Mac users have historically trusted their operating system to keep them safe. That peace of mind mostly comes from Apple’s strict control over its ecosystem, and the fact that macOS has historically faced fewer mass attacks than Windows. However, that doesn’t mean Macs are invulnerable: threats do exist, and new ones emerge all the time. Over just the past few weeks, security researchers have published reports on at least two new campaigns that target Apple devices. The malware used in one of the campaigns has been dubbed CrashStealer , while the other is known as ClickLock . Both rely on different tricks to force users into entering their Mac password, which attackers then use to steal account credentials, crypto assets, documents, and much more. In today’s post, we take a close look at how CrashStealer operates — and how to avoid falling victim to it. A videoconferencing app with CrashStealer inside It was back in May 2026 that researchers spotted the first signs this malware was being developed, and by early July, they caught it operating in the wild. The malware earned its name because of its core mechanism: it disguises itself as the macOS built-in crash reporting tool (CrashReporter) while functioning as an infostealer designed to hijack sensitive data. Researchers managed to trace one of the websites users visited to download the malware. The site poses as a legitimate platform for distributing the video conferencing tool Werkbit. According to researchers, this is the site victims used to download Werkbit, which secretly contained the CrashStealer malware loader. Source However, you can’t just visit the site and download the software. Before downloading, visitors are asked to enter a special meeting PIN. This setup likely allows the attackers to limit the distribution scope by targeting only specific, pre-selected victims. Exactly how the cybercriminals choose their targets and deliver the PIN remains unknown. The “lucky” users with a code end up installing the initial malicious payload — named Werkbit Setup. Interestingly, it carries a valid Apple developer certificate and has successfully passed Apple’s notarization process — meaning it cleared the automated prescan for malicious code. As a result, the attackers manage to bypass the operating system’s built-in Gatekeeper defense. This allows the payload to launch without triggering the usual untrusted software warnings. The Werkbit Setup installer is signed with a valid Apple developer certificate and has passed notarization. Source Once launched, Werkbit Setup first reaches out to GitHub. Researchers believe using this popular platform helps attackers blend in by making these initial network requests look far less suspicious to security tools. After retrieving instructions from a GitHub repository, the program connects directly to the attackers’ server to fetch CrashStealer itself. The loader then saves the malware to a temporary macOS folder, launches it, and wipes most of the intermediate setup files. As a result, a fully functional infostealer is up and running within seconds of Werkbit Setup starting. By the way, the user never gets any videoconferencing app. How CrashStealer works Unlike the Werkbit Setup loader, the CrashStealer malware itself isn’t signed with an Apple developer certificate. To keep users from suspecting anything, the malware disguises itself as the built-in macOS crash reporting tool, CrashReporter, by using the exact same name, app identifier, and a similar icon. Once launched, CrashStealer completes a sequence of steps to gain access to sensitive data, establish persistence in the system, and cover its tracks: Remove metadata — including the attribute that flags the app as an internet download. Display a fake system prompt asking for the user’s macOS password. Use the previously captured credentials to gain access to Keychain, the built-in macOS password manager. Check the computer for installed security tools and malware analysis software.…
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl contain a vulnerability that allows SAML authentication bypass. The verify_xml function verifies responses against a certificate embedded within the response itself when no trust anchor is configured, enabling attackers to authenticate arbitrary assertions using self-signed certificates. This occurs because the code returns early if no trust anchors or CA certificates are provided, trusting the embedded certificate without external validation.
A MongoDB server initiating an outbound TLS connection may terminate abnormally when processing a malformed OCSP response from a remote peer during the TLS handshake. OCSP stapling validation is enabled by default for outgoing TLS connections. Affected scenarios require the remote peer to hold a certificate issued by the cluster's trusted certificate authority, or for the connection to traverse an untrusted network path.
A high-severity vulnerability in Google Chrome on Linux prior to version 150.0.7871.182 allows an attacker in a privileged network position to perform domain spoofing by exploiting insufficient validation of untrusted certificate input. This vulnerability could enable an attacker to impersonate domains via malicious network traffic. The issue is addressed in Chrome version 150.0.7871.182.
Improper TLS hostname verification in Snowflake Connector for Python versions prior to 4.7.1 and 3.18.1 may have allowed a network-positioned attacker to bypass certificate hostname validation on HTTPS connections made by the connector. An attacker with on-path network access could exploit this by intercepting or redirecting network traffic and presenting a certificate signed by any trusted CA for any domain, causing the connector to accept connections without validating that the certificate matched the requested hostname. Successful exploitation requires an on-path traffic interception capability (e.g. ARP/DNS poisoning, rogue access point, BGP hijacking, or malicious proxy/exit node). This vulnerability may have exposed credentials, query data, and staged file contents to interception and tampering, and may have enabled the attacker to issue arbitrary SQL within the context of the victim's connector session. Impact is limited by the privileges of the affected Snowflake role. The fix is available in Snowflake Connector for Python versions 4.7.1 and 3.18.1. Users must manually upgrade.
