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57 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a16b80d2c76699beaf0773da7233c1e136a951a8edd0ba84b073ea78590c23e1) The npm postinstall lifecycle hook runs dist/config.js, which fetches JSON from https://my-api.trade-api.workers.dev?id=3 and then invokes `globalThis[data.success](data.id)`, letting the remote endpoint choose which global (eval, Function, require, etc.) to call and with what argument. The package reassigns `globalThis.require = require` earlier in the same file to make `require` reachable through this indirection. The result is arbitrary code execution on every installer machine during `npm install`, with both the executor and its argument supplied by an attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers endpoint. The package advertises itself as a color toolkit; there is no build or configuration purpose served by a network-dispatched global invocation, and the string-indexed global lookup is an evasion pattern that hides the sink from static scanners. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 5.4 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-10773zephyrproject zephyr · Bounds Medium5.4EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-10773 The DHCPv4 client helper net_dhcpv4_msg_type_name() in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c indexes a static 8-element const char * name table after a faulty bounds check. The guard used msg_type <= sizeof(name) instead of msg_type <= ARRAY_SIZE(name); sizeof returns the byte size of the pointer array (32 on 32-bit, 64 on 64-bit targets) rather than the element count of 8, so message-type values from 9 up to that byte size pass the check and cause name[msg_type - 1] to read past the end of the array. The msg_type value originates from the DHCP MESSAGE TYPE option, which is read as an unchecked raw byte from a received packet (net_pkt_read_u8) and passed unmodified into the lookup. A DHCP server, or any host able to inject a spoofed DHCP reply onto the client's link, can therefore drive the index out of bounds. The out-of-range slot yields a garbage const char * that is then dereferenced by a %s log conversion. The lookup is reached only from a debug log statement (NET_DBG / LOG_DBG), so the out-of-bounds read is triggerable only when the DHCPv4 log module is built at DEBUG level (CONFIG_NET_DHCPV4_LOG_LEVEL_DBG), which is not the default configuration. When that condition holds, the result is an out-of-bounds read and a wild-pointer dereference: most likely a crash of the DHCP client (denial of service) and potentially disclosure of an adjacent pointer's contents through the log output. The fix replaces sizeof with ARRAY_SIZE, restoring the correct 1..8 acceptance window. EPSS 0.3%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-64375Linux kernel · FD links High7.8EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-64375 CVE-2026-64375 is a race condition vulnerability in the Linux kernel's proc filesystem related to ptrace access checks. The flaw arises because the kernel looks up the task from the pid multiple times without proper synchronization, leading to potential inconsistent access control decisions. The issue has been fixed by introducing a locking mechanism (exec_update_lock) around ptrace_may_access() and restructuring the access check flow to ensure task lookup and access verification are atomic. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.5 | High8.5GCVE Database ### Summary Budibase's central outbound-fetch guard (`fetchWithBlacklist`) prevents SSRF/DNS-rebinding by resolving the target hostname, checking every resolved IP against the blacklist, and **pinning** the connection to the validated IP. The pin is implemented as a Node `http(s).Agent` (`makePinnedAgent`). The fix for CVE-2026-54353 relies on this pin to stop DNS rebinding. The REST datasource integration (`@budibase/server`) calls `fetchWithBlacklist` but performs the actual request with **undici**'s `fetch`. undici does not support the Node `agent` option — it is silently ignored — and instead uses its own `dispatcher`, which re-resolves the hostname's DNS at connection time. As a result, **the validated/pinned IP is never used on the REST datasource path**, and the DNS-rebinding protection that CVE-2026-54353 added is silently defeated for the single most-used outbound path in Budibase. An authenticated user who can configure/run a REST datasource (e.g. a builder/tenant) can use a rebinding hostname (public IP during validation, internal IP at connect) to make the server issue arbitrary, full-response HTTP requests to internal-only services — cloud metadata (IAM credential theft), the internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO, and other internal endpoints — reading and, because REST datasources allow arbitrary method/body, writing or destroying internal data. ### Details **The guard pins the validated IP via a Node agent** — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts`: - `resolveSafePinnedIp(url)` resolves the hostname and checks every address against `isBlacklisted`, returning