Search: well-being.based
12 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
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| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog Security teams are being asked to defend a growing attack surface with fewer people and around the clock, against threat actors who never take a night off. As cyberattackers increasingly use AI to launch and scale campaigns, the volume, speed, and sophistication of threats continue to rise. Closing that gap takes more than tooling. It takes a partner that pairs a leading security platform with scaled intelligence and human experts who can act on your behalf at any hour. That’s exactly what Microsoft Defender Experts MDR is built to do. We are excited to announce that we have been named a Leader in the 2026 IDC MarketScape: Worldwide MDR/MXDR for the Enterprise Vendor Assessment (Doc #US54792426, July 2026). Read the excerpt here . Scale your SOC with Microsoft Defender Experts MDR Expert-led MDR, built on the Microsoft Defender platform Microsoft Defender Experts MDR is a round-the-clock, expert-led managed detection and response service that helps security teams triage, investigate, and respond to incidents so they can stop cyberattackers in their tracks and prevent future compromise. Rather than bolting a separate stack of tools and connectors onto your environment, the service operates natively on Microsoft Defender , with built-in protection across endpoints, identities, email, cloud apps, cloud workloads, and network security, as well as around-the-clock proactive threat hunting with Microsoft Defender Experts Hunting . Because the service is delivered on the same platform it monitors, detection and intelligence improvements reach customers continuously. The insights our experts generate also strengthen protection across the broader Defender ecosystem, so every customer benefits from what we learn defending the next environment. The IDC MarketScape vendor assessment model is designed to provide an overview of the competitive fitness of technology and service suppliers in a given market. The research uses a rigorous scoring methodology based on both qualitative and quantitative criteria that results in a single graphical illustration of each supplier’s position within a given market. The Capabilities axis measures supplier product, go-to-market, and business execution in the short term, while the Strategy axis measures how well a supplier’s strategy aligns with customer requirements over a 3-5-year timeframe. Supplier market share is represented by the size of the icons . Threat intelligence at internet scale Great detection starts with great intelligence. Defender Experts MDR draws on Microsoft’s global threat intelligence: more than 10,000 security researchers and 100 trillion signals analyzed every day across billions of users and millions of organizations. 1 That breadth lets our analysts recognize subtle patterns early, often before a campaign escalates, and respond with higher-confidence attribution than intelligence sourced from any single customer’s telemetry could provide. AI-accelerated operations, expert-led decisions Defender Experts MDR also combines advanced AI and generative AI with seasoned human experts. AI filters noise, grades and classifies incidents, and accelerates investigation at machine speed and scale, while our analysts own the outcome. According to the IDC MarketScape, “70% AI-assisted workflows are enabled through automated noise filtering, AI-based grading, and agentic operations while maintaining expert decision-making.” Furthermore, “quantified outcomes noted include 97% AI classification accuracy, 77% malware/phishing agent-investigated, 72% faster resolution combining AI and humans, and 45% autonomous investigations.” The impact shows up in the work. Over the past year, Defender Experts mitigated 27,000 high-severity incidents, and the team’s threat research now contributes a meaningful share of all Defender detections, enriching protection for customers well beyond the MDR service itself. Throughout, a dedicated security delivery expert and on-demand access to our experts keep customers i… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | DeadLock ransomware: Breaking down a Rust-based encryptor with decentralized recovery infrastructure Microsoft Security Blog In this article Pre-encryption Encryption Post-encryption Defending against DeadLock ransomware Indicators of compromise Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracks DeadLock ransomware as an emerging financially motivated operation distinguished by its use of decentralized infrastructure to support victim communications and data leak operations. Its recovery ecosystem combines the Session messaging network with blockchain-backed services that store and deliver resources used throughout the extortion process. This architecture likely increases the resilience of portions of its communication, leak-hosting, and negotiation infrastructure, allowing DeadLock operators to recover from some disruption efforts while maintaining continuity for victims. Microsoft has observed DeadLock ransomware being deployed by multiple groups including an affiliate of the Lynx and INC ransomware ecosystems. First observed in July 2025, DeadLock operators employ double extortion tactics, encrypting victim environments while threatening to publicly release exfiltrated data. As of July 2026, the operators have published more than 80 compromised organizations on their data leak site, called the DeadLock blog, with more than half of the claimed victims in Europe. Microsoft identified DeadLock ransomware impacting organizations across information technology (IT), mining, transportation and logistics, manufacturing, hospitality, consumer goods, and other sectors