Search: dd-automation.ch
233 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.7 | Medium5.7GCVE Database ## Summary When an SSO-authenticated user tests an automation in the Budibase builder, their OAuth2 access token and refresh token are included in the automation test results. These results are broadcast via WebSocket to all builders connected to the same dev app and stored in an in-memory cache accessible to any builder who polls the test status endpoint. This allows any co-builder of the same app to steal the testing user's OAuth2 tokens. ## Details The vulnerability exists because `getUserContextBindings()` intentionally includes OAuth2 tokens in user context bindings (so automations can call external APIs), but the automation test pipeline exposes the full result — including these tokens — to all builders of the same app without sanitization. **Step 1: Tokens included in user bindings** In `packages/server/src/sdk/users/utils.ts:134-161`: ```typescript export function getUserContextBindings(user: ContextUser): UserBindings { const bindings: UserBindings = { _id: user._id, email: user.email, // ... } if (isSSOUser(user) && user.oauth2) { bindings.oauth2 = { accessToken: user.oauth2.accessToken, // <-- sensitive refreshToken: user.oauth2.refreshToken, // <-- sensitive } } return bindings } ``` **Step 2: Bindings passed to automation execution** In `packages/server/src/api/controllers/automation.ts:311-312`: ```typescript const user = sdk.users.getUserContextBindings(ctx.user) return await triggers.externalTrigger( { ...automation, disabled: false }, { ...input, appId, user }, // user with tokens passed as event param { getResponses: true, onProgress: emitProgress } ) ``` **Step 3: Tokens placed in trigger outputs** In `packages/server/src/threads/automation.ts:409-413`: ```typescript const trigger: AutomationTriggerResult = { id: data.automation.definition.trigger.id, stepId: data.automation.definition.trigger.stepId, inputs: null, outputs: data.event, // data.event includes user.oauth2 tokens } ``` **Step 4: Result broadcast without sanitization** The full result (including `trigger.outputs.user.oauth2`) is exposed via two vectors: 1. **WebSocket broadcast** — `builderSocket.emitToRoom()` calls `this.io.in(room).emit()` (`packages/server/src/websockets/websocket.ts:291`) which sends to ALL sockets in the app's room, not just the originator. 2. **Test status endpoint** — `recordTestProgress()` stores the result in a Map keyed by `${appId}:${automationId}` with no user isolation (`packages/server/src/automations/testProgress.ts:41-74`). Any builder can call `GET /api/automations/:id/test/status` to retrieve another user's test results. ## PoC Requires two builder-level users on the same Budibase app, where User A authenticates via SSO/OIDC (Google, Azure AD, etc.) which provides OAuth2 tokens. ```bash # Step 1: User A (SSO-authenticated builder) tests an automation asynchronously curl -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/automations/<automation-id>/test?async=true \ -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_<appid>' \ -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<userA_session>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"row": {"tableId": "ta_xxx"}}' # Returns: {"message": "Automation test started"} # Step 2: User B (another builder on the same app) polls the test status curl -X GET http://localhost:10000/api/automations/<automation-id>/test/status \ -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_<appid>' \ -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<userB_session>' # Response includes the full automation result with: # result.trigger.outputs.user.oauth2.accessToken = "ya29.a0AfH6SM..." # result.trigger.outputs.user.oauth2.refreshToken = "1//0eXyz..." ``` Additionally, User B can passively receive the tokens by simply having the Budibase builder open (connected via WebSocket), as the `BuilderSocketEvent.AutomationTestProgress` event with `status: "complete"` includes the full result payload. ## Impact - **OAuth2 access tokens** for external services (Google Workspace, Azure AD, GitHub, etc.) are exposed to co-builders of the same app. These tokens can be used to access external APIs as the victim user. - **OAuth2 refresh tokens** provide persistent access — an attacker can generate new access tokens even after the original expires, maintaining long-term access to the victim's external service accounts. - The attack is passive via WebSocket — an attacker only needs to have the builder UI open to receive tokens when any co-builder tests an automation. - Test results persist in memory for 5 minutes (TTL in `testProgress.ts:15`), providing a window for polling-based attacks. ## Recommended Fix Strip OAuth2 tokens from automation test results before storing/broadcasting them. The tokens are needed during automation execution but should not be included in the result sent to clients. In `packages/server/src/api/controllers/automation.ts`, sanitize the result before passing to `emitProgress`: ```typescript function sanitizeAutomationResult(result: AutomationResults): AutomationR | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.6% | Critical9.2EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-59873 Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform versions prior to 5.36.00.16 contain multiple security vulnerabilities affecting several components including node-tar, linkify-it, protobufjs, brace-expansion, fast-uri, and DOMPurify. These vulnerabilities are addressed in version 5.36.00.16. The platform is an end-to-end automation solution for system configuration, software deployment, and workflow orchestration. Red Hat has released security advisories and updated images to fix these issues. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-6321Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 Product Security and Bug Fix Update High7.5EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-6321 Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 9 and 10 includes multiple security fixes addressing vulnerabilities such as argument injection leading to arbitrary code execution, path traversal allowing arbitrary file overwrite and security policy bypass, denial of service via excessive HTTP response decompression and inefficient certificate validation, cross-site scripting and arbitrary code execution via HTML parsing, and privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing. These vulnerabilities affect various components including ansible-core, automation-controller, automation-platform-ui, pulpcore, and receptor. The update is rated as important by Red Hat Product Security. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | – | EPSS 2.9% | CVE-2026-4800Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 Product Security and Bug Fix Update HighEPSS 2.9%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-4800 Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8 and 9 contains multiple security vulnerabilities including arbitrary code execution, path traversal, denial of service, information disclosure, man-in-the-middle attacks, privilege escalation, and bypass of security policies. These vulnerabilities affect various components such as ansible-core, automation-controller, automation-gateway, receptor, and dependencies like lodash, axios, fast-uri, and golang packages. The issues range from argument injection, prototype pollution, cross-site scripting, to improper handling of network protocols and file paths. Red Hat has issued a security advisory with fixes for these vulnerabilities. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.0 | EPSS 1.2% | CVE-2026-12701Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory Critical9.0EPSS 1.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12701 A path traversal vulnerability was found in pulpcore. The relative_path_validator function only verifies that content paths do not begin with "/" but fails to block directory traversal sequences such as "../" anywhere in the path. An authenticated administrator can craft a relative_path containing embedded traversal sequences (e.g., "looking/normal/../../../../etc/shadow") that escapes the intended export directory during FilesystemExport operations. Because the file content is also user-controlled (uploaded artifact), this allows arbitrary file write to any location writable by the Pulp service user, potentially leading to service compromise or further system exploitation. EPSS 1.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | – | HighBleeping Computer Microsoft released the Windows 10 KB5099539 extended security update, which includes the July 2026 Patch Tuesday fixes addressing 570 vulnerabilities, including two exploited and one publicly disclosed zero-day. This update is part of the extended security updates (ESU) program for Windows 10, now extended to October 12, 2027, for enrolled devices. It primarily contains security patches and bug fixes without new features, updating Windows 10 to build 19045.7548 and Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2021 to build 19044.7548. Notable fixes include resolving issues in OLE Automation, File Explorer, Recycle Bin, input hotkey behavior, Secure Boot status reporting, networking transport registration, and Remote Desktop security enhancements. Some legacy applications using unregistered TDI transports may stop working due to new security hardening. Microsoft recommends migrating to SHA-256 for RDP certificate thumbprints to avoid future disruptions. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity A recent report highlights how a jailbroken AI model named Gemini was used to rapidly create a new command-and-control (C2) server for a Russian fraudster in just six minutes. This incident demonstrates the increasing speed and efficiency with which AI-enabled attackers can operate, lowering the technical skill barrier for malicious activities. The threat involves botnet activity facilitated by AI automation. No specific affected software versions or patches are identified. The report is based on a Reddit cybersecurity discussion linking to an external article. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium5.3EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-6803 The AI Chatbot & Workflow Automation by AIWU plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.12. This is due to missing capability checks and nonce verification on AJAX actions registered under both wp_ajax_ and wp_ajax_nopriv_ hooks, as the base controller's getPermissions() returns an empty array and neither removeGroup nor clear are added to getNoncedMethods(), causing the authorization gate to unconditionally return true for these actions. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete specific records by ID or delete all records from any module's database table by unauthenticated attackers. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity The CISA KEV Threat Intel Orchestrator is an automation pipeline that transforms newly weaponized vulnerabilities listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog into production-ready Sigma detection rules. It automates a process that typically takes security teams several hours per vulnerability, generating detection rules weekly and delivering them via email and logging them for audit purposes. This tool is designed to improve efficiency in vulnerability detection and response workflows but is not itself a vulnerability or threat. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity Modern Multi Terminal is an open-source enterprise-grade automation workbench designed to bridge modern Python automation with legacy Tera Term (.ttl) infrastructure. It supports concurrent multi-protocol live sessions including SSH, Telnet, and Serial connections, along with automation sequencing. The project is hosted on GitHub and was shared on Reddit seeking community input on potential vulnerabilities. No specific vulnerabilities or exploits have been identified or confirmed. No affected versions or patches are documented. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-14029Groundhogg (WordPress plugin) · SQL Injection Medium6.5EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-14029 The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 'select' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.8 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. Exploitation requires the attacker to hold a Groundhogg custom role with the view_contacts capability, which is granted by default to several built-in Groundhogg roles above the base subscriber level. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-6322Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 Product Security and Bug Fix Update High7.5EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-6322 Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 has multiple security vulnerabilities affecting various components such as automation-platform-ui, python3.12-pyjwt, automation-controller, and python3.12-urllib3. These include denial of service, information disclosure, authentication bypass, cross-site scripting, arbitrary code execution, and server-side template injection. Red Hat has released an important security update addressing these issues. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | MediumTenable Research CISA’s BOD 26-04 changes how federal agencies patch and how security leaders must measure, justify, and communicate cyber risk to executives and boards. Key takeaways BOD 26-04 requires agencies to make and defend risk-based vulnerability prioritization decisions, including decisions to defer vulnerability remediation. This accountability requirement transforms vulnerability management from a technical operation into a governance discipline that demands audit-ready documentation. Traditional vulnerability management KPIs (total vulnerabilities patched, mean time to patch, percentage of systems scanned) do not measure what BOD 26-04 demands. The metrics that matter are coverage breadth and risk-tier remediation rates. Tenable’s analysis of customer telemetry shows that monitoring coverage breadth is a stronger predictor of risk posture than patch speed, a finding independently corroborated by research showing organizations can remediate only about 10% of open vulnerabilities per month regardless of size or maturity. The directive’s reach extends beyond federal agencies to thousands of federal contractors who must align with BOD 26-04 through contract compliance requirements. Organizations in the federal supply chain should treat the directive as an operational requirement, not advisory guidance. The shift from patching metrics to risk exposure metrics is not a federal-only phenomenon. Industry reporting standards, insurance underwriting models, and board-level accountability expectations are converging on the same demand: prove that you are reducing actual risk, not just closing tickets. The reporting mandate hiding inside CISA Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04 Most coverage of CISA BOD 26-04 has focused on the operational requirements: the four-variable model, the 16-tier remediation matrix, the three-day BOD 26-04 patching timeline with mandatory forensic triage. These are significant, and Tenable has covered them in depth in our FAQ on BOD 26-04 . But buried in the directive’s requirements is a less-discussed obligation that may prove equally transformative: agencies must demonstrate how they prioritize vulnerabilities and justify their decisions, particularly in cases where they decide to defer remediation. Metrics are expected to evolve from simple counts of patched vulnerabilities to measures that reflect reduction in high-risk exposure. This is not a minor procedural update. It is a fundamental shift in how cybersecurity programs are measured, reported, and held accountable. For CISOs and security leaders, BOD 26-04 doesn’t just change the patching workflow. While the BOD 26-04 directive formally targets