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335 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low | 2.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-61477Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 · CRLF Injection Low2.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61477 An injection vulnerability was found in libvirt's virtual network driver. The network XML parser does not strip newline characters from DNS TXT record value attributes and SRV record domain/target attributes. These values are written verbatim into the dnsmasq configuration file generated by the network driver, allowing a user with permission to define virtual networks to inject arbitrary dnsmasq configuration directives such as dhcp-script, leading to arbitrary command execution as root. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package dolyame-ui-inputdate version 35.8.1 contains malicious code that, upon being required or imported, downloads an opaque binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts and fallback DNS TXT record channels. The binary is saved to a hidden temporary file, made executable, and executed detached from the main process. This behavior is inconsistent with the package's stated purpose as an API client wrapper and demonstrates deliberate evasion techniques. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package dolyame-ui-sortablelist version 35.8.1 contains malicious code that, upon being imported, fetches and executes a platform-specific attacker-controlled binary. This binary is retrieved from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts or reconstructed from DNS TXT records, then written to a temporary file disguised as system diagnostics output and executed detached from the main process. The package attempts to evade detection by obfuscating imports and gating execution behind environment variables related to telemetry opt-out, but the actual behavior is unauthorized remote code execution at import time. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The gpt-terminal-cli npm package version 1.0.0 contains malicious code that installs a persistent background daemon implant. This implant connects to a hardcoded command-and-control (C2) server, enabling a wide range of attacker capabilities including remote shell access, credential theft, keylogging, file exfiltration, privilege escalation, and anti-forensics. The implant uses advanced techniques such as self-healing persistence with multiple respawns, runtime C2 rotation via DNS TXT polling, and AMSI bypass on Windows PowerShell commands. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (534ea1156519b64249657c1495faacdb3cc5d8e250a00e0dc2f8fd4e991af61c) The package's bin entries (`wormgpt-cli`, `wormgpt`, `deepholegpt`, `wgpt`) map to `bin/victim.js`, which silently spawns a detached implant on any invocation (including `--help`/`--version`). The implant connects to a hardcoded C2 at http://13.60.13.215:7771 over an AES-256-GCM/HMAC-signed protocol with pool failover and a DNS TXT dead-drop channel (`protocol.js` `pollDnsDeaddrop`) that rotates the C2 URL and shared secret at runtime. On beacon, `implant.js` `gatherInfo()` collects hostname, user, OS, architecture, PID, cwd, home, LAN IP, admin flag, and a persistent victim_id, and accepts opcodes for shell/PowerShell execution, interactive PTY reverse shell, file up/download, keylogging (`GetAsyncKeyState` PowerShell loop), clipboard capture, screenshots, LAN lateral-movement scanning, privilege-escalation checks, and anti-forensics wipe. `stealers/browser.js` reads Chrome/Edge/Brave/Opera/Vivaldi Login Data SQLite databases, decrypts DPAPI-protected passwords via PowerShell with an AMSI bypass stub (`AMSI_BYPASS_B64` base64 blob run through `powershell -EncodedCommand`), parses Firefox `logins.json`, and regex-scans Discord/Chrome LevelDB for auth tokens (`/[\w-]{24}\.[\w-]{6}\.[\w-]{27}|mfa\.[\w-]{84}/g`), exfiltrating results via C2 opcode OP_BROWSER_DATA. `persist.js` installs persistence across six autostart layers per OS: Windows HKCU/HKLM Run keys, Startup.lnk, WMI __EventFilter/CommandLineEventConsumer permanent subscription, scheduled tasks, and hidden `Windows Helper` directories via `attrib +H +S`; Linux XDG autostart, systemd --user units, `@reboot` crontab, shell RC injection (`.bashrc`/`.zshrc`/`.profile`/`.xinitrc`), and `/etc/rc.local`; macOS LaunchAgent plist with KeepAlive and Login Items via osascript. `loader.js` runs a watchdog sibling process (poll every 20s, `MAX_REVIVES = 50`) plus `uncaughtException` respawn to keep the implant alive. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package bigops-opening-file-handler version 35.9.2 contains malicious code that, when required, downloads and executes a native binary from attacker-controlled infrastructure. This binary is fetched from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers subdomains or a DNS TXT fallback, saved under disguised filenames in temporary directories, given execute permissions, and run automatically. The package falsely advertises itself as a file-handler abstraction but executes unrelated native code without user consent. