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The strange tale of ischhfd83: When cybercriminals eat their own

Medium
Published: Wed Jun 04 2025 (06/04/2025, 19:24:22 UTC)
Source: AlienVault OTX General

Description

This investigation uncovered a large-scale campaign involving backdoored GitHub repositories targeting game cheaters and inexperienced cybercriminals. The threat actor, possibly linked to a Distribution-as-a-Service operation, uses multiple types of backdoors and a convoluted infection chain leading to RATs and infostealers. The campaign involves automated commits, obfuscation techniques, and complex payloads. Researchers found over 100 malicious repositories with distinct contributor roles, suggesting an automated framework. The eventual payload includes AsyncRAT, Remcos, and Lumma Stealer. The threat actor uses Telegram for notifications and various paste sites for hosting malicious code. This case highlights the complexity of modern cyber threats and the importance of cautious approaches to open-source repositories.

AI-Powered Analysis

AILast updated: 07/06/2025, 22:27:09 UTC

Technical Analysis

The threat campaign dubbed "ischhfd83" involves a sophisticated and large-scale operation leveraging backdoored GitHub repositories to target game cheaters and inexperienced cybercriminals. The adversary, potentially linked to a Distribution-as-a-Service (DaaS) model, employs a multi-stage infection chain characterized by automated commits to GitHub repositories, heavy use of obfuscation techniques, and complex payload delivery mechanisms. The campaign's infrastructure includes over 100 malicious repositories with distinct contributor roles, indicating an automated framework designed to maintain and propagate malicious code efficiently. The final payloads delivered through this chain include well-known Remote Access Trojans (RATs) such as AsyncRAT and Remcos, as well as the Lumma Stealer infostealer malware. These payloads enable attackers to exfiltrate sensitive information, maintain persistent remote access, and execute arbitrary commands on compromised systems. The threat actor uses Telegram channels for real-time notifications and various paste sites to host malicious code snippets, complicating detection and takedown efforts. The campaign demonstrates advanced operational security and evasion tactics, including the use of multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as obfuscated files and information (T1027), execution through various scripting methods (T1059 variants), persistence mechanisms (T1547.001), and credential dumping (T1003). This case underscores the risks associated with relying on open-source repositories without thorough vetting, as threat actors exploit these platforms to distribute malware and target niche communities like game cheaters and novice cybercriminals.

Potential Impact

European organizations face significant risks from this campaign, particularly those involved in gaming, software development, and cybersecurity sectors. The use of backdoored open-source repositories can lead to inadvertent infection of developer environments, resulting in compromised intellectual property, stolen credentials, and unauthorized access to internal networks. The presence of RATs like AsyncRAT and Remcos facilitates persistent remote control, enabling attackers to conduct espionage, data theft, or lateral movement within corporate networks. Infostealers such as Lumma Stealer exacerbate data confidentiality risks by extracting sensitive user information, including passwords and financial data. The campaign's targeting of inexperienced cybercriminals and game cheaters may also indirectly impact organizations by increasing the prevalence of compromised endpoints within their networks, especially in environments where BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) policies are in place. Additionally, the use of Telegram and paste sites for command and control complicates detection and response efforts, potentially allowing prolonged undetected presence. Overall, the campaign threatens confidentiality, integrity, and availability of affected systems, with potential cascading effects on business operations and reputation.

Mitigation Recommendations

To mitigate this threat, European organizations should implement a multi-layered defense strategy tailored to the campaign's unique characteristics. First, enforce strict controls and vetting processes for open-source software dependencies, including automated scanning of repositories for backdoors and malicious code before integration. Employ advanced static and dynamic analysis tools capable of detecting obfuscation and suspicious behaviors in code. Enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities to identify indicators of compromise related to AsyncRAT, Remcos, and Lumma Stealer, including monitoring for unusual network communications to Telegram domains and paste sites. Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement and restrict outbound traffic to only necessary destinations, blocking known malicious infrastructure. Educate developers and users about the risks of using unverified repositories and the importance of verifying code sources. Regularly update and patch systems to reduce exploitation windows. Deploy multi-factor authentication (MFA) to protect credentials and limit the impact of stolen information. Finally, establish threat intelligence sharing with European cybersecurity communities to stay informed about evolving tactics and indicators associated with this campaign.

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Technical Details

Author
AlienVault
Tlp
white
References
["https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2025/06/04/the-strange-tale-of-ischhfd83-when-cybercriminals-eat-their-own"]
Adversary
ischhfd83
Pulse Id
68409d66fe68571150ccaad4
Threat Score
null

