Search: soft-update.com
563 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Microsoft released emergency out-of-band updates (KB5121767 and KB5121768) to fix a known issue causing some Dell PCs running Windows 11 25H2, 24H2, and Enterprise LTSC 2024 to unexpectedly shut down, experience poor performance, increased heat, and battery drain. The problem stems from an incompatibility between the Intel Innovation Platform Framework (IPF) Processor Participant driver and the new Windows USB-C Connection Manager interface introduced in the June 2026 preview update KB5095093. Affected devices show a yellow exclamation mark in Device Manager next to the Intel driver. Microsoft initially blocked the July 2026 security update (KB5101650) on affected Dell systems until the fix was ready. The emergency updates include all previous improvements plus the fix and are recommended only for affected devices. Devices managed by Windows Autopatch with hotpatch enabled receive the update automatically, and IT admins can expedite deployment via Microsoft Intune. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.6% | Medium5.3EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-15588 A denial-of-service and resource exhaustion vulnerability exists within the `GDBus` component of GLib. The `gdbusauth` authentication mechanism fails to enforce proper length limitations on data lines read from a client. An unauthenticated local or remote attacker can exploit this lack of input validation by sending excessively long streams of data, causing the application to consume massive amounts of system memory and CPU, potentially leading to a crash or system hang. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | – | CriticalSecurityWeek Microsoft released patches addressing a record 622 vulnerabilities, including two zero-day flaws actively exploited in the wild affecting Active Directory Federation Services and SharePoint Server. Additionally, a BitLocker security bypass vulnerability was publicly disclosed prior to the patch release. The update also includes fixes for critical vulnerabilities in Windows components such as VMSwitch, Exchange Server, Remote Desktop Protocol, DHCP Server, and others. These vulnerabilities span multiple Microsoft products including Windows, Office, Azure, Defender, and SQL Server. | SecurityWeek | |||
| High | – | HighBleeping Computer Microsoft released the Windows 10 KB5099539 extended security update, which includes the July 2026 Patch Tuesday fixes addressing 570 vulnerabilities, including two exploited and one publicly disclosed zero-day. This update is part of the extended security updates (ESU) program for Windows 10, now extended to October 12, 2027, for enrolled devices. It primarily contains security patches and bug fixes without new features, updating Windows 10 to build 19045.7548 and Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2021 to build 19044.7548. Notable fixes include resolving issues in OLE Automation, File Explorer, Recycle Bin, input hotkey behavior, Secure Boot status reporting, networking transport registration, and Remote Desktop security enhancements. Some legacy applications using unregistered TDI transports may stop working due to new security hardening. Microsoft recommends migrating to SHA-256 for RDP certificate thumbprints to avoid future disruptions. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| High | – | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-12151Red Hat Security Advisory: nodejs22 security update HighEPSS 0.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-12151 Node.js is a software development platform for building fast and scalable network applications in the JavaScript programming language. Security Fix(es): * ip-address: ip-address: Cross-site scripting via improper HTML escaping of untrusted input (CVE-2026-42338) * undici: undici: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth via WebSocket frames (CVE-2026-12151) * nodejs: Node.js WebCrypto: Denial of Service via large input to subtle.encrypt() (CVE-2026-48933) * nodejs: Node.js: Information disclosure of proxy credentials via proxy tunnel error handling (CVE-2026-48615) * nodejs: Node.js: Authentication bypass due to TLS hostname handling and unicode dot separator mismatch (CVE-2026-48618) * brace-expansion: Brace-expansion: Denial of Service due to exponential-time complexity (CVE-2026-13149) * tar: Node-tar: Denial of Service via malformed tar archive header (CVE-2026-59874) * tar: node-tar: Denial of Service via crafted gzip bomb (CVE-2026-59873) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.4% | HighEPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-9678 This update includes the following RPMs: rust: * cargo-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (aarch64, x86_64) * clippy-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (aarch64, x86_64) * rust-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (aarch64, x86_64) * rust-analyzer-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (aarch64, x86_64) * rust-debugger-common-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-doc-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (aarch64, x86_64) * rust-gdb-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-lldb-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-src-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-std-static-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (aarch64, x86_64) * rust-std-static-aarch64-unknown-none-softfloat-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-std-static-aarch64-unknown-uefi-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-std-static-i686-pc-windows-gnu-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-std-static-wasm32-unknown-unknown-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-std-static-wasm32-wasip1-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-std-static-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-std-static-x86_64-unknown-none-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rust-std-static-x86_64-unknown-uefi-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (noarch) * rustfmt-1.97.0-1.1.hum1 (aarch64, x86_64) * rust-1.97.0-1.1.hum1.src (src) | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fe0926f0a2c1f47072efaac014be38bb00c8e9f31f59badf188b1ed74dd5c2ce) On require of auth-next-gen, index.js loads lib/writer.js, which at module top level performs an axios GET against a base64-obfuscated URL (https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/GS6NQ, with a second hex-encoded URL https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/HY6M6 staged the same way) and passes the response body to eval(), yielding arbitrary code execution on the installer under attacker control. In parallel, writer.js builds a data object at module top containing the full process.env, os.platform(), os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, and non-internal MAC addresses, staged alongside the fetched payload for exfiltration. The destination URLs and the axios/get/then identifiers are hidden behind base64 (atob) and a hex-decoding helper. The package.json advertises the module as an SSR auth-sync helper and the code, keywords (logger, stream, json), and image assets (pino-banner.png, pino-logo-hire.png) are lifted from the pino logger project, functioning as a lure that is unrelated to the actual payload in writer.js. jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous pastebin-style host with mutable content — the exec'd bytes can change at any time without a package update. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8f52954814f4b0c9537e621a23b42653a6d1e5ec73344441a0a020031ee9983c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f29d6bfc122cb5792d95cfade56e62789f83366b30fc0d58a88a84113d89962c) Package impersonates the pino logger (README is pino documentation, package name is a lookalike). The main export is a middleware factory that spawns lib/caller.js as a detached Node child process. caller.js retrieves JavaScript from hardcoded remote endpoints at https://json.extendsclass.com/bin/863e90480800 and https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3, then evaluates the response body using the Function constructor with require passed in scope, yielding arbitrary code execution in the consumer's environment under the endpoint owner's control. The destination URLs are base64-encoded and stored under a decoy DEV_API_KEY property (e.g., aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1hSR0Yz decodes to the jsonkeeper.com URL) to hide the C2/dead-drop from casual review. Mutable third-party paste services as the code source mean the delivered payload can change at any time without any package update. ## Source: ghsa-malware (1155002b11d7043b2de14581ed13165ffe96a13c73e839c5650c8cace990ded7) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (b976e6ab638a52663d25f360bffec6706dc82991ad27c552788a5a4d785ff89f) The package presents itself as the popular `pino` logger (README badges, file layout mirroring pino's lib/proto.js, lib/redaction.js, lib/transport.js, DEFAULT_LEVELS, and `module.exports.pino = middleware`), but on use it triggers a remote code execution flow. index.js spawns `node./lib/caller.js` in a detached, stdio-ignored child when the exported middleware is invoked. lib/caller.js issues an HTTPS GET against https://jsonkeeper.com/b/QWPQX, reads the `cookie` field of the returned JSON, and passes it to `Function.constructor('require', s)`, invoking the returned function with the real `require` — giving whatever code the paste currently contains full Node capabilities inside the installer's process. The exfil/C2 URLs are further obfuscated as base64-encoded fake `process.env.DEV_API_KEY` / `DEV_SECRET_KEY` / `DEV_SECRET_VALUE` constants in lib/caller.js and lib/const.js that decode to additional jsonkeeper.com paste endpoints (https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3, https://jsonkeeper.com/b/4NAKK) and a custom `x-secret-key` header. jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous, mutable paste host — the executed payload can be swapped by the operator at any time without a package update. Name impersonation of `pino` plus a mutable-paste remote-execute channel plus URL obfuscation is an unambiguous supply-chain attack. ## Source: ghsa-malware (30f271d63c5628cb52ec8178b640bcf8becf253a8f61563940a6c1e419586509) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Microsoft has announced plans to disable Outlook Web Access (OWA) Light, the lightweight version of the Outlook Web App email client, in a future Exchange Server update. [...] | Bleeping Computer | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 8.8% | High7.5EPSS 8.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-29146 Tomcat is the servlet container that is used in the official Reference Implementation for the Java Servlet and JavaServer Pages technologies. The Java Servlet and JavaServer Pages specifications are developed by Sun under the Java Community Process. Tomcat is developed in an open and participatory environment and released under the Apache Software License version 2.0. Tomcat is intended to be a collaboration of the best-of-breed developers from around the world. Security Fix(es): * Apache Tomcat: Apache Tomcat: Information disclosure via Padding Oracle vulnerability in EncryptInterceptor (CVE-2026-29146) * Apache Tomcat: Apache Tomcat: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data due to EncryptInterceptor bypass (CVE-2026-34486) Bug Fix(es) and Enhancement(s): * Remove tomcat clustering JAR from RPM builds (JIRA:RHEL-185571) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.8% | HighEPSS 0.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-28390 Red Hat released a security update for the compat-openssl10 package addressing two vulnerabilities in OpenSSL libraries used for compatibility with older software. The first vulnerability (CVE-2026-28390) is a denial of service caused by a NULL pointer dereference in CMS EnvelopedData processing. The second (CVE-2026-45447) is a heap use-after-free in the PKCS7_verify() function. These issues could cause application crashes or instability when processing certain cryptographic data. The update is rated as important by Red Hat and affects Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.8 variants. No CVSS score is provided, but the impact is considered high. Red Hat has issued patches for these vulnerabilities in version 1.0.2o-4.el8_8.1 of compat-openssl10. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Check Point Research Note: SysAid was not compromised, and no SysAid vulnerability was involved. The attacker had already gained access to the victim environment and abused a legitimate software-deployment feature to deploy malware onto another machine within it. Key Points Check Point Research (CPR) tracks ‘ Cavern Manticore ’ as an Iran-nexus threat actor operating against Israeli targets , with a focus on the government and IT sectors. Cavern Manticore shares technical overlaps with other Iranian MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security)-linked threat actors, including MuddyWater and Lyceum . CPR observed a modular C2 framework in the wild, with all samples built on top of .NET but compiled into different output formats. These components are used as Cavern agent and Cavern modules . The framework’s anti-analysis posture relies on uncommon .NET compilation formats ( Mixed-Mode C++/CLI and Native AOT ) that force reverse engineers into multiple toolsets and metadata-reconstruction workflows, together with per-module AppDomain isolation as an anti-forensics measure. In malware-engine coverage, the majority of observed samples score zero or very low detection rates on VirusTotal. Post-exploitation modules provide the threat actor with extended capabilities , including file system and database browsing, LDAP querying, network reconnaissance, and tunneling. In multiple observed intrusions, the initial foothold was achieved through abuse of existing Remote Monitoring and Management ( RMM ) software deployed in the targeted organization. Introduction Since early 2026, Check Point Research (CPR) has tracked a new modular command-and-control framework used by Cavern Manticore , an Iran-nexus APT group primarily targeting Israeli organizations, with a focus on IT providers, and government sectors. Cavern Manticore is an Iran MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security)-linked actor, with links to the OilRig subgroup named Lyceum . The framework reflects a mature and adaptable toolset built around a shared .NET foundation, while using multiple compilation formats across different components, including .NET Framework , .NET Mixed-Mode C++/CLI , and .NET Native AOT . The compilation format itself becomes the