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290 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 4.4 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium4.4EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0267 CVE-2026-0267 is an information exposure vulnerability in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect app for macOS. It allows a local user to discover the configured passcodes used to disable, disconnect, or uninstall the app. With knowledge of these passcodes, the user can bypass normal configuration restrictions and perform these actions. The vulnerability affects versions 6.2.0 and 6.3.0 of the GlobalProtect app. The CVSS score is 4.4, indicating a medium severity level. No official patch or remediation guidance has been provided yet by the vendor. There are no known exploits in the wild at this time. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.6 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-50131fedify · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) High8.6EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-50131 Fedify is a TypeScript library for building federated server apps powered by ActivityPub. Fedify previously addressed SSRF/internal network access in GHSA-p9cg-vqcc-grcx by adding public URL validation before runtime document and media fetching. However, the IPv4 validation logic present starting in version 0.11.2 and prior to versions 1.9.12, 1.10.11, 2.0.19, 2.1.15, and 2.2.4 appears incomplete. The `validatePublicUrl()` protection relies on `isValidPublicIPv4Address()` to reject non-public IPv4 destinations. The function blocks common private and local ranges such as `10.0.0.0/8`, `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `172.16.0.0/12`, and `192.168.0.0/16`, but it still treats several special-use, reserved, multicast, benchmarking, and carrier-grade NAT IPv4 ranges as valid public destinations. Because this validation is used as an SSRF defense before outbound fetches, this appears to be an incomplete mitigation or bypass class for the previous SSRF issue. Versions 1.9.12, 1.10.11, 2.0.19, 2.1.15, and 2.2.4 contain an updated patch. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.2 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-45491Microsoft .NET 10.0 runtime · Link Following Medium6.2EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-45491 CVE-2026-45491 is a vulnerability in Microsoft .NET runtime versions 8.0, 9.0, and 10.0 prior to specific fixed releases. It involves improper link resolution before file access, known as 'link following,' which allows a local unauthorized attacker to tamper with files. The issue has been officially fixed in versions 8.0.28, 9.0.17, and 10.0.9. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.1EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-46321 A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's tun driver (CVE-2026-46321) causes a memory leak when handling short frames in the tun_xdp_one() function. The issue arises because the function returns an error without freeing allocated memory, leading to page-fragment leaks. A local attacker with access to /dev/net/tun and /dev/vhost-net can exploit this by sending specially crafted short frames, potentially exhausting host memory and causing an out-of-memory (OOM) panic. This flaw has been fixed in Linux kernel versions 5.15.0-1117.124~20.04.1 and later. EPSS 0.1%Vulnerability | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit BlueTeam This report discusses a browser-based peer-to-peer (P2P) messaging app demo called Enkrypted. Chat, which aims to provide secure and private communication using end-to-end encryption, the Signal protocol, and post-quantum cryptography. The app is local-first, requires no registration or installation, and uses WebRTC with TURN servers for connectivity. It is currently a work in progress and has not undergone formal security audits or reviews. The project is shared for testing and feedback purposes only, and users are cautioned to use it responsibly. No confirmed vulnerabilities or exploits are reported at this time. | Reddit BlueTeam | |||
| Critical | – | CriticalReddit Cybersecurity Cisco has disclosed a critical, unpatched zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2026-20245) in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager that is actively exploited in the wild. The flaw allows local attackers with netadmin privileges to perform command injection attacks, leading to root privilege escalation by uploading crafted files. Exploitation requires valid credentials or prior exploitation of related vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-20182 or CVE-2026-20127). The vulnerability affects all deployment types of the product, including on-premises and cloud-managed versions. Cisco has not yet released a patch for this zero-day but advises monitoring for indicators of compromise and engaging Cisco TAC for incident response support. The vendor has released patches for related vulnerabilities but this specific flaw remains unpatched at this time. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS <0.1% | CVE-2026-21036Samsung Internet · Improper Authorization Medium6.3EPSS <0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-21036 CVE-2026-21036 is an improper authorization vulnerability in Samsung Internet browser versions prior to 30.0.0.39. This flaw allows local attackers to access sensitive information without proper authorization. The vulnerability has a medium severity rating with a CVSS 4.0 score of 6.3. No official patch or remediation guidance has been provided yet by the vendor. There are no known exploits in the wild at this time. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | – | MediumTenable Research On June 2, 2026, the White House signed an Executive Order directing federal agencies to harden their systems with AI-enabled cyber defenses and to stand up a new AI cybersecurity clearinghouse — most of it on a 30-day clock. Here’s what the EO requires and how Tenable can help. Key takeaways: The new AI Security Executive Order will require national security and civilian federal agencies to prioritize cyber defenses to account for new frontier AI model capabilities. Tenable is well positioned to help federal agencies gain visibility across their environments, including AI assets, and to prioritize the vulnerabilities and other exposures that pose the highest risk; Tenable AI-enabled exposure management capabilities can help support vulnerability remediation and automate multi-step remediation workflows. The vulnerability and patching clearinghouse which will be developed under the Executive Order will require strong engagement from private sector partners, including Tenable, to drive actionable insights on AI-associated vulnerabilities and mitigation prioritization. On June 2, 2026, the President signed an Executive Order (EO) titled “ Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security .” The direction is clear and the calls to action are fast-moving. Within 30 days: Federal agencies must begin hardening their information systems with AI-enabled cyber defenses. CISA must issue new directives or guidance for civilian agencies. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury), with the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), must stand up a new AI cybersecurity clearinghouse focused on finding and fixing software vulnerabilities. Within 60 days, Treasury, with the Department of War (DoW), NSA and CISA, in consultation with the White House and other agencies, must establish a classified benchmarking process to assess the capabilities of frontier AI models through voluntary collaboration with AI developers. While the Executive Order applies to U.S. federal agencies, the need to prepare for changes in the threat landscape brought about by the advanced cyber capabilities of frontier AI models applies to any organization that needs to manage cyber risk. Here’s a breakdown of what the AI EO requires, the deadlines that matter, and where Tenable fits. What the AI Executive Order requires The EO’s operative provisions sit in Section 2 (“Upgrading American systems for advanced AI”) and Section 3 (“Secure frontier model deployment”). The cybersecurity core is in Section 2. Within 30 days: National security and defense systems. The Committee on National Security Systems must prioritize the cyber defense of National Security Systems (NSS) and the Secretary of War must do the same for DoW information systems (Section 2(a) and 2(b)). Civilian federal systems and critical infrastructure. CISA, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the National Cyber Director, must release Binding Operational Directives (BODs) “and other guidance as appropriate” to: Expedite and prioritize the cyber defense of civilian federal information systems. Establish or expand federal programs and services that enhance AI-enabled defensive tools. Facilitate access to cybersecurity tools and services, including where appropriate, covered frontier models, for agencies, state and local authorities, and critical infrastructure operators such as rural hospitals, community banks, and local utilities. Worth noting, while the EO directs CISA to release BODs or other guidance for federal civilian agencies, the specific implementation directives are not yet known (Section 2(c)). The AI cybersecurity clearinghouse. The Secretary of the Treasury, with the National Cyber Director, NSA, and CISA, must form an AI cybersecurity clearinghouse, in voluntary collaboration with the AI industry and critical infrastructure operators. The EO tasks the clearinghouse with three concrete functions, per Section 2(d): Coordinate and deconflict scanning for software vulnerabilities Discover and validate those vulnerabilities Coordinate and prioritize the remediation and distribution of vulnerability patches. Grant funding for AI vulnerability detection. OMB, with the National Cyber Director and CISA, must determine whether existing federal grant programs have funding that can be directed toward applicants developing advanced AI vulnerability detection (Section 2(e)). Within 60 days: Cybersecurity workforce. The Office of Personnel Management must expand hiring and placement pathways for cybersecurity specialists through the United States Tech Force (Section 2(f)). Secure frontier model deployment. Treasury, NSA, and CISA, in consultation with NIST and others, must develop a classified benchmarking process to assess the advanced cyber capabilities of AI models. They must also set the threshold for designating a “covered frontier model,” and design a voluntary framework through which developers can give the government up to 30 days of pre-release access to those models. The Executive Order is explicit that it does not create any mandatory licensing, preclearance, or permitting requirement for AI models (Section 3). No fixed deadline: Criminal enforcement. The EO directs the Attorney General to prioritize enforcement against those who use AI to illegally access or damage computer systems (Section 4). For federal cybersecurity leaders, this is less a future-state policy document than a near-term planning trigger. Watch for CISA’s issuance of BODs and other guidance, and for readouts on the clearinghouse, during June and July. How Tenable can help The EO’s center of gravity — finding software vulnerabilities, validating them, prioritizing them, and driving remediation — is the work Tenable's platform is built to do. While the AI Executive Order focuses on vulnerability discovery, validation, prioritization, and remediation, the benefit of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform is that it addresses vulnerabilities alongside other security weaknesses, including misconfigurations of AI systems and overpermissioned AI agents, to serve as the system of action for mitigating cyber exposure and reducing cyber risk across organizations’ expanding attack surfaces. Below, learn how specific Tenable capabilities map to the EO’s requirements. Continuous vulnerability detection across the attack surface Sections 2(a) through 2(d) turn on the ability to find vulnerabilities across a wide range of systems continuously. Tenable One Vulnerability Management and Tenable Security Center provide network-based and agent-based assessment across IT