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248 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 10.0 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-6876ServiceNow AI Platform · CWE-693 Critical10.0EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-6876 ServiceNow has remediated a sandbox escape security issue that was identified in the ServiceNow AI Platform. This security issue could allow an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code within the ServiceNow AI Platform, potentially leading to more access to the ServiceNow AI Platform than intended. ServiceNow deployed a security update to hosted instances and ServiceNow provided the update to our partners and self-hosted customers. We are not currently aware of malicious exploitation against ServiceNow instances. We recommend customers promptly apply appropriate updates or upgrade to a patched release if they have not already done so. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer A breach at South Korea's government-backed startup platform exposed encrypted personal data after an encryption key was included in an API. Penta Security explains why encryption keys must be securely managed and kept separate from the data they protect. [...] | Bleeping Computer | |||
| High | 7.2 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-50173Rheosoph flow-like · Incorrect Authorization High7.2EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-50173 Flow-Like is a platform for building end-to-end use cases. Prior to version 1.0.4, `GET /api/v1/apps/{app_id}/invoke/presign` grants Azure Blob Storage SAS credentials with write and delete access to app content to any app member that has `ExecuteEvents`, even when that member lacks `ReadFiles` and `WriteFiles`. The route treats file permissions as optional after the `ExecuteEvents` gate. When the caller has neither file permission, it selects `CredentialsAccess::InvokeNone`. In the Azure credential provider, `InvokeNone` still mints a `content_sas_token` for `apps/{app_id}` with `sp=rwdl`, plus user-content and log SAS tokens. The returned shared credential is enough for the low-privilege caller to directly write or delete blobs under the app content prefix. Version 1.0.4 patches the issue. Flow-Like Studio and the hosted Flow-Like Web App are not affected. These deployments use AWS-backed storage. Self-hosted deployments are only affected if they use Azure Blob Storage as the storage backend. In affected deployments, the issue only applies to authenticated app members who have workflow execution permissions but should not have app file write/delete permissions. Users of affected self-hosted Azure deployments should update to version 1.0.4 or the latest dev branch. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.7 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2025-27621uptrain · Improper Authentication High7.7EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-27621 UpTrain is an open-source platform to evaluate and improve generative AI applications. In version 0.7.1 and prior, the UpTrain backend creates a new default user with a static username, where the username is also used as the default API key. The UpTrain backend also has an open CORS policy. Using these two primitives, any website can make a authenticated cross-origin request to the UpTrain instance by providing the default API key in the header `uptrain-access-token`. This issue may allow arbitrary websites to perform privileged operations on the UpTrain instance, as if they were the default logged in user. As of time of publication, no known patches are available. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Cisco Talos Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. “Experiment is the mother of knowledge.” ― Madeleine L'Engle, A Wrinkle in Time “Don't slide down the rabbit hole. The way down is a breeze, but climbing back's a battle.” ― Kate Morton, The Clockmaker's Daughter Hacker Summer Camp has come and gone, which means it’s time for you to start planning next year’s trip. I’m surely going to recap Camp Season, right? Nope. One of the things that I’ve really enjoyed lately is a segment on the Beers with Talos podcast that we call “Make Hazel a Hacker.” If you haven’t listened to it, this is a perfect time to start. Each episode we take a few minutes and pose a security question, term, or concept to Hazel and force her to come up with an idea or explanation on the spot. There are no parameters, so she’s faced with the entirety of information security — past, present, and future. I know, it’s insane. The craziest part is that (I think) Hazel came up with this idea and still volunteered to put herself in the line of fire. As we put Hazel’s feet to the fire, one of my favorite things happens: The rest of us listen in and offer our thoughts during her brainstorming process. Invariably, we’ve got three very different answers, ideas, hints, or directions for her. It’s surely maddening for Hazel, but to me, the best part of the discussion that inevitably follows is that although they’re all different, they’re all correct. For example, this past episode I asked her about a behavioral indicator (regarding “wallpaper.bmp”) that seems benign on its own, but can be interesting to use as a pivot for a threat hunt. We had various interesting angles to consider, backed by years of knowledge and experience. It gave us a good conversation, and that was a .bmp! One of the most nebulous things to learn in this field is that multiple things can be both different and correct. When you are making your decisions this week — whether it’s deciding on a new pivot in your hunting, what devices to prioritize in your patching and updating, or which books or online training to focus on — take a quick second and get a second, third, and fourth opinion. Then try something that’s outside of your normal wheelhouse but sounds good when it’s proposed. None of this is a solo sport. It’s a team game and the best plays come from a mix of perspectives, experiences, and mistakes. The “right” answer can wear many faces, and your ability to hold different truths will lead you to undiscovered territory, the rabbit hole where anomaly lives and breathes. So... welcome back from Vegas. Now go down a rabbit hole on a path you wouldn’t normally take because one of your friends (Joe) or your mortal enemy (Dave) told you that it would work. “She'd been to Narnia, Wonderland, Hogwarts, Dictionopolis. She had tessered, fallen through the rabbit hole, crossed the ice bridge into the unknown world beyond.” ― Anne Ursu, Breadcrumbs The one big thing Cisco Talos recently discovered "JWR," a previously undocumented, real-time phishing framework and likely variant of "The Outsider" phishing-as-a-service platform. JWR uses an open WebSocket connection that allows attackers to monitor keystrokes live and dynamically steer victims through fake checkout and login flows. Currently deployed via SMS lures impersonating regional toll and postal authorities, JWR enables operators to steal payment data, 2FA codes, identity documents, and device fingerprints. Why do I care? Because JWR is operator-driven in real time, attackers can actively bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) by prompting victims for 2FA codes exactly when needed. The sheer volume of collected data gives threat actors a comprehensive identity profile primed for extensive follow-on fraud and network compromise. Furthermore, JWR's seamless integration with legitimate e-commerce platforms like Shopify makes these lures incredibly convincing to the untrained eye. So now what? Prioritize user education around SMS-based phish… | Cisco Talos | |||