anti-analysis layer that forces reverse engineers into multiple toolsets and metadata-reconstruction workflows. During our investigation, we observed both Cavern agents and Cavern modules in the wild, highlighting a modular architecture that separates core communication capabilities from mission-specific post-exploitation functionality. This design allows the operators to tailor deployments per victim environment, limit what defenders and analysts can recover from any single victim and extend access after compromise through specialized modules for reconnaissance, data access, tunneling, and lateral movement. Figure 1: Cavern Modules Evade Malware Engines. Technical Analysis: Cavern – A Modular .NET C2 Framework 1. Cavern at a Glance Cavern is a modular post-exploitation C2 framework built entirely on .NET, but deliberately compiled into three different binary formats: .NET Framework ( IL-only ), Mixed-Mode C++/CLI ( IL + Native ), and .NET 8 NativeAOT ( Native-only ). The recovered execution chain begins with SysAid’s software update feature, which the actor leverages to deploy a WinDirStat DLL sideloading package to C:\ProgramData\WinDir\WinDirStat.exe . The legitimate WinDirStat.exe binary loads the trojanized uxtheme.dll , which is the Cavern Agent , and the agent in turn loads a dedicated native communication module n-HTCommp.dll to reach the C2 and then pulls down additional post-exploitation modules on operator command. Figure 2: Cavern Agent Execution Chain. The table below provides an overview of the modules. Component Internal Name Format Role Cavern Agent uxtheme.dll Mixed-Mode C++/CLI (.NET 4.7.2, IL + Native) Core backdoor, module orchestrator Communication Module n-HTCommp.dll NativeAOT (.NET 8, Native-only) HTTPS/WebSocket transport, XOR… | Check Point Research | |||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.3% | High7.1EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-52719 A security update for gstreamer-plugins-bad addresses an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the JPEG segment length validation within the VA decoder component of gstreamer1-plugins-bad-free. This vulnerability is identified as CVE-2026-52719 and affects multiple specific versions of the software. The issue could lead to memory safety problems. The severity of this vulnerability is rated as high. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.0 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-41254SUSE · Security update for lcms2 Medium4.0EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-41254 This security update for lcms2 addresses two integer overflow vulnerabilities identified as CVE-2026-41254 and CVE-2026-42798. Both vulnerabilities occur in different components of the software: CubeSize in cmslut.c and ParseCube in cmscgats.c. These issues could potentially lead to unexpected behavior or crashes. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | MediumTenable Research CISA’s BOD 26-04 changes how federal agencies patch and how security leaders must measure, justify, and communicate cyber risk to executives and boards. Key takeaways BOD 26-04 requires agencies to make and defend risk-based vulnerability prioritization decisions, including decisions to defer vulnerability remediation. This accountability requirement transforms vulnerability management from a technical operation into a governance discipline that demands audit-ready documentation. Traditional vulnerability management KPIs (total vulnerabilities patched, mean time to patch, percentage of systems scanned) do not measure what BOD 26-04 demands. The metrics that matter are coverage breadth and risk-tier remediation rates. Tenable’s analysis of customer telemetry shows that monitoring coverage breadth is a stronger predictor of risk posture than patch speed, a finding independently corroborated by research showing organizations can remediate only about 10% of open vulnerabilities per month regardless of size or maturity. The directive’s reach extends beyond federal agencies to thousands of federal contractors who must align with BOD 26-04 through contract compliance requirements. Organizations in the federal supply chain should treat the directive as an operational requirement, not advisory guidance. The shift from patching metrics to risk exposure metrics is not a federal-only phenomenon. Industry reporting standards, insurance underwriting models, and board-level accountability expectations are converging on the same demand: prove that you are reducing actual risk, not just closing tickets. The reporting mandate hiding inside CISA Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04 Most coverage of CISA BOD 26-04 has focused on the operational requirements: the four-variable model, the 16-tier remediation matrix, the three-day BOD 26-04 patching timeline with mandatory forensic triage. These are significant, and Tenable has covered them in depth in our FAQ on BOD 26-04 . But buried