Search: sc.exe
382 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.2% | CVE-2026-81572wibu-systems-ag codemeter-runtime · Link Following High7.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-81572 CodeMeter Runtime versions 8.40 up to but not including 8.41a and 9.00 up to but not including 9.10 contain a vulnerability where the cmu.exe process creates a predictable temporary file under C:\CM-Stick without properly checking for NTFS reparse points such as junctions or symbolic links. This improper link resolution can allow a local attacker to create a junction pointing to an arbitrary system path, potentially causing deletion of arbitrary files with System privileges and enabling local privilege escalation. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package chalk-util@1.0.0 is a typosquatting malicious package that executes harmful code during installation. Its postinstall script decodes and downloads a binary from an attacker-controlled URL, saving it as main.exe on Windows or executing it via PowerShell on Linux. It also sends a beacon with platform information to a hardcoded IP address over unencrypted HTTP. The package exports an empty object, with all malicious activity triggered by the postinstall lifecycle hook. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'dev-env-check' version 1.0.3 contains malicious code that executes during installation on Windows systems. It uses a postinstall hook to run a PowerShell command that downloads and executes a file named msedge_update.exe from a suspicious external URL, impersonating a Microsoft Edge update. The malicious behavior is obfuscated using XOR encoding with misleading comments. The package falsely advertises itself as a development environment validator but performs unauthorized remote code execution. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The typscript-core npm package is a typosquatting malicious package impersonating the legitimate 'typescript' package. Its postinstall script decodes and reconstructs obfuscated commands to download and execute a binary named main.exe on Windows systems. It also sends platform information to a hardcoded IP address. This behavior indicates an attempt to stealthily install and run potentially harmful code during package installation. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'typecript-cli' version 1.0.0 is a typosquatting malicious package impersonating 'typescript'. Its postinstall script performs an install-time dropper attack by downloading and executing an unsigned executable from a personal GitHub repository. It uses obfuscation techniques such as XOR-decoding payload strings and assembling IP addresses from split arrays to evade detection. On Windows, it downloads and runs 'main.exe' without verification. Under Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), it escapes the Linux sandbox to execute the same payload via PowerShell. The script also sends a beacon with platform information to a hardcoded IP address, likely for command and control or host selection purposes. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A phishing campaign targets Indian organizations by impersonating the Indian Income Tax Department. Victims receive emails containing links to spoofed notice pages that download ZIP archives. These archives include a legitimately signed Overwolf executable and two hidden files: a malicious DLL and an encrypted binary. When executed, the signed binary side-loads the malicious DLL through DLL hijacking. The DLL is UPX-packed and modified with Astral-PE, and decrypts the binary file containing ValleyRAT. The payload uses modified RC4 encryption with a 115-byte key and deploys entirely in memory. Once active, ValleyRAT establishes persistence through scheduled tasks masquerading as OneDrive entries, marks dropped files as hidden and system files, and performs process hollowing into svchost.exe to evade detection before connecting to command and control infrastructure. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-15585AKIN Software Computer Import Export Industry and Trade AKINSOFT Wolvox9 ERP / KontrolPanel.exe · Path Traversal High7.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-15585 CVE-2026-15585 is a path traversal vulnerability in AKINSOFT Wolvox9 ERP's KontrolPanel.exe component. It allows an attacker to improperly access files outside of a restricted directory. The vulnerability affects versions from s26.02.17 up to but not including 26.02.22. The CVSS score is 7.5, indicating high severity. There is no information about available patches or vendor advisories. No known exploits are reported in the wild. