Search: docker.service.ts
94 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 10.0 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-44181jupyter-server enterprise_gateway · Template Injection Critical10.0EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-44181 Jupyter Enterprise Gateway launches remote Jupyter Notebook kernels across distributed clusters like Apache Spark, Kubernetes, and Docker Swarm. In versions 2.0.0rc2 and above, prior to 3.3.0, the environment variables (KERNEL_XXX) used during the rendering of the Kubernetes manifest are vulnerable to Server Side Template Injection (SSTI). By including Jinja2 template expressions it is possible to execution Python code and OS Commands in the Enterprise Gateway service. The code can use or steal the Kubernetes service account token, which can steal Kubernetes secrets and be used to fully compromise the Kubernetes cluster by scheduling a privileged pod or a pod with a hostPath volume mount. This issue has been fixed in version 3.3.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | High7.5EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-49476 ### Summary The CSS selector parser in soupsieve (the CSS selector engine for Beautiful Soup 4) allocates unbounded memory when compiling large comma-separated selector lists. An attacker who can supply a crafted CSS selector string to `soupsieve.compile()` or Beautiful Soup's `.select()` / `.select_one()` can cause the application to allocate hundreds of megabytes of heap memory from a relatively small input, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. To be completely transparent, AI tools helped surface this issue. However, it was independently reproduced and carefully validated. Researchers follow responsible disclosure practices and originally shared this report privately. A **500 KB** selector string triggers allocation of approximately **244 MB** of heap memory - a 488x— amplification ratio**. ### Details **Affected code:** `soupsieve/css_parser.py`, lines ~204, 925, 1106 The soupsieve CSS parser splits comma-separated selector lists and creates one `CSSSelector` object per list item. Each `CSSSelector` object contains parsed selector data structures including `SelectorList`, `Selector`, and associated tag/attribute/pseudo-class metadata. When a selector string such as `a,a,a,...` (with 250,000 comma-separated items) is passed to `sv.compile()`, the parser: 1. Tokenises the entire string and identifies each comma-delimited segment (line ~1106) 2. Parses each segment into a full `Selector` object with all associated metadata (line ~925) 3. Stores all parsed selectors in a `SelectorList` (line ~204) **Root cause:** No limit is enforced on the number of selectors in a comma-separated list. The parser will attempt to parse and store an arbitrary number of selectors, with each selector object consuming approximately **976 bytes** of heap memory. The total allocation scales linearly with the number of list items, but the amplification ratio (output memory / input bytes) is extremely high because each single-character selector like `a` expands into a complex object graph. **Attack surface:** Any application that passes user-supplied CSS selectors to `soupsieve.compile()` or Beautiful Soup's `.select()` / `.select_one()`. ### Proof of Concept ```python import tracemalloc import soupsieve as sv tracemalloc.start() # Build a 500 KB selector string: "a,a,a,...,a" (250,000 items) count = 250_000 selector = ",".join("a" for _ in range(count)) print(f"Selector string size: {len(selector):,} bytes ({len(selector) / 1024:.0f} KB)") # Compile the selector — this allocates ~244 MB compiled = sv.compile(selector) current, peak = tracemalloc.get_traced_memory() tracemalloc.stop() print(f"Compiled selector count: {len(compiled.selectors):,}") print(f"Current memory: {current / 1024 / 1024:.1f} MB") print(f"Peak memory: {peak / 1024 / 1024:.1f} MB") print(f"Amplification ratio: {peak / len(selector):.0f}x") # Expected output: # Selector string size: 499,999 bytes (488 KB) # Compiled selector count: 250,000 # Current memory: ~244 MB # Peak memory: ~244 MB # Amplification ratio: ~488x ``` ### Impact **Severity: High** An attacker can exhaust available memory on any server-side Python application that compiles user-supplied CSS selectors via soupsieve. This can cause: - **OOM kills** in containerised deployments (Kubernetes pods, Docker containers) with memory limits - **Swap thrashing** on bare-metal servers, degrading performance for all co-located processes - **Process termination** via Python's `MemoryError` exception if the system runs out of addressable memory | Parameter | Value | |---|---| | Input size | ~500 KB selector string | | Memory allocated | ~244 MB | | Amplification ratio | ~488× | | Per-object overhead | ~976 bytes per selector | | Authentication required | None | | User interaction required | None | **Scalability of attack:** The memory allocation scales linearly - doubling the selector count doubles memory usage. An attacker can tune the payload to exactly exhaust a target's memory limits. Multiple concurrent requests multiply the effect. **Downstream exposure:** soupsieve is an automatic dependency of `beautifulsoup4`, one of the most widely installed Python packages. Any web application accepting CSS selectors from users (e.g., web