A sophisticated campaign targets cryptocurrency users by distributing fake wallet update ZIP files containing malicious BAT scripts. These files impersonate updates for hardware wallets like Coldcard, Ledger, and others. The attack installs ConnectWise ScreenConnect remote access software, enabling attackers to control compromised devices remotely. This access allows execution of commands, data theft including cryptocurrency credentials and private keys, and potential financial loss. Users are advised to isolate infected devices, block malicious infrastructure, remove ScreenConnect, reset credentials from clean devices, and migrate assets to new wallets.
In FRRouting, bgpd frees the sub-TLV chain of a Tunnel Encapsulation attribute (type 23) while routes stored by bgpd still point to it, if the attribute is received from a neighbor that has "soft-reconfiguration inbound" configured. A cache added to speed up attribute interning while processing the prefixes of an UPDATE checks whether an interned attribute set may be reused by comparing the parsed attributes with themselves, so the check always succeeds. Interning the parsed attributes for the Adj-RIB-In removes the Tunnel Encapsulation sub-TLVs from them, and the copy that bgpd then interns for the route reuses the cached attribute set, which still holds the sub-TLVs, without taking a reference on them. When the route is later replaced, withdrawn or cleared, for example when the session goes down, the sub-TLV chain is freed while still in use, and bgpd then reads it, decrements a reference count inside it and frees it a second time. In the reporter's build without AddressSanitizer this ended in an assertion failure in bgpd's memory accounting, aborting bgpd and dropping all BGP sessions on the router, and the neighbor can repeat it each time bgpd restarts. Because freed heap memory is written to and freed again, consequences beyond a crash cannot be ruled out. An established BGP session is required, and the attribute does not need to be malformed. bgpd processes attribute 23 from every neighbor, including eBGP neighbors, unless it is explicitly discarded, although RFC 9012 requires it to be filtered on eBGP sessions by default. Neighbors without "soft-reconfiguration inbound" are not affected.
CVE-2026-118791 is a vulnerability in CompuGroup Medical's Wingesfar application where the software update mechanism lacks proper authenticity and integrity checks. This flaw allows update packages to be accepted without sufficient cryptographic verification, potentially enabling malicious code to be installed. The issue affects versions prior to 10.2.1, which includes all versions from 0 up to but not including 10.2.1. A fix is available in version 10.2.1. The vulnerability has a high severity rating with a CVSS score of 7.2.
Between April and July 2026, AOMEI Backupper, a Windows backup and disk cloning software, was compromised multiple times in short-lived supply chain attack windows. During these brief periods, users received a downloader for the ShinyRoad modular backdoor framework. The attacker, tracked as UNC7017, tampered with update server configurations to redirect users to malicious payloads, including the CrossRoad dropper, a modified Radmin Server with a malicious DLL, and the Adaptix C2 framework. The campaign used ephemeral tampering windows lasting only five to ten minutes, reverting quickly to authentic versions, which complicated detection. The attack affected a broad range of users opportunistically, with some higher education, IT services, and telecommunications organizations in multiple countries identified as compromised. AOMEI initially dismissed reports of tampering but later took corrective actions after repeated notifications.
This vulnerability relates to an incorrect RCU (Read-Copy-Update) teardown order in the drm/i915 component. The issue affects Microsoft products with versions 3.0 and 4.0. No CVSS score or detailed impact information is provided, and there is no indication of active exploitation in the wild.
Between April and July 2026, attackers compromised AOMEI's update servers to distribute malware via brief modifications to configuration files used by AOMEI Backupper's built-in promotional and notification features. The attackers altered two configuration files to redirect software updates to malicious payloads, delivering a downloader named CROSSROAD and a backdoor called SHINYROAD. These changes were short-lived, lasting only minutes, making detection difficult. The malware established persistence and enabled remote control of infected systems. Additionally, a technique to steal Windows authentication hashes was observed during one attack window. Affected organizations spanned multiple countries and sectors. AOMEI has since upgraded its servers, patched vulnerabilities, and taken corrective actions, though details on the initial breach vector remain undisclosed.