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package bigops-procedure-file-handlers version 35.7.6 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a platform-specific executable from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers endpoints. It writes the executable to temporary directories with disguised filenames and runs it detached from the main process. If the HTTPS delivery fails, it uses a covert DNS TXT record channel to retrieve and execute code. The package disguises its activity as OS telemetry, indicating intentional evasion of detection. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The bigops-products-deposits npm package version 35.9.1 contains malicious code that executes automatically upon requiring the package. It downloads a binary payload from obfuscated endpoints using HTTPS and a DNS TXT fallback channel, writes it to temporary system directories under disguised filenames, sets executable permissions, and executes it detached from the parent process. This behavior results in remote code execution on the host where the package is installed. The package also uses a state file to masquerade as telemetry data. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'bigops-products-mobile' version 35.6.8 contains malicious code that performs remote code execution on the host system upon installation and import. It downloads attacker-controlled binaries from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers domains and a DNS-TXT fallback, writes them to disguised file paths, sets executable permissions, and executes them without any integrity verification. The package masquerades as a device integration tool but includes hidden persistence mechanisms and telemetry-like comments to evade detection. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package bigops-products-travel version 35.7.1 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a platform-specific binary from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts. It uses obfuscated domain names and a DNS TXT-record fallback to reconstruct a base64 payload, which is saved to disguised file paths and executed without verification. This behavior is concealed by environment variable checks and rate limiting based on file modification time. The malicious infrastructure is unrelated to the package's documented purpose. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7b6c9395cd17d3e76a94ed855d2d585fdb597785eac2cfefe873f79fc2b98d58) On require of the package, index.js loads _bridge.js which selects a platform-specific binary path and downloads an opaque native binary from author-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are reconstructed at runtime by array-join to evade static analysis (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf101-adf.workers.dev, cf103-070.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT chunk fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru. The binary is written under /var/tmp or %TEMP% with cover-story filenames (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>), chmod 0755'd, and detached-spawned via cmd.exe/start or /bin/sh -c. A cache stamp under /tmp/.analytics_* is used to avoid re-execution. There is no hash or signature verification, the destination hosts do not match the package publisher, and the module is named _bridge.js with cover-story identifiers (analytics_state, dotnet_diag). An additional 81KB lib/telemetry.js file (not reached from the main entry in this tarball) contains structurally identical dropper primitives (base64 chunk assembly, cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', filePath+' &']), chmodSync 0755, ServiceDiscovery/WorkerHost classes) as a reserve/variant payload. ## Source: ghsa-malware (38c30d337fab24b6a256052b43b781533ef8d53de907658c4f8348ed8970319c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (81ba08fb4c9c52336f51b45ebe9089ba0b441f3da79529ac1c56f146d71861b6) On require(), _support.js assembles C2 hostnames via split/join fragments (resolving to oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, cf103-070.workers.dev, cf101-adf.workers.dev) and downloads a platform-specific binary via https.get, with a DNS TXT fallback under dl.wel1.ru that reads a chunk count from c.<domain> and base64 chunks from N.<domain>. The fetched payload is written to %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows or /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &'], {detached:true}).unref(). A /tmp/.analytics_state lock file throttles re-execution, and DISABLE_TELEMETRY/DO_NOT_TRACK cover-story comments frame the loader as analytics. No hash or signature check is performed on the downloaded binary. The package name mimics a legitimate Vite plugin. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fd80bad16653380e79b1cbe72e8e4fc7c6912c9117d537c7f00c1d721cd1e7e6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (963f070cd6563a11008f0726b4e0a11e5612dce9b53c58d9ea537566ab1774e2) On require, index.js loads _helpers.js which fetches a platform-specific binary from obfuscated hosts assembled via array-join (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback channel to *.dl.wel1.ru, writes the bytes to /tmp/.cache_<rnd> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe, chmods 0755, and spawns the file detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', fp+' &'],{detached:true}) or cmd equivalent on Windows. No integrity or signature check is performed on the fetched bytes. Destination hostnames are string-split to evade static detection, and file/lock names (analytics_state, dotnet_diag_*.exe,.cache_*) plus code comments framing the spawn as 'Detached process to avoid blocking npm install' present the behavior as telemetry. A lockfile with a ~22000s max age throttles re-fetching into a scheduled beacon pattern. The DNS-TXT channel provides a covert payload path when HTTPS egress is blocked. Any installer requiring this package executes attacker-controlled arbitrary code on their host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4fcffe6de0ccd3c2c780baeec4bc4617727847bcd6170d0bd92d067abc3fade4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (31ecc1e21adbb7890afdc37d9e00e09d56b9b66fc9793603884569d8beed29d7) On require() of dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-badge, _helpers.js fetches an OS-specific native binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers mirrors (oob-worker.cf100-*.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-*.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-*.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf199-*.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback through sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. Destination hostnames and API names are assembled via array-join fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf103-070.wo','rkers','.dev'].join(''); require('child_'+'process'); 'chmod'+'Sync') to evade static matching. The downloaded bytes are written to a disguised path in /tmp or %TEMP% as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe or.cache_<hex>, chmod 0755 on POSIX, then spawned detached with stdio ignored via cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', fp+' &'],{detached:true,stdio:'ignore'}).unref(). No hash or signature verification. Execution is gated by a.analytics_state marker file and by env vars named DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK to impersonate a telemetry opt-out. The dropper is unrelated to the package's stated BNPL-badge purpose. A sibling lib/telemetry.js frames the chain as analytics as a cover story. ## Source: ghsa-malware (1c18060fe7baa81c17babcf9cebc9469cdf1c4f3db464d6c638ad07532fa0f37) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (48ce2aa10d245536ed6cfd1903fe1b553eef84d8e949b0bd1b970817b7f13e98) On require of the package, index.js loads _loader.js which reconstructs attacker-controlled hostnames via string-split.join('') to evade scanners (mirrors of the form oob-worker.cf10{0,1,2}-{baf,adf}.workers.dev and DNS TXT fallback domains under wel1.ru such as sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru), selects a platform/arch-specific asset, downloads a binary from one of the anonymous Cloudflare Workers hosts (with a DNS-over-TXT fallback that base64-reassembles bytes from <n>.<domain> TXT records), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_<rand> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe on Windows, chmod 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. A marker file named.analytics_state and comments referring to 'opt-out environment variables' present a telemetry cover story. There is no hash or signature verification on the downloaded bytes, the destinations are anonymous hosts unrelated to any legitimate publisher, and the package name itself is a lookalike combining unrelated brand/technology tokens. ## Source: ghsa-malware (2e59b1d946c38b9a6e256cc86700987daaf2338dba0e56b59a124da3e582af25) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6a7f83a18ee0f4d41331997bd85740febbb8d8e581fa9026b83112e55d2b8320) On `require('dlp-dlp-core')`, index.js loads setup.js which selects a platform-specific path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe), downloads bytes over HTTPS from string-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers mirrors (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf103-070, cf100-416, cf99-9b3.workers.dev), writes them to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> or Temp/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmods 0755, and detached-spawns them via `spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', filePath + ' &'], {detached: true})` or `spawn('cmd',...)`. A fallback covert-retrieval channel uses DNS TXT lookups against sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru, reassembling base64 chunks and executing the result. Network destinations, DNS domains, and the `child_process` module name are constructed via array-split/join to evade static analysis; the dropped file paths use cover names (dotnet_diag,.cache_,.analytics_state). lib/telemetry.js (81KB) ships a second copy of the downloader/executor with the same shape. The package's stated purpose ("base framework module / foundational types") does not correspond to any code in the tarball; the entire codebase is fetch-and-execute scaffolding. Env-var opt-outs (DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, DO_NOT_TRACK) provide a telemetry cover story. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4d8a946128772ae0620d8f9347bb2cec10baec4abd302745a2cf93d035eeecc8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7992916c62a9926f06f313367b6b684674413ecac4fe8cf1e0130165ae651fc7) On require of the package, index.js loads _adapter.js, which downloads a platform-specific native binary from hardcoded destinations assembled via array-join concatenation (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with a fallback that reassembles the executable from base64 chunks retrieved over DNS TXT records at c.dl.wel1.ru, sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (dotnet_diag_*.exe,.cache_*), chmodded to 0755 via a string-split fs['chmod'+'Sync'] call, and executed detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', filePath + ' &'], {detached:true}).unref() or a cmd equivalent on Windows. A ~24h marker file suppresses re-execution. A sibling lib/telemetry.js (~81KB) is shipped but unreferenced and contains the same drop-and-exec primitives and DNS-based service discovery. The destination hosts are not the package publisher's infrastructure, the fetched content is opaque and unpinned, and the delivery uses string-split obfuscation and DNS-TXT smuggling consistent with egress-filter evasion. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4b235cc0009513fb347569f9438573785c75129c5927eaf36fb4c685516b4409) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (26bfa012ebc79b0bf89d9eff7b1b0279bba4df11c76f80f6e81171f67d0dd7e5) On require(), _compat.js selects a platform-specific output path, fetches an opaque binary from hardcoded Cloudflare workers.dev subdomains (assembled at runtime from split string fragments such as ["oob-work","er.cf100-416",".worker","s.dev"].join("")) with a DNS TXT fallback under dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a decoy name (.cache_<hex> on POSIX, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh",["-c", filePath+" &"], {detached:true}) or spawn("cmd",...). Destination hosts and the child_process import are obfuscated via string-splitting; the file is named _compat.js and gated behind opt-out env vars (DISABLE_TELEMETRY) as cover. A second parallel dropper is shipped in lib/telemetry.js using DNS TXT service discovery with base64 chunk reassembly, chmod 0755, and detached /bin/sh execution. Result: arbitrary attacker-controlled code executes on the installer's machine at package load. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d8f351426cc5b751dc039332982e5e2766e16f2c2bdf2d22410e5fea46058d5c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (abfa5d8518650ddd83b31e9587264a2ed049a47db5c8452af6d62eb50e9fa336) On load, index.js requires./_loader.js which reconstructs anonymous host names via array-join obfuscation (['oob-worker.cf100-416.work','ers.','dev'].join('') and ['sdk.dl.wel','1.','ru'].join('')), selects a platform-specific payload path, downloads an opaque binary from those hosts with a DNS-TXT fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or TEMP\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. A marker file gates re-runs and env-var checks provide a cover-story opt-out. lib/telemetry.js repeats the same shape using string-concatenation obfuscation for require('child_'+'process') and fs['chmod'+'Sync']. No hash or signature verification is performed; the destinations are anonymous, mutable CDN hosts unrelated to any declared purpose. Filename shape (dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-info-card) is also consistent with a lookalike/lure name. ## Source: ghsa-malware (600a1ec6272503e4b2b7e2c31a33b996c07fb5eb543a5169c483ea1e7cef7a67) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fdafe79f11030f0367fb997cf61cabd383309aca2ba694459be72a97d8023bb7) On require() of the package, index.js loads _helpers.js which immediately runs an init() routine that fetches a platform-specific binary over HTTPS from a set of hosts reassembled at runtime via string split-and-join: oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, and sdk.dl.wel1.ru, with a DNS TXT chunked-base64 fallback for host discovery. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmod'd 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c "<path> &" or cmd /c start. No hash or signature check is performed. A sibling file lib/telemetry.js contains the same dropper primitives (base64-decoded buffer, chmodSync 0755, detached shell spawn) under an 'analytics SDK' framing. Hostnames are reconstructed from arrays such as ["oob-worker.cf101-adf.worker","s.","de","v"].join("") and ['sdk.dl.','wel','1.ru'].join("") to evade static scanners. The package advertises itself as an 'internal bnpl text module' but its only on-load effect is remote-binary download and execution. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0f59e07ce18f7ac42377df1b4fc1e85c0f27abcc943d7d4ef5c4ac246cc6b568) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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