assets, with credentialed scanning for greater depth. Tenable One Cloud Exposure extends that visibility to cloud workloads and configurations, and Tenable One Attack Surface Management maps internet-facing assets that agencies may not know they have. For agencies operating classified or air-gapped environments — relevant to the National Security Systems named in Section 2(a) — Tenable Enclave Security is built to run vulnerability and configuration assessment inside those boundaries. Risk-based prioritization, not “patch everything” Section 2(d) doesn’t only call for discovering vulnerabilities — it calls for prioritizing them for remediation. That distinction matters because no agency can patch everything at once. Tenable’s Vulnerability Priority Rating (VPR) uses machine learning, trained on the company’s corpus of more than 1.7 trillion security findings accumulated over more than 25 years of continuous scanning, to forecast which vulnerabilities are most likely to be exploited, so defenders can focus on the smaller set that represents real, immediate risk. By leveraging AI-generated features and expert intelligence from Tenable's Research Special Operations team, VPR helps organizations pinpoint the critical 1.6% of vulnerabilities that represent actual business risk . Tenable also ingests CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog — the continuously updated, authoritative list of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) under active exploitation — directly into prioritization, aligning remediation guidance to the same source CISA uses to track risk across the federal enterprise. AI-enabled defensive tooling Section 2(c) directs CISA to establish or expand programs that enhance AI-enabled defensive tools. As frontier AI models accelerate the rate at which vulnerabilities can be discovered and exploited , the traditional window for manual remediation is rapidly closing. The June 2026 AI Executive Order recognizes this shift, directing federal agencies to counter machine-speed threats with AI-enabled cyber defenses within 30 days. Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform , is designed to help counter machine-speed threats, supercharge productivity, and accelerate risk reduction by automating multi-step remediation workflows. Security teams can leverage pre-built agents directly in the user interface or build custom agents via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), turning exposure intelligence into decisive action at machine speed. At the same time, as agencies build custom models or adopt third-party tools like ChatGPT and Copilot, they fundamentally expand their attack surface. It is now critical to protect enterprise AI, shadow AI, training data, and underlying infrastructure from emerging threats like adversarial attacks, data poisoning, and model theft. Tenable secures this expanding attack surface with Tenable One AI Exposure , which is designed to help agencies see, manage, and control the risks introduced by generative AI. Tenable One AI Exposure allows agencies to discover and inventory AI tools and libraries, and apply AI usage policies across the environment — a growing requirement as agencies adopt AI and need to account for it as part of | Tenable Research | |||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium6.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-41858 Weak Randomness / Insecure Cryptographic Primitive (CWE-338) in Get-RandomPassword in BOSH-Ecosystem / windows-utilities-release allows a network attacker to estimate VM boot time and reconstruct a small candidate list to recover the Administrator password. The randomize_password job exists solely to lock the local Administrator account behind an unguessable password as a hardening control. Because the password is derived from a predictable, clock-seeded PRNG, a network attacker who can estimate VM boot time can reconstruct a small candidate list and recover the Administrator password, defeating the hardening control. Affected versions: - windows-utilities-release: all versions prior to v0.23.0 (inclusive); fixed in v0.23.0 or later | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-31676linux, linux-aws, linux-aws-6.8, linux-aws-fips, linux-azure, linux-fips, linux-gcp, linux-gcp-6.8, linux-gcp-fips High7.5EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-31676 Multiple security vulnerabilities were discovered in the Linux kernel affecting various subsystems including socket buffer handling, XFRM ESP-in-TCP, RxRPC networking, ptrace, and AppArmor notifications. These flaws include logic errors, race conditions, memory leaks, NULL pointer dereferences, use-after-free, out-of-bounds reads, and improper lock handling. Local attackers could exploit these issues to escalate privileges, cause denial of service conditions such as kernel panics or deadlocks, leak sensitive information, corrupt kernel memory, or potentially escape container environments. The vulnerabilities affect Ubuntu Linux kernel versions 6.8, 6.17, and 7.0, among others. Fixes have been released and are available in updated kernel packages. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-8501 CVE-2026-8501 is a high-severity vulnerability in the Symantec PC Tools Internet Security product. It involves improper access control in the PCTCore64.sys Windows kernel driver, allowing local user-mode processes to access privileged IOCTL handlers via the PCTCoreDriver WDM device interface. This can enable a local attacker with access to the driver to perform sensitive and privileged operations on the affected system. There is no confirmed patch or official remediation available at this time, and no known exploits have been reported in the wild. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (6cb44ff898e25fb999f53e510a71e9552e04f9d095485c3819dce288f32b44ae) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (36b45af60e80d9abdc8d1ce1bd7a54acd6f958ce3c6558ce6b55af06b2538894) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (487b1a50ed4af81c3fdbd1786feb85dd5e2b1b7394dd4b2615c8390090c27b53) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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