Between April and July 2026, attackers compromised the update and notification infrastructure of AOMEI Technology to distribute malware to users of AOMEI Backupper, a widely used backup software. The attackers hijacked the update servers during three brief windows, modifying download instructions to deliver a malicious ZIP archive containing a downloader that installed a persistent remote-access backdoor. This backdoor allows attackers to execute commands and install additional malware, increasing the risk of further system compromise. The compromised infrastructure also serves AnyViewer customers. Detection was difficult due to the short tampering periods. Users can check for infection by scanning with security software, inspecting Task Scheduler for specific tasks, searching for unsigned upgrade-now.exe files, or monitoring suspicious network traffic to certain domains.
Microsoft will block .msix and .msixbundle file attachments in Outlook Web and the new Outlook Windows client starting in November 2026. These file types, used for modern Windows installation packages, will be added to the default blocked attachments list in Exchange Online's OWA Mailbox policies. After the update, users will be unable to send, receive, open, or download these attachments by default. Administrators can whitelist these file types if necessary. This change is part of Microsoft's ongoing efforts to enhance security by blocking potentially unsafe file attachments that have been abused in attacks.
In July 2026, phishing campaigns targeted organizations across multiple industries by distributing a masqueraded MSP360 Remote Monitoring and Management installer through meeting invitations, PDF-themed lures, and software update prompts. Once executed, the legitimate MSP360 installer established remote management access on affected devices, providing threat actors with an initial foothold using trusted administrative software. The MSP360 deployment was then used to download and install a ConnectWise ScreenConnect client, creating a secondary remote-access channel for redundant access to compromised systems. Following access establishment, threat actors deployed additional tools and conducted post-compromise activity, including information collection and credential-access operations. The campaigns utilized multiple delivery mechanisms including actor-controlled domains, compromised websites, and legitimate cloud services such as Amazon S3, Cloudflare R2, Dropbox, GitLab, and Supabase.
Two sophisticated phishing campaigns employed browser-in-the-browser (BiTB) techniques to deceive victims into installing rogue ScreenConnect remote management tools. Attackers sent phishing messages with malicious links redirecting targets to fake Adobe Reader update pages. The BiTB technique created convincing fake browser windows within webpages, displaying legitimate-looking Adobe URLs to bypass user awareness training. Victims were tricked into downloading ScreenConnect installers disguised as Adobe software updates. Each incident resulted in deployment of multiple rogue ScreenConnect instances for redundant persistence, followed by execution of defense-evasion binaries (HideCursor.exe and HideUL.exe) designed to hide attacker activities. The attacks established service-based persistence through Windows services, enabling continued remote access. Both campaigns were intercepted before further damage occurred, demonstrating how threat actors combine social engineering throughout the entire attack chain...
An active malware campaign utilizes fraudulent software-download websites impersonating trusted vendors to distribute malicious installers. The operation primarily targets China-based operations of multinational organizations and Chinese-speaking users across healthcare, manufacturing, gaming, technology, logistics, government, and education sectors. The malicious installers deploy malware capable of establishing persistence, disabling Windows Update services, configuring Microsoft Defender exclusions, deleting volume shadow copies, and establishing command-and-control communications. Microsoft attributes this activity with moderate confidence to the Chinese threat cluster Silver Fox, known for using spoofed vendor download pages to distribute remote access trojans. The campaign leverages high-fidelity clones of legitimate vendor websites hosted on Chinese domains, delivering server-side generated payloads through ZIP archives.
