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16 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog The Retadup worm, originally widespread in 2017 and dismantled in 2019, has resurfaced through infected old USB drives and offline computers. The worm spreads by copying itself to connected flash drives and external disks as hidden files and shortcuts. After French law enforcement took down the botnet in 2019 by seizing its C2 servers and issuing self-destruct commands, the worm was thought eradicated from online systems. However, in 2024, attackers re-registered Retadup's old C2 domain names, reactivating the botnet for infected offline systems or USB drives. The worm now downloads the more advanced CoffeeLoader malware, which uses sophisticated evasion techniques and can download further malware such as infostealers or ransomware. Retadup infection attempts have been detected primarily in Peru, Angola, and Russia. Users are advised to disable autorun, scan old drives before use, and maintain updated security software. | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog This content is a thematic cybersecurity analysis using Christopher Nolan's film adaptation of The Odyssey as an allegory to illustrate various cybersecurity concepts and threats. It draws parallels between characters and events in the story and common cyber threats such as ransomware, Trojan horses, VPN usage, social engineering, DDoS attacks, and advanced persistent threats (APTs). The narrative uses metaphorical language to educate about digital hygiene and security principles rather than describing an actual technical vulnerability or active threat. | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog This analysis discusses a new type of denial-of-service attack against AI agents called "denial of wallet," where attackers exploit the pay-as-you-go token consumption model of large language models (LLMs) to cause excessive financial costs. Autonomous AI agents that operate continuously and retry failed steps can consume tokens unpredictably and in large bursts, making costs difficult to control. Attackers can exploit this by sending numerous complex or looping requests that inflate token usage, leading to significant budget overruns. This issue has been recognized as a top risk in the OWASP guide for language models (LLM06:2026). | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog This report discusses a category of risky websites that browsers often mistakenly classify as safe. These 'gray-area' sites are not outright phishing scams but are untrustworthy and may cause financial loss or data compromise. Examples include subscription aggregators with hidden costly renewals, scam online stores selling counterfeit or non-existent goods while harvesting personal and payment data, fraudulent crypto trading platforms that steal investments and credentials, deceptive middleman services charging excessive fees, and fake browser extensions that hijack browsing data and sessions. These sites often exploit legal loopholes or obscure terms to avoid direct illegality. Users are advised to be cautious even when browsers show no warnings, especially with suspicious payment methods or requests for sensitive information. | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog A recent article in The Atlantic ran under the blunt headline, The End of Reading Is Here . According to the piece, research from the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) found that fewer than 50% of American adults read even a single book in 2022, and only 38% read a novel or short story. At the same time, the U.S. book market keeps breaking its own publishing records year after year: in 2025, for instance, the number of new titles topped four million — up a third from 2024. A huge chunk of that, 3.5 million titles, came from self-publishing, and one of its most powerful engines is Amazon’s Kindle Direct Publishing (KDP). My theory on this mismatch in trends: nobody’s reading books anymore because everyone’s too busy writing them. Joking aside, if there’s still a reader left out there, they’ve probably already guessed where I’m going with this: the all-powerful AI. Not long ago, a New York Times tech journalist was startled to find her own biography on Amazon — and one quick look confirmed it had been written by AI. Digging deeper into the world of AI book publishing, she stumbled onto the work of an extraordinarily prolific retired cybersecurity consultant. What happened next — and where to find reliable information in the age of AI — is what this post is about. Backstory: how a journalist chased the White Rabbit and fell down the hole Let’s start from the beginning. In the summer of 2026, New York Times tech journalist, Kashmir Hill, learned from an acquaintance that a biography about her had been published on Amazon a year earlier. It was titled The Biography of Kashmir Hill: The New York Times Technology Journalist Who Exposed Clearview AI, Challenged Big Tech and Redefined Privacy in the Digital Age . And she was more than stunned since nobody had ever reached out to her, or to anyone she knew, to research the book. “Alice started to her feet, for it flashed across her mind that she had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat-pocket, or a watch to take out of it…” The author of record was one John Crane Miller, and the photo on his Amazon page turned out to be a generic