Search: super.ai
216 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity Super-Lite Cyber Coder (Qwen2.5 1.5B) is a lightweight, 4-bit quantized language model designed for local coding and security tasks, including authorized ethical hacking and penetration testing. It is intended to run on low-spec hardware with minimal resource requirements. The model is openly available on Hugging Face and includes usage instructions for various platforms. There is no indication of inherent security vulnerabilities or exploits associated with this model. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 3.5% | Critical9.8EPSS 3.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-14894 The Super Forms – Drag & Drop Form Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload in all versions up to, and including, 6.3.313 via the submit_form function. This is due to missing file type validation and the absence of any capability check on the submit_form nopriv AJAX handler, whose only barrier is a session nonce freely obtainable by unauthenticated visitors via a separate nopriv endpoint. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload files that may be executable, which makes remote code execution possible. The nonce requirement is trivially bypassed because the super_create_nonce nopriv AJAX action allows any unauthenticated visitor to mint a valid sf_nonce and session cookie in a single prior request, reducing exploitation to two unauthenticated HTTP requests. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.7EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-58656 Grav API plugin before v1.0.0-rc.16 accepts JWT tokens via the ?token= URL query parameter and responds with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, allowing unauthenticated attackers to make fully authenticated cross-origin API requests from any malicious website. Attackers who obtain a leaked JWT token from access logs, proxy logs, browser history, or Referrer headers can create persistent backdoor super-admin accounts and exfiltrate sensitive configuration and user data. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-10536SUSE · Security update for curl HighEPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-10536 This security update for curl addresses multiple vulnerabilities including issues with STARTTLS connection reuse, service reuse, trailing dot domain super cookies, cross-proxy Digest authentication state leaks, stale proxy password leaks, use-after-free (UAF) conditions, exposure of HTTP/3 early data, improper SSH host validation, and HTTP/2 stream-dependency tree UAF. These vulnerabilities could lead to information leaks, authentication bypass, and memory corruption. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-38976mrubyc · NULL Pointer Dereference High7.5EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-38976 mrubyc through 3.4.1 was found to contain a NULL pointer dereference in src/vm.c in op_super() / OP_SUPER due to a missing runtime guard for top-level super. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Unrated | – | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-8924Microsoft · trailing dot domain super cookie UnratedEPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-8924 CVE-2026-8924, known as the 'trailing dot domain super cookie' vulnerability, affects Microsoft products version 3.0 and 4.0. The provided information does not include technical details, impact, or remediation guidance. No CVSS score or exploit activity is reported. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-11746LY Central Dogma · CWE-798 Critical9.4EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-11746 ## Vulnerability `ZooKeeperReplicationConfig.secret()` silently substitutes the hard-coded constant `"ch4n63m3"` (leetspeak for "change me") whenever the operator omits `replication.secret`. The same secret is wired into both the **client-facing SASL context** and the **quorum/learner SASL contexts** of the embedded ZooKeeper. The constant is in OSS source on GitHub and is discoverable via code search in seconds. ### Three Reinforcing Defects 1. **OSS-public credential** — `DEFAULT_SECRET` is in `line/centraldogma` source. 2. **Silent fallback** — `firstNonNull(convertValue(...), DEFAULT_SECRET)` substitutes the default with no log, no warning, no startup banner. The only sanity check `checkArgument(!secret().isEmpty(), ...)