CVE-2026-73297microsoft UFO · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Medium6.9EPSS 2.9%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-73297 Microsoft UFO open-source framework for intelligent automation across devices and platforms. Prior to 3.0.8, _is_blocked_ip in ufo/utils/url_security.py did not block NAT64 prefixes 64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48, the 6to4 prefix 2002::/16, or the Teredo prefix 2001::/32 and did not re-check embedded IPv4 destinations, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker who can influence URLs processed by validate_url to bypass the SSRF guard and reach cloud metadata, internal services, or localhost. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.8. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.7% | High8.8EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-15426 The AcyMailing – An Ultimate Newsletter Plugin and Marketing Automation Solution for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 10.11.1. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the BCC field of the acy_notification_cms notification template, causing subsequent WordPress password-reset emails — including those targeting administrator accounts — to be silently copied to an attacker-controlled address, enabling account takeover via the captured reset link. Successful exploitation requires the site administrator to have enabled the "Send website emails with AcyMailing" option, which routes WordPress core notification emails through AcyMailing's templating system. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity A recent scan identified over 4,000 Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley industrial controllers used in U.S. water and wastewater systems exposed directly to the internet. Despite federal warnings, many of these devices remain accessible, including 22 in cities recently targeted by cyberattacks. The exposed devices use the EtherNet/IP protocol, which can allow remote identification and potential configuration changes if improperly secured. Some devices appear vulnerable to a known remote code execution flaw disclosed in 2017 (CVE-2017-16740). The FBI and EPA have confirmed cyberattacks on water utilities in multiple states, with some attacks causing operational disruptions such as pressure loss and flooding. The exposure is attributed to mass scanning and opportunistic exploitation rather than targeted zero-day attacks. Manufacturers and federal agencies have long advised against placing such controllers on the public internet. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-11332Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.7 Container Release Update High7.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-11332 Red Hat has issued a security advisory for Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.7 container release update addressing multiple vulnerabilities including CVE-2026-11332. The update fixes a range of security issues affecting the platform, which provides an enterprise framework for IT automation. Users are advised to apply this update after ensuring all previous errata are applied. The advisory references multiple CVEs and bug fixes, indicating a comprehensive security update. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-40898Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.7 Product Security and Bug Fix Update HighEPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-40898 A denial of service vulnerability (CVE-2026-40898) exists in the quic-go component used by Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.7. The flaw involves excessive memory allocation triggered via HTTP/3 trailers, which can cause service disruption. Red Hat has issued a security update addressing this issue in version 1.6.7 of the receptor package. The vulnerability is rated as having high severity by Red Hat Product Security. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.9% | CVE-2026-18583mz-automation libiec61850 · Out-of-bounds Read Medium6.9EPSS 0.9%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-18583 CVE-2026-18583 is a medium severity vulnerability in mz-automation libiec61850 versions 1.6.0 and 1.6.1. It involves an out-of-bounds read in the checkDataSetAccess function of the MMS Request Handler component. The vulnerability can be triggered remotely without authentication. A public exploit is available. Upgrading to version 1.6.2 addresses the issue. EPSS 0.9%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.4 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-67530ArnasDon wacrm · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Medium6.4EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-67530 CVE-2026-67530 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in ArnasDon's wacrm product, a self-hostable CRM template for WhatsApp. Versions 0.7.0 and earlier allow an authenticated user with automation privileges to submit arbitrary webhook URLs that the server fetches without proper SSRF protections. This enables requests to internal network addresses, including private, loopback, link-local, and cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254. The vulnerability has been fixed in a later commit. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog Every organization needs security that protects end to end with the speed and scale of AI. Microsoft’s vision is simple: security should be ambient and autonomous, just like the AI it protects. As organizations scale AI and expand across environments, security teams need protection that covers every surface. This month’s updates help security and IT teams secure their AI environments, use AI to defend at speed and scale, and strengthen the foundations that AI-powered operations depend on. Here’s what’s new: Project Perception brings agentic defense to security operations Project Perception , newly announced, is a coordinated system of specialized agents, cybersecurity-focused models, and enterprise-wide signals that transform how security operates. The agents work as a team: red team agents expose weaknesses, blue team agents investigate cyberthreats, and green agents harden what’s found. These multi-agent autonomous workflows work as a team to operate in continuous loops to execute end-to-end security workflows. Learn more about Project Perception Microsoft Defender secures the full AI attack surface, from inbox to cloud Expanded Microsoft Defender protections are designed to reduce risks associated with day-to-day AI interactions, from email inboxes to cloud agent environments. New prompt injection protection in Microsoft Defender, now in preview, identifies