a single `pinnedIp` (lines ~39–53). - `makePinnedAgent(url, ip)` builds a **Node** `http.Agent`/`https.Agent` whose `lookup` always returns `pinnedIp`, so a node-fetch connection can only reach the validated IP (lines ~55–68). - `fetchWithBlacklist` passes that agent into the request: `fetchFn(nextUrl, { ...nextRequest, agent: makePinnedAgent(nextUrl, pinnedIp) })` (lines ~186–192). Each redirect hop is re-validated and re-pinned in the loop. **The REST integration overrides the transport with undici, which ignores `agent`** — `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts`: - `fetch` is imported from **`undici`** (top-of-file import block, ~line 30). - The request is made by overriding `fetchFn` (lines ~767–793): ```ts const setDispatcher = (requestInput, requestUrl) => ({ ...requestInput, dispatcher: getDispatcher({ rejectUnauthorized, url: requestUrl }), }) ... response = await coreUtils.fetchWithBlacklist(url, input, { fetchFn: async (requestUrl, requestInput) => fetch(requestUrl, setDispatcher(requestInput, requestUrl)), // undici.fetch }) ``` The options object reaching `undici.fetch` is `{ ...nextRequest, agent: <pinned Node Agent>, dispatcher: <getDispatcher result> }`. **undici uses `dispatcher` and ignores `agent`.** **The dispatcher does no IP pinning** — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/fetch.ts`: - `getDispatcher` → `createDispatcher` → (no proxy env) → `createDirectAgent` = `new Agent({ connect: { rejectUnauthorized } })` (lines ~109–114, ~161–172, ~183). This is a plain undici `Agent` with **no `connect.lookup` / no pin**, so undici resolves the hostname's DNS itself at connect time. **Net effect (TOCTOU / DNS rebinding):** `fetchWithBlacklist` validates the hostname → safe public IP and builds a pinned Node agent; the REST path then connects via undici, which re-resolves the same hostname independently. With a rebinding domain (TTL 0: public IP during validation, `127.0.0.1` / `169.254.169.254` / internal IP at connect), the request lands on an internal service — exactly the gap CVE-2026-54353's pin was meant to close. **Scope of impact / why it's REST-specific:** `rest.ts` is the only caller that overrides `fetchFn` with undici. All other outbound sinks (automation `outgoingWebhook`/`n8n`/`make`/`zapier`/`discord`/`slack`, and AI-extract's `processUrlFile`) use the default node-fetch-based `fetchWithBlacklist`, which **does** honor the pinned agent and is **not** affected. REST datasource queries are the most common outbound path, and the response body is returned to the caller (full-response SSRF, not blind). ### PoC The PoC drives the **real, unmodified** guard code (`outboundFetch.ts` + `fetch.ts`, copied verbatim — sha256 verified) and reproduces the exact `rest.ts` call pattern. Only the `../blacklist` module is stubbed to model the rebinding **input** (validation observes a safe public IP). Requires Node 18+. ```bash # prerequisite: a Budibase checkout; set BB to its path export BB=/path/to/budibase mkdir ssrf-poc && cd ssrf-poc SRC="$BB/packages/backend-core/src" # 1) Copy the REAL guard code, verbatim (sha proves no edits) mkdir -p real/utils real/blacklist cp "$SRC/utils/outboundFetch.ts" real/utils/ cp "$SRC/utils/fetch.ts" real/utils/ # 2) Scenario stub = the rebinding INPUT: validation sees a safe, non-blacklisted public IP cat > real/blacklist/index.ts << | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.7% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-64142 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: close durable scavenger races against m_fp_list lookups ksmbd_durable_scavenger() has two related races against any walker that iterates f_ci->m_fp_list, including ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode() (used by ksmbd_vfs_rename) and the share-mode checks in fs/smb/server/smb_common.c. (1) fp->node list-head reuse. Durable-preserved handles can remain linked on f_ci->m_fp_list after session teardown so share-mode checks still see them while the handle is reconnectable. The scavenger collected expired handles by adding fp->node to a local scavenger_list after removing them from the global durable idr. Because fp->node is the same list_head used by m_fp_list, list_add(&fp->node, &scavenger_list) overwrites the m_fp_list links and corrupts both lists. CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST can report this on the share-mode walk path. (2) Refcount race against m_fp_list walkers. The scavenger qualifies an expired durable handle with atomic_read(&fp->refcount) > 1 and fp->conn under global_ft.lock, removes fp from global_ft, then drops global_ft.lock before unlinking fp from m_fp_list and freeing it. During that gap fp is still linked on m_fp_list with f_state == FP_INITED. ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode() under m_lock read calls ksmbd_fp_get() (atomic_inc_not_zero on refcount that is still 1) and takes a live reference; the scavenger then unlinks and frees fp while the holder owns a reference, leading to UAF on the holder's subsequent ksmbd_fd_put() and on any field reads performed by a concurrent share-mode walker that iterates m_fp_list without taking ksmbd_fp_get() (smb_check_perm_dleases-like paths). Fix both: * Stop reusing fp->node as a scavenger-private list node. Remove one expired handle from global_ft under global_ft.lock, take an explicit transient reference, drop the lock, unlink fp->node from m_fp_list under f_ci->m_lock, then drop both the durable lifetime and transient references with atomic_sub_and_test(2, &fp->refcount). If the scavenger is the last putter the close runs there; otherwise an in-flight holder that already raced through the m_fp_list lookup owns the final close via its ksmbd_fd_put() path. The one-at-a-time disposal can rescan the durable idr when multiple handles expire in the same pass, but durable scavenging is a background expiration path and the final full scan recomputes min_timeout before the next wait. * Clear fp->persistent_id inside __ksmbd_remove_durable_fd() right after idr_remove(), so a delayed final close from a holder that snatched fp does not re-issue idr_remove() on a persistent id that idr_alloc_cyclic() in ksmbd_open_durable_fd() may have already handed out to a brand-new durable handle. * Bypass the per-conn open_files_count decrement in __put_fd_final() when fp is detached from any session table (fp->conn cleared by session_fd_check() at durable preserve -- paired with the volatile_id clear at unpublish, so checking fp->conn alone is sufficient). The walker that owns the final close runs from an unrelated work->conn whose stats.open_files_count never tracked this durable fp; without this guard the holder would underflow that unrelated counter. The two races are folded into one patch because patch (1) alone cleans up the corrupted list but leaves a deterministic UAF window for m_fp_list walkers that the transient-reference and persistent_id discipline in (2) close; bisecting onto an intermediate state would land on a UAF that pre-patch chaos merely made less reproducible. Validation: * CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST coverage for the list_head reuse path. * KASAN-enabled direct SMB2 durable-handle coverage that exercised ksmbd_durable_scavenger() and non-NULL ksmbd_lookup_fd_inode() returns while durable handles expired under concurrent rename lookups, with no KASAN, UAF, list-corruption, ODEBUG, or WARNING reports. ---truncated--- | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.8 | EPSS 0.3% | Critical9.8EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-53260 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Add preempt_{disable,enable}_nested() in reqsk_queue_hash_req(). syzbot reported a weird reqsk->rsk_refcnt underflow in __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(). The captured reqsk_put() in __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop() is called only when it successfully removes reqsk from ehash. Moreover, reqsk_timer_handler() calls another reqsk_put() after that. This indicates that the reqsk was missing both refcnts for ehash and the timer itself. Since all the syzbot reports had PREEMPT_RT enabled, the only possible scenario is that reqsk_queue_hash_req() is preempted after mod_timer() and before refcount_set(), and then the timer triggered after 1s aborts the reqsk due to its listener's close(). Let's wrap mod_timer() and refcount_set() with preempt_disable_nested() and preempt_enable_nested(). Note that inet_ehash_insert() holds the normal spin_lock() (mutex in PREEMPT_RT), so it must be called outside of preempt_disable_nested(), but this is fine. The lookup path just ignores 0 sk_refcnt entries in ehash and tries to create another reqsk, but this will fail at inet_ehash_insert(). [0]: refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:28 at refcount_warn_saturate+0xb2/0x110 lib/refcount.c:28, CPU#0: ktimers/0/16 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ktimers/0 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)} Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/18/2026 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb2/0x110 lib/refcount.c:28 Code: e4 7d d1 0a 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 4a e8 38 3d 23 fd 48 8d 3d e1 7d d1 0a 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 37 e8 25 3d 23 fd 48 8d 3d de 7d d1 0a <67> 48 0f b9 3a eb 24 e8 12 3d 23 fd 48 8d 3d db 7d d1 0a 67 48 0f RSP: 0000:ffffc90000157948 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffff84a1301b RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ffff88801ca98000 RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff8f72ae00 RBP: ffffffff99ae3b01 R08: ffff88801ca98000 R09: 0000000000000005 R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ffff8880425ef568 R13: ffff8880425ef4f8 R14: ffff8880425ef578 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888126386000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f7b46710e9c CR3: 000000000dbb6000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __refcount_sub_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:400 [inline] __refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:432 [inline] refcount_dec_and_test