stock image of a white man: the kind that shows up all over the internet. Hill couldn’t find a shred of personal detail or contact information for him. But digging deeper into his Amazon profile turned up something else: in a single week in the summer of 2025, he had published biographies not just of Hill, but of nine other American journalists. Even the most trusting reader would find it hard to believe a literary genius could produce this kind of staggering output without a little robotic help. The AI-generated biography of journalist Kashmir Hill, which she stumbled across by accident on Amazon. Source And yet the hardcover of Kashmir Hill’s biography cost a full US$26.99 — despite running to just 90 pages. After reading it, Hill learned a whole slew of “facts” about herself she’d never known — including a detailed description of her coffee-making ritual (which, as the journalist notes, is actually her husband’s duty). Mr. Miller even claimed in the text to have read Kashmir Hill’s childhood diary. “…burning with curiosity, she ran across the field after it, and fortunately was just in time to see it pop down a large rabbit-hole under the hedge.” Hill had no luck tracking down the author of her biography. She left a comment on the book’s Amazon page asking him to get in touch. Nobody wrote back — and not long after, every book under John Crane Miller’s profile vanished. But that gave her a lead on several other AI authors on Amazon. In particular, she came across a certain Bill Johns, whose author page listed a staggering 445 books . Not expecting much to come of it, she asked Johns if he’d be willing to do an interview — and was more than a little surprised when he agreed. It was probably right around then that Kashmir Hill’s investigation turned into a genuine trip down the AI rabbit hole… “In another moment down went Alice after it, neve… | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Files built with the polyglot technique have been showing up more and more in cyberattacks in recent years. They let attackers slip malware past email filters and file scanners, deceive victims in phishing attacks, and complicate incident investigations. To pull this off, attackers deliberately construct a file that a system can interpret as different formats depending on which application opens it. A classic example is a file that can be handled as a PNG image or a ZIP archive. All it takes is changing the file’s extension, or simply using one or another application to open it. Let’s take a look at why it’s even possible to create files like this, which format combinations have turned up in real-world attacks, and how organizations can protect themselves from this threat. Why polyglot files are possible The data formats behind polyglot files are seldom exotic. It all comes down to a clever combination of common formats that happen to be structurally compatible. Polyglots exploit at least one of the following quirks in certain file formats: Most file formats need decoding from the very first byte, but some require to read them from the end. The clearest example is a ZIP archive: a corrupted or missing beginning doesn’t stop applications from reading the file, because all the needed headers actually sit at the end. This lets attackers simply glue two files together — in the example above, a PNG and a ZIP. The beginning reads as a valid PNG image, while the end reads as a valid ZIP archive. Many formats work like Russian matryoshka nesting dolls: despite outwardly having a specific extension matching its intended usage, inside the file is essentially a ZIP archive containing the necessary data. This group includes modern office documents (DOCX/XLSX/PPTX), Android installation packages (APK), Java library files (JAR), and many others. Some formats have no strict structural requirements — or their requirements are loose enough that the application that’s processing the file can locate the fragment it needs even when that fragment isn’t at the beginning. The Polydet GitHub repository describes numerous examples of possible file combinations for building a polyglot. Under the MITRE classification, this technique falls under the Masquerading category ( T1036.008 , Masquerade File Type). Examples of polyglot files in known cyberattacks Publicly available malware campaign analyses reveal all kinds of polyglots. Attackers adapt the entire attack scenario to fit a specific file type combination. The Head Mare group delivered the PhantomPyramid malware as a ZIP attachment. The file consisted of Windows executable code (EXE) with a small ZIP archive glued onto the end. When the victim opened the archive, it contained a file with the extension PDF.LNK, which would then launch that same polyglot attachment — this time as an executable file. In the attack documented by JPCERT , attackers created a file that started as a PDF and was detected as a PDF by most scanners but carried a DOC extension and opened in Office applications as a valid DOC file containing malicious macros. The attacks spreading the StrRAT and Ratty Trojans used a polyglot built from a signed Windows installer package (MSI) with malicious Java code (JAR) tacked onto the end. The StrelaStealer attacks used a polyglot with an HTML extension: a Windows library (DLL) with a decoy HTML document glued onto the end. A shortcut in the archive launched the file twice: once via the start command (the equivalent of a