Sonatype Nexus Repository 3 versions from 3.0.0 up to but not including 3.94.0 are vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the SSL Certificate Retrieval endpoint. An authenticated user with the nexus:ssl-truststore:read permission can cause the server to make outbound connections to internal or restricted network hosts. The vulnerability has a medium severity with a CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.3.
A security issue exists within CompactLogix® 5380, ControlLogix® 5580, and EN4 communication modules related to CIP Security certificate revocation handling. The security issue stems from the controller failing to properly reject certificates signed by an intermediate certificate that has been revoked via a Certificate Revocation List (CRL). This could allow a network-based attacker to establish a connection using a certificate that should be untrusted, potentially bypassing CIP Security protections.
DIRAC is an interware, meaning a software framework for distributed computing. Prior to versions 8.0.79, 9.0.22, and 9.1.10, WorkloadManagementSystem/Utilities/PilotWrapper.py pilotWrapperScript uses ssl._create_unverified_context to download the second-stage pilot.tar archive without TLS certificate verification and downloads the reference checksum through the same unvalidated channel. An attacker able to redirect or intercept a grid site's network traffic through DNS or routing manipulation can substitute both the executable pilot code and its checksum, causing arbitrary code to run in the pilot context with access to pilot proxy credentials. The fixed implementation validates the server certificate through system trust and X509_CERT_DIR or the grid certificate directory. This issue is fixed in versions 8.0.79, 9.0.22, and 9.1.10.
A network attacker positioned between UAA and its LDAP directory can impersonate the directory using any certificate from any trusted CA, then harvest the LDAP bind password and every end-user password sent during simple-bind authentication, and return forged group memberships that grant themselves admin scopes. This affects every deployment that authenticates users against LDAP over StartTLS.
Affected versions: UAA versions prior to v78.13.0; Cf-deployment versions prior to v56.2.0.
### Summary
The AI Bridge Proxy (`aibridgeproxyd`) created a goproxy server whose default transport set `InsecureSkipVerify: true` and only assigned a secure transport when an upstream proxy was configured. In the default configuration (no upstream proxy), outbound HTTPS to the Coder access URL accepted any TLS certificate.
> **Note:** Practical exploitation requires an on-path (man-in-the-middle) position between the AI Bridge Proxy and the Coder server. Deployments where they are co-located over loopback are effectively unaffected.
### Impact
An attacker positioned between the proxy and the Coder server, via ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning or control of proxy environment variables, could intercept injected Coder session tokens, user-supplied provider API keys (BYOK) and full request and response bodies including prompts and completions. The default transport also honored `HTTP_PROXY` and `HTTPS_PROXY`, allowing environment-based traffic redirection.
### Patches
The fix applies the secure transport (TLS 1.2 or higher using system root CAs) unconditionally. The AI Bridge Proxy was introduced in v2.30.0. Earlier release lines including the v2.29 ESR line are not affected.
The fix is available in the following releases:
| Release line | Patched version |
|---|---|
| 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) |
| 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) |
| 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) |
### Workarounds
Ensure the Coder access URL uses a trusted certificate and secure the network path between the AI Bridge Proxy and the Coder server (for example, loopback or mTLS).
### Resources
- Fix: #26131
### Credits
Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22455) for independently disclosing this issue!
Description:
To issue and renew TLS certificates on behalf of customers, Cloudflare's Universal SSL feature automatically manages the CAA RRset for the customer's zone. This auto-managed RRset is permissive by design (e.g. 'issue "letsencrypt.org"' without parameters). On Universal SSL zones, Cloudflare's authoritative DNS serves this auto-managed RRset at query time, superseding any customer-configured CAA records on the zone. When a customer publishes a stricter CAA record using the RFC 8657 accounturi or validationmethods parameters, the Certificate Authority does not observe those parameters when evaluating the served RRset under RFC 8659. As a result, the RFC 8657 account-binding and validation-method-binding protections are not enforced end-to-end on Universal SSL zones. Successful exploitation could result in issuance of a browser-trusted TLS certificate to an attacker, enabling MITM against the affected domain.
Exploitation is non-trivial in practice: an attacker would need to hold an ACME account at one of the Certificate Authorities in the served CAA RRset and to simultaneously satisfy domain control validation across the multiple geographically distinct Network Perspectives the CA relies on for Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration. Cloudflare prefixes are anycast-announced from hundreds of locations globally, raising the bar against single-vantage-point BGP hijacks. Any resulting misissuance of a browser-trusted certificate is subject to Certificate Transparency logging required by major browsers, and would be visible to CT monitoring.
