Search: ru.bat
29 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated campaign targets cryptocurrency users by distributing fake wallet update ZIP files containing malicious BAT scripts. These files impersonate updates for hardware wallets like Coldcard, Ledger, and others. The attack installs ConnectWise ScreenConnect remote access software, enabling attackers to control compromised devices remotely. This access allows execution of commands, data theft including cryptocurrency credentials and private keys, and potential financial loss. Users are advised to isolate infected devices, block malicious infrastructure, remove ScreenConnect, reset credentials from clean devices, and migrate assets to new wallets. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The hello-bat-fwi9 package on PyPI contains an obfuscated batch (.bat) file that delivers a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) using its own Python runtime and PTH files. The malicious code requires manual activation to execute. This package is part of a known malicious campaign identified as 2026-11-hello-bat-fwi9, continuing a previous campaign named 2026-11-filipt. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.0 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-119288zuke · OS Command Injection High7.0EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-119288 Zuke-build versions prior to 1.51.0 contain an OS command injection vulnerability on Windows platforms. The issue arises because the tool launches Windows .cmd and .bat shims by prepending 'cmd /c', causing cmd.exe to reparse command lines with C-runtime quoting rules. If an attacker can influence the command line with unquoted metacharacters such as &, |, or ^, they can execute arbitrary commands in the build context with the same privileges and access to credentials. This vulnerability does not affect POSIX platforms and is fixed in version 1.51.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Threat actors are distributing legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools such as ScreenConnect, FleetDeck, Datto, SimpleHelp, JumpCloud, and N-able through phishing campaigns. These campaigns use social engineering tactics with fake Adobe Acrobat updates, DocuSign viewers, and document access prompts to trick victims into installing remote access tools disguised as business documents. Delivery methods include LNK files, BAT scripts, VBS files, and PDFs. The RMM tools contain embedded configuration data linking back to attacker infrastructure, enabling remote access while evading detection. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-102925pypa virtualenv · OS Command Injection High7.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-102925 ### Impact The generated `activate` (bash/zsh) and `activate.fish` scripts interpolate a `shlex.quote`-ed value into a position that quotes it a second time. The extra quotes terminate the quoted run early and leave part of the value parsed as shell code, so a path containing shell metacharacters runs commands when a user sources the activation script. `activate` is affected through the virtual environment's own path, on the branch that reports a relocated environment: ```sh echo "Virtual environment directory __VIRTUAL_ENV__ does not exist!" >&2 ``` For a destination named `x'$(id)'y`, `shlex.quote` emits `'x'"'"'$(id)'"'"'y'`. The inner `"` closes the enclosing double quote and `$(id)` is left unquoted. Backtick and `;` payloads reach the same result. This branch runs whenever the recorded path is absent, which is the normal case for a virtual environment copied or distributed to another machine. `activate.fish` is affected through the interpreter's Tcl/Tk library paths: ```fish set -gx TCL_LIBRARY '__TCL_LIBRARY__' ``` `shlex.quote` already returns `'/tcl/(cmd)/lib'`, so the rendered line is `''/tcl/(cmd)/lib''`. fish concatenates the adjacent quoted runs and expands the `(cmd)` left between them. The same doubling also splits a path containing a space into two list elements, corrupting `TCL_LIBRARY` and `TK_LIBRARY`. This is the same defect class as GHSA-x78j-v8h9-3j2q, which covered `activate.bat`. ### Patches Fixed in 21.7.13 by moving the placeholders outside the surrounding quotes, so each value keeps only the quoting `shlex.quote` applied. Fix: https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3252 ### Workarounds Avoid creating or distributing virtual environments whose path contains `'`, `` ` ``, `$`, `;`, `(` or `)`, and inspect the generated activation script before sourcing one you did not create. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (cb2bf0fd5f445eed9825601f2b4497502054176d106d4fecb9eabf38312dd582) prosocks 1.0.25 enrolls the installer's host as a remote-controlled SOCKS5 exit node under a hardcoded control plane at https://kalnetz.store. setup.py's custom install command writes prosocks.bat into the Windows Startup folder (establishing boot persistence) with the command '"{python_exe}" -m prosocks https://kalnetz.store' and immediately spawns that process during `pip install`. The top-level module additionally calls _auto_launch() so that any `import prosocks` spawns a detached subprocess running the same agent. Once running, ProSocksAgent.register() queries ip-api.com and api.ipify.org for the host's public IP, generates an agent_id and proxy password, and POSTs agent_id, hostname, public IP, proxy port, and password to https://kalnetz.store/api/register, then binds a SOCKS5 server on 0.0.0.0:9050 accessible from any network the host can reach. Heartbeat and bandwidth telemetry are POSTed to /api/heartbeat and /api/bandwidth, and IP changes trigger re-registration. All requests to the panel and IP-lookup services are made with TLS verification disabled (verify=False). The combination of install-time execution, import-time execution, Windows Startup persistence, hardcoded non-first-party control plane, and an unauthenticated SOCKS5 listener on all interfaces whose credentials are handed to that control plane matches a proxyware/botnet backdoor. ## Source: kam193 (a1ca37b881f19975a8ab8b23bd5e69b51355333374385aabfc5784b69bf95545) The package automatically joins the machine to a proxy network. Depending on the version, it can happen during the package installation or when importing the module. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-09-prosocks Reasons (based on the campaign): - other - peristence-autorun - persistence | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 8.5 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2025-53000Jupyterlab: nbconvert has an uncontrolled search path that leads to unauthorized code execution on Windows High8.5EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-53000 On Windows, JupyterLab's nbconvert tool has a vulnerability where converting notebooks with SVG output to PDF can lead to unauthorized code execution. This occurs because nbconvert searches for an 'inkscape' executable in a way that allows a malicious 'inkscape.bat' batch file in the current directory to be executed. This uncontrolled search path vulnerability affects Windows users running vulnerable versions of JupyterLab. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (502c2aae77a471762612a5114d299651b7e75571d5c6d9dd5665a3dc2c503327) package.json declares a postinstall hook that executes a bundled Windows PE launcher (DakuMangalSingh\DakuMangalSingh.exe) at npm install time. The launcher is a jpackage wrapper that loads an embedded JAR named virus.jar containing classes Main, Executor, BatchExecutor, Fetch, RobotService (java.awt.Robot input synthesis), Screenshort (screen capture), and DeviceId (host fingerprinting) — the shape of a remote-command agent with screen-capture and input-synthesis capability. A bundled replicate.bat installs persistence by creating a shortcut to the dropped executable in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup so the payload auto-runs at every user logon. A cleanup.bat kills the process and recursively deletes the package folder, providing anti-forensics on the installer's host. Installing the package on Windows results in immediate arbitrary code execution, a persistent logon-triggered agent, and evidence-removal tooling — with no legitimate library functionality. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.8EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-68266 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs An imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose reservation object is the exporter's dma_buf->resv. The importer, however, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful dma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive, so if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a later access to that resv is a use-after-free: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm] RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0 This can be reached on two paths: - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation. In both cases the BO already has bo->base.resv pointing at the exporter resv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which locks bo->base.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has been freed. Take the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before ttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and release it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole BO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path. v2: - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds. - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore incomplete imports. v3: - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment. - Per Christian's suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely. - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch. v4: - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas). - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas). v5: - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is already LRU-visible. (Thomas) v4 patch: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129&rev=2 - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian's Reviewed-by from v4. v6: - Reworked the fix based on Thomas' suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5), just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it. Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas) - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved() so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas). - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost BO that outlived the exporter. Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/ v7: - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message. - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas) (cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a) | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Have you ever tried to open an “encrypted” email or an urgent document, only to realize with horror that your usual DOCX attachment is actually a file with the extension .docx.exe? Or maybe you received an email supposedly with an invoice, contract, or internal memo attached — only for the file to prove something entirely different from what it claimed to be? If so, you were likely targeted in a malware infection attempt. Cybercriminals routinely disguise malicious files as harmless documents and archives, banking on recipients blindly clicking without checking the extension. Kaspersky experts analyzed the file formats most frequently deployed in malicious email blasts to reveal what really lurks behind these extensions — and how attackers weaponize them in their campaigns. Important note: the extensions we’ll be discussing here are routinely used for completely legitimate files. For example, Windows executables normally end in .exe. However, we’re focusing specifically on scenarios where attackers disguise or spoof a file’s extension to pass it off as a totally different type of file. What extensions are most commonly found in malware? Our experts analyzed malicious email blasts from the beginning of 2026 to pinpoint the 15 most common dangerous file extensions. .exe .js .html .dll .bat .vbs .xls .pdf .jse .au3 .docx .htm .wsf .scr .lnk The top 15 file extensions used in malicious email blasts Let’s take a look at what files with these extensions actually do under the hood. Executable files An executable file is a compiled