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A China-nexus threat actor is targeting Myanmar government personnel and diplomats through Operation QUICSILVER, delivering malware via Virtual Hard Disk files disguised as JPEG images. The campaign uses Burmese-language lures impersonating Myanmar's Information Technology and Cyber Security Department, including graduation ceremony invitations. The multi-stage infection chain begins with a malicious LNK file that abuses ftp.exe to execute scripts, reconstructs payloads from split files, and deploys QUICAgent, a custom Go-based backdoor. The implant retrieves C2 infrastructure through Cloudflare Workers, communicates over HTTP/3 using QUIC protocol, and employs RC4 encryption. Deleted documents recovered from the VHD reveal interest in ASEAN affairs, BIMSTEC, and Myanmar diplomatic activities. Three related campaigns were identified between April and July 2026, sharing similar TTPs and infrastructure. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c027fa29f4577bd052bfda553a617994365ea5855216b877e900610542f4bcce) On require/import, the package spawns a bundled 1.1 MB Windows executable at vendor/nanocache.exe as a detached background process with stdio ignored, windowsHide set, and child.unref() so it survives parent exit. The declared purpose is an in-memory LRU+TTL cache, which does not require a native background process, and the binary is not built from source shipped in the tarball. Strings inside the executable include `/ws/agent`, `disconnect`, `update`, and `exit_code`, consistent with a WebSocket-based remote agent that accepts commands from a remote controller. The README further describes vendor/nanocache.exe as a drop-in slot for an arbitrary Windows executable, indicating the npm module functions as a generic launcher for the bundled binary. Installing or importing the package on a Windows host results in an opaque, hidden native process being launched under a cache-library cover story, giving a remote party persistent control over the installer's machine. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General HoneyMyte APT group (also known as Mustang Panda) has significantly upgraded its CoolClient backdoor with kernel-level rootkit capabilities. The latest variant deploys a signed kernel-mode driver (msagent.sys) as a Windows service, enabling advanced stealth features including process hiding, file and registry protection, and network traffic filtering. The multi-stage malware uses DLL sideloading through a legitimate Sangfor application, establishes persistence via scheduled tasks and AutoRun entries, and implements UAC bypass techniques. CoolClient now injects into synchost.exe and communicates with the kernel driver through IOCTL requests. The driver hooks Nsiproxy to filter C2 addresses from network information. Victims have been identified in Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Russia, with PlugX serving as the initial infection vector before CoolClient deployment. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2024-22190Nbdime · Untrusted search path under some conditions on Windows allows arbitrary code execution High7.8EPSS 0.3%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2024-22190 CVE-2024-22190 is a vulnerability in nbdime affecting Windows platforms where GitPython uses an untrusted search path to run git or bash.exe, allowing arbitrary code execution. This occurs when GitPython runs git commands through a shell or runs hook scripts using bash.exe without properly restricting the search path. Malicious executables named git.exe or bash.exe placed in a repository or working directory can be executed unintentionally. The vulnerability is a partial regression of CVE-2023-40590 and affects nbdime versions from 1.1.0 up to but not including 4.0.1_1. A fix is available in version 4.0.1_1. | GCVE Database | ||
| Medium | 6.7 | EPSS 0.7% | Medium6.7EPSS 0.7%GCVE Database FastMCP versions from 2.12.3 up to but not including 3.2.0 have a command injection vulnerability on Windows. This occurs when server names contain shell metacharacters such as '&' and are passed to the 'fastmcp install claude-code' or 'fastmcp install gemini-cli' commands. The vulnerability arises because these commands invoke Windows .cmd wrapper scripts via cmd.exe, which interprets metacharacters, allowing arbitrary command execution. This does not affect macOS or Linux, nor does it affect config-file-based install targets. The issue is fixed in version 3.2.0 by validating server names to reject shell metacharacters. | GCVE Database | ||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.9% | CVE-2026-73414ericcornelissen shescape · OS Command Injection Critical9.2EPSS 0.9%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-73414 Shescape is a simple shell escape library for JavaScript. Prior to 2.1.14 and 3.0.1, getEscapeFunction in src/internal/win/cmd.js does not escape `(` and `)` when applications use the escape or escapeAll APIs on Windows with shell set to cmd.exe, or with shell set to true when CMD is the default. An attacker-controlled argument can break out of a parenthesized CMD construct and inject shell syntax depending on the original command, resulting in arbitrary command execution. This issue is fixed in versions 2.1.14 and 3.0.1. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Critical | 9.2 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-72793siyuan · Insufficiently Protected Credentials Critical9.2EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-72793 **CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72793](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72793). ### Summary `/api/system/getConf` is registered with `CheckAuth` only and is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token, and anonymously when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. Its non-administrator masking chain is a blocklist that enumerates fields individually. Three fields that the configuration-export endpoint in the same file deliberately clears are absent from that blocklist and are returned to readers: | Field | JSON | What it is | Cleared by `exportConf` at | |---|---|---|---| | `Conf.CookieKey` | `cookieKey` | The session-cookie signing key | `kernel/api/system.go:360` | | `Conf.Export.PandocBin` | `export.pandocBin` | Absolute path embedding the OS username | `kernel/api/system.go:338` | | `Conf.NotebookCrypto` | `notebookCrypto` | Encrypted-notebook key material | `kernel/api/system.go:360` | The project has already classified all three as values that must not leave the server. The reader-facing path returns them. ### Details **Route.** `kernel/api/router.go:70` : `POST /api/system/getConf` → `model.CheckAuth` → `getConf`. No `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole`. **The masking chain, and what each stage covers.** `getConf` masks through `GetMaskedConf()` → `HideConfSecret()` (non-administrators) → `FilterConfByPublishIgnore()` (readers) → a browser-request path strip. - `GetMaskedConf`: `UserData`, `MCPOAuth`, `AccessAuthCode`. - `HideConfSecret`: `AI`, `Api`, `Flashcard`, `ServerAddrs`, `Publish`, `Repo`, `Sync`, `Secrets`, `Variables`, and the System paths. No reference to `CookieKey` or `Export.PandocBin`. - `FilterConfByPublishIgnore`: `UILayout` only. - Browser strip (`kernel/api/system.go:630-631`): System paths only. Each stage names fields explicitly, so any field nobody thought to add is returned by default. --- **1. `CookieKey`: the live session-signing key.** The value is passed straight into the session store at startup: ``` cli/cmd/serve.go:67 go server.Serve(false, model.Conf.CookieKey) kernel/server/serve.go:152 sessionStore = cookie.NewStore([]byte(cookieKey)) kernel/server/serve.go:159 ginServer.Use(sessions.Sessions("siyuan", sessionStore)) ``` `gin-contrib/sessions/cookie.NewStore` constructed with a single key uses that key as the `gorilla/securecookie` HMAC key. The `siyuan` session cookie is signed with the value this endpoint hands out, so an attacker holding it can mint and modify session cookies the server accepts as authentic. Escalating a forged session to administrator additionally requires the forged `SessionData` to carry the matching `AccessAuthCode` which *is* masked or the instance to have no access-auth code configured, which is a common deployment. The unconditional impact, present on every instance, is disclosure of a persistent cryptographic secret to an unauthenticated party. Rotating it invalidates every active session, so it cannot be quietly refreshed. --- **2. `Export.PandocBin`: bypasses a shipped privacy control.** The field is an absolute path that embeds the OS username by construction: ``` conf/export.go:35 PandocBin string `json:"pandocBin"` model/conf.go:430-431 if "" == Conf.Export.PandocBin { Conf.Export.PandocBin = util.PandocBinPath } util/pandoc.go:154 PandocBinPath = filepath.Join(tempPandocDir, "bin", "pandoc.exe") util/pandoc.go:134 tempPandocDir = filepath.Join(TempDir, "pandoc") util/working.go:359 TempDir = filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, "temp") util/working.go:312 defaultWorkspaceDir = filepath.Join(userProfile, "SiYuan") ``` → `C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\temp\pandoc\bin\pandoc.exe` This one is notable beyond the disclosure itself, because a control was shipped specifically to prevent it. `kernel/api/system.go:630` adds, for browser requests: ```go if util.IsBrowserRequest(c) { maskedConf.System.WorkspaceDir = "" maskedConf.System.AppDir = "" maskedConf.System.ConfDir = "" maskedConf.System.DataDir = "" maskedConf.System.HomeDir = "" } // 避免泄露用户名等敏感信息 ``` The comment states the goal plainly: avoid leaking the username and other sensitive information. The block enumerates only `System.