double-click, which opened a browser showing the HTML document), and once via rundll32 (which launched the malicious DLL). In a simulated but elegant attack, researchers joined two ordinary ZIP files together and found that different popular archive tools displayed the combined file differently: some showed only the first archive, some only the second, and some showed both at once as if it were a single archive with shared contents. If the attacker is familiar with the vic… | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Have you ever tried to open an “encrypted” email or an urgent document, only to realize with horror that your usual DOCX attachment is actually a file with the extension .docx.exe? Or maybe you received an email supposedly with an invoice, contract, or internal memo attached — only for the file to prove something entirely different from what it claimed to be? If so, you were likely targeted in a malware infection attempt. Cybercriminals routinely disguise malicious files as harmless documents and archives, banking on recipients blindly clicking without checking the extension. Kaspersky experts analyzed the file formats most frequently deployed in malicious email blasts to reveal what really lurks behind these extensions — and how attackers weaponize them in their campaigns. Important note: the extensions we’ll be discussing here are routinely used for completely legitimate files. For example, Windows executables normally end in .exe. However, we’re focusing specifically on scenarios where attackers disguise or spoof a file’s extension to pass it off as a totally different type of file. What extensions are most commonly found in malware? Our experts analyzed malicious email blasts from the beginning of 2026 to pinpoint the 15 most common dangerous file extensions. .exe .js .html .dll .bat .vbs .xls .pdf .jse .au3 .docx .htm .wsf .scr .lnk The top 15 file extensions used in malicious email blasts Let’s take a look at what files with these extensions actually do under the hood. Executable files An executable file is a compiled computer program that’s ready to run. Once launched, a malicious executable can download additional payloads, alter system settings, steal user data, connect your device to external attacker-controlled servers, and much more. These are the most common executable extensions found in malicious email campaigns: .exe .dll .com .scr .exe The classic Windows executable extension. It powers every program you use daily, from web browsers and games to office suites and software installers. By the way, attackers often wrap EXE malware in double extensions: invoice.docx.exe, report.pdf.exe, or even photo.jpg.exe. They take advantage of a default Windows setting: hiding extensions for known file types. Because this setting is turned on by default, users only see the first part of the file name — invoice.docx, report.pdf, or photo.jpg — and assume it’s just a normal document or image. But the second you open this trap file, the malware fires up. .dll Another common extension abused in malicious campaigns is .dll (dynamic-link library). These libraries hold functions that Windows programs frequently require while running, such as printing a document. This modular architecture prevents redundant code by letting multiple applications call on the exact same library for specific tasks. However, if an attacker replaces a legitimate library with an infected one, running any normal program that calls on it can trigger malicious code. .com While files with the .com extension have absolutely nothing to do with the web domain of the same name, cybercriminals likely count on victims mistaking these files for links in an unusual format. In reality, it’s a legacy Windows executable format. While modern versions of Windows no longer rely on this file type, the operating system can still run and execute it, which makes opening one a very bad idea. .scr SCR files are screensavers — those idle Windows screen animations featuring abstract patterns, the iconic bouncing logo, or whatever else. Despite their harmless reputation, screensavers are essentially executables just like EXE files: once opened, they can install extra components or alter system settings all the same. In malicious campaigns, these files routinely masquerade as images, screenshots, or documents. Scripts Scripts are text files containing a sequence of commands that a computer runs automatically in order. They can download files, install and launch programs, modify securi… | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog For security researchers studying unconventional side-channel attacks, acoustic keylogging is something of a Hello World: a foundational problem that’s been tackled many times. A recent paper authored by researchers across three Japanese universities cites six previous studies on the topic that date as far back as 2004. While earlier experiments showed theoretical promise, they came with real-world caveats so severe that it made them all but impractical for actual espionage. The authors of this latest study, however, claim to have overcome most of those limitations. Today, we look at how they pulled it off, and assess whether their method holds up in real-world scenarios. What makes this new approach different? Previous acoustic keylogging techniques were fundamentally flawed. Best-case scenarios required prior training on the target’s specific keyboard model. Worst-case