and isolates emails containing malicious AI instructions before delivery, reducing the risk of prompt injection attacks reaching the inbox. Unified Defender posture and runtime protection for cloud agents in Microsoft Agent 365 consolidates security posture assessment and runtime protection for Microsoft Foundry, Microsoft Copilot Studio, and third party-managed agents, helping teams reduce AI-specific risk across the agent estate. Accelerate detection, prioritization, and response with AI embedded in SecOps workflows Security teams can accelerate detection, prioritization, and response to cyberthreats with AI embedded directly into security operations (SecOps) workflows through Microsoft Defender. Threat intelligence enhancements, including Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence convergence and an enhanced Threat Intelligence Agent , bring more out-of-the-box intelligence and automation into the unified SecOps workflow, so teams can move from summary to action. Strengthen the cloud, code, and identity foundations AI depends on Microsoft Defender is strengthening the foundational protections that AI-era operations depend on across cloud, code, and identity. Cloud Security Posture Management extends coverage to serverless containers , giving teams visibility and continuous posture assessment across containerized workloads running on Azure Container Apps, Azure Container Instances, and Amazon Web Services Elastic Container Service (AWS ECS) on Fargate. New interconnected experiences between Defender and Microsoft Entra empower the security operations center (SOC) to disable compromised identities directly using a role-based access control (RBAC) mode that maintains least privilege. Microsoft Defender Experts services are also expanding : Microsoft Defender Experts Threat Intelligence delivers human-led, curated insight into the cyberthreats most relevant to each organization, and Microsoft Defender Experts MDR extends expert-run detection and response beyond the Microsoft estate into third-party and multicloud signals through Microsoft Sentinel . Microsoft Entra strengthens identity across the AI-powered enterprise Strengthen identity foundations for AI-powered operations New capabilities in Microsoft Entra are designed to strengthen the identity foundations that AI-powered operations depend on. Tenant governance helps organizations discover, manage, and govern tenants across their environment with centralized policies and cross-tenant delegated administration. Microsoft Entra ID is making passkeys the default authentication experience , which helps reduce reliance on SMS… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-67424flytohub flyto-core · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) High8.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-67424 Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.7, the HTTP modules http.get, http.request, and http.batch in src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py, src/core/modules/atomic/http/request.py, and src/core/modules/atomic/http/batch.py validate only the initial URL, then follow redirects with allow_redirects=True and without per-hop Location revalidation, allowing a public URL to redirect into internal address space and return the internal response body. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.7. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog As organizations move beyond AI experimentation, success will depend on how effectively they combine intelligence and trust. The same systems that amplify knowledge, accelerate decisions, and unlock new outcomes must also protect data, govern AI, and build resilience. In this next phase of transformation, security is not separate from innovation—it is an enabler that helps make responsible innovation possible at a faster pace. That starts with asking better questions—the kind that help organizations turn intelligence into action and trust into a foundation for progress. AI is changing how security decisions are made. Defenders now have access to more signals, insights, and analytical power than ever before. But better security does not start with more information. It starts with asking the right questions: What are we trying to protect? What risks matter most? What conditions need to be true? And what decisions do we need to make with confidence? That clarity matters because security is shaped by more than technology. The challenges organizations face rarely exist in isolation. They emerge across people, processes, technology, data, identities, and governance. Understanding those connections is what allows security teams to use platforms, AI, and automation to make better decisions under real-world conditions. Connect with Microsoft Security at Black Hat USA 2026 Security as a systems challenge Security has never been a single-layer challenge. Vulnerabilities can emerge across code, data, identities, and integrations, while exposure is often created at the intersections between them. Designing for security requires a systems mindset—understanding how these elements work together, where failure can occur, and what safeguards are needed so no single layer carries the burden alone. That is why defense in depth remains essential: layered controls, ongoing monitoring, mitigations, and risk management across the AI lifecycle help organizations reduce exposure while continuing to adapt. Agentic AI in cybersecurity Explore actionable takeaways ↗ This is especially important as AI becomes more embedded in how organizations operate. AI can help teams analyze vast amounts of information, identify patterns, and surface recommendations at a scale that was previously unthinkable. Those AI outputs still require oversight, governance, and human judgment, with clear accountability for how AI-generated insights are validated and used. But insight only creates value when it is grounded in the right context and connected to action. AI-generated insights still require validation, oversight, and resilience planning because AI systems can produce incomplete or inaccurate outputs. Clarity creates better decisions The most important security decisions start with a clear view of the risk, the level of control or visibility required, and the outcome the system is designed to achieve. When we optimize for capability over context, we miss how security decisions are actually made: through signals, expertise, validation, and judgment. This becomes even more important as AI expands what is possible. Better analysis can surface more insights, but better decisions still depend on understanding what matters most and applying the right context. That matters most when conditions are changing quickly, and teams need to act before every answer is certain. Threat intelligence offers a useful example. Defenders operate in environments defined by ambiguity, incomplete information, and rapidly changing conditions. Success rarely comes from a single source or signal. It comes from combining multiple forms of intelligence, applying expertise, validating assumptions, and connecting insights in ways that strengthen assurance. The lesson extends beyond threat intelligence. Different security objectives require different combinations of signals, analysis, and human judgment. Resilient decisions come from bringing those elements together thoughtfully, rather than relying on a… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-12383Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8 · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity High7.