include/linux/refcount.h:450 [inline] reqsk_put include/net/request_sock.h:136 [inline] __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop+0x3ce/0x440 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1007 reqsk_timer_handler+0x651/0xdf0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1137 call_timer_fn+0x192/0x5e0 kernel/time/timer.c:1748 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1799 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2374 [inline] __run_timer_base+0x6a3/0x9f0 kernel/time/timer.c:2386 run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2395 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x67/0x170 kernel/time/timer.c:2403 handle_softirqs+0x1de/0x6d0 kernel/softirq.c:622 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline] run_ktimerd+0x69/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:1151 smpboot_thread_fn+0x541/0xa50 kernel/smpboot.c:160 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-52998Linux kernel · NULL Pointer Dereference High7.5EPSS 0.6%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-52998 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix potential NULL dereference in ttl check The nf_osf_ttl() function accessed skb->dev to perform a local interface address lookup without verifying that the device pointer was valid. Additionally, the implementation utilized an in_dev_for_each_ifa_rcu loop to match the packet source address against local interface addresses. It assumed that packets from the same subnet should not see a decrement on the initial TTL. A packet might appear it is from the same subnet but it actually isn't especially in modern environments with containers and virtual switching. Remove the device dereference and interface loop. Replace the logic with a switch statement that evaluates the TTL according to the ttl_check. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 4.9 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-10645zephyrproject zephyr · Bounds Medium4.9EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-10645 The Zephyr ext2 filesystem driver (subsys/fs/ext2) trusted the on-disk directory entry fields de_rec_len and de_name_len when walking a directory block. ext2_fetch_direntry() guarded only with de_name_len > EXT2_MAX_FILE_NAME, but de_name_len is a uint8_t and EXT2_MAX_FILE_NAME is 255, so the check is always false; the function then memcpy'd up to 255 name bytes and the lookup/readdir paths advanced traversal by an unvalidated de_rec_len. Each directory block is read into a block_size-sized slab buffer, and block_off can be driven near the block end by preceding entries' rec_len, so the 8-byte header read and the subsequent name memcpy can read up to ~263 bytes past the end of the block buffer into adjacent heap/slab memory. On the readdir path those bytes are returned to the caller in fs_dirent.name, leaking adjacent kernel heap memory; a de_rec_len of 0 also causes a zero-progress infinite loop (denial of service), and the unlink path's memmove(de, next, next_reclen) over unvalidated records is an additional OOB read/write source. The defect is reached by any path-based operation (open, stat, unlink, rename, mkdir) or directory listing on a mounted ext2 volume, so a crafted or corrupted ext2 image on attacker-supplied storage (SD card, USB mass storage, or otherwise mounted image) triggers it. Affected: Zephyr ext2 from its introduction in v3.5.0 through v4.4.0. The fix validates rec_len and name_len in the parser and rejects entries whose header does not fit the remaining block or whose rec_len crosses the block boundary in every traversal caller. EPSS 0.2%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-12044pgAdmin 4 · SQL Injection High8.8EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-12044 SQL injection in pgAdmin 4 across every dialog template that renders ``COMMENT ON ... IS '<description>'`` for a user-supplied description field. The Jinja templates for Domains (and their constraints), Foreign Tables, Languages, and Event Triggers, plus the Views OID-lookup query, interpolated the description directly inside a single-quoted SQL literal -- ``'{{ data.description }}'`` -- instead of passing it through the ``qtLiteral`` escape filter. An authenticated pgAdmin user with permission to create or alter the affected object types could submit a description containing an apostrophe, break out of the literal and chain arbitrary SQL. The injected SQL runs under the PostgreSQL role the user is already authenticated as; for a connected role with ``COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM`` (typically PostgreSQL superuser), this chains to OS command execution on the PostgreSQL host. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through pgAdmin's Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants. The marginal impact captures bypass of any application-layer Query Tool gating an operator may have configured. The defect was originally reported against the Domain Dialog ``description`` field; a code-wide audit identified sixteen sites of the same pattern across the templates listed above. The same review also surfaced ten related sinks in the pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats templates -- ``pgstattuple('{{schema}}.