| –Not rated | – | Cisco Talos Cisco Talos recently identified an undocumented phishing framework, internally branded "JWR" by its developer, built to convincingly impersonate checkout and login pages across major payment and shopping platforms. The client engine of the JWR phishing framework is a real-time, operator-driven system that, rather than merely logging form submissions like a static credential-stealing page, keeps an AES-CTR encrypted WebSocket open to the threat actor so they can steer each victim's session live. The victim data targeted by the actor using JWR extends well beyond payment data, encompassing identity documents, Social Security numbers, passport and driver's license images, website and PayPal credentials, 2FA codes, and full device fingerprints, all committed to the actor's server once a session ends. Talos assesses with medium confidence that the JWR phishing framework is a variant of "The Outsider," a phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platform, based on several similarities in the client engine scripts and functionalities of the two PhaaS platforms. Talos observed a real-world campaign delivering the JWR client via SMS lures impersonating toll authorities, and postal and courier services of several countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. JWR phishing framework, a likely variant of the Outsider JWR is a phishing framework capable of harvesting complete payment card data, login credentials, and personally identifiable information (PII) documents and images in real time. The client-side engine of the framework impersonates login, and checkout flows of several payment gateways, including Shopify, PayPal, Apple, Klarna, and banks, while allowing the operator to stealthily control the victim session through an AES-CTR encrypted WebSocket channel. The client engine architecture is divided into a Host Bridge module that relays commands into a phishing inline frame (iframe) and a Vue.js victim application that renders across 44 phishing pages, streams the victim's keystrokes to the actor as they are typed, and carries out more than 40 distinct instructions issued from the command-and-control (C2) console. The data exfiltration schema is a cvvform object that includes fields such as credit card number, CVV, PIN, expiry date, Social Security Number (SSN), passport or ID images, two-factor authentication (2FA) codes, website logins, PayPal credentials, and device fingerprint. Talos discovered that the JWR client engine shares significant code and functional similarities with the client of The Outsider PhaaS platform operated by the Chinese-speaking actor “Outsider Enterprise,” which was reported by external researchers . JWR client architecture and workflow Figure 1. JWR phishing framework’s client engine architecture and execution flow. The execution starts when the parent phishing webpage loads and executes the client's engine. It checks a single global flag, window.__HOST_MODE , which is set by the parent phishing page, and selects one of two execution modes. If the flag is set, the script enters Host Mode, and control passes to the Host Bridge module, an immediately invoked function expression (IIFE) that operates within the parent page, typically a replica of a legitimate checkout or account login page, relaying received details into a child iframe that contains the actual phishing form. It establishes a persistent WebSocket connection to the actor’s C2 server. If the flag is not set, the page enters Content Mode, and control passes to the Vue.js Application, an interactive front end that renders the phishing pages, collects victim input, manages the flow across 44 HTML files, and handles the actor’s instructions from the C2 server, ultimately redirecting to a custom error page after sending the data to the C2. The Content Mode of execution has three communication modes: standalone, pluginIframe, and hostIframe. In standalone mode, the application fully owns its WebSocket connection. In pluginIframe mode, it has no direct link to t… | Cisco Talos | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Adform, a major advertising platform, remained compromised for roughly 24 hours from late on July 26 through the evening of July 27 after being breached by unknown attackers. Few people outside the industry recognize the name, but Adform serves around 1.5 billion ad impressions every day across tens of thousands of websites. That means anyone visiting any site that runs Adform ads could have been targeted. The attackers weren’t trying to install malware. Instead, they ran a script in the victim’s browser that checked the clipboard every three seconds, and if it found a cryptocurrency wallet address had been copied, swapped it for the attackers’ own wallet address. So if someone had a site with the malicious ad open in one browser tab, and was making a crypto transaction in another tab or in a dedicated app, the funds could have ended up in the attackers’ pockets instead. Adform’s owners caught the attack and fixed the problem, but there’s no guarantee a similar incident won’t happen again — which is why every user should defend themselves against malvertising . Check out our tips at the end of this post. What we know about the attack on Adform There isn’t a lot of information out there, since the company’s official statement covers only what happened and when, without getting into the root cause of the incident. Independent research has dug up technical details about how ordinary users were targeted, but none of that explains how Adform itself was breached in the first place. What’s clear is that the attackers slipped their own code into the JavaScript that loaded on every site running Adform ads. Whenever an ad was about to display, the script would load from Adform’s server, pick the right ad, and show it — but the attackers had tacked on a set of malicious functions: monitoring the clipboard, sending data about the site where the encounter happened, and the victim’s IP address back to their own server, and swapping out Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Tron wallet addresses. All it took to make it work was having any site with Adform-served ads open in one browser tab. It didn’t matter what kind of site it was, what the ad looked like, or which advertiser it belonged to. The one thing that mattered was whether the site ran over HTTP or HTTPS. According