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12383 A flaw was found in the Event-Driven Ansible (EDA) server. The ExternalEventStreamViewSet uses permissive access controls (permission_classes=[AllowAny], authentication_classes=[]) and relies solely on the Subject HTTP header value for mTLS authentication without verifying that the header originated from a trusted proxy. Additionally, the expected certificate Distinguished Name is leaked in the 403 error response body. An attacker who can reach the EDA API endpoint with a spoofed Subject header can inject arbitrary events into mTLS-protected event streams, triggering downstream automation actions. EPSS 0.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | High8.5GCVE Database ### Summary Budibase's central outbound-fetch guard (`fetchWithBlacklist`) prevents SSRF/DNS-rebinding by resolving the target hostname, checking every resolved IP against the blacklist, and **pinning** the connection to the validated IP. The pin is implemented as a Node `http(s).Agent` (`makePinnedAgent`). The fix for CVE-2026-54353 relies on this pin to stop DNS rebinding. The REST datasource integration (`@budibase/server`) calls `fetchWithBlacklist` but performs the actual request with **undici**'s `fetch`. undici does not support the Node `agent` option — it is silently ignored — and instead uses its own `dispatcher`, which re-resolves the hostname's DNS at connection time. As a result, **the validated/pinned IP is never used on the REST datasource path**, and the DNS-rebinding protection that CVE-2026-54353 added is silently defeated for the single most-used outbound path in Budibase. An authenticated user who can configure/run a REST datasource (e.g. a builder/tenant) can use a rebinding hostname (public IP during validation, internal IP at connect) to make the server issue arbitrary, full-response HTTP requests to internal-only services — cloud metadata (IAM credential theft), the internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO, and other internal endpoints — reading and, because REST datasources allow arbitrary method/body, writing or destroying internal data. ### Details **The guard pins the validated IP via a Node agent** — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts`: - `resolveSafePinnedIp(url)` resolves the hostname and checks every address against `isBlacklisted`, returning a single `pinnedIp` (lines ~39–53). - `makePinnedAgent(url, ip)` builds a **Node** `http.Agent`/`https.Agent` whose `lookup` always returns `pinnedIp`, so a node-fetch connection can only reach the validated IP (lines ~55–68). - `fetchWithBlacklist` passes that agent into the request: `fetchFn(nextUrl, { ...nextRequest, agent: makePinnedAgent(nextUrl, pinnedIp) })` (lines ~186–192). Each redirect hop is re-validated and re-pinned in the loop. **The REST integration overrides the transport with undici, which ignores `agent`** — `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts`: - `fetch` is imported from **`undici`** (top-of-file import block, ~line 30). - The request is made by overriding `fetchFn` (lines ~767–793): ```ts const setDispatcher = (requestInput, requestUrl) => ({ ...requestInput, dispatcher: getDispatcher({ rejectUnauthorized, url: requestUrl }), }) ... response = await coreUtils.fetchWithBlacklist(url, input, { fetchFn: async (requestUrl, requestInput) => fetch(requestUrl, setDispatcher(requestInput, requestUrl)), // undici.fetch }) ``` The options object reaching `undici.fetch` is `{ ...nextRequest, agent: <pinned Node Agent>, dispatcher: <getDispatcher result> }`. **undici uses `dispatcher` and ignores `agent`.** **The dispatcher does no IP pinning** — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/fetch.ts`: - `getDispatcher` → `createDispatcher` → (no proxy env) → `createDirectAgent` = `new Agent({ connect: { rejectUnauthorized } })` (lines ~109–114, ~161–172, ~183). This is a plain undici `Agent` with **no `connect.lookup` / no pin**, so undici resolves the hostname's DNS itself at connect time. **Net effect (TOCTOU / DNS rebinding):** `fetchWithBlacklist` validates the hostname → safe public IP and builds a pinned Node agent; the REST path then connects via undici, which re-resolves the same hostname independently. With a rebinding domain (TTL 0: public IP during validation, `127.0.0.1` / `169.254.169.254` / internal IP at connect), the request lands on an internal service — exactly the gap CVE-2026-54353's pin was meant to close. **Scope of impact / why it's REST-specific:** `rest.ts` is the only caller that overrides `fetchFn` with undici. All other outbound sinks (automation `outgoingWebhook`/`n8n`/`make`/`zapier`/`discord`/`slack`, and AI-extract's `processUrlFile`) use the default node-fetch-based `fetchWithBlacklist`, which **does** honor the pinned agent and is **not** affected. REST datasource queries are the most common outbound path, and the response body is returned to the caller (full-response SSRF, not blind). ### PoC The PoC drives the **real, unmodified** guard code (`outboundFetch.ts` + `fetch.ts`, copied verbatim — sha256 verified) and reproduces the exact `rest.ts` call pattern. Only the `../blacklist` module is stubbed to model the rebinding **input** (validation observes a safe public IP). Requires Node 18+. ```bash # prerequisite: a Budibase checkout; set BB to its path export BB=/path/to/budibase mkdir ssrf-poc && cd ssrf-poc SRC="$BB/packages/backend-core/src" # 1) Copy the REAL guard code, verbatim (sha proves no edits) mkdir -p real/utils real/blacklist cp "$SRC/utils/outboundFetch.ts" real/utils/ cp "$SRC/utils/fetch.ts" real/utils/ # 2) Scenario stub = the rebinding INPUT: validation sees a safe, non-blacklisted public IP cat > real/blacklist/index.ts << | GCVE Database |
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