Search: 1c-ru.net
76 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (42d10ba1427af01794dfb0a6b39a05f969547455e9d86d75f18601b1d035c507) preinstall.js runs unconditionally on npm install and POSTs a JSON payload to a hardcoded Pipedream collector at https://f5778d1d81cc30c39dcdd0da5ca1d49a.m.pipedream.net. The payload includes os.hostname(), os.userInfo() username, platform/arch/node version, process.env.INIT_CWD, process.cwd(), the consumer project's package.json name and version, whether the consumer declares an @alphaspace dependency, npm registry hosts parsed from ~/.npmrc, CI-related environment variable names, and proxy host configuration. The same script performs DNS resolution against a hardcoded list of *.yahoo.com and *.ouryahoo.com internal hostnames (including istio-system.prod1-gq1.omega.yahoo.com and buildr.corp.yahoo.com), and for any banana.stand.*.yahoo.com name that resolves it issues an https.request with rejectUnauthorized:false, capturing the response status, Server header, and first 512 bytes of the body and forwarding them in a banana_proof field of the exfil payload. The @alphaspace scope name and an in-file 'authorized security research' banner form a dependency-confusion lure aimed at Yahoo internal builds; the installer-side behavior — host fingerprinting, npmrc/registry disclosure, and TLS-verification-disabled internal-network probing from the installer's host — fires against any machine that resolves this package. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-80981Linux kernel · net/smc: fix use-after-free of the LLC qentry in smc_llc_srv_add_link() Critical9.8EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-80981 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix use-after-free of the LLC qentry in smc_llc_srv_add_link() smc_llc_srv_add_link() keeps add_llc pointing into the queue entry: add_llc = &qentry->msg.add_link; smc_llc.c:1482 ... smc_llc_save_add_link_info(link_new, add_llc); smc_llc.c:1494 smc_llc_flow_qentry_del(&lgr->llc_flow_lcl); smc_llc.c:1495 ... u8 *llc_msg = smc_link_shared_v2_rxbuf(link) ? (u8 *)lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2 : (u8 *)add_llc; smc_llc.c:1504 smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys(link, link_new, llc_msg); smc_llc.c:1506 smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() kfree()s the entry, so on a link without a shared v2 receive buffer the pointer handed to smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys() is already freed. Before the Fixes: commit that branch always used lgr->wr_rx_buf_v2 and add_llc was not used after the free. Reproduced on an unpatched tree over rxe, with KASAN, kasan_multi_shot and a link forced to max_recv_sge == 1: the entry is freed and read by the same call, and the freeing frame is smc_llc_srv_add_link() itself. [ 2.523161] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523499] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880052194de by task kworker/0:1/11 [ 2.523789] [ 2.523862] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-p0-g2c9dd296545d #35 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 2.523865] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 2.523866] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [ 2.523869] Call Trace: [ 2.523870] <TASK> [ 2.523871] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 2.523872] print_report+0xd0/0x630 [ 2.523874] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523876] ? smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523878] kasan_report+0xce/0x100 [ 2.523879] ? smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523881] smc_llc_save_add_link_rkeys+0x333/0x350 [ 2.523883] ? smcr_buf_reg_lgr+0x2a4/0x660 [ 2.523885] smc_llc_srv_add_link+0xaa2/0x1e50 [ 2.523888] ? _printk+0xba/0xf0 [ 2.523897] ? __pfx_smc_llc_srv_add_link+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523899] ? down_write+0xb0/0x130 [ 2.523903] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523905] smc_listen_work+0x489e/0x4d00 [ 2.523907] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c6/0x3a0 [ 2.523911] ? __pfx_smc_listen_work+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523913] ? release_sock+0x148/0x1d0 [ 2.523915] ? smc_tcp_listen_work+0xb4f/0xfc0 [ 2.523917] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0 [ 2.523918] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523920] process_one_work+0x633/0x1030 [ 2.523922] ? assign_work+0x11d/0x370 [ 2.523924] worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 [ 2.523926] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523928] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523929] kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 [ 2.523931] ? recalc_sigpending+0x15c/0x1e0 [ 2.523934] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523935] ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 [ 2.523937] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523938] ? __switch_to+0x572/0xdd0 [ 2.523943] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2.523944] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 2.523947] </TASK> [ 2.523948] [ 2.531253] Allocated by task 48: [ 2.531399] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 2.531570] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 2.531737] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 2.531905] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370 [ 2.532100] smc_llc_enqueue+0x72/0x560 [ 2.532268] smc_wr_rx_tasklet_fn+0x474/0xa80 [ 2.532491] tasklet_action_common+0x20f/0x8a0 [ 2.532714] handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590 [ 2.532886] do_softirq+0x3b/0x60 [ 2.533036] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x61/0x70 [ 2.533221] __alloc_skb+0x732/0x890 [ 2.533384] rxe_init_packet+0x16b/0x4f0 [ 2.533567] prepare_ack_packet+0xb8/0x830 [ 2.533760] rxe_receiver+0x495/0x96e0 [ 2.533933] do_work+0x144/0x470 [ 2 ---truncated--- | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-81001Linux kernel · slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync() High7.