` passes because the getter substitutes the literal before the emptiness check runs. 3. **Dual-purpose secret** — used for both ZK client-port super auth and inter-peer quorum SASL. A single leaked password authenticates against both surfaces. ### Architecture Context (Important) Central Dogma does **NOT** connect to an external ZooKeeper ensemble. Each replica embeds a `QuorumPeer` (`EmbeddedZooKeeper extends QuorumPeer`) inside its own JVM. The Central Dogma cluster **IS** the ZK ensemble. So the "ZK network" is the inter-replica network of the Central Dogma cluster itself. ### Applicability | `replication.method` | ZK Started? | Applicable? | |---|---|---| | `NONE` (standalone, dev default) | No | **NOT applicable** | | `ZOOKEEPER` (HA production) | Yes, embedded on every replica | **Fully applicable** — canonical production configuration | --- ## Evidence **File:** `server/src/main/java/com/linecorp/centraldogma/server/ZooKeeperReplicationConfig.java` **Branch:** `main` @ commit `d64a5151` **Line 53** — the constant: ```java private static final String DEFAULT_SECRET = "ch4n63m3"; ``` **Lines 210–215** — the silent fallback: ```java /** * Returns the secret string used for authenticating the ZooKeeper peers. */ public String secret() { return firstNonNull(convertValue(secret, "replication.secret"), DEFAULT_SECRET); } ``` --- **File:** `server/src/main/java/com/linecorp/centraldogma/server/internal/replication/ZooKeeperCommandExecutor.java` **Lines 586–607** — JAAS wiring (same secret on both surfaces): ```java final String escapedSecret = jaasValueEscaper.escape(cfg.secret()); ImmutableList.of("Server", EmbeddedZooKeeper.SASL_SERVER_LOGIN_CONTEXT).forEach(name -> { buf.append(name).append(" {").append(newline); buf.append(DigestLoginModule.class.getName()).append(" required").append(newline); buf.append("user_super=\"").append(escapedSecret).append("\";").append(newline); buf.append("};").append(newline); }); ImmutableList.of("Client", EmbeddedZooKeeper.SASL_LEARNER_LOGIN_CONTEXT).forEach(name -> { buf.append(name).append(" {").append(newline); buf.append(DigestLoginModule.class.getName()).append(" required").append(newline); buf.append("username=\"super\"").append(newline); buf.append("password=\"").append(escapedSecret).append("\";").append(newline); buf.append("};").append(newline); }); ``` --- **File:** `server/src/main/java/com/linecorp/centraldogma/server/internal/replication/EmbeddedZooKeeper.java` **Line 44** — proves CD embeds the ZK server: ```java final class EmbeddedZooKeeper extends QuorumPeer { ``` **Lines 213–220** — client port binding (loopback only): ```java private static ServerCnxnFactory createCnxnFactory(QuorumPeerConfig zkCfg) throws IOException { final InetSocketAddress bindAddr = zkCfg.getClientPortAddress(); final ServerCnxnFactory cnxnFactory = ServerCnxnFactory.createFactory(); // Listen only on 127.0.0.1 because we do not want to expose ZooKeeper to others. cnxnFactory.configure(new InetSocketAddress("127.0.0.1", bindAddr != null ? bindAddr.getPort() : 0), zkCfg.getMaxClientCnxns()); return cnxnFactory; } ``` > Quorum/election ports are **NOT** loopback-bound — they bind to `replication.servers[].host` as configured, exposed on the inter-replica network. --- ## PoC Two attack surfaces, two scenarios. **Surface A** (client port, same-host) is implemented as a working read-only PoC. **Surface B** (quorum-port peer impersonation) is documented but intentionally not weaponized. ### Surface A — Same-Host Client Port (Loopback) PoC Python + kazoo + pure-sasl. Authenticates as `super` over SASL DIGEST-MD5 with the leaked secret and reads the full Central Dogma replication log. Hardcoded to `127.0.0.1`, read-only, prints first 5 entries. ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ C3 PoC -- ZooKeeper default-secret takeover (read-only, loopback only). Demonstrates that a Central Dogma instance launched with a ZooKeeper-replicated configuration but without `replication.secret` set exposes its embedded ZooKeeper to anyone with local-host access, using the well-known credential `super / ch4n63m3`. SAFETY: * Hardcoded to 127.0.0.1. Refuses any other targ | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-56080Cap-go capgo · Improper Authentication Medium6.9EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56080 Capgo before 12.128.2 contains a flaw in the Enforce Password Policy feature: after a Super Admin enables the policy and successfully changes their password to a compliant one, the backend does not update the password-compliance state. As a result, the backend continues to treat the account as non-compliant and repeatedly forces password-reset prompts, permanently locking the Super Admin out of organization access (organization lockout / denial of service) despite valid authentication. EPSS 0.4%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-49762elixir · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Medium5.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-49762 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in the Elixir standard library's Version module allows an attacker who controls a version string to cause a denial of service through CPU and memory exhaustion. The version parser converts numeric version components (major, minor, patch and numeric pre-release/build identifiers) to integers without bounding their length. A single large all-digit component therefore forces a super-linear, non-yielding base-10 to arbitrary-precision integer conversion (String.to_integer/1, i.e. :erlang.binary_to_integer/1) that pins a BEAM scheduler, and a larger component raises an uncaught SystemLimitError that crashes the calling process. A single moderately sized string (around one megabyte) is enough; no authentication is required. This is reachable from the public entry points Version.parse/1, Version.parse!