in Europe, Asia, North America, South America, and Africa. The DeadLock encryptor includes a resource-aware throttling mechanism designed to maintain system responsiveness during encryption. In addition to its encryption capabilities, the ransomware also appears to implement language or country-based geofencing designed to avoid running in environments associated with former Soviet and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)-linked countries as well as select Middle Eastern countries, a pattern commonly observed among ransomware operators believed to operate from those regions. Together, these capabilities demonstrate how DeadLock combines established ransomware tradecraft with decentralized infrastructure designed to improve operational resilience. In this blog, we present a technical analysis of the DeadLock ransomware encryptor, covering its execution flow, defense evasion techniques, encryption design, and post-encryption behaviors, including a decentralized recovery chat system. We also provide indicators of compromise (IOCs), Microsoft Defender detections, and mitigation guidance to help organizations defend against this threat and similar ransomware activity. Pre-encryption Configuration parsing Before performing any malicious activity, the DeadLock encryptor decrypts an embedded configuration blob using XOR decoding with an 8-byte key. Below are the malware’s configuration fields and their values. Field Value Victim UID Malware public key 03bf50bbf97c4e951e66ff12b689a37a3ce675b4921e254eae76da77573843e4a9 Encryption rule 1000,05052429880,025124288000,010524288000,F991114288000 Language exclude list Geofencing language IDs (see Language geofencing ) Process stop list Processes to terminate (see Process and service termination ) Service stop list Services to stop and delete (see Process and service termination ) File exclude list Extensions and file names to avoid encrypting (see Directory traversal ) Directory exclude list Pre-traversal filter with directories to avoid encrypting (see Directory traversal ) Sub-path Exclude List Sub-paths to avoid encrypting during traversal (see Directory traversal ) Text ransom note Full text ransom note content (see Ransom notes deployment ) HTML recovery chat Full HTML/JS interactive chat page (see Recovery chat: Technical architecture ) Language geofencing As an early exit check, the malware queries the system’s default and user interface (UI) languages. If either language matches the exclude list in the configuration, the malware self-deletes immediately withou… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog The news coverage surrounding the breach of the AI platform Hugging Face by OpenAI’s autonomous agents reads like a scene straight out of a Terminator movie (apparently, a prequel). Yet for enterprise security teams — even those that don’t develop or deploy artificial intelligence — the detailed incident report published by Hugging Face provides a critical operational roadmap. The incident needs to be evaluated on the basis of a single, fundamental question: “Which organizational security flaws, missing controls, configurations, or technologies allowed this attack to succeed?” What happened? During cyber-capability testing of OpenAI’s advanced AI models against the ExploitGym benchmark, an agent found a way to break out of its confinement, reached the internet, and breached the infrastructure of several companies — one of them being Hugging Face. The model reasoned that it could find solutions to the benchmark challenges on these external systems. Dozens of articles have since covered these incidents in detail , so no need to go over that here. What truly matters is what transpired within Hugging Face’s systems between July 9 and 13 while the AI agent operated unchecked inside. The Hugging Face incident report includes an interactive attack timeline, so we’ll just list the key stages. A malicious configuration in a dataset uploaded by the agent allowed it to exfiltrate credentials for a worker pod , and execute code within it. The agent then exploited cloud environment metadata and escaped the privileged pod to obtain root-level access on the host. It retrieved a substantial number of secrets from storage and used a stolen VPN key and shared cluster administrator credentials to pivot deeper into the internal network and source code repository before the Hugging Face security team blocked its access. How significant is the fact that this was next-generation AI? Regardless of the specific area of activity of a company, tomorrow it may become a target of human attackers, fully autonomous systems, or AI agents manually controlled by human hackers. Many AI practitioners have rushed to dismiss this incident based on assumptions that OpenAI will never allow its tech to get into serious hacking. However, security researchers have argued for months that even currently available open-source models can be used to launch both offensive research and real-world attacks. Human oversight, while still a requirement, can be minimal. Even mid-tier models can easily iterate through a dozen vulnerabilities, inventory a compromised infrastructure, and quickly figure out how to expand their reach across a network. Defenders must analyze incidents like this in detail, map the key findings to their own environments, and adapt security controls to counter both stealthy human actors and rapid, noisy AI agents. Three distinguishing features of AI-powered attacks The techniques detailed in the Hugging Face report are not novel — the agent didn’t invent anything new. However, three factors regarding the attack’s speed and scale fundamentally shift the economics for both attackers and defenders: Trial and error becomes significantly cheaper. Where a human hacker might test five attack vectors, an