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-81001 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync() slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on them. sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which sl_setup() installs as dev->priv_destructor. priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting for the device refcount to drop: /* Snapshot list, allow later requests */ list_replace_init(&net_todo_list, &list); __rtnl_unlock(); ... if (dev->priv_destructor) dev->priv_destructor(dev); /* slip_devs[i] = NULL */ if (dev->needs_free_netdev) free_netdev(dev); ... /* Free network device */ kobject_put(&dev->dev.kobj); So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at all. sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and released the device: CPU0 (slip_open) CPU1 (slip_close) unregister_netdev() rtnl_unlock() netdev_run_todo() __rtnl_unlock() rtnl_lock() sl_sync() dev = slip_devs[i] priv_destructor(dev) slip_devs[i] = NULL kobject_put(&dev->dev.kobj) /* dev is freed */ sl = netdev_priv(dev) if (sl->tty || sl->leased) /* use-after-free */ BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sl_sync drivers/net/slip/slip.c:730 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in slip_open+0xef4/0x1210 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:806 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880712dac71 by task syz-executor.2/6506 CPU: 2 PID: 6506 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.1.134-syzkaller-00260-g0c8fc3469765 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: sl_sync drivers/net/slip/slip.c:730 [inline] slip_open+0xef4/0x1210 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:806 tty_ldisc_open+0xa2/0x120 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:433 tty_set_ldisc+0x324/0x720 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:564 tiocsetd drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2428 [inline] tty_ioctl+0x5f0/0x1530 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2712 Allocated by task 6502: alloc_netdev_mqs+0x98/0xfe0 net/core/dev.c:10719 sl_alloc drivers/net/slip/slip.c:756 [inline] slip_open+0x36d/0x1210 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:817 tty_ldisc_open+0xa2/0x120 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:433 tty_set_ldisc+0x324/0x720 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:564 Freed by task 6497: device_release+0xa2/0x240 drivers/base/core.c:2507 kobject_put+0x179/0x280 lib/kobject.c:729 netdev_run_todo+0x6c8/0xef0 net/core/dev.c:10509 slip_close+0x166/0x1c0 drivers/net/slip/slip.c:906 tty_ldisc_close+0x113/0x1a0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:456 tty_ldisc_kill+0x94/0x160 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:614 tty_ldisc_release+0xe3/0x2b0 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:782 tty_release+0xbcc/0xe70 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1860 Commit e58c19124189 ("slip: Fix use-after-free Read in slip_open") fixed a different source of stale entries - a device left in slip_devs[] after slip_open() freed it on the registration error path - and does not address this race, which is why the report survives it. Drop the entry from ndo_uninit instead. unregister_netdevice() calls ndo_uninit under RTNL, before the device is queued to netdev_run_todo(), so an entry that sl_sync() can still see while holding RTNL belongs to a device that cannot be freed until RTNL is dropped. sl_free_netdev() stays only for the slip_open() error path, where register_netdevice() may have failed before ndo_init and ndo_uninit is then not called either. Both running for the same device is harmless: the ---truncated--- | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | 1.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-80744Linux kernel · netfilter: nf_tables_offload: suppress WARN_ON_ONCE for ENOMEM in abort path Low1.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-80744 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables_offload: suppress WARN_ON_ONCE for ENOMEM in abort path In nft_flow_rule_offload_abort(), WARN_ON_ONCE(err) is triggered on every error during rollback, including -ENOMEM. Memory allocation failures are expected under low-memory conditions and do not indicate a kernel bug. Trace for example: nft_flow_offload_chain() // FLOW_BLOCK_BIND nft_flow_block_chain() nft_chain_offload_cmd() nft_block_offload_cmd() ->ndo_setup_tc() nsim_setup_tc() flow_block_cb_setup_simple() flow_block_cb_alloc() // fails to -ENOMEM The warning was reproduced on the 5.10 stable kernel under memory pressure via fault injection, but the underlying bug exists in mainline as well, as demonstrated by the ENOMEM trace above. The following splat was triggered during nf_tables transaction processing: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8567 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 nft_flow_rule_offload_abort