/1, Version.match?/3, Version.compare/2, and Version.parse_requirement/1, which applications routinely call on untrusted input such as HTTP parameters, dependency-manifest fields, and package metadata. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/version.ex and program routines 'Elixir.Version.Parser':parse_digits/2. This issue affects elixir: from 0.9.3 before 1.20.1. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-10070macrozheng mall · Improper Authorization Medium5.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-10070 A vulnerability was found in macrozheng mall up to 1.0.3. This affects an unknown function of the file /admin/update/ of the component Super Admin Password Handler. Performing a manipulation results in improper authorization. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The vendor deleted the GitHub issue for this vulnerability without any explanation. Afterwards the vendor was contacted early about this disclosure via email but did not respond in any way. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.9 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-46624twentyhq twenty · OS Command Injection Critical9.9EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-46624 Twenty is an open source CRM. From 1.7.7 through 1.16.7, a critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in Twenty CRM via a chained SQL Injection and PostgreSQL COPY TO PROGRAM attack. If Postgres user is a super user then any authenticated user can execute arbitrary OS commands on the database server by injecting SQL through the unsanitized timeZone parameter in the REST API groupBy endpoint. The timeZone field within the group_by query parameter is directly interpolated into a raw SQL expression using JavaScript template literals without any parameterization, validation, or escaping. This affects engine/api/graphql/graphql-query-runner/group-by/resolvers/utils/get-group-by-expression.util.ts. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research As frontier AI models collapse the traditional exploit window, Tenable Hexa AI transforms the security operating model from manual triage to agentic orchestration. See how you can automate vulnerability remediation and super-charge exposure management with Tenable Hexa AI. Key takeaways AI models like Claude Mythos have reduced the time from vulnerability discovery to weaponization from weeks to minutes, making manual defense untenable. Tenable Hexa AI serves as an agentic engine that orchestrates complex, multi-step remediation workflows across modern attack surfaces to accelerate the speed of preemptive security and propel your exposure management program. Using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) included in Tenable Hexa AI, your team can build and deploy custom agents that anchor your preferred LLMs in the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric, ensuring every automated action is governed, auditable, and accurate. Why you need to implement agentic AI in cybersecurity (and specifically, in vulnerability management) For most of my career in cybersecurity, we’ve operated on a fundamental, if unspoken, assumption: We had a grace period. Whenever a new vulnerability was discovered, we knew we had time, often weeks or months, before adversaries would begin exploiting it. The time between vulnerability discovery and exploitation gave us breathing room. It gave us time to patch, triage, and remediate. But not any more. The gap between discovery and exploitation has been shrinking for years, and the vulnerability discovery capabilities demonstrated by frontier AI models like Claude Mythos are narrowing it even more. We have entered the era of AI speed. When an LLM can unearth a 27-year-old vulnerability in a hardened OS in minutes, and then weaponize it in seconds, old defensive cycles can’t keep up, and that’s untenable. This is why I’m so excited to announce the general availability of Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform , at EXPOSURE 2026 : because it’s designed to help your organization address the escalating, AI-driven pace of vulnerability discovery. The agentic AI imperative in cybersecurity: Scale your preemptive defense to match machine speed with agentic innovation from Tenable Tenable Hexa AI is built to be a force multiplier and a flexible engine for innovation. Featuring a suite of built-in agents ready to automate assessment configuration, asset tagging, dashboard creation, ticket creation, and more, Tenable Hexa AI is designed to help your organization overcome the operational challenges deepened by adversarial AI use. When the window between discovery and exploitation hits near-zero, security teams locked in manual vulnerability