agent can iterate through five hundred. Scenarios that security teams previously dismissed as “theoretically possible, but impractical and unlikely” and placed them on the backlog can now become active threats. Attack execution and incident response windows shrink. High-speed attacks are not unheard of, while some ransomware operators achieve compromise within hours even without AI. However, this accelerated pace will likely become the new baseline in cybersecurity, as demonstrated by the agent obtaining admin privileges at Hugging Face within 13 hours. Numerous alerts and log entries generated by the agent’s trial-and-error attempts can both help and hinder attackers as well as defenders. This noise can serve both as an indicator for threat detection, and as cam… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Cisco Talos Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. For my fianceé’s 30 th birthday, I took her on a weekend trip to Shenandoah National Park – a favorite of ours since we went to a wedding there several years back. We’ve done several incredible hikes over the years, but one in particular had always loomed over my head: Old Rag, a 9.3 mile circuit hike that’s largely considered the most difficult in Virginia. I've always been warned that at the beginning and end, you hate Old Rag. For the first 2.6 miles, you’re hiking a steep climb on a dirt road, with lots of switchbacks, and plenty of places where you turn a corner and groan, because there’s an even steeper section ahead. This part was pretty torturous, because 1) I felt like my heart was going to explode out of my chest, 2) I couldn’t breathe, and 3) several times, there was a family we passed as they were taking a break, then WE took a break and THEY passed US, and so on and so forth. So awkward. Finally, we reached the fun part: a mile-long rock scramble, where you're squeezing through (and down) narrow rock crevices, cramming your boots to desperately find any leverage to propel yourself upward, and using all your upper body strength to control your descent. This was definitely the most fun part, although my hands and knees were sore by the end. After hiking for hours, you reach the top and realize it was all worth it, because the summit has a a spectacular vie— ... That’s what we get for being excited to hike in overcast weather. Well, at least the way back down is fun— oh wait, four miles downward on a fire trail, crushing your toes in the front of your hiking boots? Yike. It may sound like I’m complaining a lot about this hike, but it was genuinely the most fun one that I’ve done to date. By the time I was freshly showered and drinking an iced coffee in Culpeper, I was gushing about when we’d go back. There’s a really good tie-in to cybersecurity somewhere here. Ah, got it. Everyone has had those uphill hike phases with the endless documentation, patching, and alerts that keep you up at night. You’re waiting for the misery to end and hoping that around the next corner, you’ll see a sign that you’re almost out of the woods. Bruised and out of breath, you finally arrive at the exciting parts: a complex project that finally comes together, the thrill of stopping an attack, or a feeling of pride when someone you're mentoring gets a new certification. Maybe the payoff is something completely unexpected. Those moments definitely don’t erase the exhaustion — you're still sore and bruised, and will be for days — but they do remind you why you started in the first place. The one big thing Talos released our Q2 2026 Incident Response Trends report , which showed a massive spike in authentication abuse and sophisticated phishing tactics. Phishing drove over half of all engagements, with attackers leveraging QR codes and advanced platforms like ARToken to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA). Additionally, ransomware operators are increasingly weaponizing legitimate remote management tools like MeshAgent and Zoho Assist to establish stealthy, persistent access. Why do I care? Standard email gateways and basic MFA are no longer enough to stop adversaries from bypassing traditional defenses. By abusing legitimate administrative tools and trusted cloud infrastructure, threat actors can easily blend malicious traffic with normal network activity to remain undetected before deploying ransomware. Furthermore, the continued targeting of health care and public administration highlights a deliberate focus on organizations with zero tolerance for downtime. So now what? Organizations must transition from push- and SMS-based MFA to phishing-resistant methods like FIDO2 or hardware security keys. Defenders should also shift to behavior-based monitoring, specifically hunting for unauthorized instances of administrative tools. Finally, configure centralized logging with at leas… | Cisco Talos | |||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-67248ASUSTOR ADM · Stack-based Buffer Overflow High8.7EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-67248 A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability was found in the File Explorer on the ADM. The vulnerability occurs because user-controlled input is not properly validated before being decoded and copied into a fixed-size stack buffer. An authenticated attacker can exploit this issue to cause denial of service of the affected CGI process. Further impact may be possible depending on exploitability and runtime protections. Affected products and versions include: from ADM 4.1.0 through ADM 4.3.3.RUN1 as well as from ADM 5.0.0 through ADM 5.1.3.RI81. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | Medium6.5GCVE Database ## Summary When ISR is enabled, the serverless entrypoint lets an unauthenticated request decide which route the origin renders. The internal `_isr` function reads the `x_astro_path` query parameter and rewrites the request path to it without any authentication. Edge level access controls only ever see the `/_isr` path, so they do not apply to the route that actually gets rendered. This is the same confused deputy problem as CVE-2026-33768, reachable again through the ISR path. ## Impact This affects apps that use `@astrojs/vercel` with `isr: true` and protect routes at the edge. Two common setups are affected: 1. Path rules or firewall deny rules configured on Vercel (for example blocking `/admin`). 2. Split deployments (`edgeMiddleware: true`) where authorization lives in Astro middleware, since that middleware runs at the edge and not in the origin. An attacker reads any GET rendered route by requesting `/_isr?x_astro_path=/the/protected/path`. No credentials are required. The protected content is produced by a fresh origin render, so the attack does not depend on the response being cached first. ## Details `packages/integrations/vercel/src/serverless/entrypoint.ts` picks the real path like this: ```js if (hasValidMiddlewareSecret) { realPath = request.headers.get(ASTRO_PATH_HEADER); // secret checked } else if (request.headers.get('x-vercel-isr') === '1') { realPath = url.searchParams.get(ASTRO_PATH_PARAM); // no secret checked } ``` The header path is gated by the per build secret and is fine. The ISR branch is not. Two facts make it reachable by anyone: 1. The `_isr` function is publicly addressable. 2. Vercel sets `x-vercel-isr: 1` on requests to it, including direct external requests, so the attacker does not even need to send that header. So `GET /_isr?x_astro_path=/admin` sets the internal path to `/admin` and renders it. The edge saw only `/_isr`, which is allowed, so any path based rule on `/admin` never fires. In split deployments the edge middleware also runs against `/_isr`, and the origin does not run middleware at all, so middleware based auth is skipped as well. ## How this regressed CVE-2026-33768 was fixed in 10.0.2 by commit 335a204161 (PR #15959), which required the secret for every path override and removed the query parameter source. Commit aa266364fe (PR #16079, "Fix ISR path rewrite to prevent 404") brought the query parameter back, guarded only by the `x-vercel-isr` header. That header is not a security boundary, so the fix was effectively undone for ISR routes starting in 10.0.3. Worth noting the contrast: the original report treated Edge Middleware as the mitigation and scoped the issue to deployments without it. Here, for split deployments, Edge Middleware is bypassed too, since the attacker reaches `/_isr` directly and the middleware only sees `/_isr` while the origin runs none. ## Proof of concept 1. Create an Astro app with `output: 'server'` and adapter `vercel({ isr: true })`. 2. Add a page at `/admin` that returns sensitive content. 3. Deny `/admin` at the edge, for example a Vercel path rule that returns 403, or a middleware auth check in a split (`edgeMiddleware: true`) build. 4. Request `/admin`. It is blocked (403). 5. Request `/_isr?x_astro_path=/admin`. It returns 200 with the admin content. The response header `X-Vercel-Cache: MISS` confirms it was rendered fresh, not served from an existing cache entry. ## What is not affected 1. Classic (non split) middleware. It runs inside the origin against the rewritten path, so it still applies to the target route. 2. State changing requests. Vercel serves ISR functions for GET only, and returns 403 for POST, PUT and DELETE, so the method preserving variant of CVE-2026-33768 does not reproduce here. Impact is limited to reading (confidentiality). 3. Whole deployment protection (Vercel SSO or password), which also covers `/_isr`. ## Severity Unauthenticated read of any GET rendered route that is protected only at the edge. No integrity or availability impact because the vector is GET only. ## Suggested fix One option would be to require the secret again for path overrides, the way PR #15959 did, so the ISR branch stops trusting the client supplied `x_astro_path`. The 404 that PR #16079 was fixing would then need another approach that does not rely on client input. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (34db1950ee9bdf9c75ae9bb2436085bbb443107321d8d7056a0bf3b8fae36978) The package is published as 'nhmpy' on PyPI but its contents are a verbatim copy of NumPy 2.4.6: the same source tree, docstrings, and license files. The distribution metadata falsely identifies the package as authored by 'Travis E. Oliphant et al.' and maintained by 'NumPy Developers <numpy-discussion@python.org>', with Project-URL pointing at https://numpy.org. Internal modules still import from the real 'numpy' namespace (e.g., nhmpy/__init__.py line 788: `from numpy._pytesttester import PytestTester`), so the package masquerades as numpy and depends on numpy being installed alongside it. The current 2.4.6 contents do not execute install scripts, perform network I/O at import, or contain obfuscated code — there is no active exfiltration or RCE payload in this version. However, the name is a one-character edit from 'numpy' (a top-tier PyPI package) and the metadata is deliberately deceptive about authorship, which is the precondition for a future malicious release under the same name. Routing for human review of the name-confusion claim and possible registry takedown. ## Source: kam193 (0b2d6b794431c52ef6b905eb676d70274a792cbca1b266a3405734a7a900860b) Typosquatting package published from a compromised account with an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | – | MediumTenable Research Tenable CTO Vlad Korsunsky talks about participating in the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity and Tenable’s EXPOSURE 2026 conference, where he talked with global leaders about new game-changing AI threats and the