to Adform, the attack couldn’t succeed on a site loaded over HTTPS since the connection to the attackers’ server was blocked in this case. The company hasn’t shared any information on how many users were affected, or how many sites still serve their content and ads over HTTP. Malicious ads are an everyday occurrence Unfortunately, dangerous online ads have become a systemic problem. And we’re not just talking about sketchy supplement ads or gambling promos — we mean ads that spread malware or lead to sites designed to steal payment details and other valuable data. Attackers have built out industrial-scale infrastructure to pull this off, and they use several different approaches. Hacking and compromising ad servers. Adform isn’t an isolated case: attackers have previously breached Revive ad servers , for one, and spread malware through ads on PornHub . Hijacking the ad accounts of legitimate, reputable brands . All it takes is stealing a password from someone in marketing. From there, the cybercriminals run ads posing as the company they hacked, pushing fake app updates, bogus promotions, and similar scams. In the worst cases — like the account breaches at adtech.de and adxpansion.com — attackers managed to run ads that redirected victims straight into automatic malware installs ( drive-by downloads ). Buying ads directly. That’s right — attackers simply set up their own advertiser accounts and run ads for their phishing sites and malware, just like any other business online. Since ads show up practically everywhere — on websites, in apps, and on social media — these threats can turn up in pretty much any context. And you’ll find variations of this threat on both computers and mobile de… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog Security teams are being asked to defend a growing attack surface with fewer people and around the clock, against threat actors who never take a night off. As cyberattackers increasingly use AI to launch and scale campaigns, the volume, speed, and sophistication of threats continue to rise. Closing that gap takes more than tooling. It takes a partner that pairs a leading security platform with scaled intelligence and human experts who can act on your behalf at any hour. That’s exactly what Microsoft Defender Experts MDR is built to do. We are excited to announce that we have been named a Leader in the 2026 IDC MarketScape: Worldwide MDR/MXDR for the Enterprise Vendor Assessment (Doc #US54792426, July 2026). Read the excerpt here . Scale your SOC with Microsoft Defender Experts MDR Expert-led MDR, built on the Microsoft Defender platform Microsoft Defender Experts MDR is a round-the-clock, expert-led managed detection and response service that helps security teams triage, investigate, and respond to incidents so they can stop cyberattackers in their tracks and prevent future compromise. Rather than bolting a separate stack of tools and connectors onto your environment, the service operates natively on Microsoft Defender , with built-in protection across endpoints, identities, email, cloud apps, cloud workloads, and network security, as well as around-the-clock proactive threat hunting with Microsoft Defender Experts Hunting . Because the service is delivered on the same platform it monitors, detection and intelligence improvements reach customers continuously. The insights our experts generate also strengthen protection across the broader Defender ecosystem, so every customer benefits from what we learn defending the next environment. The IDC MarketScape vendor assessment model is designed to provide an overview of the competitive fitness of technology and service suppliers in a given market. The research uses a rigorous scoring methodology based on both qualitative and quantitative criteria that results in a single graphical illustration of each supplier’s position within a given market. The Capabilities axis measures supplier product, go-to-market, and business execution in the short term, while the Strategy axis measures how well a supplier’s strategy aligns with customer requirements over a 3-5-year timeframe. Supplier market share is represented by the size of the icons . Threat intelligence at internet scale Great detection starts with great intelligence. Defender Experts MDR draws on Microsoft’s global threat intelligence: more than 10,000 security researchers and 100 trillion signals analyzed every day across billions of users and millions of organizations. 1 That breadth lets our analysts recognize subtle patterns early, often before a campaign escalates, and respond with higher-confidence attribution than intelligence sourced from any single customer’s telemetry could provide. AI-accelerated operations, expert-led decisions Defender Experts MDR also combines advanced AI and generative AI with seasoned human experts. AI filters noise, grades and classifies incidents, and accelerates investigation at machine speed and scale, while our analysts own the outcome. According to the IDC MarketScape, “70% AI-assisted workflows are enabled through automated noise filtering, AI-based grading, and agentic operations while maintaining expert decision-making.” Furthermore, “quantified outcomes noted include 97% AI classification accuracy, 77% malware/phishing agent-investigated, 72% faster resolution combining AI and humans, and 45% autonomous investigations.” The impact shows up in the work. Over the past year, Defender Experts mitigated 27,000 high-severity incidents, and the team’s threat research now contributes a meaningful share of all Defender detections, enriching protection for customers well beyond the MDR service itself. Throughout, a dedicated security delivery expert and on-demand access to our experts keep customers i… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.4% | High8.8EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48169 PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 of the PraisonAI Platform API have two authorization failures that together break workspace isolation. The service layer for issues and projects performs global primary-key lookups without checking workspace ownership, so any authenticated user can read, modify, and delete resources in any workspace just by swapping UUIDs in their API requests. On top of that, every member management endpoint (add, update role, remove) only requires `min_role="member"`, which lets any workspace member promote themselves to owner and kick out the original owner. A low-privilege member of one workspace can steal data from every other workspace and take over any workspace they belong to. Both issues come from the same gap: the route layer pulls `workspace_id` from the URL and verifies membership, but the service layer ignores the workspace scope for resource lookups and ignores the caller's role level for member operations. The `require_workspace_member()` dependency does its job correctly. The problem is that the service layer doesn't use the information it provides. Version 0.1.4 of the PraisonAI Platform API patch the issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Tenable Research Agentic AI armed attackers first, but it also put real building power in defenders’ hands. Here’s what security practitioners built in two days at Black Hat USA 2026, and how the CyberAgents Exchange keeps that work compounding long after the event. Key takeaways Building defensive cybersecurity tooling no longer requires a developer. Agentic tooling drove the cost of finding and exploiting a vulnerability down to 1990s levels; it also removed the engineering barrier that kept defenders from building the automation they’ve always wanted. The unglamorous work won the room: triage, reconciliation, toil. Given two days and a requirement to publish, practitioners at SWARM developed agents for prioritization, cross-tool reconciliation, and the unglamorous toil they recognize from their own environments. All SWARM builds live on the CyberAgents Exchange , source repos attached. Every component built at SWARM is published open source with its source repository attached, so the next team facing the same problem starts from working code instead of a blank editor. Another security team already built the AI agent you need You may not realize it, but somewhere out in the ether, there’s a security team facing the same challenge as you. The only difference is they just solved the problem with agentic AI. The problem is, you have no way to find out the solution even exists. It could be an asset inventory that three systems describe in three different ways; a findings queue nobody has the hours to work; or a “critical” that a platform upgrade quietly neutralized six months ago, still sitting there waiting for someone to prove it. Somebody has already built the thing you keep meaning to build. Now it’s time we help you find it. At Black Hat USA 2026, nearly 100 registrants had the opportunity to come together for 48 hours and solve both halves of that problem: identifying a key operational pain point and building the fix. Problems like those got solved at SWARM, and the fixes are sitting on the CyberAgents Exchange right now, open source, with their source repositories attached. One team built the agent that works out which handful of fixes retires the most risk across thousands of findings. Another correlated two scanners to tell whether a flaw in the code is even reachable in the running application. A third made the case that a finding had already been mitigated, with evidence an auditor would accept. You can download and deploy any of them today. Agentic AI doesn’t just arm attackers Black Hat’s keynote stage spent this year focused on one theme: the plummeting cost of cyber offense in the agentic AI era. The price for an attacker to find and exploit a vulnerability is at lows the industry hasn’t seen since the 1990s, when a working exploit meant weeks of expert reverse engineering. Now all it takes is an afternoon and a subscription. The artisanal exploit isn’t rare anymore. True. But neither is the defender who can build. The same agentic tooling that’s arming attackers puts real building power in everyone’s hands, and that half of the story got almost no airtime. Security automation used to require the work and ongoing maintenance of skilled engineers. Now practitioners who understand the problem can build the fix. Inside the conference room at the Mandalay Bay where Tenable hosted our inaugural SWARM event, the proof of that was on every table. The winning ranking engine ships as a skill that runs on the Python standard library alone — no packages, no install step, no build pipeline. Point it at the bundled demo estate and it answers “what should we fix first?” in seconds. That’s a deliverable a practitioner can produce and a colleague can run, and two days was enough. The attacker-defender asymmetry doesn’t stem from a lack of talent or willingness. Offensive cyber capabilities compound because the tooling circulates: it’s built once, forked, passed on, or sold to the next threat actor to leverage in their attack. Meanwhile, defenders… | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog As organizations adopt AI, they must secure both cloud and AI environments through a unified security control plane as their attack surface expands. Because modern applications and AI workloads are built and run in the cloud, security teams must understand which exposures matter most, prioritize what can truly be exploited, and reduce risk across cloud infrastructure, applications, identities, data, and AI systems in one place. Modern IT estates now span multiple clouds and on-premises systems, with architectures built on containers, Kubernetes, serverless functions, microservices, APIs, and AI-powered workloads. This increases both the volume and the interconnectedness of security signals. The challenge is no longer identifying individual risks, but determining how misconfigurations, identities, and data exposures combine to create real attack paths, and which of these are most critical to fix at the source. KuppingerCole’s Leadership Compass: Cloud Native Application Protection Platforms (CNAPP) reflects this shift. The report describes how CNAPP is evolving from a consolidation of cloud security tools into the security foundation for AI-native enterprises, combining cloud security, AI security posture management, runtime protection, attack path analysis, cloud detection and response, and agentic AI operations into unified platforms. Read the full report Within this evolving market, KuppingerCole names Microsoft a Leader across all four of its Leadership categories: Overall, Product, Innovation, and Market. In the report’s words: “Microsoft earns its Overall Leadership with its Defender for Cloud that is redefining the CNAPP market by extending cloud security beyond infrastructure protection and into a unified security platform for cloud, data, identity, AI, and security operations, supported by one of the industry’s most advanced agentic AI ecosystems.” That recognition reflects where the category is heading: toward platforms that unify cloud and AI security into one operational view of risk. Why CNAPP is being redefined KuppingerCole makes a clear point: CNAPP is no longer about posture or visibility alone. It is becoming the operational foundation for securing AI-powered applications, services, and business processes, across the full software lifecycle from cloud infrastructure to the AI systems running on top of it. Modern environments introduce complexity across: Multicloud and hybrid infrastructure. Rapid development and continuous deployment. Containers, serverless, microservices, and APIs. AI models, agents, pipelines, and machine identities. This complexity exposes the limits of traditional, siloed tools, where cloud posture, workload protection, AI security, and the security operations center (SOC) each live in their own console. Organizations now need platforms that can: Correlate posture, runtime, identity, data, application, and AI signals. Prioritize risk based on exploitability, not severity alone. Integrate