The npm package 'tyepescript-cli' is a typosquatting malicious package impersonating the legitimate 'typescript' package. Its postinstall script uses XOR obfuscation to decode attacker-controlled URLs and commands. On Windows, it downloads and executes a malicious binary from a suspicious GitHub account. Under Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), it uses a PowerShell bridge to execute the same payload on the Windows host. The script also sends an install-time beacon to a hardcoded IP address. This behavior indicates an active attempt to compromise systems during package installation.
A phishing campaign targets Indian organizations by impersonating the Indian Income Tax Department. Victims receive emails containing links to spoofed notice pages that download ZIP archives. These archives include a legitimately signed Overwolf executable and two hidden files: a malicious DLL and an encrypted binary. When executed, the signed binary side-loads the malicious DLL through DLL hijacking. The DLL is UPX-packed and modified with Astral-PE, and decrypts the binary file containing ValleyRAT. The payload uses modified RC4 encryption with a 115-byte key and deploys entirely in memory. Once active, ValleyRAT establishes persistence through scheduled tasks masquerading as OneDrive entries, marks dropped files as hidden and system files, and performs process hollowing into svchost.exe to evade detection before connecting to command and control infrastructure.
CVE-2026-73055 is a medium severity vulnerability in the ericcornelissen shescape library affecting versions before 2.1.15 and 3.0.0 before 3.0.2. The issue involves improper escaping of tilde (~) characters in assignment contexts on Unix systems where the shell is set to "sh" and /bin/sh points to BusyBox. This can allow an attacker using the escape and escapeAll APIs with untrusted input to inject a tilde payload that discloses the user's home directory location and potentially alters the target location of a command.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (832d1ce61ce1f1e1430c60e94175cc80700dfbb2f8d0f46fd7d00b64720026d8)
Package publishes under a lodash-imitating identity: keywords `lodash`/`lodash-js`, and the README is a verbatim copy of the official lodash 4.18.1 README. The single shipped file `dist/common-js.js` is not lodash — it is a ~770 KB javascript-obfuscator bundle (17,969-entry rotated string array, `_0xNNNN` identifiers). After deobfuscation the bundle is a browser-based cryptocurrency-mining client: it opens a WebSocket to a caller/config-supplied pool URL, spawns a fan-out of Web Workers keyed by `workerId`, handles `nonce` framing, and bundles an AES-GCM decryption primitive (`aesGcmDecrypt` from @noble/ciphers) for pool message decryption. Wallet and worker identifiers are read from a config object with fallbacks (`cfg.wallet||'x'`, `cfg.worker||'worker'`). A developer who installs this expecting a lodash-family utility and ships it in a web application will silently mine cryptocurrency on their end users' browsers, consuming visitor CPU/battery and creating a compliance/abuse liability for the downstream site. The identity masquerade (name/keywords/README all mimicking lodash) combined with heavy string-array obfuscation of the real payload is the standard shape of a supply-chain masquerade attack.
The @cdnshell/loader npm package masquerades as a CDN static-asset distribution library but contains 19 pre-compiled Mach-O binaries targeting iOS versions 13 to 19. These binaries reference private iOS entitlements and WebKit GPU-process IPC symbols consistent with a WebKit renderer-to-kernel exploit chain. The package includes an obfuscated JavaScript loader that dynamically fetches and executes remote code, selecting payload variants based on the visitor's user agent. The malicious behavior activates only when the loader is embedded in a webpage served to iOS/macOS users, enabling targeted exploitation. There are no npm lifecycle hooks or main entry points, so the package does not execute on installation or require, making detection harder. This combination of obfuscation, multi-version exploit payloads, and dynamic remote code execution is inconsistent with legitimate static asset distribution libraries.
OpenClaw CLI versions from 2026.2.13 up to 2026.3.1 allowed node camera URL payloads to be fetched by the gateway or agent host without restricting downloads to the resolved node host. This could enable a malicious or compromised paired node to cause the gateway to fetch URLs from off-node destinations, potentially facilitating internal network probing or fetch pivots. The issue is considered medium severity and has been fixed in version 2026.3.2 by enforcing hostname matching and SSRF-guarded fetches.
OpenClaw CLI versions up to 2026.2.21-2 have a vulnerability in the tools.exec.safeBins feature where a generic fallback safe-bin profile allowed interpreter-style binaries to execute inline payloads in allowlist mode. This issue requires explicit operator configuration to add such binaries, limiting impact to misconfigured deployments. A fix is planned in version 2026.2.22 that removes the generic fallback and requires explicit safe-bin profiles.