scenarios required a complex microphone array to isolate the subtle acoustic differences between keystrokes. Crucially, almost all prior models failed outside silent environments, which rendered the attack vector virtually useless. The Japanese research team demonstrated reliable keystroke interception even if the target was sitting nearby in a public space, sound was being recorded in an online meeting, or the researchers were using a contact microphone to eavesdrop through a wall. All this with strong model accuracy and a minimal training dataset. Their process needs a sample of just 150 to 200 keystrokes to reach a 99% accuracy rate for subsequent typing. Attack scenarios and core methodology proposed by the Japanese researchers. Source How to crack 200 keystrokes in under 50 iterations To understand how the researchers achieved such high accuracy and adaptability, we have to look at their audio processing pipeline. Their analysis begins by automatically segmenting a raw recording into discrete keystrokes. This data is then passed through a specialized algorithm that simplifies the subsequent audio analysis. Next, the system clusters together acoustically similar signals. The assumption is that the members of one cluster map to the exact same key. One particularly intriguing takeaway was isolating the spacebar sound from all the rest. Because the spacebar produces a distinctly unique sound profile compared to other keys, identifying it provides reliable word boundaries. This streamlines the next phase: feeding the preprocessed acoustic data into specialized language models for inference. Yes, the method relies on not one but two language models. The first model performs multiple passes over the audio stream to map acoustic signatures to potential keyboard characters. During each pass, the model leverages dictionaries to hypothesize character mapping, and check whether the resulting text aligns with standard words. The second model handles the final refinement pass: it ingests thoroughly pre-processed data rather than raw inputs. The method doesn’t stop there: unrecognized keystrokes undergo manual analysis, with analysts injecting educated guesses before re-running the recognition pipeline once again. The goal of looping through these multiple iterations is to achieve complete recognition across the keyboard from an ultra-compact dataset of ideally no more than 200 captured keystrokes. This marks a major shift from legacy methods, which relied on massive training datasets. Clustering the sounds of keystrokes permits grouping similar acoustic profiles together prior to recognition. Notice how distinctly the spacebar sounds stand out: they make subsequent text reconstruction vastly simpler. Source Research results To validate their theoretical model, the researchers created an experimental testing setup: Clustering the sounds of keystrokes permits grouping similar acoustic profiles together prior to recognition. Notice how distinctly the spacebar sounds stand out: they make subsequent text reconstruction vastly simpler. Source The team tested four distinct la… | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog The news coverage surrounding the breach of the AI platform Hugging Face by OpenAI’s autonomous agents reads like a scene straight out of a Terminator movie (apparently, a prequel). Yet for enterprise security teams — even those that don’t develop or deploy artificial intelligence — the detailed incident report published by Hugging Face provides a critical operational roadmap. The incident needs to be evaluated on the basis of a single, fundamental question: “Which organizational security flaws, missing controls, configurations, or technologies allowed this attack to succeed?” What happened? During cyber-capability testing of OpenAI’s advanced AI models against the ExploitGym benchmark, an agent found a way to break out of its confinement, reached the internet, and breached the infrastructure of several companies — one of them being Hugging Face. The model reasoned that it could find solutions to the benchmark challenges on these external systems. Dozens of articles have since covered these incidents in detail , so no need to go over that here. What truly matters is what transpired within Hugging Face’s systems between July 9 and 13 while the AI agent operated unchecked inside. The Hugging Face incident report includes an interactive attack timeline, so we’ll just list the key stages. A malicious configuration in a dataset uploaded by the agent allowed it to exfiltrate credentials for a worker pod , and execute code within it. The agent then exploited cloud environment metadata and escaped the privileged pod to obtain root-level access on the host. It retrieved a substantial number of secrets from storage and used a stolen VPN key and shared cluster administrator credentials to pivot deeper into the internal network and source code repository before the Hugging Face security team blocked its access. How significant is the fact that this was next-generation AI? Regardless of the specific area of activity of a company, tomorrow it may become a target of human attackers, fully autonomous systems, or AI agents manually controlled by human hackers. Many AI practitioners have rushed to dismiss this incident based on assumptions that OpenAI will never allow its tech to get into serious hacking. However, security researchers have argued for months