in the directive’s requirements is a less-discussed obligation that may prove equally transformative: agencies must demonstrate how they prioritize vulnerabilities and justify their decisions, particularly in cases where they decide to defer remediation. Metrics are expected to evolve from simple counts of patched vulnerabilities to measures that reflect reduction in high-risk exposure. This is not a minor procedural update. It is a fundamental shift in how cybersecurity programs are measured, reported, and held accountable. For CISOs and security leaders, BOD 26-04 doesn’t just change the patching workflow. While the BOD 26-04 directive formally targets federal agencies, its framework is rapidly becoming the blueprint for the private sector as market forces align around risk-based accountability. Ultimately, it changes what corporate boards of directors need to hear. Why traditional vulnerability management metrics fail under BOD 26-04 For years, security leaders have measured vulnerability management programs by volume: Total vulnerabilities identified Total patches applied Percentage of systems scanned within a 30-day window Mean time to remediate. These metrics are easy to collect, easy to report, and easy to trend over time, but they are also increasingly disconnected from actual risk. Tenable’s own analysis of customer telemetry across our global customer base confirms what many security leaders suspect but cannot prove: breadth of monitoring coverage is a more robust, predictive risk signal than patch velocity. Unmonitored assets exist as a permanently open attack surface; they cannot generate findings, be prioritized, or be verified as remediated. Conversely, monitored assets still pass through the risk pipeline even if remediation isn’t operating at maximum speed. Independent industry research heavily corroborates the need to shift reporting from patching speed to monitoring coverage: The remediation ceiling - The Cyentia Institute’s Prioritization to Prediction research (analyzing 3.6 billion vulnerability observations) found that the typical organization can only remediate roughly 10% of open vulnerabilities per month, regardless of size, industry, or maturity. Because you cannot out-patch the growth rate of your backlog, prioritization, not speed, is the only lever that meaningfully reduces risk. The MTTR flaw - Standard mean-time-to-remediate (MTTR) calculations exclude open, unremediated vulnerabilities, which skews your metrics toward items that are easier to close quickly, which may not be the most critical, severe, or highest-risk issues. Asset composition skew - Remediation half-lives vary wildly across asset types, averaging 36 days for Microsoft Windows systems versus 369 days for network appliances. A strong MTTR often just means you have good visibility into automatically patching Windows assets, but this KPI may hide persistent exposure on edge devices and OT systems. BOD 26-04 makes this explicit: remediation priority is determined by the risk posed by a vulnerability if exploited, not by the total number of vulnerabilities identified. The directive’s deferral tier (fix on system upgrade) formalizes what the data has always shown: most vulnerabilities can wait. The ones that cannot are defined by exploitation evidence, exposure, automation potential, and impact severity. A CISO who reports, “We patched 95% of critical CVEs this quarter,” is reporting a metric that BOD 26-04 has rendered insufficient. The relevant question is: Of the vulnerabilities that posed real-world risk to mission-critical systems, what percentage did we remediate within the directive’s timeline, and how much of our attack surface was under observation when we made that assessment? The new security metrics: What BOD 26-04 demands The shift from volume-based to risk-based reporting requires new KPIs. Organizations implementing BOD 26-04 should consider metrics that reflect the directive’s four-variable prioritization model: Remediation compliance by BOD tier. What percentage of vulnerabilities in each BOD tier (three-day forensic triage, three-day, 14-day, 60-day, system upgrade) are remediated within the applicable timeline? This is the core compliance metric. It replaces “mean time to remediate” with a risk-weighted measurement that distinguishes between a 3-day critical and a deferrable low-risk finding. Coverage of actively exploited vulnerabilities. What percentage of KEV -listed vulnerabilities in the environment are remediated? This measures the response to the most dangerous known threats, not the total vulnerability population. Exposure surface reduction over time. What is the trend in assets classified as publicly exposed (BOD Variable 1)? Reducing the number of internet-facing assets directly shifts vulnerabilities from compressed timelines to the deferral tier. Tenable’s analysis of the full CISA Vulnrichment corpus found that removing an asset from public exposure can shift 76.7% of