A denial of service vulnerability exists in pyasn1's BER/CER/DER decoders and encoders when processing OBJECT IDENTIFIER and RELATIVE-OID values. The decoding and encoding operations exhibit quadratic time complexity relative to the number of arcs, allowing a crafted payload with many arcs to consume excessive CPU resources. This affects applications decoding untrusted ASN.1 data such as certificates, LDAP, SNMP, and Kerberos. The issue is fixed in pyasn1 version 3.4_1.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (85b93f1a0694dc37c94e18c12eb32ebe9cab96ded318e46ee5c774db80f4a648)
On require('bcs-compact'), index.js runs a self-scrubbing IIFE that reads the installer's Sui wallet keystore at ~/.sui/sui.keystore, ~/.sui/sui_config/*.yaml, and any.env* files containing SUI_/PK_B64/PRIVATE_KEY markers, base64-encodes their contents, and PUTs them to api.github.com/repos/futongwan/sui-research-notes/contents/fingerprints/... using a hardcoded GitHub personal access token. The destination host (api.github.com), repository slug (futongwan/sui-research-notes), and Bearer token are reconstructed at runtime via an XOR routine keyed on the string 'bcs-c0mpact-v10' to hide them from static inspection. After exfiltration the payload rewrites index.js on disk to remove the /* compat-probe:start */.../* compat-probe:end */ block so the installed file no longer contains the malicious code on subsequent inspection. The package is presented as a BCS codec; the exfiltration and anti-forensics behavior have no relationship to that stated purpose.
## Source: ghsa-malware (26785e267ea5dbbb1a77bd9745feb4eed05a2579f8855af25bacd40264a837e4)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
@openzeppelin-4/contracts is a malicious npm package published by npm account `mssjeep843` that impersonates OpenZeppelin's `@openzeppelin/contracts` (the v4 line) via the look-alike scope `@openzeppelin-4`, falsely describing itself as a "compatibility distribution". It ships no Solidity contracts — only an install-time payload (index.js) run via preinstall/postinstall that harvests credential-shaped environment variables and reads and exfiltrates SSH private keys, cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Kubernetes/Docker), Solana/Anchor/NEAR/Sui wallet keys, Foundry keystores, `.git-credentials` and local `.env` files to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. It is one of a series of DeFi/crypto impersonation packages from the same account sharing this webhook.site endpoint, which also squat Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, Euler EVC, BoringVault and Uniswap Permit2.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (2841eb854dad391b8cf3d290704a888d5ac186a1f51aec84594eaa09acdfeb68)
Package name @openzeppelin-4/contracts impersonates the @openzeppelin/contracts scope but ships no Solidity contracts — only index.js, executed via lifecycle scripts. index.js enumerates process.env for credential-shaped keys (KEY, TOKEN, SECRET, AWS, GITHUB, NPM, MNEMONIC, WALLET, INFURA, etc.), reads installer secret files including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.git-credentials, gcloud application default credentials, Solana/Anchor/Sui keys, Foundry keystores, and project.env files, then POSTs the collected data to https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09. Delivery uses spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }) with a randomized 60–240 second delay, and the script bails out when the hostname or username matches sandbox/scanner patterns (scan-, detonation, sandbox, ubuntu-fc-uvm) or when canary env markers are present, evading install-time analysis.
@openzeppelin-5/contracts is a malicious npm package published by npm account `mssjeep843` that impersonates OpenZeppelin's `@openzeppelin/contracts` (the v5 line) via the look-alike scope `@openzeppelin-5`, falsely describing itself as a "compatibility distribution". It ships no Solidity contracts — only an install-time payload (index.js) run via preinstall/postinstall that harvests credential-shaped environment variables and reads and exfiltrates SSH private keys, cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Kubernetes/Docker), Solana/Anchor/NEAR/Sui wallet keys, Foundry keystores, `.git-credentials` and local `.env` files to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. It is one of a series of DeFi/crypto impersonation packages from the same account sharing this webhook.site endpoint, which also squat Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, Euler EVC, BoringVault and Uniswap Permit2.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (800da818da3fee0353766227eafcd43c0c7cf7fd0126af5ded48b7c1ba522e21)
Package name typosquats @openzeppelin/contracts. package.json declares both preinstall and postinstall as `node index.js || true`, so the payload auto-executes on `npm install`. index.js harvests process.env entries matching KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|MNEMONIC|WALLET|AWS|GITHUB|NPM and reads installer-side credential files including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.git-credentials, gcloud/solana/sui/foundry keystores, and local.env files. The bundle is POSTed to a hardcoded webhook.site endpoint (path 326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09) via a detached child process spawned with a randomized 60–240 second delay to outlive install-time scanning windows. A hostname regex (/^(scan-|detonation|sandbox|ubuntu-fc-uvm)/i) throws early on known sandbox/scanner hosts as anti-analysis gating.
Affected versions of cti-transmute allow a tag's icon value to be stored and later interpolated into HTML through Vue's v-html. The helper mapIcon() previously constructed an HTML string directly from the icon value:
<i class="fas fa-${name}"></i>
Because the icon is user-supplied, a crafted value could break out of the intended markup and inject attacker-controlled HTML. When the affected tag was later rendered, including on the administrative triage interface, the payload could execute in the viewer's browser.
The patch mitigates the issue at multiple layers: v-html is replaced with Vue :class binding, mapIcon() now returns only a constrained FontAwesome class string, and the backend validates icons against the FontAwesome catalogue or a strict [a-z0-9-]{1,40} slug pattern before storing them.