that even currently available open-source models can be used to launch both offensive research and real-world attacks. Human oversight, while still a requirement, can be minimal. Even mid-tier models can easily iterate through a dozen vulnerabilities, inventory a compromised infrastructure, and quickly figure out how to expand their reach across a network. Defenders must analyze incidents like this in detail, map the key findings to their own environments, and adapt security controls to counter both stealthy human actors and rapid, noisy AI agents. Three distinguishing features of AI-powered attacks The techniques detailed in the Hugging Face report are not novel — the agent didn’t invent anything new. However, three factors regarding the attack’s speed and scale fundamentally shift the economics for both attackers and defenders: Trial and error becomes significantly cheaper. Where a human hacker might test five attack vectors, an agent can iterate through five hundred. Scenarios that security teams previously dismissed as “theoretically possible, but impractical and unlikely” and placed them on the backlog can now become active threats. Attack execution and incident response windows shrink. High-speed attacks are not unheard of, while some ransomware operators achieve compromise within hours even without AI. However, this accelerated pace will likely become the new baseline in cybersecurity, as demonstrated by the agent obtaining admin privileges at Hugging Face within 13 hours. Numerous alerts and log entries generated by the agent’s trial-and-error attempts can both help and hinder attackers as well as defenders. This noise can serve both as an indicator for threat detection, and as cam… | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Your phone rings, you pick up and say hello. On the other end: total silence. No one answers, and the call abruptly disconnects. If you don’t already use spam call blockers, you’ve almost certainly run into this situation before. In most cases, these are scam calls. Today, we explain why these calls happen, what the callers want from you, and how to protect yourself. Most importantly, we’ll look at whether you even need to bother protecting yourself against them in the first place. Who’s calling? It’s not just scammers on the line — robots, legitimate call center operators, and ordinary folks make these calls too. Let’s break down each type of caller — ordered from best-case to worst-case scenario for your security. Actual person The most harmless scenario is that an actual person called you, but their microphone is acting up. Maybe they accidentally muted themselves with their ear, or their smartphone connected to a Bluetooth headset, speaker, or car system that isn’t capturing their voice. Carrier glitches can also mute one side of a call. The caller might have no idea there’s a problem — as far as they know, they are speaking, but no one can hear them. In cases like this, you usually recognize the incoming phone number. If the call comes from an unknown number, there’s still no need to panic — though the list of those who might be calling gets much longer. One legitimate possibility is a call center agent who simply didn’t pick up or connect their headset in time. Call center systems are designed to dial numbers faster than agents can wrap up their calls. The system tried to route the call to a human, but no reps were available. That’s why you sometimes have to wait a few seconds before hearing a single word, or why you might hear ringing tones as if you were the one making the call. Robot or AI Silence on the line is a common sign of robocalls. Robots test whether a phone number is active and, if it is, pass it along to a human — meaning a real sales rep (or scammer) will call you back in the next few days. It’s worth noting that scammers aren’t the only ones making these pinging calls. Legitimate call centers use the exact same tools to reduce the workload on their live agents. An AI agent could also be behind the silent call. To the person answering, there’s no practical difference: the call looks identical to one made by a standard bot. However, AI can do more than just auto-dial numbers — it can analyze your response and use that data to decide whether your number is active and ready to be handed off to a live person for follow-up. Unwanted caller Now we get to the real threat. Perhaps one of the most dangerous and unpleasant sources of silent phone calls is a scammer. A quick, silent call like this can actually be the groundwork for a long, elaborate attack with cover stories about loans, government agencies, other fraudsters, even law enforcement. Debt collectors might also be calling and staying quiet. Your number could end up on their radar if you, your family, or close contacts have outstanding debts. In these cases, a silent call is often used as a tactic for psychological pressure. A similar technique is used in stalking. While silent calls cause no direct harm on their own, they can be leveraged to induce anxiety, create a feeling of being constantly watched, and cause ongoing emotional distress. Why do they call and stay silent? When you pick up, you likely respond out of habit with a quick “Hello?” or “Hi there.” That’s all it takes for the other party to gather a wealth of data. While this information used to be difficult to process, the rise of artificial intelligence has made the task significantly