security across development, cloud operations, and the SOC. Bring AI systems into the same risk model as the rest of the cloud. Runtime intelligence is now central to this shift. Across the platforms KuppingerCole evaluated, 94% detect active exploitation of the complex attack paths they surface, moving teams from long lists of findings to the exposures threat actors can actually use. What distinguishes leading platforms KuppingerCole evaluates providers on product strength, innovation, and market presence, and, more importantly, on how effectively they help organizations manage real risk across cloud and AI. Several themes define the next generation of platforms: AI security posture management that governs models, pipelines, and AI-specific attack paths. Agentic AI that investigates, validates exposures, and helps remediate, not just detect. Runtime-driven risk prioritization focused on what is exploitable in production. Security graphs and attack path analysis across identity, data, network, workload, an… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (42180a034d43d3c6d16e223fe6fcd93f6e403f0c73c763e9b21b6aded0545274) On npm install, postinstall.mjs enumerates platform-specific sibling package names of the form opencode-engos-<platform>-<arch>[-baseline][-musl], resolves each to the current 'latest' tag via `npm view <name> version`, installs the resolved version into a temp directory, then copies the fetched 'opencode' binary into the wrapper's bin/ with chmod 755. The fetched artifact is not pinned to a specific version and is not hash- or signature-verified, so whatever the publisher of the sibling packages pushes to 'latest' at install time is what executes on the installer's host. The sibling package names are not declared in the manifest's optionalDependencies, so they are resolved by name rather than through the reviewable dependency graph. In addition, createSymlinks() writes symlinks at /usr/local/bin/innexarcode and /usr/bin/innexarcode pointing at the fetched binary — a name that matches neither the package name (opencode-engos-ai), its declared bin entry (opencode-engos), nor any documented CLI, placing an unrelated command into the installer's system PATH. The package name also resembles the existing 'opencode' AI CLI. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Microsoft Security Blog The calculus of cybersecurity has changed. AI is reshaping how organizations build, deploy, operate, and defend digital systems. AI-powered development tools, agents, and autonomous workflows are accelerating innovation but they are also introducing new attack surfaces, new trust boundaries, and new security challenges. Microsoft has long helped organizations secure their digital estates using Zero Trust principles . That leadership was recently recognized by KuppingerCole analysts, which named Microsoft as the Overall Leader in its Zero Trust Platform Leadership Compass , ranking Microsoft highest for both product and innovation leadership. Learn more about Zero Trust for AI As organizations accelerate AI adoption, secure software development becomes more important than ever. That’s why we are expanding the Zero Trust for AI strategy with two major additions: a new AI-focused Zero Trust Assessment experience and a new DevSecOps pillar in the Zero Trust Workshop . Together, they help organizations get ready for AI by assessing exposure, risks, prioritizing remediation, and securing AI-enabled development from source code to deployment. Zero Trust Assessment tool updates: New set of assessment checks for AI, Security Operations (SecOps), and Infrastructure. Zero Trust Workshop updates: New dedicated pillar focused on Developer Security (DevSecOps) and additional guidance for AI Memory. New guidance: New practical guidance for security practitioners and a new e-book titled Zero Trust for AI, rebuilding security controls for autonomous and agentic systems . This builds directly on the Zero Trust for AI strategy announced at RSA Conference 2026 and moves the conversation from architecture to implementation. If that announcement was about establishing Zero Trust for AI, this one is about operationalizing it: giving security, engineering, and platform teams the specific controls they need to act. To learn more about our work in applying Zero Trust for AI and agents watch this Microsoft Mechanics video: New AI pillar in Zero Trust Assessment tool The Zero Trust Assessment provides an automated view of security posture by evaluating tenant configuration and activity signals across the environment and translating those findings into prioritized recommendations. As organizations adopt AI agents, Copilots, developer tools, and autonomous workflows, the Assessment helps security and platform teams establish a baseline, measure progress, and identify gaps across both traditional and AI-powered environments. It now includes expanded coverage with new pillars for AI, Security Operations, and Infrastructure (in addition to existing Identity, Devices, Network, and Data pillars), with Zero Trust for AI-focused checks that help organizations evaluate the controls required for secure AI adoption. Additionally, enhanced reporting delivers both practitioner-level guidance and executive-ready summaries that communicate risk, progress, and next steps. Results map directly into the Zero Trust Workshop’s First, Then, Next framework, transforming assessment findings into a prioritized roadmap for remediation and implementation. Together, the Assessment and Workshop help organizations move from understanding risk to executing a structured plan for continuous improvement across their Zero Trust and AI security journey. Explore the Zero Trust Assessment updates What’s New in the Zero Trust Workshop AI is fundamentally changing software development. Developers increasingly rely on AI assistants to generate code, recommend packages, create infrastructure configurations, and automate testing. While these capabilities accelerate delivery, they also amplify the consequences of governance gaps, excessive permissions, insecure dependencies, and compromised supply chains. That is why Microsoft is introducing a new DevSecOps pillar (with 15 control groups and 91 tasks that help teams apply Zero Trust from source code to cloud deployment) in the Zero Trust Workshop.