computer program that’s ready to run. Once launched, a malicious executable can download additional payloads, alter system settings, steal user data, connect your device to external attacker-controlled servers, and much more. These are the most common executable extensions found in malicious email campaigns: .exe .dll .com .scr .exe The classic Windows executable extension. It powers every program you use daily, from web browsers and games to office suites and software installers. By the way, attackers often wrap EXE malware in double extensions: invoice.docx.exe, report.pdf.exe, or even photo.jpg.exe. They take advantage of a default Windows setting: hiding extensions for known file types. Because this setting is turned on by default, users only see the first part of the file name — invoice.docx, report.pdf, or photo.jpg — and assume it’s just a normal document or image. But the second you open this trap file, the malware fires up. .dll Another common extension abused in malicious campaigns is .dll (dynamic-link library). These libraries hold functions that Windows programs frequently require while running, such as printing a document. This modular architecture prevents redundant code by letting multiple applications call on the exact same library for specific tasks. However, if an attacker replaces a legitimate library with an infected one, running any normal program that calls on it can trigger malicious code. .com While files with the .com extension have absolutely nothing to do with the web domain of the same name, cybercriminals likely count on victims mistaking these files for links in an unusual format. In reality, it’s a legacy Windows executable format. While modern versions of Windows no longer rely on this file type, the operating system can still run and execute it, which makes opening one a very bad idea. .scr SCR files are screensavers — those idle Windows screen animations featuring abstract patterns, the iconic bouncing logo, or whatever else. Despite their harmless reputation, screensavers are essentially executables just like EXE files: once opened, they can install extra components or alter system settings all the same. In malicious campaigns, these files routinely masquerade as images, screenshots, or documents. Scripts Scripts are text files containing a sequence of commands that a computer runs automatically in order. They can download files, install and launch programs, modify securi… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (936d3c8bc6611b58f5321ba5aab651bb3d2db821d172816283ca04633be00863) The `stella` CLI shipped in bin/stella.js prompts users for their phone number and the WhatsApp verification code and POSTs both to a hardcoded bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint at http://62.238.2.22:8787 (paths /api/v1/auth/register/register and /verify). Subsequent chat input is sent to the same host. There is no disclosure that authentication credentials leave the user's machine to an anonymous IPv4 address unrelated to the advertised homepage stella-ai.app. In addition, bin/postinstall.js and install.bat implement a dropper flow that downloads stella-latest.tar.gz from the same bare-IP plain-HTTP endpoint, extracts it under ~/.stella, installs the Bun runtime via `curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash`, and executes the fetched contents; the Windows bootstrap pipes http://62.238.2.22:8787/install.ps1 directly into `iex`. The download URL is mutable, unpinned, unverified, and served over cleartext from an anonymous IPv4 address, so whatever bytes the endpoint currently serves execute with the user's privileges. Package metadata reinforces the mismatch: homepage stella-ai.app, repository github.com/anomalyco/opencode, operational endpoint a raw IPv4. ## Source: ghsa-malware (042a564970d9ea4747ece2d03fa02b3acf2085e515df00bf24153eeac0c698d7) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package `datefmt-helper` is a supply-chain dropper disguised as a benign date-formatting utility (its `description` reads "dates formatting utility with locale support"). The package ships no source repository and places its real behaviour in an install script. A `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The install script uses HTTP / `curl` / `wget` primitives to download a second-stage payload from the hardcoded external IP `115.190.124.243`, then executes it via a Node child process — the classic download-and-execute pattern. Any developer workstation or CI runner that installs the package (directly or transitively) hands arbitrary code execution to the operator of that endpoint. Detected and classified independently by codelake Research from the live npm feed on 2026-07-02; at the time of reporting the package was not present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d92b853245953aa75db608f0ae2e5de2321301b94ca6b48f55746a1bd60b6ea4) On `npm install`, the package's postinstall script fetches an unauthenticated payload over plain HTTP from a hardcoded bare IP (115.190.124.243:8761) and executes it. On Unix, `curl`/`wget` output is piped directly to `sh`. On Windows, `certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f` downloads a batch file to C:\Users\Public\run.bat and executes it. The fetched content is unpinned, unverified, and mutable — the operator of the endpoint can serve arbitrary code at any time. The package advertises itself as a lightweight date formatter (`date-fns-lite` branding, impersonating the date-fns ecosystem), but the payload has no relationship to date formatting. The typosquat/impersonation branding combined with an install-time dropper is a supply-chain attack lure. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6c9b82c471edb6b2caeb78c78887556e4c313efc0ba29a88a482b0f93d378807) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General SideCopy, also tracked as APT36 or Transparent Tribe, has launched a new attack campaign targeting Indian defense personnel using a fake 'Minutes Of Meeting' document as lure. The attack employs an identical playbook to previous operations: a double-extension Minutes Of Meeting.docx.lnk file executes a PowerShell stager (pdfdocs.bat) from a nested pdfdocs folder while displaying a clean decoy document. The chain deploys a Remote Access Trojan (pdfdocs) that establishes persistence through the HKCU Run key. The staged components demonstrate low detection rates at initial delivery, with the decoy document scoring 0/66, the stager 1/61, and only the final executable reaching 35/71 detections. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated Python-based RAT targeting Korean users through spear phishing emails disguised as Microsoft security alerts. The attack chain employs LNK files embedded in ZIP archives, BAT-based obfuscation, and multi-stage loaders culminating in NarwhalRAT deployment. This advanced malware features keylogging, screen capture, microphone recording, and USB data collection capabilities. It utilizes a dual C2 infrastructure combining Korean relay servers (daehoat.com, novel21.co.kr) with pCloud API as a dead-drop resolver. The malware creates encrypted configuration files, implements anti-VM techniques, and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks. It operates as a manually-controlled RAT with selective function activation via C2 commands, employing in-memory execution to evade file-based detection. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.3% | High8.8EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-46238 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: stop caching unowned originator pointers in BAT IV BAT IV keeps the last-hop neighbor address in each neigh_node, but some paths also cache an originator pointer derived from a temporary lookup. That pointer is not owned by the neigh_node and may no longer refer to a live originator entry after purge handling runs. Stop storing the auxiliary originator pointer in the BAT IV neighbor state. When BAT IV needs the neighbor originator data, resolve it from the stored neighbor address and drop the reference again after use. [sven: avoid bonding logic for outgoing OGM] EPSS 0.3%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated multi-stage infection chain was identified through proactive threat hunting, beginning with the execution of MicrosoftToolkit.exe, a commonly abused hack tool. The attack employed file masquerading techniques, renaming a .dot file to .bat format to evade detection. The malware performed process discovery and attempted to terminate security-related processes before extracting payloads using extract32.exe. An AutoIt-compiled executable (Replies.scr) functioned as a loader, processing an external encrypted payload file and establishing command-and-control communication with infrastructure associated with Vidar Stealer. The malware demonstrated advanced anti-analysis capabilities, including debugger detection and instrumentation callback queries. It targeted credentials, browser data, cryptocurrency wallets, and system information. Post-execution cleanup routines deleted artifacts and terminated processes to minimize forensic evidence and evade detection, significantly complicating incident res... | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium5.4EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-34596 Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, a Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exists during addon installation. When a user installs an addon through the SandMan interface, UpdUtil.exe is spawned as SYSTEM by SbieSvc but stages files in the user-writable %TEMP%\sandboxie-updater directory. After UpdUtil verifies file hashes against the signed addon manifest, install.bat extracts files.cab and executes config.exe from its contents. Between hash verification and extraction, an unprivileged user can replace files.cab with a crafted cabinet containing a malicious executable, which is then run as SYSTEM. No UAC prompt is required. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated multi-stage infection chain targets Argentina's judicial ecosystem using spear-phishing tactics and authentic-looking judicial content. The campaign employs a carefully crafted ZIP archive containing a weaponized LNK shortcut, BAT-based loader script, and judicial-themed PDF decoy. The attack chain leads to the deployment of a Rust-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that demonstrates extensive anti-VM, anti-sandbox, and anti-debugging techniques. The RAT establishes a resilient command-and-control channel, supports modular commands for various malicious activities, and implements full lifecycle management. The operation, dubbed 'Operation Covert Access,' aims to secure long-term access within high-trust institutional settings, highlighting the need for improved defenses against socially engineered intrusion chains. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated spear-phishing campaign targeting Argentina's judicial sector has been uncovered. The operation uses a multi-stage infection chain to deploy a stealthy Remote Access Trojan (RAT). Attackers exploit trust in court communications by using authentic-looking judicial decoy documents. The campaign employs a weaponized LNK file, a BAT-based loader script, and a covert Rust-based RAT to establish persistent access within judicial environments. The malware performs extensive anti-VM and anti-debug checks, collects system information, and establishes resilient C2 connections. It supports various malicious activities including persistence, file transfer, data harvesting, encryption, and privilege escalation. The campaign demonstrates high operational sophistication and aims to gain long-term access to sensitive legal and institutional data. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-22864denoland deno · Command Injection High8.1EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-22864 Deno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Before 2.5.6, a prior patch aimed to block spawning Windows batch/shell files by returning an error when a spawned path’s extension matched .bat or .cmd. That check performs a case-sensitive comparison against lowercase literals and therefore can be bypassed when the extension uses alternate casing (for example .BAT, .Bat, etc.). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.6. | CVE Database V5 |
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