net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8567 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 nft_flow_rule_offload_commit+0x971/0xcd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:591 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 8567 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.10.260-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:nft_flow_rule_offload_abort net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:532 [inline] RIP: 0010:nft_flow_rule_offload_commit+0x971/0xcd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:591 Call Trace: nf_tables_commit+0x3bd/0x4bd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8604 nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xb1e/0x1f20 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:509 nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:579 [inline] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3b3/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:597 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x6cd/0xa00 net/netfilter/af_netlink.c:1340 netlink_sendmsg+0x906/0xe10 net/netfilter/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x155/0x190 net/socket.c:663 ____sys_sendmsg+0x705/0x870 net/socket.c:2379 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2433 __sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2462 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 Change the condition to WARN_ON_ONCE(err && err != -ENOMEM) so that warnings are only emitted for unexpected errors. This aligns with the common kernel practice of not warning on -ENOMEM. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (072daea48b555582ea01125b1a71fff5907e73bc890ec56f7b012ac38230b69e) On require() of bigops-storio, _support.js selects a platform-specific endpoint and fetches an opaque binary over HTTPS from one of four string-split *.workers.dev hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, cf101-adf, cf99-9b3, cf103-070 under workers.dev), assembled at runtime via array.join("") to hide the destinations from static inspection. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under a hidden random filename (dot-prefixed / dotnet_diag-style cover names), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b with stdio ignored. A DNS-TXT fallback (txtFetch/dns.resolveTxt against sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru — also assembled from string fragments) reassembles N base64-encoded TXT chunks into the same executable payload when HTTPS delivery fails. There is no version pinning, no hash or signature verification, and the fetched executable is unrelated to the package's stated storio abstraction purpose. The dropper runs automatically at library load time via index.js's try{require('./_support')}. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cd9ebb4bf8d8e6554d93f8343675d991c677dea6469481d1689813b405dca59c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (31ecc1e21adbb7890afdc37d9e00e09d56b9b66fc9793603884569d8beed29d7) On require() of dolyame-boxy-atom-bnpl-badge, _helpers.js fetches an OS-specific native binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers mirrors (oob-worker.cf100-*.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-*.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-*.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf199-*.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback through sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. Destination hostnames and API names are assembled via array-join fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf103-070.wo','rkers','.dev'].join(''); require('child_'+'process'); 'chmod'+'Sync') to evade static matching. The downloaded bytes are written to a disguised path in /tmp or %TEMP% as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe or.cache_<hex>, chmod 0755 on POSIX, then spawned detached with stdio ignored via cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', fp+' &'],{detached:true,stdio:'ignore'}).unref(). No hash or signature verification. Execution is gated by a.analytics_state marker file and by env vars named DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK to impersonate a telemetry opt-out. The dropper is unrelated to the package's stated BNPL-badge purpose. A sibling lib/telemetry.js frames the chain as analytics as a cover story. ## Source: ghsa-malware (1c18060fe7baa81c17babcf9cebc9469cdf1c4f3db464d6c638ad07532fa0f37) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (626b386d1f127bc0ed973dbac051023f0f021b0be476d1cd8678802ef98c5d42) On require of the package, index.js unconditionally loads _bootstrap.js, which downloads a platform-specific binary from hostnames assembled via split-string concatenation (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev) with fallbacks to sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru and a DNS TXT-record base64-chunk retrieval channel. The downloaded binary is written to /tmp or %TEMP% under a decoy hidden filename (.cache_<uid>, dotnet_diag_<uid>.exe), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. Hostnames and API names are runtime-assembled ("child_"+"process", "chmod"+"Sync") to defeat static scanners. A second, larger implementation of the same drop-and-exec pattern is shipped as lib/telemetry.js under an 'analytics SDK' cover story. ## Source: ghsa-malware (00ac66bbc4c02b2579e227b39cd22b64e933989d8526b03c561886cd85d67abc) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (51c824c84c8427ff1b81076d89a6d253b0d312f9eb28382311f601bbf4c5ceee) The