groundbreaking benefits of exposure management. Key takeaways The patching cycle is obsolete. Advanced AI models have compressed exploitation timelines into “negative days,” meaning adversaries actively weaponize vulnerabilities before vendor patches are even released. Shift from static CVE severity scores to AI-powered exposure management. Point-in-time vulnerability-risk snapshots fall short. You need AI insights to prioritize remediation based on real-world exploitability of your entire attack surface. Secure the agentic economy. The rapid explosion of autonomous non-human AI identities demands the immediate application of zero trust and least-privilege cryptographic primitives to mitigate severe, systemic internal risks. Don’t focus only on vulnerabilities. While the 2026 Verizon DBIR ranks vulnerability exploitation as the top initial access vector for breaches (about 30%), the majority of breaches (70%) stem from human errors, such as misconfigurations and identity flaws. Tenable Chief Technology Officer Vlad Korsunsky recently participated in the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity in Geneva, Switzerland, an annual summit that takes the pulse of global cyber risk. Korsunsky was one of 150 senior leaders from global industry and government who gathered to discuss how to strengthen businesses’ cyber defenses. The sobering, collective consensus: The traditional cybersecurity playbook is obsolete, as AI becomes an unprecedented threat multiplier. For Tenable, participating in foundational, high-level dialogues and collaborations such as this one is both a privilege and an immense responsibility. As the cybersecurity operating model gets rewritten in real-time, Tenable feels a duty to help shape cyber defenders’ collective insights and strategies. Tenable has spent years addressing the structural cybersecurity operational gaps that worry C-level executives and government leaders worldwide. Korsunsky also had a chance to sit down with many of the hundreds of cybersecurity executives who gathered recently at Tenable’s EXPOSURE 2026 conference . The EXPOSURE 2026 discussions ranged from the death of reactive patching cycles to the need to counter AI threats with systemic cyber resilience, and signaled an urgent need to shift away from a siloed, fragmented approach to cybersecurity and move toward AI-powered exposure management . Below is an in-depth Q&A with Korsunsky, expanding on his participation in the Geneva and Tenable meetings, the rapid escalation of AI threats, and the way to tame cyber risk today and in the coming years. Q: Vlad, you recently returned from the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity in Geneva. What was the overarching energy in the room among these 150 global leaders, which included CEOs, CTOs, CISOs and government leaders? Vlad Korsunsky: The energy was highly focused and, frankly, deeply sober. We are witnessing an unprecedented compression of the threat landscape, and everyone in that room, whether they were running a multinational bank, directing a national cyber defense agency, or leading an NGO, realized that conventional cyber defenses cannot keep up with this velocity. A telling example of how high the stakes have jumped occurred just recently in Washington, D.C. The then Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell and U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent convened an emergency, high-level meeting with the CEOs of some of America's largest financial institutions, including Wall Street giants like Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley. The entire meeting focused on a single AI model: Anthropic’s Claude Mythos Preview . Anthropic had flagged that while it built Mythos to bolster cyber defense, its raw capabilities were so advanced that, if weaponized or leaked, it could pose a major threat to the structural stability of the global financial system. When the highest echelons of fiscal and state power are holding emergency briefings over the capabilities of a single generative AI model, you know you’re dealing with a fundamentally different cyber threat landscape. Q: When asked, "What are the top cyber concerns for 2027?," meeting participants ranked the capacity of AI to be a threat multiplier as number one. Is this a future problem, or are we living it now? Vlad Korsunsky: The threat of AI in the hands of attackers is absolutely a global concern today. Look at the empirical metrics tracking adversary speed over the last decade and a half. For years, Mandiant tracked a linear trend that actually looked like a win for defenders. Time-to-exploit, which is the window between a vulnerability being disclosed and an active exploit hitting the wild, shrank steadily from 63 days in 2018 down to 32 days by 2022. Concurrently, average attacker dwell time — the time an attacker remains undiscovered after breaching a network – plummeted from more than 400 days in 2011 down to just 14 days in 2025. In short, defenders were actively closing the gap. Then came 2023, and the trend broke violently. Time-to-exploit collapsed from 32 days to just five. By 2024, it went negative: minus one day. According to Mandiant’s latest “M-Trends 2026 Report ,” published last month, the average time-to-exploit sits at minus seven days . Think about that structural asymmetry. Attackers are successfully weaponizing and exploiting vulnerabilities a full week before a vendor compiles and ships a patch. Meanwhile, the median timeline for an enterprise to deploy a patch across their environment is roughly 43 to 55 days, according to this year’s Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) . If adversaries are operating in negative time and defenders are operating across months, the traditional patching cycle is effectively a dead strategy. Q: What is