scraping APIs, content filtering tools, CMS preview features) is potentially affected. --- ### Credit Discovered by a security research team from the University of Sydney, focused on detecting open source software vulnerabilities. Liyi Zhou: https://lzhou1110.github.io/ Ziyue Wang: https://zyy0530.github.io/ Strick: https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/ Maurice: https://maurice.busystar.org/ Chenchen Yu: https://7thparkk.github.io/ | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-56260Crawl4AI · Path Traversal High8.8EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-56260 Crawl4AI versions before 0.8.7 have a path traversal vulnerability in the Docker API server's /screenshot and /pdf endpoints. The vulnerability allows arbitrary file writes via the output_path parameter, which lacks proper validation. An attacker can supply absolute or path-traversal paths to overwrite files accessible by the application's user, potentially causing denial of service. EPSS 0.6%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-39832Red Hat Security Advisory: buildah security update Critical9.1EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-39832 The buildah package provides a tool for facilitating building OCI container images. Among other things, buildah enables you to: Create a working container, either from scratch or using an image as a starting point; Create an image, either from a working container or using the instructions in a Dockerfile; Build both Docker and OCI images. Security Fix(es): * golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: golang: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Denial of Service via crafted SSH certificate (CVE-2026-39835) * golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent: Security bypass due to improper handling of key restrictions (CVE-2026-39832) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package `antsrcsrctest` masquerades as a "simple date formatting utility" (`index.js` exports a harmless `formatDate()` function that is never referenced by the malicious code) but is a credential-harvesting and cloud-metadata-stealing reconnaissance tool. It declares a `preinstall: node preinstall.js` hook, so the payload executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported or used. `preinstall.js` collects `os.hostname()`, `os.platform()`, `process.cwd()`, and the victim's entire `process.env` (all environment variables, frequently containing API keys, tokens and secrets); fingerprints container context by checking for `/.dockerenv` and reading `/proc/1/cgroup` and `/proc/self/mountinfo`; runs local reconnaissance commands via `child_process.execSync` (`id`, `whoami`, `hostname`, `ps aux`); and performs SSRF against the Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun) instance metadata service at `http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/`, specifically probing `/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/` in an attempt to steal cloud IAM role credentials. All of the above (including the full environment variable dump) is exfiltrated via two plaintext HTTP POST requests (to `/` and `/env`) to a hardcoded C2 endpoint `http://101.35.44.248` (raw IP, port 80, no TLS) using Node's built-in `http` module. All errors are silently swallowed so the attack is invisible to the installer. The package was published by npm user `xingzhigege` (`xingzhi@foxmail.com`). Analysis performed via static review only (npm registry metadata and package source retrieved as text via the npm registry and unpkg CDN) — the package was not installed or executed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (80da6b239fe02ae1bbf7086d885062181d9ea048490ad77911a63ae4c393cc42) On `npm install`, the declared preinstall script (preinstall.js) POSTs the installer's full `process.env`, `os.hostname()`, `os.platform()`, cwd, container-detection artifacts (`/.dockerenv`, `/proc/1/cgroup`, `/proc/self/mountinfo`), and the output of shell reconnaissance commands (`id`, `whoami`, `hostname`, `ps aux`) to `http://101.35.44.248` over plain HTTP. The script additionally issues `curl` requests to the Alibaba Cloud instance metadata service at `100.100.100.200`, including the `latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/` path that returns temporary IAM credentials for the instance role, and forwards the response to the same attacker endpoint. The package advertises itself as "a simple date formatting utility" and index.js contains only a 7-line date formatter, confirming a decoy cover story for install-time credential theft and environment exfiltration. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (f7c7439acf2736b50448bcb0f682babcb4ad09d0f316acb5ec5442130f3ee3f2) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'antsrcsrctest' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-39829Red Hat Security Advisory: buildah security update High7.5EPSS 0.5%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-39829 The buildah package provides a tool for facilitating building OCI container images. Among other things, buildah enables you to: Create a working container, either from scratch or using an image as a starting point; Create an image, either from a working container or using the instructions in a Dockerfile; Build both Docker and OCI images. Security Fix(es): * golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: golang: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Denial of Service via crafted SSH certificate (CVE-2026-39835) * golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Denial of Service via crafted public key with excessive parameters (CVE-2026-39829) * golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Denial of Service via resource leak from unsolicited SSH responses (CVE-2026-39830) * golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent: Security bypass due to improper handling of key restrictions (CVE-2026-39832) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | – | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2025-0495SUSE · Security update for docker-compose HighEPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-0495 This security update for SUSE's docker-compose package addresses multiple vulnerabilities including credential leakage to telemetry endpoints, denial of service during SSH key exchange, an infinite loop in HTTP/2 transport, and a validation bypass that could allow privilege escalation. The affected versions are specific SUSE docker-compose packages on aarch64 and ppc64le architectures. The update fixes CVE-2025-0495, CVE-2025-22869, CVE-2026-33814, and CVE-2026-39821. These issues have been classified as high severity. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 2.8% | CVE-2026-34599coollabsio coolify · OS Command Injection High8.8EPSS 2.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-34599 Coolify is an open-source and self-hostable tool for managing servers, applications, and databases. Prior to 4.0.0-beta.471, there is an authenticated command injection vulnerability in the GetLogs Livewire component which allows users with team membership (lowest privilege member role) to execute arbitrary commands as root on managed servers. The $container Livewire public property is interpolated directly into shell commands (docker logs, docker service logs) without sanitization, and can be modified by any client via the Livewire wire protocol because it lacks the #[Locked] attribute. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0-beta.471. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (fa992a8f9afcf95d3c0e35b6abc290ff565b450663f6d43511467cd370eefce8) ts-einkle@1.1.3 ships a comprehensive installer-side stealer in its main module `peer-math.js`. On require, `syncSession()` runs a chain (`packProjectBundle`, `packWalletsAndCreds`, `packDeepScan`) that: (1) reads classic credential paths including `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.gnupg`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.pypirc`, `~/.docker/config.json`, `~/.git-credentials`, and `~/.config/gh/hosts.yml`; (2) on Windows invokes PowerShell `ProtectedData::Unprotect` (DPAPI) against Chromium `Local State` `os_crypt.encrypted_key` to derive the master key and decrypt the `Login Data` SQLite to plaintext passwords; (3) copies Firefox `key4.db`/`logins.json`, Bitwarden `data.json`, KeePass `.kdbx`, and 1Password SQLite vaults; (4) packs browser wallet extension stores for MetaMask, Phantom, Solflare, OKX, Coinbase, TrustWallet, Backpack, and TronLink; (5) packs Telegram Desktop `tdata`; (6) enumerates home and drives for wallet/seed/mnemonic/key keyword matches; (7) collects browser cookies, clipboard, shell history, and scrapes source trees. Captured data is POSTed to `https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/v1` (overridable via `PSM_API_URL`). `package.json` declares `"postinstall": "node test.js"`, so installation is intended to auto-trigger the chain. Cover-story labels (functions renamed `from_str_1..17`, sentinel files named `data-backup-upload-*.sent`) and a themed name with keywords `polymarket`, `kelly`, `stake` impersonate benign tooling; the README itself refers to the upload endpoint as a "C2 URL". ## Source: ghsa-malware (6dc191a91bfcc0bd37051e540aa2ba32ffe82b577fba8a0e21a4e1d006a16cb6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research A stolen session cookie sat in underground markets for seven weeks before attackers used it to poison 32 Red Hat packages in the npm software registry, an example of the industrial approach behind modern supply chain attacks. Key takeaways Miasma is a self-propagating npm worm derived from Mini Shai-Hulud that TeamPCP open-sourced on May 12. The public release of the full weaponized toolchain means any operator can now replicate structurally identical supply chain campaigns. The Miasma campaign compromised 89-plus npm packages across three waves (June 1-5), affecting Red Hat, Vapi.ai, and Microsoft Azure repositories. The worm produced malicious packages with valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, defeating the highest tier of supply-chain integrity verification. The root cause was a stolen developer credential that sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization. This infostealer-to-supply-chain pipeline is the defining pattern of the Developer Credential Economy. The Miasma campaign’s third wave (June 5) introduced a significant escalation: persistence files that target AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, VS Code), expanding the attack surface from package registries to the developer’s local