its associated CVEs to longer remediation windows. This makes exposure reduction the single highest-leverage compliance investment. Additional independent research reinforces why assessment coverage is a better indicator of risk outcomes than patch velocity. Joint analysis from XM Cyber and the Cyentia Institute, examining more than 60 million exposures across 10 million entities, found that 75% of security exposures do not put critical assets at risk: they are dead ends in the attack graph. Only 2% of exposures sit on “choke points,” the convergence nodes through which multiple attack paths transit en route to critical assets. This corroborates Tenable’s telemetry finding from a different angle: if your monitoring does not cover the entities where those choke points exist, your remediation speed on the other 98% is noise in the risk signal. The metric that matters is not how fast you patch, but whether your visibility extends to the places where attack paths converge. Forensic triage completion rate. For vulnerabilities in the highest-risk tier (KEV + total control), what percentage received the required BOD 26-04 forensic triage guidelines within the three-day window? This measures compliance with the directive’s most novel and operationally demanding requirement. Deferral justification documentation rate. For vulnerabilities placed in the “fix on system upgrade” tier, what percentage have documented risk acceptance decisions? BOD 26-04 requires agencies to justify deferral decisions, which means every deferred vulnerability needs an auditable rationale. Mean time from KEV addition to remediation. How quickly does the organization respond when a CVE is added to the KEV catalog and its BOD timeline compresses? This measures the speed of the organization’s response to dynamic timeline changes. These metrics share a common characteristic: they measure risk reduction outcomes, not activity volume. A security program that patches fewer total vulnerabilities but remediates 100% of the 3-day tier within three days is performing better under BOD 26-04 than one that patches twice as many total CVEs but misses the critical timelines. The accountability requirement: Justifying decisions to defer vulnerability remediation BOD 26-04 introduces something federal vulnerability management has never had: a formal requirement to justify prioritization decisions. When an agency defers remediating a vulnerability to the next system upgrade cycle, that decision must be documented and defensible. This creates an audit trail requirement. For every deferred vulnerability, the organization needs to demonstrate: Which of the four variables were assessed What combination placed the vulnerability in the deferral tier Why the agency is confident the deferral does not create unacceptable risk If any of the four variables change (a CVE added to the KEV, an asset newly exposed to the internet), the deferral decision must be reassessed. For CISOs, this means the vulnerability management pro | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Microsoft has introduced a new Teams admin policy that enables meeting organizers to prevent third-party bots from joining meetings without explicit approval. This policy automatically detects potential bots, places them in the meeting lobby, and requires organizer confirmation before admission. The feature enhances control and visibility over external bots, helping to block malicious or unauthorized automated participants in Teams meetings. Additional planned controls include allow lists for approved bots, blocking external bots entirely, and audit logging. This update aims to reduce risks from malicious bots and improve meeting security in Microsoft Teams. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.5EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-42501 CVE-2026-42501 is a vulnerability in the Go command (cmd/go) used in Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs. It allows a malicious module proxy to bypass checksum validation, potentially leading to execution of untrusted Go toolchains if a user interacts with a compromised proxy. Red Hat has released updated golang-fips1.25 RPMs to address this issue. Users are advised to revalidate module dependencies by regenerating the go.sum file to mitigate risk. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-40169SUSE · Security update for ImageMagick HighEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-40169 A security update for ImageMagick addresses multiple vulnerabilities including buffer overflows, information disclosure, denial of service, heap use-after-free, and memory leaks across various image processing components. These issues affect the handling of different image formats and server processes. The update also fixes a non-security issue related to softlinks. No specific affected versions are provided in the data. | GCVE Database |
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