driving this terrifying acceleration? How are attackers moving so quickly? Vlad Korsunsky: It is driven entirely by advanced frontier LLMs doing in minutes what used to require weeks of highly specialized human labor. Back in February, Anthropic’s Opus 4.6 model uncovered more than 500 zero-day vulnerabilities in widely utilized open-source software, flaws that had remained undiscovered despite decades of manual peer review by brilliant human engineers. Less than two months later, Anthropic’s Mythos model found thousands more vulnerabilities across foundational operating systems, web browsers, and core cryptographic libraries. More importantly, Mythos went further after spotting them; it boasted an 83% autonomous success rate in chaining disparate, low-severity logic flaws into devastating, end-to-end critical exploits. Essentially, we have reached a watershed moment reminiscent of when Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo defeated human Go champions . Experts believed a computer was decades away from mastering the Go game because the game features more potential board configurations than there are atoms in the observable universe. Brute force was impossible. Yet, AlphaGo won by leveraging deep neural networks to synthesize a form of machine intuition, discovering creative moves no human had conceived in 2,500 years of play. Today, frontier AI models are applying that exact evolutionary leap to cybersecurity. The most powerful LLMs can now execute 32-step complex reasoning chains to autonomously map and compromise simulated corporate networks. The asymmetry is stark. This massive capability curve means the absolute volume of known exposures is poised for a massive step-change, and GenAI has poured pure gasoline on the fire. Q: With zero-days dropping in droves thanks to AI-aided discoveries, should enterprises focus all their engineering resources on hunting down these vulnerabilities? What did you hear from CISOs and other high-level cybersecurity leaders about this issue at Tenable’s EXPOSURE 2026? Vlad Korsunsky: This is where we have to look at the whole board and avoid panic. While the influx of AI-driven zero-day disclosures is a massive upstream pressure on software vendors, data from this year’s Verizon DBIR shows that breaches directly leveraging software exploits account for about 30% of incidents. It's a significant percentage, yes, but what about the other 70%? Cybersecurity leaders I talked to at EXPOSURE 2026 realize that the overwhelming majority of enterprise breaches do not begin with an ultra-sophisticated, state-sponsored zero-day exploit. They start with incredibly simple, unforced human errors: unsecured shadow IT cloud assets running outside corporate governance; misconfigured databases left wide open to the public internet; over-privileged corporate identities; a lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA); and highly targeted, AI-driven spear phishing. This is a critical insight for guiding your cyber strategy today. These misconfigurations and unsecured cloud credentials are the dry fuel sitting inside an enterprise network. When an AI hacking agent comes looking, that fuel ignites faster than any traditional cybersecurity team can react. So organizations must be diligent about proactively maintaining stringent security hygiene. Q: If paddling faster inside the old patching model won't save us, how do defenders change the rules of the game? Vlad Korsunsky: We have to look at this the way wildland firefighters have looked at massive forest fires for over a century. When a wildfire is roaring toward a town faster than a human can run, firefighters don’t just stand at the edge of the flames reaching for a bigger water hose. They get ahead of the blaze and light a controlled burn. They intentionally clear out the brush, trees, and fuel ahead of time. When the main fire line reaches that cleared zone, it starves and dies because there is nothing left to consume. Enterprise security must adopt this exact philosophy. We have to stop reacting to the fire and start aggressively clearing the fuel before the adversary arrives. This requires a wholesale shift from reactive vulnerability patching to continuous exposure management . The traditional Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is effectively dead as a primary prioritization tool . A static CVSS score tells you the theoretical severity of a single CVE in a vacuum; it tells you absolutely nothing about real-world exploitability within the specific context of your unique enterprise environment. At EXPOSURE 2026, we heard from our customers how continuous, AI-driven exposure management is helping them counter today’s evolving AI threats successfully. With exposure management, you use advanced analytics to gain unified, real-time visibility across your entire modern attack surface, encompassing data centers, cloud infrastructure, OT/IoT environments, corporate identities, and newly deployed AI pipelines. We must use AI on the defense side to continuously map true attack paths ; for example, pinpointing exactly where a minor misconfiguration chains into a critical business asset. Q: You mentioned using AI on the defense side. How does Tenable view the balance between human security analysts and autonomous AI defenders? Vlad Korsunsky: Security is fundamentally a team sport, and AI vendors like OpenAI and Anthropic are not our adversaries. AI is the single most potent tool ever introduced into the defender’s toolkit; we simply need to wield it with machine-speed orchestration. Because our adversaries are deploying fully autonomous hacking agents today — tools that are already topping commercial bug bounty leaderboards — the only fair fight is to meet machine speed with machine speed. This means building and deploying agentic AI