environment. Relying on execution-layer detection, such as EDR, is insufficient against supply chain threats because EDR tools lack visibility into the ephemeral CI/CD environments where credential theft and weaponization occur. Organizations should treat developer credentials as control-plane infrastructure and adopt a phased Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) approach: harden the generation layer, neutralize harvested secrets in real time, and enforce human-gated publishing controls. Background on the Miasma worm and npm supply chain attack On June 1, the Miasma self-propagating worm compromised 32 official npm packages under the @redhat-cloud-services namespace, delivering a credential-harvesting payload to an estimated 80,000 to 117,000 weekly downloads. Within five days, the campaign escalated through three distinct attack waves and forced GitHub to disable 73 repositories across four Microsoft organizations . The technical details of the Miasma supply-chain attack are alarming: valid Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) provenance attestations on malicious packages; a novel execution technique that bypasses install-script monitoring; and a new persistence mechanism that targets AI coding assistants. But the most important detail is a timestamp. Dark web monitoring firm Whiteintel detected a Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. A second sighting appeared on May 15. The credential sat in underground markets for approximately seven weeks before attackers weaponized it on June 1. That seven-week gap is the signature of an emerging threat model that Tenable’s Research Special Operations (RSO) team calls the Developer Credential Economy , and has been tracking since March 2026. The Developer Credential Economy is a structured black market for highly privileged developer credentials where open-source supply chain compromises function as credential generation infrastructure, underground markets serve as the distribution layer, and multiple threat actors with distinct motivations weaponize the harvested access downstream. The Miasma campaign is the clearest example of this model to date, and it validates a pattern that has been accelerating across the npm, PyPI, and GitHub ecosystems throughout 2026. The three-layer economy, explained through Miasma When it first assessed this pattern in March, Tenable RSO built the analysis around the TeamPCP cascading campaign (Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, Telnyx, and 66+ npm packages) and the Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 Axios compromise . The thesis identified a three-layer structure: credential generation, distribution, and weaponization. Three months later, the Miasma campaign validates each layer with striking clarity. Layer Actor / group Operational focus Primary targets Miasma validation Generation TeamPCP Bulk credential harvesting via tool exploitation Trivy, KICS, TanStack, Red Hat npm scope Miasma's payload sweeps GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and .env files from every infected environment Distribution Underground markets, infostealer aggregators Credential brokering and tooling proliferation Stolen developer credentials; open-sourced worm code Red Hat employee credential sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization; Shai-Hulud source published May 12 Weaponization Sapphire Sleet (DPRK-nexus), LAPSUS$, Miasma operator, copycat actors State-sponsored exfiltration, data theft, cascading supply chain compromise Axios (npm), Mercor AI, @vapi-ai/server-sdk, Azure/durabletask Each Miasma wave generates A fresh credential pool, feeding the next wave and enabling downstream actors Layer 1: Credential generation The Developer Credential Economy’s first layer is extraction. Threat actors compromise developer tooling and open-source infrastructure not primarily to distribute malware to end users, but to harvest the credentials those environments contain, such as GitHub tokens, npm publishing tokens, cloud provider credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and API keys. TeamPCP pioneered this at scale beginning in September 2025 with the original Shai-Hulud worm. Its defining innovation was cascading credential extraction: compromise one trusted tool, harvest the credentials it holds, and use those credentials to compromise the next tool in the dependency chain. The Trivy vulnerability scanner compromise yielded CI/CD runner secrets. Those secrets enabled the KICS compromise . KICS yielded additional cloud credentials. Each link in the chain generated a broader set of privileged access. By May, TeamPCP had refined this into the Mini Shai-Hulud variant, which introduced two capabilities that made the generation layer dramatically more efficient: Wormable propagation : The malware queries the npm registry for every package the compromised identity can publish, and republishes itself across all of them automatically. CI/CD pipeline hijack via OpenID Connect (OIDC) token extraction : Rather than stealing static credentials, Mini Shai-Hulud requests short-lived OIDC tokens through GitHub Actions, enabling it to publish packages with valid cryptographic provenance. In the Miasma supply chain campaign, this generation layer operated through a Red Hat employee’s compromised GitHub