*` and misses `Export.PandocBin`, which carries the same username through the same response. A publish reader is a browser request, so the System paths are blanked while `export.pandocBin` passes through intact. Where an administrator has configured a custom pandoc location, that path is disclosed instead still a filesystem-layout disclosure. --- **3. `NotebookCrypto`.** Encrypted-notebook key material is likewise absent from `HideConfSecret` while `exportConf` sets it to `nil`. Reported previously and included here only because it is the third instance of the same root cause; the fix below closes all three together. --- **The root cause is the blocklist itself.** `exportConf` (`kernel/api/system.go:299`) clones the configuration and clears each secret before | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (502c2aae77a471762612a5114d299651b7e75571d5c6d9dd5665a3dc2c503327) package.json declares a postinstall hook that executes a bundled Windows PE launcher (DakuMangalSingh\DakuMangalSingh.exe) at npm install time. The launcher is a jpackage wrapper that loads an embedded JAR named virus.jar containing classes Main, Executor, BatchExecutor, Fetch, RobotService (java.awt.Robot input synthesis), Screenshort (screen capture), and DeviceId (host fingerprinting) — the shape of a remote-command agent with screen-capture and input-synthesis capability. A bundled replicate.bat installs persistence by creating a shortcut to the dropped executable in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup so the payload auto-runs at every user logon. A cleanup.bat kills the process and recursively deletes the package folder, providing anti-forensics on the installer's host. Installing the package on Windows results in immediate arbitrary code execution, a persistent logon-triggered agent, and evidence-removal tooling — with no legitimate library functionality. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package dakumangalsingh_virus contains a 455 KB Windows PE64 executable named DakuMangalSingh.exe. The package itself does not execute the binary during installation or import, as no lifecycle scripts or entry points trigger it. However, if a user manually executes the binary on a Windows system, it may cause harm. The package self-identifies as a virus and lacks documentation or source code. Systems with this package installed should be considered fully compromised, and all secrets and keys should be rotated from a clean environment. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (dc1b76be1956e2772f73d7712934ee4a296d4407df590f6ca4225db7310de916) The package advertises itself as a dependency-free calendar/streak math library but ships a Linux x86_64 ELF at dist/internal/calc-math.dat. The main entry's top-level IIFE chmods 0755 and spawns this binary detached on any require()/import, under cover text 'Native accelerator loaded'. The ELF is a remote-controlled shell beaconing to hardcoded C2 217.60.77.63: it accepts remote commands and pipes them to /bin/sh and /bin/bash (arbitrary RCE on the installer's host), fetches second-stage ELF/shellcode over plain HTTP from http://217.60.77.63/Others/ and http://217.60.77.63/SC/ into /tmp or a memfd for chmod+exec, installs a systemd user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/svc-update.service (Description='System Update Service', ExecStart=/proc/self/exe, enabled via systemctl --user) for reboot-surviving persistence, and streams collected files (SSH keys, credentials, database finds, clipboard, downloads) to http://217.60.77.63/api/extract-receive as chunked POSTs tagged Loot_<host>_<date>. Behavior fires on import, requires no user interaction beyond installing the package, and grants the operator full interactive shell, dropper, persistence, and bulk file exfiltration on any host that installs or transitively depends on this package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f1234e3b7168d42083f0164bd35e94c2bde548891b63b0f33b2dbd53b65e40aa) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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