… | Microsoft Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Cisco Talos Actor usage of AI is exploding. By analyzing artifacts left behind, Talos has created a detailed analysis of how we are seeing adversaries leverage the technology to include development, force multiplication, and vulnerability research. Based on the evidence Talos gathered, guardrails did not provide much protection, with most actors able to convince the models to comply despite the lack of sophisticated techniques or encoding. The pre-existing skill of the actor has a large impact on what they can accomplish with AI. Talos observed novice users able to create malicious capabilities, albeit with limited capabilities and success. Advanced users were able to build astonishing capabilities, pushing the models to create sophisticated and complex outputs. Artificial intelligence (AI) and associated language models are now ubiquitous and heavily used in both personal and professional contexts to streamline tasks and expand capabilities. With AI being used everywhere and by almost everyone, one of the biggest questions is how malicious actors are taking advantage. Fortunately, actors make mistakes and chatbots leave artifacts. Leveraging cloud-based AI models leaves behind a variety of artifacts, most notably a prompt log. These logs can take on a variety of shapes and sizes, but they are left on endpoints that are running various applications, such as Claude Code, CodeX, Cursor, or Gemini. Over the course of our research, we’ve collected a significant corpus of these files and can start discussing the ways we see bad actors leveraging these technologies. In conducting the research, three categories of activity emerged. One was using AI as a malicious software engineer, leveraging AI to write (in some cases) very sophisticated code with clear malicious intentions. Another was actors leveraging AI to scale criminal operations and campaigns. Finally, there were a lot of actors leveraging it for bug bounty or vulnerability research, rapidly accelerating their capabilities of discovery and disclosure. Each category demonstrates how threat actors are currently leveraging AI. Within each category is a wide disparity in sophistication based on the knowledge level of the actors involved. We tried to include use cases to cover the breadth of what we found. Takeaways and high-level findings With the recent disclosures from Hugging Face and OpenAI , it's clear the era of agentic attackers has effectively arrived. In that incident, the models were operating inside a sanctioned evaluation with safeguards deliberately relaxed — but they autonomously escaped their sandbox, found and chained real vulnerabilities, and compromised production infrastructure to reach their objective. The capabilities exist; the only missing ingredient is malicious intent, and it's a matter of time before threat actors supply it. For defenders, this is a wake-up call: Vulnerabilities will surface faster, exploitation will happen sooner, and the actors behind it won't need rest or downtime. As the case studies below show, the central challenge for guardrails right now is supporting legitimate dual-use work — red teaming and vulnerability research — without empowering malicious actors. One of the immediate takeaways is that guardrails are not functioning as expected. We did not encounter any sophisticated encoding or techniques designed to trick the models — most of the time it was a simple “I'm allowed to do this,” and the model complied. When guardrails did engage, they accomplished little. In one instance, we watched an actor abandon a censored model and pivot to an uncensored version, which completed the task without question. In another, a model pushed back on a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) operator, but by that point the tooling had already been built. This wasn't specific to a single model or platform; it was across the board. The other big takeaway is that an actor's skill level largely determines how effectively AI can be leveraged and how much impact it u… | Cisco Talos | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated scam is spreading through WhatsApp that exploits the platform's legitimate 'Linked devices' feature to take over user accounts. Attackers compromise existing accounts and send messages to contacts asking them to vote for a friend or relative in various online contests. When victims click the provided link, they are redirected through pages appearing to be WhatsApp-related, often using the legitimate wa.me domain. The attack tricks users into authorizing a new linked session, granting attackers full access to read messages, send messages as the victim, and access contacts. The scam is particularly effective because it comes from known contacts and relies on trust and quick reactions. Once compromised, attackers can continue the scam by messaging the victim's contacts, creating a chain of account takeovers without triggering traditional security alerts. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Medium | 6.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-48115misskey · Improper Authorization Medium6.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-48115 Misskey is an open source, federated social media platform. All Misskey servers running versions 2024.5.0 and later, but prior to 2026.5.4, contain a vulnerability in the Server Announcements API where insufficient permission checks allow attackers to access limited portions of data that they normally couldn't view. This vulnerability occurs whether or not federation is enabled. This issue has been fixed in version 2026.5.4. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Mac users have historically trusted their operating system to keep them safe. That peace of mind mostly comes from Apple’s strict control over its ecosystem, and the fact that macOS has historically faced fewer mass attacks than Windows. However, that doesn’t mean Macs are invulnerable: threats do exist, and new ones emerge all the time. Over just the past few weeks, security researchers have published reports on at least two new campaigns that target Apple devices. The malware used in one of the campaigns has been dubbed CrashStealer , while the other is known as ClickLock . Both rely on different tricks to force users into entering their Mac password, which attackers then use to steal account credentials, crypto assets, documents, and much more. In today’s post, we take a close look at how CrashStealer operates — and how to avoid falling victim to it. A videoconferencing app with CrashStealer inside It was back in May 2026 that researchers spotted the first signs this malware was being developed, and by early July, they caught it operating in the wild. The malware earned its name because of its core mechanism: it disguises itself as the macOS built-in crash reporting tool (CrashReporter) while functioning as an infostealer designed to hijack sensitive data. Researchers managed to trace one of the websites users visited to download the malware. The site poses as a legitimate platform for distributing the video conferencing tool Werkbit. According to researchers, this is the site victims used to download Werkbit, which secretly contained the CrashStealer malware loader. Source However, you can’t just visit the site and download the software. Before downloading, visitors are asked to enter a special meeting PIN. This setup likely allows the attackers to limit the distribution scope by targeting only specific, pre-selected victims. Exactly how the cybercriminals choose their targets and deliver the PIN remains unknown. The “lucky” users with a code end up installing the initial malicious payload — named Werkbit Setup. Interestingly, it carries a valid Apple developer