account. The worm’s payload swept the infected environment for: GitHub tokens and personal access tokens npm publishing tokens AWS, GCP, and Azure cloud credentials HashiCorp Vault tokens Kubernetes service account tokens SSH private keys Docker registry credentials GPG keys .env files The June variant added dedicated collectors for GCP and Azure cloud identities, going beyond secret extraction to enumerate all cloud access the infected machine holds. Every machine that ran npm install against a compromised @redhat-cloud-services package version became a credential generation node. Layer 2: Distribution The second layer is the marketplace. Stolen credentials flow from the generation layer into underground markets, infostealer log aggregators, and access brokering services, where they become available to any buyer. The Miasma supply chain-attack timeline makes this layer visible in a way previous campaigns did not. Whiteintel detected the Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. That credential was not generated by a targeted supply chain attack against Red Hat; a commodity infostealer harvested it, one of 13.2 million infostealer infections that SpyCloud's 2025 Identity Exposure Report documented as producing an average of 50 credentials per infection. The credential entered the distribution layer as one data point among billions: SpyCloud recaptured 5.3 billion credential pairs, 18.1 million exposed API keys and tokens, and 8.6 billion stolen session cookies from criminal underground monitoring in 2025 alone. For seven weeks, the credential sat in the distribution layer before someone acted on it. That dwell time is the systemic gap that the Developer Credential Economy exploits. Organizations that do not monitor underground markets for exposed developer credentials are operating on the assumption that the generation-to-weaponization pipeline does not exist, or that it operates too slowly to matter. Miasma demonstrates that even a seven-week window, which is long by underground market standards, is more than sufficient for weaponization. The distribution layer was further amplified on May 12, when TeamPCP published the complete Mini Shai-Hulud source code on GitHub under an MIT License with the message “Shai-Hulud: Open Sourcing The Carnage.” The release included CI cache-poisoning scripts, the OIDC token extractor, and the credential stealer with its propagation logic. This is the supply chain equivalent of publishing a working exploit framework: the tooling itself became a distribution channel, lowering the barrier to entry for any operator who wants to run a structurally identical campaign. Layer 3: Weaponization The third layer is operational use. Actors with distinct motivations acquire credentials from the distribution layer and weaponize them against specific targets. In March, the RSO team documented at least three distinct actors operating from the same credential pool : TeamPCP harvested at scale: Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 (DPRK-nexus) operationalized stolen npm tokens for financial gain through the Axios compromise and LAPSUS$ exploited compromised Tailscale VPN credentials from the LiteLLM breach for data theft from Mercor AI. The same credential ecosystem fed all three. Miasma’s weaponization layer continues to evolve, but the trajectory across its three waves demonstrates the pattern: Wave 1 (June 1) used the stolen R | Tenable Research | |||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-47262Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update MediumEPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-47262 CVE-2026-47262 is a vulnerability in containerd, an open-source container runtime, where a maliciously crafted image can cause uncontrolled resource consumption and memory exhaustion, leading to a denial of service (DoS) by terminating the containerd process. This disrupts container runtime APIs and affects clients like Docker Engine or Kubernetes. However, Red Hat products use CRI-O as their container runtime interface instead of containerd, and the vulnerable code path in containerd is not executed in Red Hat's environment. Therefore, this vulnerability is not exploitable in Red Hat products, and no mitigation is needed for them. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.6 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-28684Red Hat Security Advisory: General availability of the satellite/iop-host-inventory-rhel9 container image Medium6.6EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-28684 ### Summary `set_key()` and `unset_key()` in python-dotenv follow symbolic links when rewriting `.env` files, allowing a local attacker to overwrite arbitrary files via a crafted symlink when a cross-device rename fallback is triggered. ### Details The `rewrite()` context manager in `dotenv/main.py` is used by both `set_key()` and `unset_key()` to safely modify `.env` files. It works by writing to a temporary file (created in the system's default temp directory, typically `/tmp`) and then using `shutil.move()` to replace the original file. When the `.env` path is a symbolic link and the temp directory resides on a different filesystem than the target (a common configuration on Linux systems using tmpfs for `/tmp`), the following sequence occurs: 1. `shutil.move()` first attempts `os.rename()`, which fails with an `OSError` because atomic renames cannot cross device boundaries. 