package `main` (`index.js`) requires `./_init` on load. `_init.js` assembles hostnames via string-split `.join('')` obfuscation to produce a rotating list of Cloudflare Workers endpoints (`oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev`, `oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev`, `oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev`, `oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev`) plus a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback via `*.dl.wel1.ru` (`sdk.dl.wel1.ru`, `ext.dl.wel1.ru`, `pkg.dl.wel1.ru`, `net.dl.wel1.ru`). It downloads a platform-specific binary, writes it to `/var/tmp` or `%TEMP%` under disguised names (`dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe`, `.cache_<rand>`), sets mode 0755 on POSIX, and spawns it detached via `/bin/sh -c... &` or `cmd /c start /b`. Environment flags such as `DISABLE_TELEMETRY`, `ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT`, and `DO_NOT_TRACK` act as kill switches. A second dropper is bundled in `lib/telemetry.js` (81 KB), which reconstructs a payload from base64-encoded DNS TXT chunks and executes it using the same detached-shell pattern, hidden behind `require('child_'+'process')`, `fs['chmod'+'Sync']`, and an `analytics-sdk` cover story. The package's advertised purpose has no relationship to any such native runtime. ## Source: ghsa-malware (2c6b20a72d52db6e703edf3d70652989c61e881ea98641fcdbfd73847d7452a5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (dc1752274e08bd28f5be07afaa71cafeea1e7822330016892d0f06abd6c50681) On require() of the package, index.js loads _vendor.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from a string-concatenation-obfuscated list of Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT chunked base64 fallback to sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or the Windows TEMP directory under deceptive names such as dotnet_diag_*.exe and.cache_*, chmod 0755 on POSIX, then spawned detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd.exe /c start /b. A second ~81 KB module at lib/telemetry.js, framed as an 'Analytics SDK', reimplements the same fetch/write/chmod/spawn chain and DNS-TXT reassembly as a redundant dropper. Hostnames and sensitive API identifiers ('child_process', 'chmodSync', 'workers.dev', 'dl.wel1.ru') are reconstructed at runtime via Array.join and bracket-property concatenation to evade static analysis. Opt-out environment variables and a TTL lock file are present as cover-story hygiene but do not constitute consent. ## Source: ghsa-malware (36e37533131ea5ce9d4a73dfa8680516c916abc9b3eb719a4678fdb8cd8f1f31) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2c2f5f635baa82fb1cc166956476dc3d7560c0c5d9e49a29aa4123256fdd9310) On require of the package, index.js unconditionally loads _bootstrap.js, which selects a platform-specific endpoint and downloads an opaque binary from string-split obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback that reassembles base64 content across numbered subdomains of sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp/.cache_<rand> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe, chmod 0755 on POSIX, and executed detached via spawn("/bin/sh",...) or spawn("cmd",...). Destination hostnames are assembled from fragmented arrays joined at runtime to evade static analysis; the file is staged under masquerading names (dotnet_diag_,.cache_) and gated behind DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK cover-story environment variables. The package's advertised purpose (a picture-gallery / BNPL support module) has no legitimate need to download and execute a native binary from anonymous edge-worker hosts with no version pinning, no publisher-controlled origin, and no hash or signature verification. ## Source: ghsa-malware (93b7d20b5c9d5f24d8d4b343681dbe0e37ec95816667d008a60fe956e8714e66) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e31cd37951ea782d9a4a5cd23ad0524d154dccddbf0aef0d96cfdcaa29d03698) index.js unconditionally requires./_bridge on load. _bridge.js selects a per-platform payload (linux x64/arm64, darwin, win32), fetches a native binary over HTTPS from a hardcoded list of Cloudflare *.workers.dev endpoints (assembled at runtime by joining split string arrays such as ["oob-worker.cf101-adf.work","ers",".de","v"]), writes it to /tmp/.cache_<uid> or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<uid>.exe under names that impersonate benign artifacts, chmods 0755 on POSIX via fs["chmod"+"Sync"], and spawns it detached through /bin/sh -c on POSIX or cmd.exe /c start /b on Windows. A DNS TXT covert-channel fallback resolves alternate payload sources under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru, with the discovery domains also reconstructed from split arrays. lib/telemetry.js ships a second parallel dropper implementation labelled as an "Analytics SDK" (base64 payload assembly, chmodSync 0755, /bin/sh -c spawn) that is not reached from the current index.js but is packaged in the tarball. The advertised purpose (a BNPL banner abstraction) has no relationship to fetching and executing platform-specific native executables, and the destinations are not publisher-owned. ## Source: ghsa-malware (136bb556f5d69b483536f852deeebae245dcd87809dd2dd7e39f1909acabefae) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4f29e1e3b6b3a01a935dbcd19077e516c17d31c3674078ecfe2cd112b0137437) On require, index.js loads _init.js which reconstructs hostnames from split-string arrays (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf102','-baf.workers.','dev'].join('') and ['sdk.dl.','wel1.ru'].join('')) to build URLs against four Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback via sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. A platform-specific binary is downloaded via https.get, written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as.cache_<hex> and dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmodded 0755, and launched detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', path+' &']) or spawn('cmd',...). The fetched payload is unverified, comes from mutable non-publisher hosts, and executes on module load rather than through any documented API of the package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7cd7386bf67dcd89be60f275d29aa374bf07fa12a56f1ff56bef400c7b2ddf17) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (bbb4bab7b1c75e94cd3411aa312a1313e3d5a84bed77943b10f8c969b751cb23) On require() of the package's main entry, index.js loads _loader.js which selects a per-platform URL, downloads an opaque native binary from one of three Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback via sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru. The bytes are written to /tmp/.cache_<rand> or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start /b. Hostnames are assembled from split string arrays (e.g. ["oob-worker.cf99-9b3.wor","kers.","dev"].join("")) to evade substring scans, and file names (analytics_state, dotnet_diag) masquerade as diagnostics artifacts. A telemetry-styled opt-out gate (DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK) frames the download-and-execute as consented telemetry, but the default path is unconditional remote code execution. No hash or signature verification is performed; the URL is mutable and anonymous. The package name resembles a UI select component but its only observable behavior on import is the dropper. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9c3519c1c22bb4eab75836d741089a70981c2909eea8323132d4424fb338f929) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (85f76938cd11389b3bd414591165194a80fb7188a92630a675a68c5cdb61202b) index.js unconditionally requires _runtime.js, whose top-level start() function selects a platform-specific asset path, fetches an opaque binary from string-array-obfuscated hostnames reconstructed at runtime (oob-worker.cf1-03-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), writes it to a hidden file under /tmp or %TEMP% with a random suffix (e.g..cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start /b. A fallback covert channel resolves c.<domain> TXT records for a chunk count, then fetches <i>.<domain> TXT records from sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru and base64-decodes the concatenation into the executable payload, bypassing HTTP egress filtering. No hash or signature verification is performed and the destination is not the publisher. A sibling file lib/telemetry.js under an 'analytics-sdk' cover story ships the same download→base64-decode→chmod 0755→sh -c file & chain as a staged alternate payload. Requiring or installing this package causes attacker-controlled native code to run on the installer's machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a5faa7e2f12c9eabdb7879bf9d4b2aaf2310f04df1c66c3de3dadaad22ad7358) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (4b54c7175e494e683cdbc63814267aa5544f88d0373b929b9f0fe3fcb8202bd3) On require() of the package, index.js loads _loader.js which selects a platform-specific asset path and fetches a binary from one of four string-split-obfuscated `oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev` hostnames (with a DNS TXT chunked-base64 fallback via `*.dl.wel1.ru`). The fetched bytes are written to `/var/tmp/.cache_<hex>` (POSIX) or `%TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe` (Windows), chmod 0755'd, and spawned detached via `spawn('/bin/sh',...)` or `spawn('cmd',...)`. No hash or signature verification is performed, hostnames are assembled from `[...].join('')` fragments to evade static inspection, and the code is gated by `DISABLE_TELEMETRY`/`ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT`/`DO_NOT_TRACK` env vars while dropping a `.analytics_state` flag file as a telemetry cover story. Filenames impersonate legitimate.NET/system artifacts (`dotnet_diag_`, dot-prefixed cache). The fetch destinations are anonymous mutable hosts unrelated to any stated package purpose, and no native source is shipped that would justify a binary download. ## Source: ghsa-malware (135914b0e51c8aacf675ddb6fb98037d996d1296a52b77092267cf60e7b05520) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ad7aaa115c4d227fa01dd5a8b2e9f6945b21c65a7df4433ecf527ef69b3d0b40) On require(), index.js loads _adapter.js which fetches an unsigned, unhashed platform-specific executable from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it 0755, and detached-spawns it via child_process.spawn on /bin/sh or cmd. If HTTPS retrieval fails, the loader falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel that reassembles base64-encoded chunks from resolver domains sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru, reconstructs the binary, and executes it. Hostnames are assembled from split string fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.','cf100-41','6.workers.dev'].join('')), a.analytics_state stamp file is written, and environment variables named DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK frame the behavior as telemetry despite the payload being an executable binary. Package metadata is placeholder (empty dependencies, no repository/author) and the name impersonates an internal CI/GitLab tool. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6c356d83f79f184b78b1d19a8180dbda1f572e4845b9c9f5a1a9114b867075f8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0c4cd991fb1b5e2308797829d38de8ba8b673c91a889e800621d01faef34610d) devplatform-nx-husky is a typosquat blending the nx and husky ecosystem terms; its exported class is an inert no-op and the package has no legitimate functionality. On require(), _vendor.js selects a per-platform payload path and fetches an executable from one of four Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev). If HTTPS delivery fails, it falls back to a DNS TXT covert channel under *.dl.wel1.ru (sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru), reading a chunk count from a c.<domain> TXT record and reassembling base64 TXT chunks into the payload. The bytes are written to /var/tmp (or %TEMP% on Windows) under an inconspicuous name, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start. Destination hostnames and the child_process/chmodSync API names are reassembled at runtime from split-string arrays (e.g. ["oob-worke","r.cf102-baf.","work","ers.dev"].join(""), require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]) to evade static detection. A second copy of the fetch-decode-chmod-spawn dropper is bundled in lib/telemetry.js under an 'Analytics SDK' cover story. ## Source: ghsa-malware (bbf7609632af8a7f80ad4e0c4ba1cf57436d4d55d3f60377d6ea91e2fa1ed2ac) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3d18ba9f3689dbc03127a3d82ffe0a6a2a15edf3e7f58b7ca9322499b2b68197) devplatform-humanize-network-error@35.3.8 advertises itself as a network-error humanizing utility, but on `require()` its index.js unconditionally loads _adapter.js, which fetches a platform-specific native binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts assembled at runtime from string fragments (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), writes it to /tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via `/bin/sh -c` or `cmd.exe`. No hash or signature verification is performed and the payload is unrelated to the package's stated purpose. If the HTTPS fetch returns less than 1000 bytes, a fallback DNS-TXT covert channel reassembles a base64-encoded payload from TXT records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru (queried as c.<domain> plus per-index sub-labels) and executes it identically. Destination hostnames are reconstructed from `.join("")` fragments and dropped artifacts are named to masquerade as telemetry/diagnostic files (.analytics_state,.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), with comments framing the drop as analytics. A sibling lib/telemetry.js (~80 KB) shipped in the same tarball replicates the same HTTPS+DNS discovery, detached shell spawn, chmod 0755, and base64 chunk reassembly primitives but is not currently referenced by the entry graph. ## Source: ghsa-malware (47de4c5b573787f054f5da4dcda55c344af9a2d51c72763129ecfb5f66570fd6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3270e0e94deb3e2573594f28e84026653ee60f6c7f0a1fb79286ebba811ca525) On require, index.js unconditionally loads _init.js, which selects a platform-specific binary for linux/darwin/win32, downloads it from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled by splitting and joining string fragments (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback under sdk/ext/pkg/net subdomains of dl.wel1.ru, writes the bytes to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as dotnet_diag_*.exe and.cache_*, chmods 0755, and detach-spawns the file via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", path + " &"], {detached:true}) or cmd.exe /c start /b. No hash or signature verification is performed and the destinations are not documented publisher infrastructure. child_process is obtained via require("child_" + "process") to evade static matching. lib/telemetry.js ships an 81 KB second loader that reproduces the same fetch, base64-decode, chmod 0755, and /bin/sh -c spawn chain. The package's declared purpose (PO declaration generator) does not require fetching and executing native binaries from anonymous Cloudflare Workers hosts. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0a16595ba151c2cc5e13ed55ecd21e30ac2aab5a1723f476d76f0a2547ee0ac3) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (755ebe99a58cc94ddd8953897d01f30fcbacd145f6acf635761cf08b33d4868c) On require of this package, index.js loads _ext.js, which fetches a platform-specific binary from a rotating list of Cloudflare workers.dev hosts assembled at runtime via array.join to defeat static string scanning (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback channel via *.dl.wel1.ru (sdk, ext, pkg, net). The fetched binary is written to /tmp or %TEMP% under a cover-story name impersonating.NET diagnostics tooling (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on POSIX), chmod 0755 on POSIX, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. Any consumer that requires the package on install/import receives arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution on the host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (26008a5d95840ff404c5a75362ed3d81eedbd8989fcd37a6c40441421a96dc29) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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