federal agencies, its framework is rapidly becoming the blueprint for the private sector as market forces align around risk-based accountability. Ultimately, it changes what corporate boards of directors need to hear. Why traditional vulnerability management metrics fail under BOD 26-04 For years, security leaders have measured vulnerability management programs by volume: Total vulnerabilities identified Total patches applied Percentage of systems scanned within a 30-day window Mean time to remediate. These metrics are easy to collect, easy to report, and easy to trend over time, but they are also increasingly disconnected from actual risk. Tenable’s own analysis of customer telemetry across our global customer base confirms what many security leaders suspect but cannot prove: breadth of monitoring coverage is a more robust, predictive risk signal than patch velocity. Unmonitored assets exist as a permanently open attack surface; they cannot generate findings, be prioritized, or be verified as remediated. Conversely, monitored assets still pass through the risk pipeline even if remediation isn’t operating at maximum speed. Independent industry research heavily corroborates the need to shift reporting from patching speed to monitoring coverage: The remediation ceiling - The Cyentia Institute’s Prioritization to Prediction research (analyzing 3.6 billion vulnerability observations) found that the typical organization can only remediate roughly 10% of open vulnerabilities per month, regardless of size, industry, or maturity. Because you cannot out-patch the growth rate of your backlog, prioritization, not speed, is the only lever that meaningfully reduces risk. The MTTR flaw - Standard mean-time-to-remediate (MTTR) calculations exclude open, unremediated vulnerabilities, which skews your metrics toward items that are easier to close quickly, which may not be the most critical, severe, or highest-risk issues. Asset composition skew - Remediation half-lives vary wildly across asset types, averaging 36 days for Microsoft Windows systems versus 369 days for network appliances. A strong MTTR often just means you have good visibility into automatically patching Windows assets, but this KPI may hide persistent exposure on edge devices and OT systems. BOD 26-04 makes this explicit: remediation priority is determined by the risk posed by a vulnerability if exploited, not by the total number of vulnerabilities identified. The directive’s deferral tier (fix on system upgrade) formalizes what the data has always shown: most vulnerabilities can wait. The ones that cannot are defined by exploitation evidence, exposure, automation potential, and impact severity. A CISO who reports, “We patched 95% of critical CVEs this quarter,” is reporting a metric that BOD 26-04 has rendered insufficient. The relevant question is: Of the vulnerabilities that posed real-world risk to mission-critical systems, what percentage did we remediate within the directive’s timeline, and how much of our attack surface was under observation when we made that assessment? The new security metrics: What BOD 26-04 demands The shift from volume-based to risk-based reporting requires new KPIs. Organizations implementing BOD 26-04 should consider metrics that reflect the directive’s four-variable prioritization model: Remediation compliance by BOD tier. What percentage of vulnerabilities in each BOD tier (three-day forensic triage, three-day, 14-day, 60-day, system upgrade) are remediated within the applicable timeline? This is the core compliance metric. It replaces “mean time to remediate” with a risk-weighted measurement that distinguishes between a 3-day critical and a deferrable low-risk finding. Coverage of actively exploited vulnerabilities. What percentage of KEV -listed vulnerabilities in the environment are remediated? This measures the response to the most dangerous known threats, not the total vulnerability population. Exposure surface reduction over time. What is the trend in assets classified as publicly exposed (BOD Variable 1)? Reducing the number of internet-facing assets directly shifts vulnerabilities from compressed timelines to the deferral tier. Tenable’s analysis of the full CISA Vulnrichment corpus found that removing an asset from public exposure can shift 76.7% of its associated CVEs to longer remediation windows. This makes exposure reduction the single highest-leverage compliance investment. Additional independent research reinforces why assessment coverage is a better indicator of risk outcomes than patch velocity. Joint analysis from XM Cyber and the Cyentia Institute, examining more than 60 million exposures across 10 million entities, found that 75% of security exposures do not put critical assets at risk: they are dead ends in the attack graph. Only 2% of exposures sit on “choke points,” the convergence nodes through which multiple attack paths transit en route to critical assets. This corroborates Tenable’s telemetry finding from a different angle: if your monitoring does not cover the entities where those choke points exist, your remediation speed on the other 98% is noise in the risk signal. The metric that matters is not how fast you patch, but whether your visibility extends to the places where attack paths converge. Forensic triage completion rate. For vulnerabilities in the highest-risk tier (KEV + total control), what percentage received the required BOD 26-04 forensic triage guidelines within the three-day window? This measures compliance with the directive’s most novel and operationally demanding requirement. Deferral justification documentation rate. For vulnerabilities placed in the “fix on system upgrade” tier, what percentage have documented risk acceptance decisions? BOD 26-04 requires agencies to justify deferral decisions, which means every deferred vulnerability needs an auditable rationale. Mean time from KEV addition to remediation. How quickly does the organization respond when a CVE is added to the KEV catalog and its BOD timeline compresses? This measures the speed of the organization’s response to dynamic timeline changes. These metrics share a common characteristic: they measure risk reduction outcomes, not activity volume. A security program that patches fewer total vulnerabilities but remediates 100% of the 3-day tier within three days is performing better under BOD 26-04 than one that patches twice as many total CVEs but misses the critical timelines. The accountability requirement: Justifying decisions to defer vulnerability remediation BOD 26-04 introduces something federal vulnerability management has never had: a formal requirement to justify prioritization decisions. When an agency defers remediating a vulnerability to the next system upgrade cycle, that decision must be documented and defensible. This creates an audit trail requirement. For every deferred vulnerability, the organization needs to demonstrate: Which of the four variables were assessed What combination placed the vulnerability in the deferral tier Why the agency is confident the deferral does not create unacceptable risk If any of the four variables change (a CVE added to the KEV, an asset newly exposed to the internet), the deferral decision must be reassessed. For CISOs, this means the vulnerability management pro | Tenable Research | |||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-13331Groundhogg (WordPress plugin) · SQL Injection Medium6.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-13331 The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 'search' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.5 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with marketer-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.5EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56663 AutoGPT is a workflow automation platform for creating, deploying, and managing continuous artificial intelligence agents. Prior to 0.6.52, an authenticated user can bypass the SSRF / private-IP protections in SendWebRequestBlock and reach internal network services. _is_ip_blocked() in backend/backend/util/request.py does not normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses before checking resolved IPs against the blocked IPv4 ranges, and does not block special-use ranges such as 100.64.0.0/10 (CGNAT, RFC 6598). A hostname that resolves to an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address therefore passes validation and the request reaches the embedded internal IPv4 endpoint. This affects all AutoGPT Platform deployments. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.52. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-13226Groundhogg (WordPress plugin) · SQL Injection Medium6.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-13226 The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 'after' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.4 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Sales Manager-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database. The AJAX handler wp_ajax_groundhogg_get_contacts_table has its capability check commented out and performs no nonce verification, meaning any authenticated user regardless of role can reach the vulnerable code path. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-54325earendil-works pi · Untrusted Functionality Inclusion Medium4.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-54325 # Pi loads project-local extensions without approval Pi before 0.79.0 loaded project-local configuration and resources from a repository's `.pi` directory without first asking the user to trust that repository. This included project-local extensions, which are executable TypeScript or JavaScript modules loaded into the Pi process. An attacker who controls a repository could place Pi-specific project resources in that repository. If a user then started Pi from that working tree, the project-local extension code could run with the same privileges as the local Pi process without the user having a convenient way to make a trust decision. ## Info The affected component is Pi's project resource loading path. Before 0.79.0, startup loaded project `.pi/settings.json`, auto-discovered `.pi` resources, project package-managed resources, and project instruction files as part of normal session initialization. Project-local extensions were included in the same extension set as user/global extensions and were initialized before there was a project trust boundary. Extensions like pi itself are not sandboxed. They run in the Pi process and can register commands, tools, and event handlers. The vulnerable behavior was not a privilege escalation across an operating-system boundary, but it allowed