workflows on the side of the defense to power autonomous exposure management. However, this must always be balanced with strict human-in-the-loop oversight. In Geneva, we spent a great deal of time discussing the systemic risks of unchecked automation. If an autonomous system applies a sweeping remediation script without understanding the broader business context, it can inadvertently trigger a massive operational outage: a self-inflicted systemic failure. Defenders must maintain deep visibility into the “behind-the-scenes” logic of their automation. We need human control to govern business context, while leveraging machine speed to continuously ingest, prioritize, and neutralize exposures before an attacker can strike. Q: Another major pillar of the WEF discussion centered on AI safety and non-human identities. What are the hidden risks enterprises are overlooking as they rush to adopt AI? Vlad Korsunsky: We are transitioning rapidly into what we call the “Agentic Economy.” Historically, enterprise security focused on securing human users and a relatively manageable set of non-human service accounts. As organizations embed AI agents into core business workflows — from code generation to customer operations to financial automation — we are seeing an exponential growth of non-human, agentic identities and agentic workflows. These autonomous agents are fundamentally different. Instead of operating just “on behalf” of a human in a tightly bound session, they execute complex tasks independently. The alarming reality discussed in Geneva and in our EXPOSURE 2026 conference is that our current security frameworks lack effective, native guardrails for these agents. LLMs routinely bypass system prompts or ignore markdown safety files. They can even actively manipulate or hack neighboring AI agents to achieve their algorithmic goals. We’ve seen anecdotal instances of an enterprise AI agent autonomously writing a script to bypass an internal access restriction, and when flagged, its underlying logic essentially argued that the script committed the violation, not the agent itself. Because AI agents behave essentially like trusted corporate insiders that have been let loose across internal data silos, we must immediately apply foundational cryptographic primitives to agentic identities. We need strict zero-trust architectures, rigorous least-privilege access controls, and absolute defense-in-depth tailored specifically for non-human identities before they morph into the next great vector of unmanageable global risk. Q: Any final thoughts for organizations trying to navigate this massive technological shift? Vlad Korsunsky: Attackers are increasingly rocketing laterally across enterprise networks after the initial breach, often in minutes and even seconds, whereas before it could take them days or weeks. The adversary’s inherent advantages will always be timing, velocity, and the luxury of only needing to find a single weak link in your exposure landscape. But as defenders, we possess the ultimate home-field advantage: We can see the whole board, and we have the power to fundamentally alter the terrain. By abandoning obsolete point-in-time checkmarks, embracing continuous, AI-driven exposure management, and proactively clearing out our operational fuel at machine speed through foundational cyber hygiene, we can break the adversary’s curve and effectively secure our environments. | Tenable Research | |||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-31970samtools htslib · Heap-based Buffer Overflow High7.1EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-31970 HTSlib is a library for reading and writing bioinformatics file formats. GZI files are used to index block-compressed GZIP [BGZF] files. In the GZI loading function, `bgzf_index_load_hfile()`, it was possible to trigger an integer overflow, leading to an under- or zero-sized buffer being allocated to store the index. Sixteen zero bytes would then be written to this buffer, and, depending on the result of the overflow the rest of the file may also be loaded into the buffer as well. If the function did attempt to load the data, it would eventually fail due to not reading the expected number of records, and then try to free the overflowed heap buffer. Exploiting this bug causes a heap buffer overflow. If a user opens a file crafted to exploit this issue, it could lead to the program crashing, or overwriting of data and heap structures in ways not expected by the program. It may be possible to use this to obtain arbitrary code execution. Versions 1.23.1, 1.22.2 and 1.21.1 include fixes for this issue. The easiest work-around is to discard any `.gzi` index files from untrusted sources, and use the `bgzip -r` option to recreate them. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-30236opf openproject · Incorrect Authorization Medium4.3EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-30236 OpenProject is an open-source, web-based project management software. Prior to 17.2.0, when editing a project budget and planning the labor cost, it was not checked that the user that was planned in the budget is actually a project member. This exposed the user's default rate (if one was set up) to users that should only see that information for project members. Also, the endpoint that handles the pre-calculation for the frontend to display a preview of the costs, while it was being entered, did not properly validate the membership of the user as well. This also allowed to calculate costs with the default rate of non-members. This vulnerability is fixed in 17.2.