{{table}}')`` and the matching pgstatindex shape -- where ``qtIdent`` escapes embedded double quotes inside the identifier but not apostrophes, so a user with CREATE privilege on a schema could plant a table or index named ``foo'bar`` and a later stats viewer would render an unbalanced literal. Fix is layered: 1. Sites: replace every ``'{{ x.description }}'`` with ``{{ x.description|qtLiteral(conn) }}`` (no surrounding quotes -- the filter wraps the value in escaped quotes itself). Plumb ``conn=self.conn`` through every ``render_template`` call that loads one of these templates. Also corrects a ``{ % elif`` Jinja typo in the foreign-table schema diff (dead branch). Rewrite the ten pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats sites to address the relation via OID + ``::oid::regclass`` cast (e.g. ``pgstattuple({{ tid }}::oid::regclass)``), eliminating the embedded literal-call form entirely so that bug-class can no longer recur there. 2. Driver hardening: ``qtLiteral`` (in ``utils/driver/psycopg3/__init__.py``) used to silently return the raw unescaped value when its ``conn`` argument was falsy. It now raises ``ValueError`` -- surfacing the entire bug class going forward. The change immediately uncovered eight latent plumbing bugs (in ``schemas/__init__.py``, ``schemas/functions/__init__.py``, ``schemas/tables/utils.py``, ``foreign_servers/__init__.py``, and seven sites in ``roles/__init__.py``) -- all fixed as part of this patch. The inner ``except`` block that swallowed adapter-level failures and returned the raw value is also removed, so unadaptable inputs raise instead of leaking unescaped values. 3. Regression tests: a per-template behavioural test renders each previously-vulnerable template with an apostrophe-injection payload and asserts the escaped fragment is present and the vulnerable fragment absent; a lint test walks every ``*.sql`` template flagging any ``'{{ ... }}'`` single-quote-wrapped interpolation against an explicit allowlist; unit tests cover the new qtLiteral fail-fast and inner-except raise paths. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 3.7 | EPSS 0.3% | Low3.7EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-53607 ### Summary When `prettyUrls: true` is enabled on `@apostrophecms/file` (a documented SEO feature for serving uploaded files at clean URLs), the public pretty-URL handler builds the upstream URL using the raw `Host` HTTP request header: ```js proxyUrl = `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}${uglyUrl}` ``` That URL is then `fetch`'ed and the response body + headers are streamed straight back to the requester. Because `Host` is fully attacker-controlled, an **unauthenticated remote** attacker can pivot the apostrophe process to issue outbound HTTP requests against any host it can reach on the private network. The path component is constrained to `/uploads/attachments/<cuid>-<slug>.<ext>` (built from a local-DB lookup), which keeps the impact narrow: cross-instance data exfiltration is neutralised by cuid uniqueness, but blind-SSRF residuals remain (network-topology mapping via response-code / timing differences and verbose proxy/WAF 404 body disclosure). Verified on `apostrophe@4.30.0` (latest); no fixed release exists. - **Affected:** `apostrophe <= 4.30.0` when `@apostrophecms/file` is configured with `prettyUrls: true` and uploadfs is **local** (the default; S3/CDN deployments produce an absolute `uglyUrl` and are not affected). ### Details `modules/@apostrophecms/file/index.js` (excerpt; the public GET route registered when `prettyUrls: true`): ```js if (!self.options.prettyUrls) return; return { get: { async [`${self.options.prettyUrlDir}/*`](req, res) { const matches = (req.params[0] || '').match(/^([^.]+)\.\w+$/); if (!matches) return res.status(400).send('invalid'); const [ , slug ] = matches; if (slug.includes('..') || slug.includes('/')) { return res.status(403).send('forbidden'); } const file = await self.find(req, { slug: `${self.options.slugPrefix}${slug}` }).toObject(); if (!file) return res.status(404).send('not found'); const uglyUrl = self.apos.attachment.url(file.attachment, { prettyUrl: false }); const proxyUrl = uglyUrl.startsWith('/') ? `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}${uglyUrl}` // <-- sink : uglyUrl; return await streamProxy(req, proxyUrl, { error: self.apos.util.error }); } } }; ``` `lib/stream-proxy.js` (excerpt): ```js module.exports = async function(req, url, { error }) { const res = req.res; if (url.startsWith('/')) url = `${req.baseUrl}${url}`; let response; try { response = await fetch(url); } // <-- attacker-steered fetch catch (e) { return send502(e); } for (const header of ['content-type','etag','last-modified','content-disposition','cache-control']) { const v = response.headers.get(header); if (v != null) res.header(header, v); } res.status(response.status); response.body.pipeTo(new WritableStream({ write(c){ res.write(c) }, close(){ res.end() }, ... })); }; ``` `req.get('host')` returns the unvalidated `Host` HTTP header from the request. Express does not validate or restrict it, and apostrophe does not check the constructed `proxyUrl` against an allowlist. The upstream's body and content-type are forwarded verbatim — so any response the targeted host does return at the constrained path will reach the attacker. In practice the path constraint (`/uploads/attachments/<cuid>-<slug>.