A malware campaign uses counterfeit software-download websites impersonating trusted vendors to distribute malicious installers. The activity primarily targets China-based operations of multinational organizations and Chinese-speaking users across healthcare, manufacturing, gaming, technology, logistics, government, and education sectors. Malicious installers deploy payloads that establish persistence, disable security protections, and communicate with attacker-controlled infrastructure. The campaign employs dynamically generated installers with rotating hashes, spoofed vendor pages on .com.cn and .hl.cn domains, and randomized payload staging paths. Follow-on activity includes disabling Windows Defender, deleting shadow copies, neutralizing Windows Update, creating scheduled tasks for persistence, and establishing command-and-control over non-standard ports. Microsoft assesses this activity aligns with publicly reported Silver Fox operations but has not attributed it to a nation-state actor.
Researchers at Kaspersky have identified the first malware specifically designed to target car head units, linking it to the BadBox botnet. The malware was found on an Android-based aftermarket infotainment system from the Chinese company DoFun, widely used in China and other APAC countries. Attackers exploited a vulnerability in the system's software update mechanism to deliver malicious Android applications that act as droppers, loaders, clickers, and reverse-proxy loaders. The malware supports multiple commands, primarily used to download a reverse proxy module, indicating its main purpose is to incorporate infected devices into a proxy botnet. The vendor has addressed the vulnerability after notification. The BadBox botnet has been active since at least 2023, primarily targeting Android devices such as TV boxes, and has grown to include millions of devices. This development shows an expansion of BadBox operators' delivery methods and targets to vehicle infotainment systems.
CVE-2026-76365 is a SQL injection vulnerability in Splunk SOAR versions prior to 8.6.0. A user with the Automation Engineer role can execute arbitrary SQL commands against the Splunk SOAR database via custom list retrieval in playbooks. This allows unauthorized create, read, update, and delete operations on database data. The vulnerability arises because the software improperly constructs SQL queries using externally supplied list names without proper parameterization.
A sophisticated backdoor disguised as a legitimate Malwarebytes installer was distributed to over 100,000 machines through compromised automatic updates of one torrent client (Download Studio) and three adblockers (NetShield Kit, My AdBlock, and Net AdBlock). The backdoor creates a fake Malwarebytes installation directory containing legitimate signed files alongside malicious DLL files. Once executed, it establishes persistence through a Windows service and communicates with command-and-control servers to receive configuration updates and additional payloads. The primary observed payloads were cryptocurrency miners, though the infrastructure supports delivery of multiple persistent threats. The attack demonstrates abuse of software update mechanisms and affects primarily users in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.
The npm package 'dev-env-check' version 1.0.3 contains malicious code that executes during installation on Windows systems. It uses a postinstall hook to run a PowerShell command that downloads and executes a file named msedge_update.exe from a suspicious external URL, impersonating a Microsoft Edge update. The malicious behavior is obfuscated using XOR encoding with misleading comments. The package falsely advertises itself as a development environment validator but performs unauthorized remote code execution.
A sophisticated phishing campaign has been identified where attackers impersonate employees of a US company, sending emails that claim to contain transaction receipts. Recipients are urged to verify fund deposits by opening an attached PDF file. The malicious PDF displays a fake Adobe Flash Player update prompt, which when clicked, downloads a VBS script. This script executes with administrator privileges, displays a decoy payment receipt document, and silently installs ScreenConnect remote management software via an MSI package. The installation establishes persistent remote access to the compromised system, enabling attackers to execute commands, transfer files, and deploy additional payloads using legitimate administrative tools in a Living-off-the-Land attack technique.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (03873a12af48745e3fd5173ce736267aebd3290be427275073562b8e1ada61fc)
On import of kit-map-vim, dist/index.mjs unconditionally spawns dist/internal/calc-math.dat as a detached child process after a SHA-256 self-check. The.dat file is a Linux x86_64 ELF RedShell remote-access implant disguised as a 'native math accelerator'. The implant beacons to hardcoded C2 host 217.60.77.63 over plain HTTP and exposes command handlers that download and execute additional ELF binaries and shellcode from http://217.60.77.63/Others/* and /SC/* endpoints, including in-memory execution via memfd_create/fexecve to avoid touching disk. It installs a masquerading systemd user unit 'svc-update.service' (Description=System Update Service, Restart=always) for persistence, provides SOCKS5 proxy and TCP port-forwarding, and offers built-in commands to enumerate users/env/processes/network configuration, harvest SSH keys and credentials from ~/.ssh and credential stores, and stream arbitrary filesystem paths to the operator via a chunked 'POST /api/extract-receive' handler labeled with a 'Loot_*' destination. The package's stated day-math purpose has no need for a native binary; the ELF's exposed command set (RedShell) is unrelated to any math functionality.