management operating models are forced into a state of perpetual emergency. Manually stitching together context and telemetry from cloud, identity, OT, and vulnerability silos in an arduous effort to prioritize remediation for downstream IT and DevOps teams is a losing battle. And when you can’t provide clear, risk-based remediation priorities to IT and DevOps teams, you end up bombarding them with seemingly urgent tickets that may not in fact be critical to your organization. Constant shifts in remediation priorities and endless debates over what needs fixing and why is not sustainable. It creates friction and causes you to lose the cybersecurity race. In a world where attackers move at machine speed, only comprehensive exposure intelligence combined with the agentic AI orchestration capabilities provided by the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform can give you clarity and control. Tenable Hexa AI doesn’t just tell you where you are vulnerable; it mobilizes your preemptive defense. Capabilities of Tenable Hexa AI With this GA release, Tenable delivers foundational capabilities to help your organization accelerate the pace of vulnerability discovery and remediation, including: Your choice of agents - Use our pre-built, out-of-the-box agents to start reducing risk immediately, or use the Model Context Protocol (MCP) server built into Tenable Hexa AI to create custom agents tailored to your organization’s environment. Advanced multi-step reasoning - Tenable Hexa AI executes complex, end-to-end workflows spanning your attack surface (e.g., IT, cloud, identity, OT, etc.) in a single request, eliminating the need for practitioners to toggle between views to get exposure context. It understands that a CVE in your web app is a critical threat specifically because it is linked to a privileged service account with a path to your sensitive data. Automated remediation workflows - Tenable Hexa AI orchestrates remediation workflows, automatically creating and routing tickets, generating custom policies, and producing audit-ready reports, so security teams can act fast on every critical exposure. End-to-end exposure path insights - Practitioners can query their environment by identity attributes, such as service accounts, privileged users, and Active Directory groups, to surface exposure paths that traditional asset inventories miss. Tenable Hexa AI also provides guided assistance for complex Active Directory sensor configurations. Build your own AI agents for cybersecurity with Tenable Hexa AI In addition to out-of-the-box agentic capabilities for use cases like automated assessment configuration, asset tagging, and ticket creation, customers can also build custom agents via Tenable Hexa AI's built-in MCP that are informed by your organization’s unique security policies and internal business logic. Tenable Hexa AI serves as the orchestration layer connecting your favorite AI tools to your infrastructure and other security tools, all with the data and context from the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric. By anchoring the models your organization uses in the authoritative context of your own environment, Tenable Hexa AI moves you beyond generic AI answers to governed and auditable automation. Whether you are automating complex remediation or generating board-ready dashboards, Tenable Hexa AI ensures the output is both verifiable and auditable. The Tenable Exposure Data Fabric is key because an agent is only as effective as the data it has access to. Tenable Hexa AI is powered by the Tenable Exposure Data Fabric, a repository of 20 years of vulnerability research and the industry’s largest collection of contextualized exposure data. In other words, we’ve built an agentic engine for cybersecurity that uses the world’s best exposure data to drive machine-speed actions. This is the only way to ensure your AI is validating the real state of your environment, rather than just guessing. Real-world agentic AI use cases for Tenable Hexa AI While there are virtually infinite ways to apply agentic orchestration to your unique cybersecurity challenges, here are four high-impact areas where manual workflows traditionally break down and make it impossible for you to keep pace with AI-powered vulnerability discovery: Supply chain response - Neutralize third-party threats by using Tenable Hexa AI to correlate software components with affected internal assets. Automated patching - Use custom Hexa agents to beat the Mythos clock by orchestrating patches the moment a vulnerability is validated. Remediation assignment - Use Tenable Hexa AI to automatically match CVEs to asset owners in seconds and trigger immediate response workflows. These use cases demonstrate how Tenable Hexa AI can bridge the gap between exposure intelligence and action. Make the untenable Tenable The collapse of the exploit window is a wake-up call. It gives us the opportunity to change how we work. By shifting from manual triage to agentic