<ext>`) and cuid uniqueness mean meaningful body exfiltration only occurs against verbose-404 / banner- leaky proxies; against most internal services this degenerates to blind SSRF (response-code + timing side channels). Prerequisites are minimal: `prettyUrls: true` (a documented production SEO option) + at least one file uploaded with a known slug. Slugs are publicly enumerable in normal CMS use (file URLs appear in page content). **Distinct from the only published apostrophe SSRF advisory, GHSA-pr28-mf3q-qpg6** ("Authenticated SSRF in rich-text widget import via @apostrophecms/area validate-widget"), which is authenticated and lives in a completely different module/route. This finding is unauthenticated, in `@apostrophecms/file`, via the `Host` header. ### PoC Three services on an isolated Docker network: `mongo`, `internal` (returns a fake secret, **never exposed to the host**), `apos:3000` (the only port the host can reach). The host attacker proves it cannot reach `internal` directly, then exfiltrates `internal`'s response via one crafted request to `apos`. `app.js` (normal apostrophe site, documented option only): ```js require('apostrophe')({ shortName: 'apos-ssrf-poc', autoBuild: false, modules: { '@apostrophecms/express': { options: { session: { secret: 'x' }, port: 3000 } }, '@apostrophecms/db': { options: { uri: process.env.APOS_MONGODB_URI } }, '@apostrophecms/asset': { options: { autoBuild: false, publicBundle: false, watch: false, hmr: false } }, '@apostrophecms/file': { options: { prettyUrls: true, prettyUrlDir: '/files' } }, 'poc-seed': {} // seeds one file doc on boot (= what an admin does | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2024-56633Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security update MediumEPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2024-56633 The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system. Security Fix(es): * kernel: tcp_bpf: Fix the sk_mem_uncharge logic in tcp_bpf_sendmsg (CVE-2024-56633) * kernel: KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering .vcpu_run() loop (CVE-2025-21839) * kernel: block: fix resource leak in blk_register_queue() error path (CVE-2025-37980) * kernel: dmaengine: idxd: fix memory leak in error handling path of idxd_alloc (CVE-2025-38015) * kernel: espintcp: remove encap socket caching to avoid reference leak (CVE-2025-38097) * kernel: bpf: fix ktls panic with sockmap (CVE-2025-38166) * kernel: bpf: Check rcu_read_lock_trace_held() in bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem() (CVE-2025-38202) * kernel: bpf: Do not include stack ptr register in precision backtracking bookkeeping (CVE-2025-38279) * kernel: ring-buffer: Do not trigger WARN_ON() due to a commit_overrun (CVE-2025-38267) * kernel: phy: qcom-qmp-usb: Fix an NULL vs IS_ERR() bug (CVE-2025-38275) * kernel: ftrace: Fix UAF when lookup kallsym after ftrace disabled (CVE-2025-38346) * kernel: ACPICA: fix acpi operand cache leak in dswstate.c (CVE-2025-38345) * kernel: nvmet: fix memory leak of bio integrity (CVE-2025-38405) * kernel: netfilter: flowtable: account for Ethernet header in nf_flow_pppoe_proto() (CVE-2025-38441) * kernel: net: vlan: fix VLAN 0 refcount imbalance of toggling filtering during runtime (CVE-2025-38470) * kernel: fs: writeback: fix use-after-free in __mark_inode_dirty() (CVE-2025-39866) * kernel: PCI/AER: Avoid NULL pointer dereference in aer_ratelimit() (CVE-2025-40034) * kernel: dm: fix NULL pointer dereference in __dm_suspend() (CVE-2025-40134) * kernel: Revert "NFSD: Remove the cap on number of operations per NFSv4 COMPOUND" (CVE-2025-40210) * kernel: Linux kernel MPTCP: Privilege escalation or denial of service via use-after-free in timer handling (CVE-2025-40257) * kernel: smb: client: fix potential cfid UAF in smb2_query_info_compound (CVE-2025-40320) * kernel: wifi: mac80211_hwsim: fix typo in frequency notification (CVE-2026-23040) * kernel: Kernel: Privilege escalation or denial of service in nf_tables via inverted element activity check (CVE-2026-23111) * kernel: Linux kernel: Denial of Service in ice driver due to race condition during VSI rebuild (CVE-2026-23210) * kernel: Linux kernel: Denial of service and memory corruption in RDMA umad (CVE-2026-23243) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. Additional Changes: For detailed information on changes in this release, see the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 Release Notes linked from the References section. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.8EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-43116 A high-severity vulnerability (CVE-2026-43116) in the Linux kernel's netfilter ctnetlink subsystem was resolved. The issue involves unsafe access to the master conntrack object, where holding a reference on the expectation alone is insufficient, potentially leading to invalid memory access. The fix involves extending the nf_conntrack_expect_lock section to ensure safe access and proper locking during expectation lookup and event delivery. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | – | EPSS 0.1% | MediumEPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-31781 CVE-2026-31781 is a vulnerability in the Linux kernel's drm_compat_ioctl path where a user-controlled pointer is dereferenced into a function pointer table, a pattern linked to Spectre-type speculative execution issues. The flaw was mitigated by applying array_index_nospec() to the index used for function pointer lookup, preventing speculative execution attacks. This vulnerability affects multiple Linux kernel versions from 3.16.63 up to and including 4.20. Fixed versions include 4.15 and 4.20. EPSS 0.1%Vulnerability | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Low | 3.3 | Low3.3GCVE Database ### Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-xv5w-cw7x-72gj. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ### Original Description The id utility in uutils coreutils exhibits incorrect behavior in its "pretty print" output when the real UID and effective UID differ. The implementation incorrectly uses the effective GID instead of the effective UID when performing a name lookup for the effective user. This results in misleading diagnostic output that can cause automated scripts or system administrators to make incorrect decisions regarding file permissions or access control. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 4.5 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium4.5EPSS 0.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-35376 A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability exists in the chcon utility of uutils coreutils during recursive operations. The implementation resolves recursive targets using a fresh path lookup (via fts_accpath) rather than binding the traversal and label application to the specific directory state encountered during traversal. Because these operations are not anchored to file descriptors, a local attacker with write access to a directory tree can exploit timing-sensitive rename or symbolic link races to redirect a privileged recursive relabeling operation to unintended files or directories. This vulnerability breaks the hardening expectations for SELinux administration workflows and can lead to the unauthorized modification of security labels on sensitive system objects. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.1% | Medium5.5EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-31497 A vulnerability in the Linux kernel Bluetooth driver (btusb) was resolved that involved improper indexing of a lookup table for SCO (Synchronous Connection-Oriented) links. The driver indexed an array based on the number of active SCO links without properly constraining the index, potentially causing out-of-bounds access. This issue was fixed by clamping the index to the maximum valid entry. The vulnerability affects multiple specific Linux kernel versions and has a medium severity rating with a CVSS score of 5.5. A patch is available to address this issue. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2025-22871Red Hat Security Advisory: OpenShift Container Platform 4.12.87 bug fix and security update Critical9.1EPSS 0.8%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-22871 Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform provides an enterprise framework for building, deploying and managing IT automation at scale. IT Managers can provide top-down guidelines on how automation is applied to individual teams, while automation developers retain the freedom to write tasks that leverage existing knowledge without the overhead. Ansible Automation Platform makes it possible for users across an organization to share, vet, and manage automation content by means of a simple, powerful, and agentless language. Security Fix(es): * automation-eda-controller: Template Injection via Git Branch and Refspec in EDA Projects (CVE-2025-49521) * automation-eda-controller: Authenticated Argument Injection in Git URL in EDA Project Creation (CVE-2025-49520) * automation-gateway-proxy: Request smuggling due to acceptance of invalid chunked data in net/http (CVE-2025-22871) * automation-gateway-proxy-openssl30: Request smuggling due to acceptance of invalid chunked data in net/http (CVE-2025-22871) * automation-gateway-proxy-openssl32: Request smuggling due to acceptance of invalid chunked data in net/http (CVE-2025-22871) * receptor: Request smuggling due to acceptance of invalid chunked data in net/http (CVE-2025-22871) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. Updates and fixes included: Automation Platform * Updated API error messaging to be more helpful in the event a user logs in as the admin user via legacy auth on one component, then tries to do so via the other component (AAP-47541) * Fixed an issue where API records