## Source: ghsa-malware (4eb4b412fdc46f4d5569e4b581cf64a9e1bed94cc7cd8fcd91613b98f73ac20f)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (dc1b76be1956e2772f73d7712934ee4a296d4407df590f6ca4225db7310de916)
The package advertises itself as a dependency-free calendar/streak math library but ships a Linux x86_64 ELF at dist/internal/calc-math.dat. The main entry's top-level IIFE chmods 0755 and spawns this binary detached on any require()/import, under cover text 'Native accelerator loaded'. The ELF is a remote-controlled shell beaconing to hardcoded C2 217.60.77.63: it accepts remote commands and pipes them to /bin/sh and /bin/bash (arbitrary RCE on the installer's host), fetches second-stage ELF/shellcode over plain HTTP from http://217.60.77.63/Others/ and http://217.60.77.63/SC/ into /tmp or a memfd for chmod+exec, installs a systemd user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/svc-update.service (Description='System Update Service', ExecStart=/proc/self/exe, enabled via systemctl --user) for reboot-surviving persistence, and streams collected files (SSH keys, credentials, database finds, clipboard, downloads) to http://217.60.77.63/api/extract-receive as chunked POSTs tagged Loot_<host>_<date>. Behavior fires on import, requires no user interaction beyond installing the package, and grants the operator full interactive shell, dropper, persistence, and bulk file exfiltration on any host that installs or transitively depends on this package.
## Source: ghsa-malware (f1234e3b7168d42083f0164bd35e94c2bde548891b63b0f33b2dbd53b65e40aa)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: fix stale skb->sk reference on subflow close The backlog list is updated by mptcp_data_ready() under mptcp_data_lock(). The cleanup of backlog references to a closing subflow, however, was performed in mptcp_close_ssk(), before __mptcp_close_ssk() acquires the ssk lock, and while holding neither the ssk lock nor mptcp_data_lock(). Because that traversal ran without mptcp_data_lock(), concurrent softirq RX processing on another CPU (subflow_data_ready() -> mptcp_data_ready() -> __mptcp_add_backlog(), under mptcp_data_lock()) could add a backlog entry referencing the ssk while the cleanup loop was in progress. Such an entry could be missed by the cleanup, or the concurrent list update could corrupt the traversal, leaving skb->sk pointing at the ssk after it is freed. A later mptcp_backlog_purge() then dereferences the stale pointer, triggering a warning in inet_sock_destruct() (ssk->sk_rmem_alloc != 0) followed by a use-after-free in mptcp_backlog_purge(). Fix this by moving the backlog cleanup into __mptcp_close_ssk(), after subflow->closing is set to 1 and while the ssk lock is still held, serialized under mptcp_data_lock(). The cleanup runs only on the push path (MPTCP_CF_PUSH), where backlog references accumulate; on other teardown paths the caller already handles cleanup. With subflow->closing set and mptcp_data_lock() held across the purge, any concurrent mptcp_data_ready() either completes its enqueue before the purge runs and is caught, or observes closing=1 and bails out. Once mptcp_data_unlock() is reached, no new skb referencing the ssk can be enqueued, so the cleanup is exhaustive. Remove the unprotected traversal from mptcp_close_ssk() entirely.