certificate and has successfully passed Apple’s notarization process — meaning it cleared the automated prescan for malicious code. As a result, the attackers manage to bypass the operating system’s built-in Gatekeeper defense. This allows the payload to launch without triggering the usual untrusted software warnings. The Werkbit Setup installer is signed with a valid Apple developer certificate and has passed notarization. Source Once launched, Werkbit Setup first reaches out to GitHub. Researchers believe using this popular platform helps attackers blend in by making these initial network requests look far less suspicious to security tools. After retrieving instructions from a GitHub repository, the program connects directly to the attackers’ server to fetch CrashStealer itself. The loader then saves the malware to a temporary macOS folder, launches it, and wipes most of the intermediate setup files. As a result, a fully functional infostealer is up and running within seconds of Werkbit Setup starting. By the way, the user never gets any videoconferencing app. How CrashStealer works Unlike the Werkbit Setup loader, the CrashStealer malware itself isn’t signed with an Apple developer certificate. To keep users from suspecting anything, the malware disguises itself as the built-in macOS crash reporting tool, CrashReporter, by using the exact same name, app identifier, and a similar icon. Once launched, CrashStealer completes a sequence of steps to gain access to sensitive data, establish persistence in the system, and cover its tracks: Remove metadata — including the attribute that flags the app as an internet download. Display a fake system prompt asking for the user’s macOS password. Use the previously captured credentials to gain access to Keychain, the built-in macOS password manager. Check the computer for installed security tools and malware analysis software.… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Sooner or later, every company faces the need to upgrade its infrastructure — whether to accommodate expansion, optimize processes, or keep up with the latest trends in IT. When such a decision is made, company management typically thinks first and foremost about broad changes at the platform level — assuming that applications can simply be reinstalled and everything will work as before. And to a certain extent, that’s actually true. In an era when corporate security could be ensured solely by antivirus software on workstations, that would have worked; however, modern cyberthreats require protection at a fundamentally different level. In this post, we explore why platform migration should be discussed with the security team as well, and why simply “installing a program” isn’t enough to ensure modern-day protection. Security is no longer just a single program In the past, securing endpoints was enough to prevent most attacks. In today’s environment, endpoint protection is just one layer of cybersecurity. A modern extended detection and response (XDR) solution isn’t a single application installed on a computer; it’s a set of components that work in conjunction. They provide protection for workstations and servers, event logging and storing, infrastructure-level threat detection mechanisms, investigation tools, automated response, reporting, and asset management. Each component serves a specific purpose and places different demands on the hardware and platform. For the event storage system , disk speed is the most critical factor. In a large company, the security system generates millions of records per day, and all of them must be written quickly and then retrieved just as quickly when needed. The bottleneck here usually isn’t processor capabilities, but rather how fast the system can read and write data. Threat detection requires computing power. The system compares events in real time and determines what can be a sign of an attack, and what is normal operational activity. Response time is critical for investigation tools . When an analyst investigates an incident and pieces together what happened, they work in real time, and every second of waiting adds to the overall response time to the attack. What does this mean? When a company switches platforms, it’s not enough to simply verify that the company’s existing cybersecurity solutions support the new architecture. The answer “yes, it’s supported” is too vague. It’s essential to clearly understand exactly which parts of the cybersecurity architecture are supported — starting from which version, and what is still under development. What to ask before it’s too late To avoid unexpected complications during implementation and operation, we recommend asking the right questions in advance — during the planning phase. Here are those questions: Which specific components have been tested on the new platform? The question shouldn’t be phrased as “Is the platform supported?”; the compatibility of each part of the system should be verified. Different components of a modern information-security solution operate under different rules, which is why their compatibility is tested separately. A one-word “yes” answer should raise a red flag: a reputable vendor will always provide a detailed response — including a list of components and any caveats (where applicable). Will there be sufficient resources to handle the company’s workload? “It will run” and “it will handle needed data volume” are two fundamentally different statements. The former is verified in a lab on a test bench; the latter depends on how many events specific infrastructure generates per day, and how long the company is required to retain them under regulatory or internal policies. It makes sense to ask the vendor for recommendations on calculating resources based on specific data volumes rather than relying on general minimum resource requirements when planning. Is the security solution up to date? It’s always important to clearl… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security Security experts have been sounding the alarm for years about the risks of using generic TV boxes that promise unlimited content streaming for a one-time fee, warning that they secretly rent the user’s Internet connection out to strangers. But a groundbreaking new analysis finds these devices also routinely spoof themselves as mobile phones clicking ads on AI-generated websites as part of a sprawling operation that seeks to defraud online merchants and advertising networks. Pedro Falé is a threat researcher with the security firm Bitsight . Falé told KrebsOnSecurity he was able to peer inside a vast and complex ad fraud network by registering an expired domain name that was used to coordinate fake ad clicks across a particularly popular brand of these streaming devices known as H96 . An H96 TV streaming device currently advertised for sale on Amazon. Falé said the domain he scooped up was previously used for telemetry, periodically collecting full hardware information and the entire list of installed apps from tens of thousands of H96 streaming sticks plugged