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit NetSec Hi all, I am a cybersecurity analyst with 1 year and 6 month experience. Im writing this for fun and to teach some people who maybe interested and are at a beginner level on detecting suspicious sign in activity. In my example Im going to be using Entra ID, as this is the most common IAM solution and the one Im most familiar monitoring. First step is analyzing the alert you received in the queue. "Impossible travel time" or "Anomalous sign in activity" "sign in from bad IP" - These are the type of suspicious authentication logs that you will see in the SOC. Gather all the information: time generated (time of the sign in) app that was logged into (ex officehome, msgraph) username/email IP address device info (will normally be blank if its tuned properly, if its coming from managed trusted AD device it is a big indicator its benign so need to tune it to avoid FP for VPN usuage) locationdetails (will be crucial to see which location logged from, will determine later if its physical location or location from VPN server) user agent (crucial to detect what type of device it's coming from, potential spoofing as well) Then you can run a query like this (will differ greatly based off your SIEM querying lanaguage, Im using Kusto MS Sentinel) Signinlogs | Summarize count by timegenerated, appname ,userprincipalname, IPaddress, tostring(locationdetails), tostring(deviceinfo), useragent | where resulttype == 0 (filtering to see successful sign in attempts only) \^ use a query like this to gather all crucial details, we can then use the time range to see 24 hours and then compare past previous sign ins from last 2-3 weeks to see a baseline, for location, IP address, device info, to see if they have accessed that app before. Once you determine the sign in activity is indeed suspicious, its a combination of blank device details (non managed device), new IP address, new useragent or a suspicious useragent (potential spoofed), new app that's been used and potential impossible travel based off the last successful login). We need to analyze what type of IP address is being used, from either a VPN server or a ISP IP (will show approximate physical location of actual sign in). NEVER just focus on the IP reputation, vast majority of the true positives I caught are all coming from clean IP reputations, threat actors are smart enough to know that if their IP address has been flagged and reported numerous times, their sign in activity will be blocked. Analyze the ISP info, a threat actor MAJORITY of the time will be using an IP address from a suspicious VPN server, you can do a ISP search for that VPN name and most of the time it will be something foreign. Once you confirm the IP is coming from a suspicious entity such as a VPN server that is not authorized to be used in the company or its a VPN server with suspicious name, can confirm it's indeed malicious. From there you can quickly check Auditlogs table to see any major changes to the users account. Most threat actors will remove and change the comprised users MFA, will remove the comprised user mobile device and probably add theirs. From here, you can check the email logs and url click events on the suspicious link that was clicked for them to be comprised. Once you find that suspicious email you can plug that phishing URL into a interactive sandbox such as Browserling to confirm it. Some threat actors phishing sites are capable of detecting sandboxes and won't show their sign in page so be wary of that, but this isn't very common. After detecting all these suspicious events, you can begin to lock the users account, resetting MFA settings and starting the IR process and doing some forensics on what the threat actor did. Will have to look for: \- Potential data exfiltration attempts. Can detect this from email logs or web traffic logs. \- Potential lateral movement, the threat actor will likely send the same phishing email but this time from comprised users account to other internal users. Can detect this from email events as well. \- File modifications - the threat actor could have modified a file, deleted a file, for this can check logs such as office activity (365 events) | Reddit NetSec | |||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 51% | CVE-2024-32030provectus kafka-ui · Code Injection High8.1EPSS 51%CVE Database V5CVE-2024-32030 Kafka UI is an Open-Source Web UI for Apache Kafka Management. Kafka UI API allows users to connect to different Kafka brokers by specifying their network address and port. As a separate feature, it also provides the ability to monitor the performance of Kafka brokers by connecting to their JMX ports. JMX is based on the RMI protocol, so it is inherently susceptible to deserialization attacks. A potential attacker can exploit this feature by connecting Kafka UI backend to its own malicious broker. This vulnerability affects the deployments where one of the following occurs: 1. dynamic.config.enabled property is set in settings. It's not enabled by default, but it's suggested to be enabled in many tutorials for Kafka UI, including its own README.md. OR 2. an attacker has access to the Kafka cluster that is being connected to Kafka UI. In this scenario the attacker can exploit this vulnerability to expand their access and execute code on Kafka UI as well. Instead of setting up a legitimate JMX port, an attacker can create an RMI listener that returns a malicious serialized object for any RMI call. In the worst case it could lead to remote code execution as Kafka UI has the required gadget chains in its classpath. This issue may lead to post-auth remote code execution. This is particularly dangerous as Kafka-UI does not have authentication enabled by default. This issue has been addressed in version 0.7.2. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. These issues were discovered and reported by the GitHub Security lab and is also tracked as GHSL-2023-230. | CVE Database V5 |
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