could be missing or duplicated across pages (AAP-47504) * Refactored V1RootView.get() and improve reverse lookup logic (AAP-47366) * Refactored process_statuses() method to reduce its cognitive complexity (AAP-47341) * Improved accuracy of openapi API docs and schema (AAP-46639) * Reduced the cognitive complexity of method migrate_resource() in migrate_service_data.py from 56 to <=15 (AAP-45822) * Reduced the cognitive complexity of the process_fields() method in serializers/preference.py file (AAP-45820) * Reduced the cognitive complexity of unique_fields_for_model() method to below 15 (AAP-45819) * Enable query filtering for fields user_ansible_id, team_ansible_id, and object_ansible_id on the role assignment API endpoints (AAP-45443) * The Survey form is displayed for a Worlflow visualizer Job template or Workflow Job template node with a survey enabled and no Prompt on Launch fields (AAP-47732) * Fixed a bug that was causing the UI to throw an error when launching a workflow job template with both "Prompt on Launch" and "Survey" enabled (AAP-47668) * The API feature flags used to hide references to Policy as Code in the UI have been removed. All Policy as Code fields appear for all users at all times (AAP-47006) * Fixed a bug that was causing the UI to throw an error when launching a workflow job template with both "Prompt on Launch" and "Survey" enabled (AAP-46813) * On the inventory source form, for a source type of 'VMware ESXi' the user will be able to select credentials of type 'VMware vCenter' (AAP-46784) * Fixed a bug when selecting the 'Comparison' field for Atrriibute trigger in the Authenticator Map form (AAP-46555) * Fixed a bug that was causing the UI to throw an error when launching a workflow job template with both "Prompt on Launch" and "Survey" enabled (AAP-45834) * added an extra validation to handle incorrect user input in the variables field, as the API doesn't return an error for it (AAP-42563) * Fixed a bug that was causing the UI to throw an error when launching a workflow job template with both "Prompt on Launch" and "Survey" enabled (AAP-42303) * The Hosts links in the Resource Counts section of the overview page were fixed to redirect to the Hosts page (AAP-42288) * Allows role assignments using object_ansible_id in the role_user_assignment module (AAP-48042) * Improved documentation and examples related to object_id and object_ansible_id parameters in role_user_assignment module (AAP-48041) * Allows object_id field in role_user_assignment module to accept a list of items (AAP-47979) * Fixed an example task in ansible.platform.token module (AAP-47976) * Specify correct aap_* parameters in ansible.platform.token module (AAP-47975) * Improved documentation and examples for authenticator and authenticator_map modules (AAP-45982) * Updated documentation examples for the ansible.platform.settings module with tested tasks examples (AAP-45954) * Added a new section in the collection README describing how to authenticate to AAP from the playbook (AAP-45578) * Ensures that modules in the ansible.platform collection accepts AAP_* variable for authentication (AAP-45363) * Fixed ansible.platform.user not adding users to organizations (AAP-45248) * Allows running ansible.platform collection modules in check_mode (AAP-45246) * Ad | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 6.8 | EPSS 0.2% | High6.8EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-68813 A null pointer dereference vulnerability in the Linux kernel's IP Virtual Server (IPVS) IPv4 code path was fixed. The flaw occurs when a route lookup fails and the error path calls dst_link_failure() with a NULL skb->dev pointer, leading to a kernel crash. This happens specifically when IPVS processes a packet in NAT mode with a misconfigured destination. The issue was caused by incomplete handling of skb->dev in the error path, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference in fib_compute_spec_dst(). A security update addressing this and other Linux kernel vulnerabilities has been released by SUSE and Ubuntu. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.3 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-21897nasa CryptoLib · Out-of-bounds Write High7.3EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-21897 CryptoLib provides a software-only solution using the CCSDS Space Data Link Security Protocol - Extended Procedures (SDLS-EP) to secure communications between a spacecraft running the core Flight System (cFS) and a ground station. Prior to version 1.4.3, the Crypto_Config_Add_Gvcid_Managed_Parameters function only checks whether gvcid_counter > GVCID_MAN_PARAM_SIZE. As a result, it allows up to the 251st entry, which causes a write past the end of the array, overwriting gvcid_counter located immediately after gvcid_managed_parameters_array[250]. This leads to an out-of-bounds write, and the overwritten gvcid_counter may become an arbitrary value, potentially affecting the parameter lookup/registration logic that relies on it. This issue has been patched in version 1.4.3. | CVE Database V5 |
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