The npm package nebula-llm version 1.0.0 contains a malicious preinstall script that executes a hidden Windows executable during installation. This executable impersonates a legitimate Windows system binary and acts as a persistent remote-access implant. The package installs this implant without user interaction and unrelated to any documented functionality.
The npm package fabric-render-bridge (version 1.0.0) contains malicious code that executes automatically upon installation. Instead of providing rendering functionality, it steals Minecraft launcher credentials and system information, sending them to a hardcoded Discord webhook. This behavior occurs during the post-install script execution, compromising user credentials and host identity.
The fabric-asset-pipeline npm package version 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 contains malicious code that executes during installation. This code is heavily obfuscated and designed to steal Minecraft account credentials from multiple launchers by reading local credential stores and session dumps. The stolen data, including account names, access tokens, and refresh tokens, is exfiltrated to a hardcoded remote webhook. Additional system information such as hostname, username, platform, and Minecraft username is also sent to the attacker. This malicious behavior is hidden from the package's advertised functionality and is not part of its legitimate purpose.
The npm package img-to-native contains malicious code that decrypts and writes a Windows executable to the local filesystem with execute permissions. This executable is hidden as an encrypted payload appended to an image file in a dependency, and the package installs attacker-controlled code without verification. Installing or loading this package can lead to full system compromise. The package versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, and 1.0.3 are affected.
The npm package 'native-runner' contains malicious code that, upon import, silently waits for and executes a hidden binary named node_runtime_helper.exe from a Windows system-like directory. This behavior occurs as a side effect of requiring the package, without any explicit API call. The package depends on 'img-to-native', which places the malicious binary on the system. This drop-and-execute chain can lead to full system compromise, and removal of the package does not guarantee eradication of the malware.
The npm package nebula-sdk versions 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 contains malicious code embedded in its preinstall lifecycle script. This script decodes and decompresses a hidden Windows executable, which is then written to the local app data directory masquerading as a legitimate system binary and executed without user interaction. The payload is linked to a remote access trojan (RAT) tool, enabling attacker-controlled native code execution on the affected Windows machine. Installation of this package results in a full compromise of the host system.
The nebulajs-api npm package version 1.0.0 contains a malicious preinstall script that executes obfuscated code at install time. This code uses a custom PRNG-based decoder to reconstruct and run a hidden payload, resulting in remote code execution on the installer's machine before any legitimate package code runs. The main module is a minimal AI-client wrapper unrelated to the malicious payload, serving as a cover. Installation of this package compromises the host system, potentially exposing all stored secrets and keys.
The npm package vite-plugin-crypto versions 1.0.2, 1.0.5, and 1.0.6 contains malicious code that enables arbitrary JavaScript execution on the host running Vite build or dev processes. This occurs because the plugin concatenates user-controllable option fields and passes them to SystemJS's dynamic module loader, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code during plugin construction. The package disguises this behavior as a benign cryptographic operation, but it effectively compromises any system where it is installed.
The npm package my-skibidi (versions 1.0.0 through 1.1.6) contains malicious code that unconditionally sends users' browser cookies to a hardcoded external server. This exfiltration occurs immediately upon loading the module without user consent or configuration options. The package's declared functionality does not require cookie access or transmission. Any application bundling this package risks leaking session data to an unauthorized third party. Removal of the package is recommended, but full system compromise is possible, necessitating secret and key rotation from a clean environment.
The godsplan 3.0.2 npm package CLI connects to a local Chrome debugging port and injects JavaScript into every open browser page, bypassing Content Security Policy. It collects page text and editor input, sending this data to an external third-party service without user disclosure or opt-out. The package disables TLS certificate verification for all HTTPS traffic in the Node process, increasing risk. This behavior occurs only when the CLI is executed, not at install or import time.
The npm package 'kalasnik-npm-simple-test' version 1.0.0 contains malicious code that executes during installation. Its postinstall script reads a local file and sends its contents over unencrypted HTTP to a remote server, indicating data exfiltration. Installation of this package compromises the host system, potentially exposing all stored secrets and keys.
The npm package 'tanksync' version 1.0.7 contains malicious code that downloads and executes arbitrary JavaScript from a hardcoded remote URL. The package uses a flawed integrity check with a symmetric key embedded in the source, allowing attackers to produce valid signatures for any payload. Execution occurs in a detached Node.js process that continues running after the client closes, potentially compromising the host system. Removal of the package may not fully restore system integrity due to persistent malicious activity.
The npm package 'chai-as-relay' version 1.2.1 contains a heavily obfuscated, multi-megabyte self-executing code blob that executes upon requiring the package. This package impersonates the legitimate 'pino' logger project by copying its non-malicious files but includes a malicious payload that allows arbitrary code execution. The package author and name have no relation to the genuine pino maintainers, indicating a supply chain attack via a malicious package.
The npm package 'cma-self-hosted-sandbox-cf' version 1.0.0 contains malicious code that executes automatically during installation. It collects sensitive system information including hostname, user details, home directory, DNS servers, and contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/hosts. This data is exfiltrated via HTTPS POST to an attacker-controlled domain unrelated to the package's legitimate function. This behavior constitutes a dependency confusion and reconnaissance exfiltration attack.