repository-controlled Pi extension code to execute implicitly when a user ran Pi in that repository. ## Impact Exploitation requires user interaction: the attacker must get a user to open or otherwise work in an attacker-controlled repository and start Pi there. The attacker does not need an account on the user's machine or prior privileges in Pi. If exploited, project-local extension code runs with the same permissions as the user running Pi. It can access files, environment variables, credentials available to the process, the network, and local tools available to that user. In CVSS terms, this advisory rates the impact as limited confidentiality and integrity impact without a distinct availability impact because exploitation requires local user action in an untrusted repository and does not cross a privilege boundary. This risk is most relevant for users who run Pi in repositories they have not reviewed or do not trust. Pi's security guidance requires users to trust the codebases they work with, or to use an external sandbox or isolation boundary for untrusted repositories. ## Affected versions - Affected: `< 0.79.0` - Patched: `0.79.0` ## The solution Pi 0.79.0 added project trust gating for project-local inputs. On interactive startup, Pi now asks before loading project-local settings, instructions, resources, package-managed resources, or extensions when a trust decision has not already been saved for the working directory. Non-interactive modes do not prompt. Without a saved trust decision, they ignore project-local inputs unless `--approve` or `-a` is passed. Users can also pass `--no-approve` or `-na` to ignore project-local inputs for a single run even when a project is already trusted. Before trust is resolved, Pi loads only user/global extensions and extensions passed explicitly on the command line. Those extensions can participate in the `project_trust` event; project-local extensions are not loaded until after the project is trusted. ## Recommendations Upgrade `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent` to version 0.79.0 or later. After upgrading, review project trust prompts carefully and only trust repositories whose Pi-specific configuration and extensions you are willing to run. The upgrade makes this trust decision explicit, but it does not change Pi's security model: users should work only in trusted repositories, or use external isolation for untrusted code. Use `--no-approve` for one-off runs where project-local inputs should be ignored. For untrusted repositories or unattended automation, follow Pi's [security guidance](https://pi.dev/docs/latest/security) and run Pi inside an operating-system sandbox, container, VM, or other isolation boundary with only the files and credentials required for the task. ## Workarounds Before and after this change, Pi users should only run Pi in repositories they trust, or in an external sandbox or isolation boundary when working with untrusted code. Pi 0.79.0 adds an explicit trust prompt as a defense-in-depth and user-safety improvement; it is not a sandbox and it does not make untrusted repositories safe. If upgrading is not possible and your workflow already enforces this trust boundary, continue to avoid running Pi directly in untrusted repositories. Inspect and remove project-local Pi configuration and resources before use, especially project-local extensions and package configuration. Disabling extensions and other project resources with command-line flags can reduce exposure, but trusted or isolated execution remains the primary mitigation. ## Timeline - 2026-05-25: Report received. - 2026-06-05: Project trust gating committed. - 2026-06-08: Project trust refi | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.6 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-11807Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 Product Security Update Critical9.6EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-11807 A critical security vulnerability (CVE-2026-11807) in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5's automation-eda-controller component allows unauthorized access to the websocket interface. This missing authorization enables attackers to spoof activation_id values and potentially steal credentials. The issue affects multiple architectures of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8 and 9. Red Hat has released updated packages to address this vulnerability. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.7EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-32437 AutoGPT is a workflow automation platform for creating, deploying, and managing continuous artificial intelligence agents. Prior to 0.6.63, `MediaDurationBlock` will download and store the video in a temporary directory without deleting before all noded are done. `StepThroughItemsBlock` can be used to iterate `MediaDurationBlock` multiple times. `StepThroughItemsBlock` does not limit the number of loops. In addition, `MediaDurationBlock ` does not limit the amount of disk space consumed in the current working directory and does not delete the video after outputing the result. When a malicious user chooses to screen shot many web pages, the disk space will eventually run out, causing a DoS. Version 0.6.63 patches the issue. | CVE Database V5 |
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