Mitigation:
Customers requiring strict RFC 8657 enforcement need to disable Universal SSL on the affected zone.
Universal SSL's automatic CAA management and customer-set RFC 8657 accounturi and validationmethods enforcement are mutually exclusive by the nature of the issue, so there is no in-product workaround that preserves both.
Certificate Transparency monitoring is recommended for all customers as a general detection control.
Credits:
David Osipov (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-2713-9242), independent researcher
A denial of service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the Go standard library packages crypto/x509 and crypto/tls used by Red Hat's multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.6.12. The flaw arises from improper limiting of the number of intermediate certificates processed during certificate chain building, allowing an attacker to cause resource exhaustion and service unavailability. This affects systems that process untrusted TLS certificates or X.509 chains using these Go packages.
phpseclib versions from 0.1.1 up to but not including 1.0.30, 2.0.55, and 3.0.54 contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The X509::validateSignature() function reads a URL from the Authority Information Access extension of an untrusted X.509 certificate and connects to it by default, allowing an attacker to control the destination of the connection. This can lead to unauthorized internal network access. The vulnerability is fixed in versions 1.0.30, 2.0.55, and 3.0.54.
An issue was discovered in Canonical ADSys upstream versions through v0.16.2. During Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate auto-enrollment via the vendored Samba client script (internal/policies/certificate/python/vendor_samba/gp/gp_cert_auto_enroll_ext.py), ADSys utilizes a plaintext HTTP connection (http://) instead of a secure HTTPS connection (https://) to request the CA certificate from the Active Directory Certificate Services server (GetCACert). An unauthenticated network attacker positioned between the managed Ubuntu host and the configured AD CS CA hostname can conduct a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. By intercepting the plaintext HTTP request, the attacker can supply an arbitrary, attacker-controlled Root CA certificate. Because the system automatically accepts this certificate and registers it into the local system trust store via update-ca-certificates, this results in system-wide trust store poisoning. Consequently, TLS clients utilizing the operating system trust store on the affected machine will accept rogue certificates for arbitrary domains, enabling persistent decryption and interception of subsequent TLS connections. This issue is resolved in version v0.16.3.
A security update for Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18 for Quarkus 3.33 is now available and includes the following CVE fixes:
* netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-45416)
* netty-resolver-dns: Netty: Information disclosure and data manipulation due to improper CNAME record validation [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-45674)
* netty-handler: Netty: Improper trust manager handling leads to hostname verification bypass [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-50010)
* netty-resolver-dns: Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-47691)
* netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-48059)
* netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-48043)
* netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-44893)
* netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-44249)
* quarkus-vertx-http: Authentication/Authorization Bypass via Advanced Path Normalization Vulnerabilities [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-50559)
* libthrift: Apache Thrift: Denial of Service via excessive memory allocation [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-43868)
* libthrift: Apache Thrift: Security bypass due to improper certificate validation [rhboac-camel-quarkus-3] (CVE-2026-43869)
A user reported encountering a browser security warning indicating an invalid or untrusted certificate on a medical bill payment website (mdpaybill.net). The user was forced to bypass this security warning to complete a payment using their credit card. This situation raises concerns about the security and trustworthiness of the payment site, potentially exposing sensitive financial information.
High-risk TrustAllCerts routines disable standard TLS certificate validation. Combined with hard-coded DES symmetric encryption keys, a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) actor could decrypt network traffic.
Apache Airflow's EmailOperator and the underlying `airflow.utils.email` helpers established SMTP STARTTLS connections without verifying the remote certificate when the deployment used `[email] smtp_starttls=True` without `[email] smtp_ssl`. An attacker positioned between the worker and the configured SMTP server (network MITM — typical hostile-network attack-surface for environments where the SMTP relay sits outside the worker's trust boundary) could present a self-signed certificate, have the worker complete the STARTTLS handshake silently, and capture the SMTP AUTH credentials and message contents the worker forwarded.
This CVE covers the **core apache-airflow side** of the same root cause already covered for the SMTP provider by `CVE-2026-41016` (published 2026-04-27, covering `apache-airflow-providers-smtp`). Users who already applied the SMTP-provider fix from CVE-2026-41016 should additionally upgrade `apache-airflow` to 3.2.2 or later to cover the core-side path through `airflow.utils.email`. Affects deployments configured with `smtp_starttls=True` and `smtp_ssl=False` where the SMTP relay is reachable across a less-trusted network segment than the worker.
Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow` 3.2.2 or later.