into television sets around the globe. But upon inspecting the traffic being funneled to the domain, he discovered nearly all of the TV boxes transmitting data claimed to be mobile phone models from a variety of manufacturers, including Samsung, Vivo, Huawei, and Xiaomi. “We noticed something was wildly wrong,” Falé said. “Multiple devices reporting to this factory Android TV Box backdoor were ‘phones.'” Image: Bitsight. The researcher found all of the devices reported having the same two apps installed, and that those apps were made by a company called Zhejiang Fengwo IoT Technology Ltd , an entity founded in 2019 in mainland China which operates an ad-publishing portfolio under the name Fengwo Group . Further investigation into the Fengwo Group revealed it has registered multiple patents that match the inner workings of these apps. “Bitsight TRACE identified several Hong Kong, Singapore, and single person ‘legal’ shell identities used to collect the monetization and traced the operation back to a mainland China company known as Zhejiang Fengwo IoT Technology Co., Ltd, which operates under the Fengwo Group,” Falé wrote in a report released today about their findings. Falé said an analysis of the apps shows they help to coordinate an ad fraud network that uses these H96 devices as a captive traffic source to click on ads at AI-generated websites operated by the Fengwo Group. Bitsight discovered the websites contain machine-generated news articles and graphics across a range of categories, including finance, health, education, gaming, music and food blogs. But they also found none of those sites displayed ads unless the device visiting the page matched the spoofed mobile profile of these H96 devices. AI DIGITAL HUMANS The domain for the Fengwo Group — fwgcloud[.]com — claims the company is “redefining the boundaries of human-AI interaction,” and that it has created more than 120,000 “AI digital humans” available to rent for everything from emotional companionship to 24/7 customer service and creative design. The homepage for fwgcloud dot com. Falé said the Fengwo Group’s domain shared its SSL certificate data with other domains associated with the apps found on H96 devices, specifically the phone spoofing mechanism. He noted the domain also has an internal wiki platform that directly ties the Fengwo Group to a proprietary implementation of a Google-built visual programming language called Blockly , which was originally designed to help kids learn how to write software. According to Bitsight, the Fengwo Group’s employees use Blockly to build the sham websites, allowing low-skilled operators to drag blocks of code together in their Blockly editor — without any need to understand what the underlying code blocks do or how they work. The Blockly homepage. “An operator can drag blocks together in their Blockly editor, to define each fraud routine, given a task type,” reads Bitsi… | Krebs on Security | |||
| Critical | – | CriticalTenable Research Canada’s new Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (Bill C-8) introduces a strict 72-hour cyber incident reporting mandate. Find out how Tenable is helping critical national infrastructure operators bridge the IT/OT divide to ensure full compliance. Key takeaways: Bill C-8 introduces stringent new cyber incident reporting requirements and heavy financial penalties for critical infrastructure operators. Eliminating network blind spots with a hybrid IT/OT discovery approach, including Safe Active Querying for isolated, hard-to-reach process-control systems, enables operators to establish a required security baseline. Predictive Vulnerability Priority Rating (VPR) scoring helps you prioritize and focus limited resources on the critical flaws that actually threaten physical safety and uptime. Advanced multi-detection engines and seamless IT workflow integrations accelerate mean-time-to-respond (MTTR) to help both security teams and operators align with a strict 72-hour reporting requirement. With the enactment of Canada’s Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA), commonly known as Bill C-8, the Canadian federal government is laying down a clear framework to protect the cyber-physical systems that are vital to national critical infrastructure security. For designated operators in telecommunications, energy, transportation, and banking, the mandate is clear: Establish formalized cybersecurity programs, mitigate supply chain risks, and — most critically — report cyber incidents to authorities within 72 hours. Failure to comply carries heavy consequences, including penalties that can reach up to $15 million Canadian dollars (CAD). But beyond the threat of fines, Bill C-8 highlights a fundamental operational challenge that many industrial organizations are still struggling to solve: How can you detect, investigate, and report a breach in 72 hours when you lack unified visibility across your converged IT and OT environments? Requirements for meeting Bill C-8's 72-hour incident reporting mandate In modern industrial operations and critical infrastructure, the line between IT and OT continues to blur. The introduction of connectivity (e.g., IoT-connected cameras and building management systems) has optimized processes and service delivery, but it has also introduced new cyber exposures. Today, threat actors do not honor traditional network silos; they frequently compromise a web-facing IT asset or IoT device and move laterally into the operational technology (OT) environment to disrupt physical processes. Meeting a 72-hour incident reporting window is nearly impossible if your security team is relying on fragmented point solutions. Solutions that focus exclusively on passive OT network monitoring often leave massive blind spots — especially considering that IT and IoT devices can constitute up to 50% of an industrial environment. When an incident occurs, teams waste precious hours manually correlating alerts across disconnected tools rather than actively investigating the root cause. To comply with CCSPA and protect uptime, critical national infrastructure (CNI) operators must bridge the IT/OT security divide. Establish your CCSPA cybersecurity baseline The CCSPA requires operators to implement formalized cybersecurity programs. The foundation of any mature security program is a comprehensive asset inventory — you cannot secure what you cannot see. The Tenable One Exposure Management Platform helps organizations eliminate security blind spots by building a complete, unified inventory of all OT, IoT, and IT assets. Tenable goes beyond passive-only network monitoring with our proprietary Safe Active Query technology. This hybrid approach safely communicates with industrial devices in their native protocols to uncover significantly more assets than passive monitoring alone — including dormant process control systems, shadow IT, and unmanaged IoT — without disrupting process integrity or impacting equipment uptime. Prioritize what matter… | Tenable Research |
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