Aeternum is a C++ botnet loader utilizing the Polygon blockchain for command-and-control infrastructure instead of traditional centralized servers. Threat actors write encrypted and plaintext instructions directly to smart contracts, which infected devices query via public RPC endpoints. The malware implements weak PBKDF2HMAC/AES-GCM encryption with self-salting passwords, allowing payload decryption using only the smart contract address. Analysis reveals three related samples: the core Aeternum loader with Telegram-based exfiltration, a blended threat combining XWorm RAT with XMRig cryptocurrency miner, and Python source code revealing anti-analysis checks and cryptocurrency wallet targeting. The botnet demonstrates resilience through decentralized infrastructure, making traditional law enforcement takedowns significantly more challenging while maintaining low operational costs for attackers.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp/mst: fix OOB reads in remote DPCD/I2C sideband reply parsers drm_dp_sideband_parse_remote_dpcd_read() reads num_bytes from the raw message and then unconditionally does: memcpy(bytes, &raw->msg[idx], num_bytes); without checking that idx + num_bytes <= raw->curlen. raw->msg[] is 256 bytes; if a malicious or misbehaving MST hub sets num_bytes larger than the remaining payload, the memcpy reads past the received data into whatever follows in raw->msg[]. drm_dp_sideband_parse_remote_i2c_read_ack() has the same flaw (noted with a /* TODO check */ comment since the code was introduced). Fix both functions by using a single combined check (idx + num_bytes > curlen) before each memcpy. Since num_bytes is u8, it is always >= 0, so this strictly subsumes the simpler idx > curlen form and no separate step is needed. [added missing fixes tag]
The npm package specials-resources-server version 35.8.1 is a malicious package that acts as a staged remote code execution dropper disguised as an analytics SDK. Upon import, it fetches and executes a binary payload from anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomains without integrity verification, writing it to temporary directories and executing it with elevated privileges. This behavior results in full system compromise. Immediate removal and secret rotation are advised, but full remediation cannot be guaranteed due to potential persistent compromise.
The npm package 'localization-fixer' versions 1.0.1 and 1.1.1 contain malicious code that fetches and executes arbitrary JavaScript from attacker-controlled remote JSON bins. This execution occurs both by writing the payload to a temporary file and running it via child_process.fork, and by dynamically constructing and invoking a function with full Node.js require capabilities. The package masquerades this behavior as a localization synchronization feature, but the remote code execution allows arbitrary code execution on the host system.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (80727943437a7e22116b369c010fc965c4854a0c58a053504c4bc55555e90dd4)
On import, dist/index.mjs chmods 0755 and spawns the bundled Linux x86_64 binary dist/internal/calc-math.dat as a detached background process. The binary is a RedShell-style remote-access implant: it beacons to hardcoded C2 217.60.77.63, executes /bin/sh commands, drops and runs additional ELFs and shellcode fetched from the C2, offers SOCKS5 proxying and TCP port forwarding, installs systemd --user persistence (svc-update.service), and exfiltrates files via POST /api/extract-receive. Implant commands /ssh_keys, /creds, /dbfind, /clipboard, /env, and /dataextract harvest installer-side secrets (SSH private keys, stored credentials, clipboard, environment) and upload them to the same C2 through a chunked BIGEXTRACT upload routine. Package name, README, and inline comments describe the ELF as a 'native math accelerator' for calendar/streak math, but the pure-JS daymath.mjs never invokes the binary; the shipped SHA-256 'integrity check' (4537b118...3466) pins this specific implant, so it functions as anti-tamper for the payload rather than a security control.
## Source: ghsa-malware (14340c09001c59fa53d0926ed49265d43efcb6115df75c49ac24c1358efa007b)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The npm package sme-rko-finance-front-operations-domain version 35.8.1 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a native binary from obfuscated hostnames. It uses runtime-assembled domain names and base64-decoded payloads to evade detection and bypass network egress controls. The malicious binary is saved to temporary directories with disguised filenames and executed detached from the main process. A fallback DNS-TXT channel is used to retrieve payloads if HTTPS download fails. The package includes a telemetry module that duplicates the dropper functionality. There is no integrity verification of the downloaded payload, making it opaque and unverifiable.
The npm package sme-rko-finance-front-operations-widget-domain version 35.8.1 contains malicious code that, upon being imported, downloads and executes attacker-controlled native binaries. It uses obfuscated domain names and a fallback covert channel via DNS TXT records to evade detection and bypass network egress controls. The malicious payload is stored in temporary directories under disguised filenames and executed detached from the main process, masquerading as benign telemetry activity.
The npm package sme-rko-finance-front-operations-widget-models version 35.8.1 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a native binary payload from anonymous Cloudflare Workers or via DNS TXT record queries. The payload is written to a temporary path, made executable, and launched detached from the parent process to evade detection. The package masquerades as API-client wrappers but has no legitimate reason to perform such actions. The malicious dropper logic is duplicated in multiple files to ensure execution even if one entry point is removed.