Indicators of Compromise

Hash

ValueDescriptionCopy
hash556d807df8c8a5fe567f66701b2ce4a5
hash02c67a06b83a1482fa3ffdfe93d9ce409f1a1e92173ab720ddee52f887586ec4
hash03e1ad603d31b6b116ce0f459986791eb661d5245f9b52e278cd005ec3e081a4
hash11c429b0ce110d4e9380f5a520a682c633e342c1d20538ff74869c0fe3e6e3af
hash12f1e6fadf3e9ba2d1feef21d3c852a1d56922b934096247d4b3df54df5af6ec
hash180c20e039a427f3154271e2a7a620f6c5b59a81c699758b4c1e7e4eae95c08f
hash19739d8c64656cc2b5110ba9375c54bddfcbb3b13f6e74b2360d48ffbf3b0d5e
hash22c5058c274b1f535a6c78c32b42ead9c79bfc1adfb3beb8ee9275fc5006e0e2
hash23eda28b82baac326c5878b67510e453603e68e3dfa5dfabd92b145cf95a3e76
hash2b13b1b778356d779abcef5fa6150da9cba9520231a0775218bf6c7b466327dc
hash342b5990845f9dcb8723927da482301cf8e14fcb69603edbe529260ea5207f43
hash424e91a5657753b8d0c45a096f74f59b97f626017e9b2a3a2bff4f543e80edcc
hash433138a3783bbf3033b638ed447e6fcddad64832f329cfd6b7b519fa57b31738
hash44d365d47a1f8d103795b7dc25f57068922fe8e0af1887066162c763c1b9f402
hash4f1f9a9e7f3457f7b67dbe899781d81b616c3ec57b08230cb4bcb9279c87d9c2
hash577c1e288b1d7ef69330a86f0c14d06bb67980fba64896aadf556f52b770cf56
hash5854a2f5a4f5bcbae8488a5abd05095bfe74e8f5b18dfc728d8732b61ecf3118
hash585a9fc16ab2739d9db390004272c3c26817f7d548ff4a9a3a6d3d992a14dc87
hash5d89d66fb5f1410c0ef745fecb286608db4bff9aedc68a8de3b5fb37c1c0f0e8
hash668a338ccb320200dcf4c090a01f372ea49f11cbb83946f5ea893e4c2e3caa57
hash70e33d34fd3794ef78d5b7bd0329b65cda8ea9a343458404b6ae3a666a7a259e
hash77a5d2b1fa0660f307bfe34294ff612556418685c87fead07e00c43721609a2e
hash823da5ffec1b9eed87301fc4685009e4673d72a47e1acec4baeee6df27634d51
hash89f12803ce3ec782cd912e524a4725ade4ccf45f72dd3f47b8923bebe4464553
hash8a6237ac9a90914d96490865d784a2d712ad3d3361a3d50893d33b75b865fbb5
hash918796b8cc63f91baf22cb1ec8cf8078df36c81dcaadc1428a261ea793ac71b5
hash95be742a617e91d276956b95419667b442f68d43145f6d7ffe70581b4b5b5587
hash9838a881148d4fa9c17790ab70cced2e6c9f835d1ad3855f3e4013267dbad90c
hash9cf5bece2cb9b43686cc0241883bd1932c8dc06e92e29b0e210e9f00e0ef2962
hash9ef04f50bc95f9a20c09c636f2783e5cefc8b31c8938ba2ed6b9d92d838f4b07
hash9f34a4db19d67d898420a131c6f31ba0815b009ac82a2a9925eaa07ad687eb0f
hasha3039bdf365755c334c8bf4d7f1792b066060daf8a16269659582d2458a7caf7
hasha53ac7466290c9f1e92f8c953d3068f7e72df2929972aa8d4a31a2485009862c
hashb27f694c974b44fe2f4a8a25680997db574fa35686c30fa4c4dc9dd4ec40005e
hashb58a2221aa767a97c49b7347b59dd67d16cb4babc206d444b0195c93c36379a7
hashb5a1afb3b9de392f7478dd7de55dccb1a88ffe53351ce100b2da24bd2022b482
hashbcc4d8752143d6327db02e3c52bd74ce744cf98c0aeafd205019ffc87af5bd40
hashbcca9de329754c6719b4829919dcb0603f8a5c29a36ab83f9d88a5aa2d00e2d6
hashc20f8edb938dff126e8e53add1629495a1c59c351d783eef61d3b9900a0726c5
hashcb1617e2ffbf07f9e897beddf8565965e881d4b4f45dda9ba30f5e1304d8ec11
hashe330638bc8c23e8b3d87ffc9615bbfc43bc8b37cfbd317e0e86ab456d5e044f9
hashe5b4ce9a84826170d613562ecf86df4e1d3aee36d7b78ff7e4fa468f7e5ce1ee
hashef71dc67ad8de97b39e2c98580e35402ae7dfc8f92015c1f9f689e7f2f1177ab
hashf062c7884844da7535cb7b4e7e0a517856022fbd410eb62ecf661fded2c473bc
hashf3cc80d90c7daee04a31317dfa36c7cb3975cabd6c63fb213aed901c8217a4d4

Domain

ValueDescriptionCopy
domainpaste.fo
domainpastejustit.com
domainpopcornsoft.me
domain556d807df8c8a5fe567f66701b2ce4a5.arturshi.ru
domainarturshi.ru
domainmuckdeveloper.com
domainoctofin.co
domainimg.guildedcdn.com

Threat ID: 6840afe6182aa0cae2bdf2e0

Added to database: 6/4/2025, 8:43:18 PM

Last enriched: 7/6/2025, 10:27:09 PM

Last updated: 8/12/2025, 1:30:03 AM

Views: 20

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