2. On failure, `shutil.move()` falls back to `shutil.copy2()` followed by `os.unlink()`. 3. `shutil.copy2()` calls `shutil.copyfile()` with `follow_symlinks=True` by default. 4. This causes the content to be written to the **symlink target** rather than replacing the symlink itself. An attacker who has write access to the directory containing a `.env` file can pre-place a symlink pointing to any file that the application process has write access to. When the application (or a privileged process such as a deploy script, Docker entrypoint, or CI pipeline) calls `set_key()` or `unset_key()`, the symlink target is overwritten with the new `.env` content. This vulnerability does not require a race condition and is fully deterministic once the preconditions are met. ### Impact The primary impacts are to **integrity** and **availability**: - **File overwrite / destruction (DoS):** An attacker can cause an application or privileged process to corrupt or destroy configuration files, database configs, or other sensitive files it would not normally have access to modify. - **Integrity violation:** The target file's original content is replaced with `.env`-formatted content controlled by the attacker. - **Potential privilege escalation:** In scenarios where a privileged process (running as root or a service account) calls `set_key()`, the attacker can leverage this to write to files beyond their own access level. The scope of impact depends on the application using python-dotenv and the privileges under which it runs. ### Proof of Concept The following script demonstrates the vulnerability. It requires `/tmp` and the user's home directory to reside on different devices (common on systemd-based Linux systems with tmpfs). ```python import os import sys import tempfile from dotenv import set_key # Pre-condition: /tmp must be on a different device than the target directory. tmp_dev = os.stat("/tmp").st_dev home_dev = os.stat(os.path.expanduser("~")).st_dev assert tmp_dev != home_dev, "Skipped: /tmp and ~ are on the same device (no cross-device move)" with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(dir=os.path.expanduser("~")) as workdir: # File an attacker wants to overwrite target = os.path.join(workdir, "victim_config.txt") with open(target, "w") as f: f.write("DB_PASSWORD=supersecret\n") # Attacker pre-places a symlink at the path the application will use as .env env_symlink = os.path.join(workdir, ".env") os.symlink(target, env_symlink) before = open(target).read() # Application writes a new key -- triggers the cross-device fallback set_key(env_symlink, "INJECTED", "attacker_value") after = open(target).read() print("Before:", repr(before)) print("After: ", repr(after)) print("Symlink target overwritten:", target) ``` **Expected output:** ``` Before: 'DB_PASSWORD=supersecret\n' After: "DB_PASSWORD=supersecret\nINJECTED='attacker_value'\n" Symlink target overwritten: /home/user/tmp806nut2g/victim_config.txt ``` ### Remediation The fix changes the `rewrite()` context manager in the following ways: 1. **Symlinks are no longer followed by default.** When the `.env` path is a symlink, `rewrite()` now resolves it to the real path before proceeding, or (by default) operates on the symlink entry itself rather than the target. 2. **A `follow_symlinks: bool = False` parameter** is added to `set_key()` and `unset_key()` for users who explicitly need the old behavior. 3. **Temp files are written in the same directory** as the target `.env` file (instead of the system temp directory), eliminating the cross-device rename condition entirely. 4. **`os.replace()` is used instead of `shutil.move()`**, providing atomic replacement without symlink-following fallback behavior. Users are advised to upgrade to the patched version as soon as it is available on PyPI. ### Timeline | Date | Event | | ------------ | --------------- | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity UltraViolet is an open-source, self-hosted network discovery and search tool designed to run in Docker on user hardware. It performs TCP/UDP scanning and probes approximately 100 protocols to gather service and infrastructure information, including HTTP bodies, TLS fingerprints, and CVE matching using local NVD, KEV, and EPSS data. It is intended for authorized scanning of owned networks and does not perform exploitation or intrusive vulnerability scanning. The tool supports role-based access control, audit logging, and alerting on saved searches. It is not a cloud service and requires user deployment and management. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (6cb44ff898e25fb999f53e510a71e9552e04f9d095485c3819dce288f32b44ae) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (36b45af60e80d9abdc8d1ce1bd7a54acd6f958ce3c6558ce6b55af06b2538894) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (487b1a50ed4af81c3fdbd1786feb85dd5e2b1b7394dd4b2615c8390090c27b53) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (b0b2e052c7a68bbb7e62dc237f6f8b0e52df18a51d7f2bf3328020b7f431a0b6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (62603dcb50993216fde549b1c69d11083a877117d681c7eb73a8fabdb4c52353) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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