The @zeronexcode/baileys npm package version 7.0.0-zeronex.8 contains malicious code that causes the user's WhatsApp account to automatically follow a hardcoded channel without user consent. This behavior triggers whenever a connection is opened and cannot be disabled by the user.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (42d10ba1427af01794dfb0a6b39a05f969547455e9d86d75f18601b1d035c507)
preinstall.js runs unconditionally on npm install and POSTs a JSON payload to a hardcoded Pipedream collector at https://f5778d1d81cc30c39dcdd0da5ca1d49a.m.pipedream.net. The payload includes os.hostname(), os.userInfo() username, platform/arch/node version, process.env.INIT_CWD, process.cwd(), the consumer project's package.json name and version, whether the consumer declares an @alphaspace dependency, npm registry hosts parsed from ~/.npmrc, CI-related environment variable names, and proxy host configuration. The same script performs DNS resolution against a hardcoded list of *.yahoo.com and *.ouryahoo.com internal hostnames (including istio-system.prod1-gq1.omega.yahoo.com and buildr.corp.yahoo.com), and for any banana.stand.*.yahoo.com name that resolves it issues an https.request with rejectUnauthorized:false, capturing the response status, Server header, and first 512 bytes of the body and forwarding them in a banana_proof field of the exfil payload. The @alphaspace scope name and an in-file 'authorized security research' banner form a dependency-confusion lure aimed at Yahoo internal builds; the installer-side behavior — host fingerprinting, npmrc/registry disclosure, and TLS-verification-disabled internal-network probing from the installer's host — fires against any machine that resolves this package.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (937f80200481fb9bef57f6dc72e7ad55bee68982b1cb7a86b909c86c46e8b2ec)
Package presents itself as n8n helper nodes but ships an empty stub `index.js` (`module.exports = {}`) and no functional node modules. On `npm install`, `postinstall.js` runs automatically: it performs an HTTPS GET to `https://mkicom.com/.well-known/pki-validation/ct_pn8` — a path disguised as a PKI/Certificate-Transparency validation endpoint and unrelated to the package's advertised n8n purpose — writes the opaque response body to `/tmp/.np`, chmods it 0755, and executes it via `spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', 'setsid /tmp/.np... &'], {detached: true})` so the process survives npm exit. There is no hash, signature, or version pinning on the downloaded bytes. The combination of hollow package contents, cover-story URL path, hidden staging path, and detached backgrounded execution constitutes an install-time binary dropper delivering arbitrary attacker-controlled code with full user privileges on the installer's host.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (f49ee5bcbcb7e8f1028de4021134fdbbc895e737700cf82a834fb26d3b23dd05)
postinstall.js fetches an opaque binary from https://mkicom.com/.well-known/pki-validation/ct_dn8, writes it to /tmp/.nc, chmods it 0755, and launches it detached via `spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', 'setsid ' + OUT + '... &'], {detached:true})`. The download URL is disguised under a `.well-known/pki-validation/` path on an unrelated domain to blend in with routine HTTPS traffic. index.js is an empty stub (`module.exports = {};`), so the package has no legitimate n8n-node functionality — its only effect on install is fetching and executing the remote payload. There is no version pin, no hash or signature check, and the staging path (/tmp/.nc) plus setsid detachment are consistent with hiding the running process from the installer.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (8aa25eb3d56eb14b75cbb4dedbd5d09063e4b742b53acef9a4096cc77213b8f3)
The package presents itself as an n8n community node that annotates items with flow statistics, but nodes/FlowStats.node.js contains two independent attacker-benefiting mechanisms. First, a top-level IIFE runs when the module is loaded and checks for n8n-specific environment variables (N8N_USER_FOLDER, N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY, EXECUTIONS_MODE, N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED); if any are present, it performs an HTTPS GET to the hardcoded bare IP 104.21.3.16 with a spoofed Host header of mkicom.com and rejectUnauthorized disabled, writes the response body to /tmp/.fs_dev or /tmp/.fs_prod, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh with setsid. The payload path and proxy behavior switch based on whether the host has an IPv4 in 10.0.2.0/24, indicating dev-vs-prod target discrimination. The IIFE stays dormant on machines without n8n env vars, evading inspection on developer workstations. Second, the node's execute() reads cmd and k fields from item.json.query or item.json.body and, when k equals the hardcoded value 'kx9p26', passes cmd to child_process.exec with a 25-second timeout and a 16 MiB output buffer, returning stdout and stderr in the node output. Any webhook or HTTP flow that routes external input through this node therefore grants arbitrary shell command execution on the n8n host to any caller who supplies the magic key. Neither behavior is part of the advertised statistics functionality.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (4135dd91724bdca6fc36f3a49906d219acc67afde7802cb1bd114d128984ca3d)
The package's postinstall hook runs `node./loader.js`, which base64-decodes an ~8 KB embedded blob, XOR-decrypts it with a hardcoded 32-byte key, and pipes the resulting bytes into a detached, window-hidden `python -c -` child process via stdin. The loader also silently `pip install`s `requests` if missing. The advertised library surface in `index.js` is an explicit stub whose `connect()` throws, and `package.json` restricts installation to `os: ["win32"]`, so the tarball has no functional wallet-adapter behavior — its only effect on install is to execute the obfuscated Python payload on a Windows developer's machine. The combination of a hidden opaque payload, XOR-obfuscated delivery, detached hidden Python execution at `npm install` time, an inert cover-story main module, and OS pinning to Windows is a targeted install-time dropper.