orchestration, organizations are seeing a shift in productivity and how they prioritize and action exposure reduction. While early design partners have already reclaimed days per month on foundational tasks like asset tagging, the value is not found solely in the hours saved, but rather, in the precision of the response. By automating the correlation between cloud, identity, AI, OT, and vulnerability data, Tenable One provides the clear, contextualized instructions that IT and DevOps teams need to act with confidence. This eliminates the administrative friction and back-and-forth negotiation that often results in critical vulnerabilities going unaddressed. Reclaiming those days means your best people are no longer buried in spreadsheets; they are focused on high-impact strategy, architecture hardening, and preemptive defense. Tenable Hexa AI is available today as part of the Tenable One Foundation and Tenable One Advanced packages . | Tenable Research | |||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-45665open-webui · Cross-site Scripting High8.1EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-45665 Open WebUI versions prior to 0.8.0 contain a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Banner component due to improper sanitization order. This flaw allows a malicious or compromised administrator to inject a payload into the global banner, which is rendered for all users including the Super Admin. The vulnerability enables privilege escalation by bypassing security mechanisms and stealing the Super Admin's session token. The issue is fixed in version 0.8.0. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.9 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-42611getgrav grav · Cross-site Scripting High8.9EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42611 Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.0-beta.2, a low-privileged (with the ability to create a page) user can cause XSS with the injection of svg element. The XSS can further be escalated to dump the entire system information available under /admin/config/info whenever a Super Admin visits the page; which can further be chained with the use of admin-nonce to do a complete server compromise (RCE). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.0.0-beta.2. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.7% | Medium5.3EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-7652 The LatePoint plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Account Takeover via Weak Password Recovery Mechanism in the unauthenticated guest booking flow in versions up to, and including, 5.5.0 This is due to the save_connected_wordpress_user() function propagating a LatePoint customer's email address to its linked WordPress user account via wp_update_user() without any ownership verification, combined with the guest booking flow's ability to overwrite an existing customer's email through phone-based merge without authentication. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the email address of a non-super-admin WordPress user account that is not yet linked to a LatePoint customer, enabling full account takeover by subsequently triggering the standard WordPress password-reset flow to the attacker-controlled address granted the plugin is configured with WordPress user integration enabled, phone-based contact merging, and customer authentication disabled. Administrator accounts on single-site installs are not affected. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-43194Linux kernel · net: consume xmit errors of GSO frames High7.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-43194 CVE-2026-43194 is a high-severity vulnerability in the Linux kernel related to how transmit errors of Generic Segmentation Offload (GSO) frames are handled in the networking stack. The issue causes TCP connections to become stuck due to misinterpretation of transmit return codes when packet loss occurs on veth devices without a queuing discipline (Qdisc). This leads to a deadlock where the sender and receiver disagree on sequence numbers, causing retransmission failures and stalled connections. The problem arises because TCP treats the loss of a single segment as loss of the entire GSO super frame, and the error codes returned by the network device are unreliable in this context. The vulnerability has been fixed in multiple Linux kernel commits. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.3 | EPSS 0.3% | High7.3EPSS 0.3%GCVE Database CVE-2026-23926 is a vulnerability where an authenticated administrator without superuser privileges can inject JavaScript code into a maintenance period tooltip. This malicious script executes when any user views the tooltip in the Host navigator widget, potentially allowing unauthorized actions. The vulnerability has a high severity with a CVSS score of 6.8. No specific affected software versions or patches are provided in the available data. | GCVE Database |
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