easier. Let’s look at what someone can learn about you from just one spoken word: Region, accent, and location. Scammers are sophisticated and cunning. Their tactics are often tailored by region — targeting residents of specific countries or even regions within them. This is especially relevant in places like In… | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Kaspersky uncovered a sophisticated phishing campaign by the APT group Armored Likho, deploying a previously undocumented Python-based infostealer dubbed BusySnake Stealer. The campaign targets government agencies and electric power sectors across Russia, Brazil, and Kazakhstan through spear-phishing emails containing malicious EXE or LNK attachments. BusySnake Stealer features advanced obfuscation using PyArmor Pro, extracts credentials from browsers using DPAPI and NSS libraries, captures screenshots, logs keystrokes, scrapes cryptocurrency wallets and 2FA tokens, and establishes reverse SSH tunnels for remote access. The threat actor leverages AI-generated code for first-stage payloads and distributes components via GitHub repositories. The stealer maintains persistence through scheduled tasks and communicates with C2 infrastructure to receive commands dynamically, representing a significant evolution in the group's technical capabilities. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Threat actors are exploiting legitimate Google AppSheet addresses for phishing campaigns, sending emails on behalf of major companies to steal user credentials. | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Kaspersky researchers conducted an in-depth analysis of Kimsuky APT activity, revealing tactical shifts and new malware variants based on the PebbleDash platform. The group introduced HelloDoor, a Rust-based backdoor, httpMalice leveraging HTTP and Dropbox communications, and updated MemLoad and httpTroy variants. Kimsuky maintains persistence through legitimate tools including VSCode Tunneling with GitHub authentication and DWAgent remote management software. Initial access occurs via spear-phishing with malicious attachments disguised as documents. The group primarily targets South Korean entities across government and defense sectors, with additional PebbleDash attacks observed in Brazil and Germany. Infrastructure relies on free South Korean hosting services and tunneling services like Cloudflare Quick Tunnels and Ngrok. Both PebbleDash and AppleSeed malware clusters demonstrate ongoing development with shared distribution methods, stolen certificates, and overlapping targets, indicating single-actor c... | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Kaspersky researchers uncovered new malicious operations by the Tomiris threat actor targeting foreign ministries, intergovernmental organizations, and government entities. The attacks, which began in early 2025, show a shift in tactics with increased use of implants leveraging public services like Telegram and Discord as command-and-control servers. The group employs various programming languages including Go, Rust, C/C#/C++, and Python to develop reverse shell tools. Some infections lead to the deployment of open-source post-exploitation frameworks such as Havoc and AdaptixC2. The campaign primarily focuses on Russian-speaking users and entities, with additional targets in Central Asian countries. | AlienVault OTX General | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog LeetAgent is a malware tool used by the ForumTroll APT group, which exploited a zero-day Chrome vulnerability to infect Russian organizations. The same tools were also used to distribute Dante, a sophisticated commercial spyware developed by Memento Labs (formerly HackingTeam). Dante features modular encrypted components and self-destructs if inactive. The attacks targeted media, government, educational, and financial sectors primarily in Russia and Belarus. No known exploits are currently active in the wild beyond these campaigns. Detection has been achieved through advanced XDR solutions, and threat intelligence is available via Kaspersky’s APT data service. European organizations face risks mainly if targeted by similar threat actors or if they share infrastructure or partnerships with affected regions. Mitigation requires patching browsers, monitoring for indicators of compromise, and employing advanced detection tools. Given the malware’s sophistication, modularity, and use of zero-days, the threat severity is assessed as high. | Kaspersky Security Blog | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Kaspersky researchers have discovered a new version of the Triada Trojan being distributed through infected Android device firmware. The malware is embedded into system files before devices are sold, making it nearly impossible to remove. It infects the Zygote process to compromise all apps on the device. The Trojan's modular architecture allows attackers to deliver targeted payloads for stealing cryptocurrency, credentials, and other sensitive data from popular apps like WhatsApp, Facebook, and banking apps. It can also intercept SMS messages, make calls, and act as a reverse proxy. Over 4,500 infected devices have been detected worldwide, with the highest numbers in Russia, UK, Netherlands, Germany and Brazil. The attackers have stolen over $264,000 in cryptocurrency so far. | AlienVault OTX General |
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